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Synopsis
The logical course of this work stands in a kind of correspondence 
with the very way in which Origen regards the reality of time, its origin 
and its perspectives. Thus the procedure in treating the problem is: 
reality before time; time proper; fundamental principles which 
determine the conception of time proper; certain aspects of function in 
time, which establish a certain character of it; the conception of 
eternal; the end of time and the visualization of the eschatological 
reality.
In chapter 1 we argue that Origen holds a notion of God Himself 
quite distinct from the conception of God as Creator. We argue that 
there is an ontological priority of the former notion not only to the 
latter, but also to any conception of God (such as Judge, Provident, etc.). 
This distinction is fundamental in order to rebut current views which 
employ the usual articulation typically attributed to Platonism: That is, 
the allegation that Origen cannot think of God without necessarily 
thinking of Him as Creator. The crucial point in this distinction is 
Origen’s conception of God’s w ill and how this w ill is exercised, 
namely the benevolent character of this w ill and its  freedom, which in 
the final analysis attributes to creation a contingent and not any 
necessary character.
As our purpose, in this chapter, is to clarify where time exists 
and time does not exist, and since time is defined in close relation to 
the world, i t  has been necassary to treat Origen’s conception of 
creation. There is an enormous number of scholars who have to be 
rebutted -but not an equally vast number of views.
Thus, a vast number of scholars attribute to Origen a Neoplatonic 
conception of the world and its relation to God. If they touch on the 
problem at all, these interpreters normally accept that Origen held that 
the divine reality is a timeless one. But they concede this notion in a 
general context of regarding Origen as a Platonist and Neoplatonist.
Others (such as P. Plass) attribute to him a kind of "sacred time" 
which stands in an undetermined extent between God and men. They, too, 
regard Origen as a Neoplatonist. But since the Neoplatonic world-picture 
is one of continuity from higher to lower levels of reality, such scholars 
cannot actually make any clear affirmation as to where this "sacred 
time" exists and where i t  does not exist. This is due to their failure to 
grasp Origen’s world-picture and his conception of the relation between 
God and the world -conceptions which are quite different from the 
respective Neoplatonic ones.
We argue that Origen held that the divine reality is timeless and 
the world is temporal. But this notion of timelessness in Origen’s 
thought has nothing to do with either the Platonic dialectics or the 
Neoplatonic world-picture. Any resemblance to Platonism is both 
superficial and coincidental nor does it  constitute any essential 
dependence of Origen’s thought on Platonism. Furthermore, the 
conception and definition of ataiv in Origen constitutes a radical break 
with Platonism -a point on which we elaborate later on. Besides, by the 
term "world", i t  is not human beings only, but rational creatures in 
general that are suggested. For the main distinction in Origen’s theology 
is not God-men but God-rational creatures living in various particular 
spaces which comprise the one, single, world. This world is entirely 
material and regarded as separated from God by a radical hiatus, mainly 
portrayed in terms of space and time and expressed through the 
articulation of the world being out of God, or being down We argue, 
therefore, that Origen’s world-picture is not the Platonic or Neoplatonic
one and we devote an entire section in order to rebut the most 
entrenched among all the erroneous allegations about Origen’sviews:
That is, to rebut the myth that Origen held a doctrine such as the)
so-called “eternity of creation”. This is the last section of chapter 1, 
and all the preceeding analyses in that chapter have a beating on it.
Having seen the extent of timelessness and time (and rebutted any 
notion of “sacred time"), we then examine time proper in chapter 2 In 
the firs t section we expound all those elements which constitute the 
essence of time proper. Further, we examine fundamental conceptions 
which are closely related to time proper, namely prolongation of time 
and causality. Although it  cannot be sustained that they pertain to the 
essence of time, they nevertheless determine the conception of it  so 
decisively that if, hypothetically, they were taken away, then one would 
have to speak about another conception of time -entirely different from 
that of Origen’s and indeed very close to that of certain Greek schools of 
thought.
As Origen's fundamental conception of time as Stdazrjfjo 
(extension) is of Stoic origin, we expound the terms which essentially 
determine Origen’s conception of time and compare their content with 
that which they had in the Stoics. Thus the radical transformations, 
which he established in the conception of the problem from a Christian 
point of view, become apparent. Similarly, we show how radically 
different is his conception of time as Sidazamg (dimension) from the 
Neoplatonic one.
In this chapter we have the opportunity to provide answers to 
long-standing questions. Thus we prove that it  was Origen’s views which 
constitute Augustine’s source of theory of time -a question which 
hitherto has been regarded as a "difficult question" (H.l. Marrou, 1949). 
We rebut J. Callahan’s assertion (1958) that Augustine’s source was 
Basil of Caesarea (although Callahan admitts that i t  is a "difficult
question" and a "mystery" how Augustine would have read Basil, who was 
not translated in Latin). We show that Basil only repeated Origen’s own 
words on the problem of time proper. R. Sorabji (1983) recognizes the 
problem, he speculates a source some later Aristotelians but (due to 
Augustine’s slowness in reading Greek) he says that he cannot suggest it  
as an answer. Therefore, we show the large extent to which Augustine is 
indebted to Origen’s conception of time. And further, that the 
terminology established by him excerted a decisive influence upon a vast 
number of Christian writers in the ensuing centuries. We also show that 
when they did not follow Origen’s views entirely, (such as Gregory of 
Nazianzus and John of Damascus in the definition of m m ), they came 
close to Platonic conceptions, albeit Origen had already established an 
inspired break with Platonism on this point. The same happened with 
Augustine, who came close to Neoplatonism since (for one reason or 
another) he was unable to follow Origen’s conception of time as a 
dimension all the way. Further, we argue (against R. Sorabji) that it  
was not Philoponous but Origen who argued that the world must have a 
beginning, using the notion of in fin ite  in his arguments. We also rebut 
the same author who attributes Origen’s articulations about divine 
reality to Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Philoponous -much more because, 
in one case, he regards Gregory's echoing of Origen’s views as an 
"answer" of Gregory to Origen. Besides, we adduce the necessary 
evidence in order to eliminate the present confusion as to whether or 
not the Stoics held that only what is fin ite  is knowable. We show that 
they did -but not on the evidence which R.T. Wallis adduces, which 
proves nothing of the sort, creates confusion and is currently reasonably 
challenged. However, we argue that Origen’s conception of the relation 
of what is finite and what is knowable had nothing to do with the Stoic 
argumentation, as i t  has falsely been asserted hitherto.
Having seen Origen’s view of time proper as well as fundamental
principles which determine the conception of it, we go ahead with the 
enquiry of certain functions in  time, which establish a certain 
character of it. This is the subject discussed in chapter 3. The 
conceptions of prolongation of time and causality raise the question of 
the existence of human being throughout an aeon. We enquire in the event 
of Incarnation of Christ and its significance in Origen’s thought; that is, 
we examine how decisive this event is deemed in forming a theology of 
history, -by ’’history’’ meaning the origin and ultimate perspectives of 
the entire world -and not only of human beings. How the function of 
prophecy is perceived and what is the actual significance of kairos 
(quite different from some modern accounts of it) -these are questions, 
the treatment of which renders the character of Origen’s time a 
teleoiogical and, nontheless, a dramatic one.
We have entitled chapter 4 as Time and the notion o f eternal", 
deliberately avoiding to use the term "eternity". Not only because this 
non-scriptural term is not used by Origen, but mainly because the notion 
of eternal is attributed to no less than three different realities. It is 
one thing to speak of "eternal God", but i t  is quite another to speak of 
"eternal life" and to speak of "eternal death" alludes to a completely 
different, namely a third, reality. The term eternal is a homonym, 
namely i t  is a word used to denote different realities. As we stress in 
the Introduction, the significance of homonyms is of utmost significance 
in studying Origen's thought. Many miscomprehensions of his thought are 
due to failure to grasp this crucial aspect of his thought hitherto, 
although Origen himself emphasizes the significance of "clarifying the 
homonyms" (namely discerning and pointing out the different conceptions 
denoted by one and the same term) and he himself did so quite diligently 
in interpreting scripture. As the question of the divine reality was 
treated right from the beginning of this work, namely in chapter 1, what 
we examine in chapter 4 is Origen’s conception of the realities denoted
by the expressions "eternal life" and "eternal death". We argue that 
unless this distinction of different realities, predicated by one and the 
same word (namely eternal), is made, then Origen’s views are bound to 
be misunderstood. This has happened with a vast number of scholars who 
make the misleading generalization and speak about a vague notion of 
"eternity" in Origen.
)
In treating this question, we give an account of the real 
existential status in either of these realities and show the radical 
differences of both Origen’s dialectics and conception of the very reality 
from respective conceptions in Platonism, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism. 
From these analyses, the spatio-temporal character of Origen’s thought 
emerges and the decisive role of time in the entire world-process 
becomes apparent too.
The analyses up to this point already show the intense 
eschatological character of Origen’s thought, against opposite 
allegations of a vast number of scholars mentioned in due course. The 
very teleological character of time is determined by the fact that the 
world is directed towards an end. The actual meaning of this end is 
enquired in chapter 5. We discuss how Origen comprehends the reality ir, 
the end of time as well as the reality ensuing, so to speak, this end. 
What is the final destination of what came into being out of non-being 
out of God’s benevolent decision? How w ill the end be reached and why 
w ill time reach an end, in the sense of termination? We discuss these 
problems into that section, in an enquiry from which the raison d' etre 
of time arises; and the final eschatological reality is portrayed to the 
extent that i t  is possible.
We assert that what Origen regards as having come into being out 
of non-being w ill not pass away. We consider certain views about 
various kinds of eschatology and make some remarks (though not a full 
assessment) about the simplistic criteria established in order to
classify and discern what is ■■Greek*’ and what is ’’Hebrew’’. We argue that 
Origen’s eschatology is beyond such criteria, as his eschatology contains 
both rectification of the world and consummation of nature. We finally 
argue that Origen’s conception of time is profoundly determined by a 
fact which does not exist either in Greek or Hebraic thought, namely the 
historical fact of the incarnation of Christ and its crucial eschatological 
implications. And we conclude that the constant eschatological 
orientation of Origen’s thought is vividly present in his conception of 
time, too.
Introduction
There is a remarkable difference in how space, on the one hand, 
and time, on the other, have been treated. In the dawn of Greek 
philosophy (the dawn of philosophy in general) the Presocratic 
philosophers regarded the reality of tpumg as an unquestionable datum. 
They sought to discover the permanent principles behind the <paivo|ieva 
but no one put the very existence of space proper in question. Thus the 
Euclidean conception of space encountered virtually no controversy 
throughout its historical life. In fact this conception of space endured 
for more than two thousand years.
By contrast, the question of time has received a vast variety of 
considerations and i t  has been a matter of controversy since antiquity 
-a controversy which is s till going on. Parmenides’ denial that sucession 
is real, established the firs t radical doubt about the very existence of 
time. This doubt never ceased to tantalize philosophers eversince until 
our day. This is quite understandable even by common experience. Space 
constitutes a concrete sensory tangible reality. In spite of the fact that 
the world is an obviously temporal reality, time proper is an evasive 
conception and meditation upon it  demands introspective experience, 
recollection -in short, i t  demands abstractions far more elusive than the 
notion of space does. Space is available to the most immediate 
experience (or, so i t  was thought to be), namely sight -time appears as 
a reality apprehended subsequently to space. This fact has led to 
reflection on time through nontemporal features and mainly to the 
’’spatialization of time” -an illustration which was established as a 
persistent intellectual tradition and is nontheless responsible for many 
of the miscomprehensions of time proper and its nature. This tendency 
began with the observation of the periodicity of motions of heavenly 
bodies; i t  went on with the correlation of time to spatial motion and
eventually time in itself was spatialized and thus altogether eliminated 
Quite rightly Bergson, almost a hunderd years ago, pointed out that i f  we 
try to conceive time as a static geometrical line, we are really thinking 
of space.1
Thus the conceptualization of space and things proved to be far 
more steadfast than that of time. As the conception of space went 
virtually unchallenged right through centuries, i t  provided a sufficient 
philosophical base, which played a decisive role in the growth of 
natural sciences. On the other hand, however, the non-commensurate 
developement (or, at least, general acceptance) of a sound philosophical 
ground and understanding of the nature of time played its  part in a 
non-equivalent development of the understanding of man and society. 
Great thinkers, especially religious ones, offered their accounts on the 
nature and meaning of time. The historical failure, however, lies either 
in the fact that they were neglected, even by those whom they were 
addressed to, or they were not properly understood. Yet i t  is primarily 
the conception of time which profoundly affects a philosophy of history 
and, in the final analysis, all the aspects and manifestations of human 
being in its temporal course. The most elementary manifestations of life  
involve the notion of time. The very notion of experience involves the 
distinction between past, present and future. Even the sense of to be, as 
an individual, as well as the personal opinion about it, is based upon a 
certain understanding and evaluation of the historical process.
It was not meant to be so, it  was not even realized that the 
problem of time was directed to such a "spatialized” way of 
apprehension, yet the fact is that this evolution persisted since 
Parmenides and Zeno until the twentieth century. Certainly i t  was not 
accidental. For no philosopher devoted his reflection to the question of 
time exclusively -this was just a part of his conception of reality as a 
whole. Hence, how time was viewed became an infallible indicator of
fundamental orientations of a philosophy. For such a view is not just an 
accidental by-product of a physical or metaphysical system or doctrine 
proposed by a philosopher or by a school of thought. On the contrary, it  
is an essential part, an expressive manifestation of the gist of a 
perception of reality as a whole and of the attitude towards this reality.
This is the reason, because of which it  is reasonable to expect 
that a certain conception of time can suggest significant conclusions 
about an overall philosophical attitude respective to this. As the concept 
of time is a pivotal one into a general existential attitude, such a study 
may further enlighten other facets of a philosophy. Crucial conceptions, 
such as cosmological, antrhopological, eschatological, the attitude to 
death, moral ideas -all are directly involved and interwoven with how 
time is perceived and what its meaning is fe lt ( if not consciously known 
) to be. For, in fact, the notion of time constitutes the spine of an entire 
philosophy and it  thoroughly imbues all the premises of an existential 
attitude.
Hence, how thinkers conceive of time as well as the manner in 
which they portray their perception of it, stands in agreement with 
their overall conception of reality. The concept of time is of necessity 
in harmony with their fundamental philosophical premises, their 
conception of being as a whole as well as with their methods and 
dialectics of investigation of philosophical problems.
In view of this fact, the attitude of thinkers towards the notion of 
time is highly indicative of their general philosophical orientation. For 
i t  is not only their general philosophical tendency that determines the 
conception of time. But also, a certain view of time plays a decisive role 
in the formation of a general philosophical stance. Thus the very 
conception of time brings one to the core of a philosopher’s ideas. How 
to live, what, if  any, is the purpose of individual existence, how to face 
death, what might constitute the content of a possible hope, are notions
bound with time; how, if  at all, God is conceived of; the perception of 
the world, its  purpose, if  any; whether or not the world was created and 
all the temporal implications that the notion of creation entails, are 
bound with the very conception of time, too. This close connexion of 
one’s general view of reality to his conception of time decisively forms 
his ideas of the future, namely his expectations and the overall 
visualization of things in the time to come. For i t  is mainly the concern 
for the future that affects an existential attitude. For example, no one 
feels fear in thinking that he did not exist before he was born -on the 
contrary, this thought rather brings about a feeling of unexplainable 
safety. But the awe at the idea of future non-existence is not unusual. 
In fact such a horror is only one facet of the fear of death.
Beyond these general considerations, however, there are special 
reasons which render the study Origen’s conception of time necessary. 
For the Alexandrian’s thought has been a point of intense, and frequently 
tempestuous, controversy,2 a controversy since the fourth century until 
our day. We may, therefore, expect that a definition and elucidation of 
his conception of time may provide clarifications, as well as elimination 
of miscomprehensions, of other crucial facets of his highly 
controversial theology3 -especially with respect to his cosmology and 
eschatology.
The criticism directed against Origen varies. The best case is to 
regard him as the thinker who brought closely together Greek thought 
and the emerging religion of Christianity.4 A midway stance is the 
assertion that he was restricted by the church tradition and the bible 
-but only to the extent that they did not contradict his own ideas.5 A 
more extreme opinion is that Origen was but a Platonist who did nothing 
more than articulating a mingling of Platonic and Plotinian thought in 
biblical terms.6 At any rate, the criticism is that he was responsible for 
a "Henenization” of Christianity. In this context he is considered as a
kind of Christian "Gnostic”, in as much as Gnosticism is regarded as an 
"extreme hellenization" of Christianity.
To deal with this question in general is beyond our scope, since 
our purpose here is to ponder upon Origen’s conception of time. However, 
this criticism, in its various degrees of moderation or extremity, w ill 
be extensively discussed in as much as it  is related to aspects of his 
thought pertaining to his view of time.
The birthplace of Origen, Alexandria, was where a number of 
different streams of thought were converging. Greek-Hellenistic schools, 
Hebrews, Christians and exponents of various oriental cults encountered 
each other -all these at a time when the Roman Empire was in a most 
powerful period of its history. Controversies, disputes, syncretism, 
eclecticism, allowed the flourishing of schools of thought such as the 
Judaeo-Hellenistic thought and Gnosticism in a Christian garment.
Origen found himself in the midst of this variety of religious, 
philosophical and existential attitudes. What is quite significant at this 
stage, however, is to consider this famous "Greek" background which 
allegedly has profoundly influenced him to a degree which was regarded 
as an unforgiveable deviation from the Christian orthodoxy. We should 
therefore make a survey of the various conceptions of time. Following 
this, one might be able to judge whether Origen formed his conception of 
time under the influence of or in contrast to his surroundings. Such a 
survey becomes much more necessary in view of the fact that Origen’s 
works show that he was well aware of the various streams of thought 
converging in Alexandria. Despite the controversy surrounding him, his 
erudition has never been put in question. On the contrary, this has quite 
often been regarded as his crime, as i t  sustained that this was the cause 
for him to "hellenize" Christianity.
Taking the "hellenic" background firs t, i t  should be noted that i t  is 
a favorite generalization of scholars to speak of "Greek" conception of
time as if  there was only one view of it. The fact is, however, that 
there were serious differences and nontheless intense controversy 
among the various Greek philosophical schools. At this point we shall 
examine what constitutes the "Greek tradition" as regards the question 
of time.
In spite of erroneous allegations about the contrary,7 the Greeks 
did employ time, too, as a frame for their thought-form. Already in the 
seventh century BC, Hesiod articulated in form of poetry the myth of 
five races of men: The firs t, the golden race, lived in the original 
blessed age in which earth of itself produced rich harvests and men 
were as gods. Then followed the silver race, the copper race, the race of 
Heroes and the iron race.8 Through such a mystic and mythological 
manner, using the medium of allegoric or metaphoric imagery, many 
ancient Greeks provided their accounts of the question of time, 
expressed in terms of problems of beginning, becoming, enduring and 
ceasing.9 The Presocratic philosophers, too, touched upon the problem of 
time in that unique poetic-philosophical way in which they articulated 
their conception of reality. Anaximander,10 Anaximenes,11 Heracletus of 
Ephesus,12 Anaxagoras,13 Empedocles,14 deal with problems in which the 
question of time is a central one; cyclic destructions, regenerations, 
infinity of (successive or co-existing) worlds, world-periods, etc. The 
Pythagoreans made a serious attempt to deal with the question of time 
as such. Stobaeus15 adduces the testimony that Philolaus deals with the 
beginninglessness and endlessness of the universe and Aristotle provides 
information about the views of Pythagorean Alcmaeon16 as well as of the 
Pythagorean Paron17 on time, which they consider as infinite; they point 
out that "before" and "after" make sense only in time, whereas eternity 
is a timeless perpetual "now".
Plato’s views of time have enjoyed a special interest, especially 
because of the mythological (and, thus, ambiguous) character in which he
deliberately articulated his views, as well as because of the special 
attention Christian theologians paid to his assertions on the question.
To Plato, time proper, is something continuous and thus beyond the 
possibility of conceptual definition. To speak about ■"moment" is but a 
product of abstract reasoning; "moment" in itself is not actually time 
and i t  does not really exist;18 for i f  i t  existed, time would become 
static and the content of time would include the possibility of rest 
without motion and change. Time is not an aggregate of static "nows" and 
is inherently related to change and motion. There can be no motion 
without time.19 Thus time -motion -change are so closely connected that 
they cannot be understood independently from each other. This means 
that there is no time without motion and change; subsequently, whatever 
is temporal is subject to motion and change. Plato rejects the possibility 
of human comprehension of notions such as "beginning" or "end" of time.20 
Even the fact that God created time cannot be fully grasped but one can 
only have a vague idea of such a notion21 -albeit he definitely repudiates 
the notion that time is without beginning. Aristotle singles Plato out 
stating that, with the exception of Plato, all philosophers are in 
agreement that time is uncreated.22 But this "creation" means nothing 
more than that time appeared with the order which was set on the 
pre-existing "original matter". For Plato, in tune with the general 
tradition of his day, rejects the idea of creation out of nothing. This 
should be regarded as a question needing some further discussion since 
i t  is Plato who, elswhere, speaks of the "countless ages of the past".23 
Besides, he holds that Being and action, namely the true existence and 
its creative act, being and function, are synonymous.24 God’s perfection 
always compels him to act25 and he cannot be conceived of as being in 
the timeless eternity without exercising his creative ability. So it  is 
beyond human comprehensive ability to conceive what God did "before" he 
created the universe - i f  such a question can make sense. For i t  is not
absolutely clear i f  Plato actually held a temporal beginning of the 
world.26
Even though, he denied the existence of time in the original chaos, 
since time is denied to the irregular and, therefore, to the irrational 
motion of the chaos.27 At any rate, he articulates the time’s coming into 
being in the celebrated passage in Timaeus:
"... when God the Father and creator saw the creature ... the 
created image ... He rejoiced ... and determined to make a copy ... like the 
original ... But to bestow the attribute (of the eternal) in its fullness 
upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving 
image of eternity. And when he set in order the heavens, he made this 
image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself 
rests in unity. And this image we call time.’’.28 "Time, then, and the 
heavens came into being at the same instant in order that, having being 
created together, if  there was ever to be a dissolution of them, they 
might be dissolved together. It (sc. time) was framed after the pattern 
of the eternal nature, in order that i t  might resemble this as much as 
possible. For the pattern exists from eternity, and the created heaven 
has been, is, and w ill be, in all time. Such was the mind and thought of 
God when he created time.’’.29
Aristotle treated the problem of time facing a vast extent of 
questions which are related to it.30 At the outset he states that time 
could not be without change or motion31 because it  is only through the 
different stages of motion or change within our mind that we are able to 
conceive of time.32 Although "fast" and "slow" are defined by time, time 
proper is something constant, because time is not defined by time.33 
Hence although time is something related to motion or change34 is in 
itself is something fundamentally different from motion and change 
proper.35
Thus time is a number or measure of motion ( K iv r ja e u g  apiSpog)36
as well as the "number" (api9jjog) of motion with respect to our 
distinction between the "before" and the "after".37 As "everything that 
moves is in time"38 and i t  is time which marks motion39 "time is what is 
counted and not that with which we count".40
Hence, to Aristotle time is but a number; therefore to be "in time" 
means that something is counted or measured by time.41 Time in itself 
is continuous since i t  is an attribute of what is continuous, namely the 
number of motion42 - i t  is a single, infinite and uniform "continuum".43
Time is uncreated and i t  is infinite both in respect of its 
divisibility and its extremities.44 Thus time has a uniformity of nature 
and "continues through its entire duration inalienably and without 
modification";45 it  is always what i t  is, i t  is not "in" time and it  is not 
contained by time or measured by time or affected by time.46 Time is 
the everlasting duration itself.
Of the immediate disciples of Plato i t  was Haestiaeus of Perinthus 
(of the so-caledd old Academy) who fully abided by his master’s 
allegorical definition of time and avers that "time is the course of the 
heavenly bodies in their relation to one another".47 Speussippus, 
however, seems to follow Aristotle as he defines time "the quantity 
within motion" ( to  ev Ktvfjaei noaov).48 Accordingly, Xenocrates defines 
time as "the measure of what has been created as well as everlasting 
motion" Qisxpov xuiv gevvqxwv Kai Kivqaiv atSiov)49 which maintains the 
Platonic definition of time as "motion" but also is in line with the 
Aristotelian view of time as "number".
On the other hand, the followers of Aristotle, the Peripatetics, did 
abide by their master’s definiton of time50 -perhaps because it  was not 
allegorical, more concrete and had a scientific character not susceptible 
of much controversy and different interpretations, as happened with 
Plato’s views. Thus Theophrastus defends the notion of a universe 
without beginning or end and similar views were exposed by Eudemus of
Rhodes and Dicaearchus of Messina. It was Strato of Lampsacus, 
however, who expounded his own views of time is a special treatise 
challenging the Aristotelian definition of time in terms of number or 
motion as unsatisfasctory i f  not erroneus. He defines time as "the 
quantity in all action" (to sv xaCg npa§eai noaov)51 and "the quantity of 
everything that is in motion and at rest" (to sv Kivfjosi kcu qpepia 
noaov)52 and "fiexpov Kivrjaeajg m i fiovrjg)53
This notion of "rest" is particularly interesting as i t  was on this 
that Plotinus grounded his arguments against the connexion of time with 
motion.
As regards the Stoic definiton of time, their fundamental notion is 
that time is an "extension" (SidaTqjia). This definition of time has 
enjoyed litt le  attention. It has also been inadequately comprehended. 
Some, like J. Rist,54 appear uncertain as to whether the Stoic definition 
of time should be regarded nearer to that of Plato’s or Aristotle’s. A. 
Chroust thinks that he needs but an extremely short discussion in order 
to conclude that the Stoic definition of time actually was but an echo of 
the Aristotelian one.55
The Stoic views on the question are to play a significant part in 
our exposition of Origen’s conception of time and w ill be discussed in 
chapter 2 together with Origen’s own views. At this point, however, we 
need to make clear that the Stoic conception of time was a th ird  one 
and quite independent from that of either Plato’s or Aristotle’s.
What Zeno held about time can be found in a passage which reads 
as follows: "And Zeno has said that time is an extension of motion 
(Ktvrjaeiijg 6iaaTT]pa) and the criterion of fastness and slowness. And i t  is 
in time (koto toutov) that events occur and everything that becomes and 
all beings are.’’56 Also, in another passage it  is stated that "...from the 
Stoics, Zeno (i.e. says) that time is merely the extension of every 
motion." (naaqg anflaig Kivrjaeug SidaTrjpa).57
Chryssippus defines time as the "extension of the motion of the 
world"58 This is certainly a more specific definition of time, compared 
to that of Zeno's. However we do not see why this view of Chryssippus 
should be considered as introducing an essential modification of Zeno’s 
view59 For Zeno’s original conception of time as an "extension" remains 
here unchangeable and it  is the core of Chryssippus’ conception of time, 
too. Besides, there is at least one passage where Chryssippus’ view is 
cited in disjunction or as an explanatory one to that of Zeno’s: "And 
Chryssippus [says] that time is the extension of motion (Ktvfjoeiug 
S id o iq p a) and this is why i t  sometimes is said to be the measure of 
fastness or slowness; or [time] is the extension which closely attends 
the motion of the world and [it is said that] i t  is in time that everything 
is moving as well as being’’.60
J.HRist considers that this definition in terms of its  letter may 
be nearer to Aristotle (who defined time as the measure or number of 
motion) but i t  is not impossible that the spirit of this definition be 
more related to that of Plato (who considered time as the moving image 
of eternity).61
We, however, do not see why the Stoic conception and definition of 
time should by all means be regarded as related either to that of 
Aristotle’s or of Plato’s. What we assert is that Zeno’s conception is 
clearly a third view, at least in this respect: Platonic definition of time 
is undoubtedly a metaphysical as well as a theological one, while that of 
Aristotle’s is a scientific and mathematical one. Zeno, however, neither 
regards time as something related to metaphysics in any way (for he 
was a materialist Stoic) nor does he consider time as an intellectual 
mathematical perception, namely as a "number". Although he avers that 
time amy be "and a criterion of fastness and slowness" he is clear in 
fundamentally considering time as an extension. Thus he associates time 
with a natural reality (namely, motion) regarding time as a natural
reality, too, namely as a sort of extension which is indispensable for 
motion to take place and to make sense. In his view, therefore, time is 
in neither an "image" of a metaphysical reality, nor is i t  a mathematical 
conception, namely "number". Time is a sort of natural "extension".
The Platonic definition of time is gounded on a fundamental 
premise, namely the notion of transcendence. Whatever the 
interpretation of Timaeus at this point may be, there is one fact which 
cannot be disputed: The main point which Plato wished to make in his 
definition of time is the s im ila rity  of time to eternity -which, in the 
final analysis, implies the dependence of the temporal to the eternal, 
the dependence of the image to the archetype. If Plato’s views on the 
question of "beginning" of the universe are somewhat vague and 
surrounded by controversy, i t  is because he directed his main attention 
not to the problem of "beginning", but to the point that the cosmos is 
originated and dependent on an absolute and supreme transcendent cause. 
This is the main point expressed through the allegorical statements in 
Timaeus. If one would discern some contradictions in the statements of 
Plato concerning the notion of "beginning",62 this is due to Plato’s main 
concern not with the notion of "beginning" but with that of dependence of 
the world on an supreme absolute transcendent cause.
This whole background and dialectics are totally alien to the Stoic 
thought. For to them no notion of transcendence makes any sense and 
they firm ly stick to the materiality of the world which is regarded as 
the "whole" (to  oflov^3 -with nothing existing beyond the world. So the 
spirit of the Stoic definition of time can have nothing in common with 
the views of Plato on time.
On the other hand, the seeming similarity of of the Stoic 
definition to the Aristotelian one does not actually suggest any affinity 
between them at all.
When Aristotle defines time as a "number" or "measure" of motion,
i t  follows that time could not exist as a "number" i f  there were no soul 
at all. On this point Aristotle is quite explicit. If there is no one to 
count, then there can be nothing to be counted -thus there could be no 
"number".54 For it  is only soul which is qualified to count. Without soul 
there is only motion -and if  there is only motion without any possibility 
of "counting", then his definition actually falls. In Aristotle's definition 
of time there are two fundamental premises: First, the motion or 
change; secondly, the soul, who is the counting agent and renders a 
meaning upon "number". Thus this definition of time stands only if  there 
are those two presuppositions, namely the moving (or changing) object 
and the counting intelligent subject. In fact, as Aristotle held the 
everlastingness of the world, this point raised no problems to his 
theory of time.65
In Aristotle, therefore, what is of absolute ontological priority 
with respect to time is m otion. By contrast, for the Stoics the main 
ontological predicate of time is extension. Time would be regarded also 
as a "measure", but this is just an additional property of time. This 
means that i f  time is not regarded as a "measure" and i f  there is no one 
to "count" it, the Stoic definition of time does not fall -as i t  happens 
with the Aristotelian one. What stands in the background of this 
substantial difference is the Stoic doctrine of cosmic periods.
The Stoics, as well as Aristotle, held that time is one and i t  is a 
continuum. If the Stoics held time proper to be fundamentally defined as 
"number" then the end of each cosmic period could mean the end of time 
and the beginning of another time. This is clearly rejected by them. For 
they all, especially Chryssippus, are quite explicit that each new world 
begins and ends with a cosmic catastrophe, but time does not.66
Time is one, i t  is without beginning and indeed is a continuum 
infinite in both directions. If time proper was defined as the number of 
the wordly (and thus: orderly, since there can be no number of motion in
disorder) motion, this could entail that this world is without beginning 
or end -an idea held by Aristotle but totally unacceptable to the Stoics. 
Besides, in a general conflagration there are not souls to "count" motion 
-and yet time does exist and his continuity is maintained, too.
This analysis means that if  the Stoics accepted the Aristotelian 
definition of time, then fundamental pressupositions of their philosophy 
(like that of the cosmic periods) would have no adequate ground. In 
short, the Aristotelian definition of time is essentially incompatible 
with fundamental Stoic doctrines. This is why time is in principle 
defined as an extension -a definition which can defy Aristotle's denial 
of successive worlds and it  does not necessarily presuppose an 
intelligent subject to "count" time. To the Stoics, time may be regarded 
as a "measure" not because time itself is a "number", but because motion 
takes place in  time, namely in the extension which in itse lf is time 
proper. For i t  is not number, but extension what constitutes the 
fundamental ontological definition of time proper. Thus the occurence of 
a cosmic catastrophe, which marks the end of a world and the beginning 
of the next, and the subsequent absence of an orderly motion, as well as 
of an intelligent subject capable of counting motion, does not put the 
Stoic definition of time in any question whatsoever. And this happens due 
to the fact that the Stoic definition of time is radically different from 
that of Aristotle's.
Hence, i t  is clear that the Stoic view of time, with respect to 
these of Plato's and Aristotle's, is a th ird  definition of time which is 
quite independent from either the Platonic or the Aristotelian one. Later 
i t  was Proclus who pointed out that the Stoic view is actually different 
from the views of time of either of Plato or of the Peripatetics.67
There is, therefore, a Stoic tradition on the conception of time 
(namely, on the particular question of what is  time proper) which 
stands beside the Platonic and Aristotelian views, being independent
from them.
As regards the Epicurean attitude to the problem of time we shall 
only shortly state that they generally were influenced by the 
Aristotelian view of it. They regarded time as a “symptom accompanying 
things in motion" Caupnxojpa xouxo 6* eaxf napaKoaou9T]pa Kivfjaeiuv),58 
namely it  is a concomitant of motion. In view of Origen’s disdain for 
Epicurean thought and attitude, there is no need to discuss this question 
further.
Approaching the second and firs t centuries BC i t  was a general 
symptom of the era to seek refuge to eclectism, mainly from Plato, 
Aristotle and the Stoics. This happened with the question of time, too. 
Thus in thinkers such as Carneades (of the Middle Academy), Panaetius 
and Posidonius, there is an apparent eclectisism and syncretism on the 
question of time. On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus developes a whole 
series of arguments in order to prove the unreality (avunooxaxog) of 
time.69 Finally, Marcus Aurelius did not regard time as a "scientific" but 
as a moral problem, as we discuss in chapter 2. It was the era when the 
historical period of scientific inspiration and offer had run out, and the 
main human desire was not for knowledge but for salvation7°
In fact, the Gnostic attitude towards time is inspired not by the 
desire to acquire a scientific knowledge of it, but to be "emancipated" 
from it. According to their overall hostile attitude towards the world, 
which they regarded as evil, they seek salvation not in  time but frorr. 
time. Regarding the being-in-the-world as a "fallen state" from an 
original state of freedom, their attitude to time is inspired by the 
nostalgia of a lost freedom. They detest time, the seek to shatter i t  
because it  is a means for their being in slavery and servitude.71 So their 
tendency is to annul it  and to deny i t  as a "lie" or, at least, to surpass 
it. The Gnostic mind is trying to escape the worldly reality through a 
mythological thought. In this thought, atemporality and temporality are
mingled together, as the Gnostic tries to achieve a personal 
“resurrection" and "perfection" not through a process in time but rather 
through a mystic experience.
Our reference to the Plotinus’ conception of time w ill be brief, 
mainly for two reasons: First, Plotinus was twenty years younger than 
Origen; so one could hardly say that the former’s views constitute a 
background for the latter. Such an assertion would be made only in the 
event that Plotinus' views were current or anticipated before him and 
all he did was to systematize them in the Enneads. But there is nothing 
which would put Plotinus’ originality (within the context of his 
Platonism, of course) in question whatsoever. Secondly, we shall refer 
to certain aspects of Plotinus’ view of time in chapter 2, in order to 
compare the Neoplatonic thought to that of Origen’s and to show how 
radical were the transformations which Origen made in order to 
establish a Christian view of time.
Hence, at this point, we shall make only a brief reference to 
Plotinus’ view of time. In fact Plotinus exercised a severe criticism 
against both Aristotle and the Stoics. He rejected the definition of time 
as a "number", and the Stoic definition of time as "extension" seemed to 
him as not to be touching the problem of time proper. His argument was 
that one would never find what time proper is by counting it. On the 
other hand, the Stoic assertion that time is an extension seemed to him 
as a tautology, as time was defined by a predicate (namely Sidoxqjja) 
which was not defined in itself. To him time is ontologically defined a 
life  -the life  of the Soul in the motion by which it  changes from one 
phase of life  to another.72 So time, as well as the motions of the 
physical world, are defined in terms of the life  and the motions within 
the Soul as such. The Soul partakes both of the spiritual world and of 
the material world73 and it  is itself that produces both time and the 
physical world. Thus all physical motion is "in time", but the motions
(namely the life) of the Soul itself are not in time.74 Time originates 
through the desire of the Soul to translate into physical reality what it 
had visualized in the purely spiritual world.75 So the Soul generates 
time within itself as an image of eternity primarily for itself, but 
subsequently for the physical world as such.76 Thus the Platonic notion 
of time as an "image" is maintained; the notion that time "moves" is 
maintained in a sense; for time is regarded as "a state of the Soul 
consisting of alternating motions from one sphere of life  to another".77 
To Plotinus, however, the main ontological definiton of time is that 
time in itself is life .
Besides this tradition of the various Greek conceptions of time, 
there was the biblical view of it. Whether a certain Hebraic conception 
of time actually existed or not is a moot question on which we make 
some suggestions is chapters 4 and 5. What is definite is that the 
Hebrews have never dealt with the problem of time proper and there are 
no works devoted to the discussion of this question. What existed was 
the intense orientation towards the future and the expectation of the 
fulfilment of the divine promises as stated in the Old Testament.
Christianity, being primarily a religion of salvation78 establishes 
a mode of thought according to which the prime concern is directed 
towards future -the infinite future time. This existential attitude is 
found throughout the Bible after the meaning it  acquired with the New 
Testament. However, the question of time proper was not treated in a 
way that one would speak of a "tradition" which reached Origen with 
respect to this particular point. The exception was Tatian who proposed 
that time itself is static and does not move nor change; all the notions 
about a temporal flux are but a subjective impression which is based on 
the deception that i t  is time that moves. What he suggests is that i t  is 
not time that moves, but human beings who move through time. The 
feeling that time moves, which produces the notions of temporal motion
of change, is a fallacious imagery similar to that of those who are 
sailing on a ship and think that it  is the landscape that moves and not 
them.79
This statement of Tatian, however, by no means could be regarded 
as suggesting any elaborated view of time. In fact this statement is all 
he had to say on the question of time in his vituperative work “Against 
the Greeks"; a work in which he tries to touch upon all philosophers, all 
persons (mythological or not) and all questions which the Greeks dealt 
with in one way or another. No one then would expect that in such a 
work any serious account of any philosophical problem would be offered. 
At any rate, what Tatian makes in this passage (which, we repeat, 
constitutes his only reference to the question of time) is to postulate a 
reversed view, namely that i t  is human beings and not time that "move" 
-namely he avers the notion of "static time". But this is too a 
generalistic ( if not simplistic) view to be regarded as a serious 
treatment of time. Certainly i t  is un-Platonic, but i t  is not an un-Greek 
one. For Aristotle as well as the Stoics would promptly endorse the 
principle that time itself does not "move". On the other hand, the 
psychological division "past-present-future" cannot be denied 
whatsoever. On this, all Tatian seems to say is that the distinction into 
past, present and future is but a subjective illusion.80
This view brings him closely enough to the Aristotelian Alexander 
of Aphrosisias (fl. c. A.D.205) who held that the "generation" of what is 
called "instant" "is in the mind".81
It is obvious, therefore, that there was a variety of conceptions of 
time which surrounded Origen in his era. There is no such a universal 
thing called "Greek" conception of time as it  has been simplistically (yet 
widely) asserted. From the mythological temporal articulations of the 
Presocratic period, to the -essentially theological- Platonic conception, 
through the purely scientific Aristotelian and "objectivistic" Stoic
views, until the mystic Plotinian one (not to mention the eclectics or the 
Scepticism) there was a great variety of Greek perceptions of time that 
converged in Alexandria. Beside them, the Gnostic view of time, the 
Jewish thought and syncretism in all possible combinations, constituted 
a spiritual environment, knowledge of which was an aspect of the 
erudition of the time. And Origen was a man of great erudition.
But was it  a matter of “knowledge"? This is the crucial question 
which brings to the core of Origen’s presuppositions towards a 
formation of a conception of time. In order to answer this question it  
w ill be of utmost significance to consider not only the evolution of a 
particular philosophical notion (be it  time or whatever) but to take into 
account the profound changes which were taking place at the time.
As a matter of fact, the epoch in which Origen was born (185 A.D.) 
is a period in which radical tranformations were taking place. It was 
not a question of employing this or that philosophical opinion. It was 
something more thorough, more urgent, more dramatical: A profound, and 
nontheless painful, change o f existential attitude  is the main 
characteristic of the era.
The major fact was that the more people were coming in contact 
with the various philosophical systems, the more they realized that 
philosophy was unable to fu lfil its  own self-imposed task; that is, to 
offer people the deeper knowledge of truth, through which they would 
reach virtue and bliss. Scientific knowledge (already largely undermined 
by Scepticism) did not believe any more that i t  possessed the truth. In 
the various Stoic assemblies there was an idea which was constantly 
gainnig currency: They realized and admitted that i t  was impossible for 
any human being to materialize their ideal of the wise man -which had 
so clearly and consistently been portrayed by them. From all directions, 
in all streams of thought, i t  was becoming evident that a human being 
cannot know the reality of things through his own power; subsequently,
no man could become virtuous and happy if  he relied exclusively on his 
own power. People were living under a Roman empire in which the social 
inequalities were an everyday experience; they were seeing all the goods 
of earth around them -and yet not belonging to them. So there was an 
increasing change of interest from this world towards a better one. 
After the elapse of many centuries, people found themselves again filled 
with a passionate desire for the supernatural, a hunger for religion, a 
profound need for the salvation o f soul rather than mere knowledge of 
its  confirmed impasses.82 Hence, civilization, which had already given 
its fru its of Art and Science and exhausted itself, was turning to 
Religion again. The Platonic search for the reality of things in a 
super-natural world, the Aristotelian monotheism, the Stoics ethics -all 
were elements of a past s till echoing as people were orienting 
themselves towards redemption beyond the sensible world; a 
redemption that would be reached not through a process of intellectual 
activity but through a revelation offered to people in one way or 
another.
So the requirements of science and life  converged. Science sought 
to find in religion the solution of the problems which had been
tantalizing it  for so long a time; life, on the other hand, was seeking to 
base the hunger for religion, or religious faith, on a scientific 
foundation or form.
Alexandria was the center of this radical historical procedure and 
transformation of the entire civilization, as outlined above. In the 
Library (Museum) of this cosmopolitan commercial capital city were 
treasured the fru its of the Greek erudition; and people from every tribe 
and origin were gathered in that city, in order to find answers not to 
scientific questions any more, but to the feelings and existential 
requirements which were overwhelmingly pressing them.
Such was the environment in which early Christianity was
developing. It has been suggested that the Christianity built the system 
of its  own doctrines by coming to terms with the old philosophy.83 
Origen found himself in a period in which history of philosophy was 
increasingly interwoven with history of dogma. The relationship between 
Christianity and philosophy had been opened up by the Apologists. This 
phenomenon was to continue for a very long time.
Hence the task facing Origen was not to articulate a theory of 
time and add one more opinion in the long series of scientific or 
philosophical tradition which reached him. It was the urgent need of the 
period to form  rather than to explicate a view of time, which should be 
in tune with the Christian perception of the world and would serve the 
articulation of the new religion. For there were special reasons which 
rendered this demand particularly urgent.
The new religion was founded on the events related to the 
historical life  of Jesus. The revelation did not come from the mystical 
experiences of some master who was regarded as a chosen vessel of 
God; but i t  was based on concrete historical occurences. It was a task of 
a Christian thinkers to elucidate the significance of these occurences. 
Hence the problem of philosophy o f h istory  comes to the fore as one of 
prime importance. Whereas the Presocratic religious question had been 
treated mainly in terms of the stable essence behind the phenomena, the 
stability behind the (pumg, with Christianity i t  is the problem of the 
world in time that becomes of main priority. This does not mean that 
earlier schools of thought did not seek a purpose in terms of time. Plato 
did reflect on the ultimate goal of the earthly life; Aristotle did 
research on the teleological casual sequence according to which civil 
life  was formed; and the Stoics as well as Cicero did visualize a 
world-state based on reason as a goal which human race ought to fu lfil. 
But what was entirely new was the question of an overall meaning of 
human history -a meaning originated in a "plan" or, as i t  was expressed,
in an oirovopia, the oiKovopia of God already manifested and realized in 
the person of Jesus.
So Christianity was grounded on the conviction that the advent of 
Jesus constitute the pivotal point of world history as well as a turning 
point in a process towards salvation. The sense of victory stemmed from 
the belief that, in the person of Jesus, the firs t and decisive victory 
against evil had already been won. What remained was this victory to be 
realized for the entirety of the world in the future.
This is the fundamental perception on which a Christian 
conception of time should be formed and expressed. The question in the 
old philosophy about what is Being and Becoming, was not so much 
expressed in terms of "essence" of tpuoig behind the phenomena as 
contrasted to phenomena themselves. It was now clear that Being is God 
whereas Becoming is a meaningful process in time, in which divine and 
creaturely w ill encounter each other. God manifests his w ill and man is 
free to obey or to disobey, being responsible for his action. All this 
interrelation, however, was seen in the context of a teleological 
process, namely a course towards a goal, an end, visualized in the light 
of the personal history of Jesus and his promise to his disciples about 
the eschatological expectation.
Our scope in this work w ill be to enquire in Origen's conception of 
time in itself as well as to see whether or not he attributes to time an 
intrinsic meaning; and, i f  the answer to this question is positive, to see 
what actually constitutes the intrinsic meaning of his conception of 
time.
We shall argue that the conception of time is present in the entire 
theology of Origen as a fundamental element which has been formed in 
full accordance with his general conception of the world from a 
Christian point of view. In fact, the conception of time reflects the 
entirety of his theological views and profoundly imbues them. Thus,
although i t  has not been our purpose to expound the whole of Origen's 
theology, we have regarded the study of all the aspects of his theology 
as an indispensable presupposition for the understanding and exposition 
of this crucial facet of his thought, namely his conception of time. For, 
as we already emphasized, how a thinker conceives time is actually a 
very expressive manifestation of his entire thought. The conception of 
time stands in close relation to one's entire way of perceiving the whole 
of reality, in natural, philosophical and theological terms. Hence, how a 
thinker comprehends time cannot be positively determined unless every 
aspect of his thought has been thoroughly studied. For the notion of time 
both determines and is  determined by all facets of a certain philosophy 
or theology or attitude to life  in general.
Hence, the scientific benefit out of the study of Origen’s 
conception of time lies in the fact that this may elucidate other crucial 
aspects or particular points of his thought. As a matter of fact, we shall 
argue that his conception of time is the decisive means through which 
long-standing miscomprehensions of his thought are eliminated.,
In studying Origen’s thought we have followed certain principles 
drawn from the experience of how his work has been approached or 
treated hitherto:
A large part of Origen’s works has been preserved in the Greek 
original text; another is extant only in Latin versions; there are also 
extensive parts of his writings preserved both in the Greek original as 
well as in Latin translation. It is generally accepted that Latin versions 
must be read with caution -not only because Rufinus has no hesitation to 
explicate that he has taken some liberties in rendering Origen's thought; 
but also because a comparison of Greek original texts to their 
respective in Latin show that the differences are not always just 
linguistic but they are essential. It is not only a question of Rufinus’ 
being rather talkative, in his effort to do what he thought to be an
"interpretation" rather than mere translation of Origen’s work, in order 
to avoid misunderstandings or in his effort to comply with what was 
regarded as "orthodoxy" at his time. The most crucial point is that 
Rufinus himself had not comprehended pivotal facets of Origen’s thought, 
such as his conception of time and his eschatology.
The Latin rendering of De P rincip iis  is an outstanding monument 
of this fact. It is most regrettable that, although i t  is declared that it  
is but a free rendering, the vast majority of scholars have spelled out 
opinions about Origen’s thought based on this text. As regards the 
conception of time, when a student of Origen’s thought approaches the 
Latin version of this work intending to study the question of time, he is 
struck by a characteristic fact: Whenever there are references crucially 
involving the concept of time (such as God himself with respect to time 
or the relation of the persons of Trinity between themselves or God’s 
relation to the world) there seems to be an unawareness of the 
momentous significance of the question of time in the treatment of 
those questions. Terms such as "before", "after", "earlier", "later", 
"younger", "older", applied to the forenamed subjects, seem to be used 
without any consciousness of their cruciality. For example, one meets 
passages like this:"...to prevent anyone from thinking that the tit le  of 
Almighty belonged to God before the birth of wisdom, through which he 
is called Father;..." or: "...the title  of Almighty cannot be older in God 
than that of Father, for i t  is through the Son that the Father is 
Almighty...".84 It is obvious that the terms "before" and "older" are 
implying a kind of temporal sequence or temporal priority. Further, one 
meets expressions such as; "the world ... began to exist at a definite 
time God did not exist "even fo r a single moment" without begetting 
his wisdom;85 there is also reference of "certain ages or periods of time 
... during which world" might not exist in order to reject that there were 
"ages or periods" when God was not almighty and a "time when he began
to have creatures";87 that "wisdom is everlasting ",88 and there is 
reference to whether "there w ill ever be a time when there w ill be no 
world anywhere, or i f  there ever was a time when there was no world 
at all".89
Expressions of this sort imply that time itself is regarded as 
something taken for granted -in fact they suggest that time is not 
considered at all. This simplistic way in which the question of time 
appears in the Latin rendering of Princ just indicates that time is 
applied to God quite carelessly, without any previous serious analysis of 
the whole question. The same happens with the notion of eternity. It is 
stated that "the term everlasting o r eternal properly denotes this 
which had no beginning of existence and can never cease to be what i t  is 
... His wisdom therefore is an everlasting brightness enduring eternally 
...".90 Although there is the additional definition "yet not in time", the 
whole phrase indicates that the Son’s co-eternity to the Father is 
understood by placing the Son’s birth back to the infinite past.
Passages like these seem to indicate that temporal notions are 
treated with a complete unawareness of their crucial implications, even 
when they are attributed to the divine being. It is not d ifficu lt to find 
quite a number of similar passages in the Princ, namely, passages where 
temporal terms are used in a awkward manner. Indeed the frequency of 
those terms is quite remarkable, particularly for someone who 
approaches this work with the intention to study the concept of time 
there.
It would be then not unexpected if  someone concluded that Origen 
considers time as an unquestionable datum attributed to God’s life, too. 
We intend, however, to show that such an assertion can be, to a certain 
extent, justified and grounded only in the event that the study of 
Origen’s thought is confined to the Latin rendering of the Princ . 
Expressions such as "yet not in time" are actually Origen’s ones; yet they
are almost lost and neglected into the flood of Rufinu’s arbitrary and 
careless use of inappropriate temporal notions.
Even so Rufinus could not help not translating one or two passages 
where God's transcendece in respect of time is clearly stated.91 It is 
true that in view of the length and the importance of a work such as the 
P rinc, the point where God's transcendence to time is explicated would 
by rather untrustworthy -something like a kind of one more 
interpolation of Rufinus. If the study is confined only to the Princ, such 
a suspicion would be not unjustified. For those statements are too few in 
a voluminus work of four books, compared to the numerous use of 
temporal categories in a simplistic way, where time appears to be 
attributed unquestionably even to the divine life. If there is a mistake, 
this is not the incredibility which could be attributed to the one or two 
passages of the P rinc , which prove that i t  is not quite the case; the 
mistake lies simply in the fact that the study of this question has be 
confined only in this work, as our discussion in this treatise shall show. 
For the very text of Princ contains contradictions which have led to 
assertions such as that "everything contained in his De Principiis has 
also its  antithesis in the same work".92 Some of these contradictions 
w ill be discussed in as much as they are related to our topic. However it  
w ill be mainly these points, as contrasted to Origen's consistency 
throughout his works in Greek, which show the damaging interpolations 
of Rufinus and the untrustworthiness of Latin renderings of Origen's 
works.
Hence, a major principle which was constantly followed during 
this research is that the best way to ground our assertions about 
Origen’s thought is to corroborate them through his works preserved in 
the Greek original text. It is our view that the unquestionably authentic 
views of Origen can be found in the original Greek text of his work; 
Latin version can be taken into account, but with caution. A view of
Origen’s in a Latin text should be regarded as absolutely authentic i f  it  
can be corroborated by a Greek text as well. This procedure has been 
proved particularly useful in interpreting properly points in Latin 
versions.
Subsequently, i t  is evident that this kind of research presupposes 
the study of the entirety of Origen’s works in Greek. In fact, there has 
been not a word of this work le ft out of study. The reason is that since 
Origen did not compose a special treatise on time but formed a 
conception of time which underlies and imbues decisively his entire 
theology, i t  would be unacceptable to overlook any part of his works. 
Besides, this is a way of expressing in practice our opposition to the 
currently established, practice to express views on Origen's thought on 
the basis of the study of two or three of his works -not to mention 
scholars who Princ only. It is our view (which w ill be discussed and 
proven again and again in this work) that Princ should not be regarded 
as the work which may interpret Origen’s thought or provide safe 
conclusions about it. This is rather the work which needs to be 
interpreted in the light of Origen’s other texts extant in Greek. Such an 
interpretation is a task which s till waits to be done. In this work, we 
have taken into account a number of editions of this work: P. Koetschau’s 
edition, the English translation of it, as well the French edition by H. 
Crouzel and M. Simonetti. Koetschau has quite arbitrarily interpolated 
texts of authors subsequent to Origen -and all of them hostile to him. 
This editor has shown an excessive facility in employing any kind of 
irresponsible ( if not malicious) criticism against Origen and 
incorporating i t  into the text of Princ as ’’views of Origen’’ which are 
allegedly ’’filling gaps’’ of the Latin translation of Rufinus. This edition 
(as well as views of the English translator G.W. Butterworth, who not 
only promptly accepts Koetschau’s tactics but also adds his own 
contribution to erroneous allegations) is open to severe criticism, which
we did not fail to exercise. This has been done, to a certain extent, with 
points of the French edition, which contains allegations and 
miscomprehensions far too serious to be left without comments. In fact, 
besides our comments throughout our work, we finally were forced to 
make an Appendix (namely Appendix A) in order reject some views 
related to our topic and utterly falsely rendered by that edition. But we 
touched upon this problem only in as much as the points are related to 
our topic. We leave for the future a more detailed and comprehensive 
work on a number of erroneous comments accompanying this, relatively 
recent, edition. At any rate, an edition of the Princ elucidated and 
commented in the light of the entirety  of Origen’s authentic views s till 
waits to be made, especially in the English-speaking world. As regards 
the Princ in general, we have used it  only as an ancillary source. For it  
is a text highly precarious, full of contradictions (due to Rufinus’ 
interpolations) and, at any rate, in itself, i t  is a source of confusion 
rather than elucidation of Origen's thought.
As regards other works of Origen, we have reservations about the 
authenticity of the Scholia in Apocalypsis. Not so much because there is 
from nowhere any testimony that Origen ever wrote any comments in the 
Apocalypsis;93 but to any one who is familiar with the style of Origen in 
the thousands of pages of his work in Greek, this text seems unlikely 
him and alien to his style as found from his early commJohn written in 
Alexandria in 218 to Cels written in Cesarea in 248.94 We have no 
reason to make this point one of dispute whatsoever. For, as far as our 
topic is concerned, of what is stated in that work, there is nothing to 
appeal to, or to dispute.95
There are particular reasons which render the study of Origen’s 
own words particularly useful. He had a very good command of Greek and 
he is very scrupulous in the use of every word. As regards language, he 
subjects scriptural passages to close scrutiny, very often appealing to
the etymology of a word. In using a word, he is always profoundly 
conscious of its  grammatical, philosophical and theological implications. 
In his Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul, he quite often goes as far 
as to do what he calls anoKazaazfjaai zrjv (ppamv (to restore the 
phrase), namely to render the text in correct Greek. That Origen is 
highly scrupulous in treating language is not just an assumption drawn 
of the study of his texts. It is himself who explicates the significance of 
the correct interpretation as well as proper use of Greek language 
(which he highly respected for its elegance and expressional 
possibilities)95 even in its slightest details and nuances. Thus he states:
“And let anyone know that i t  is impossible to treat properly any 
problem, be it  moral or natural or theological, unless he uses terms 
with their precise meaning and depicts the logical significations in due 
way. It is not futile to follow the preciseness of the significations as 
well as to ponder painstakingly upon them; for there are cases where we 
commit serious mistakes because of failing to clear up the homonyms 
(|irj Ka9cnpovieg xag opwvupiag), the doubts, the misuses of the terms, 
the literal meanings and the contradistinctions." And he further stresses: 
"We have said all these, in order to show that we, who wish not to be 
mistaken in understanding the divine Scriptures, believe that i t  is 
utterly necessary to be conscious and aware of the logic of the terms 
used"97
These explicit statements of Origen, as well as how he generally 
uses and explains the nuances in Greek language, convince that he knows 
this language in depth; he is perpetually conscious of the fact that the 
manner in which he treats language should serve the exposition of his 
views in the most accurate way. Given these statements about the 
significance of linguistic scrutiny and accuracy, i t  is reasonable to 
expect that the study of his works preserved in Greek may provide his 
authentic theological views in an authoritative way. We also may focus
our analysis on certain crucial terms he uses; for when Origen uses 
terms, especially those of particular significance, he is fully conscious 
of their philosophical or theological implications. As our discussions 
w ill show, following Origen's own practice towards a thorough study not 
only of the notions expressed but also of their articulation itself, is a 
principle of research which provides very significant conclusions.
A subsequent point of great importance is the significance which 
Origen attributes to the so-called "homonyms". In the passage above he 
explicates that i t  is a task "to clear up the homonyms" 0<a9aipovxeg xag 
opuvup(ag). This notion is frequently used throughout his work in order 
to indicate a term under which there are more than one conceptions to 
be understood. In the Prologue of the Commentary on the Song of Songs 
there is an account of the meaning of homonyms: "...the Divine Scriptures 
make use of homonyms; that is to say, they use identical terms for 
describing defferent things ... ; and not only are the same terms 
employed, but the things themselves are compared with one another."98 
This definition is also found in texts in Greek; thus "homonyms are those 
which have only their name in common, but their essential content is 
different" (opwvupa 6s saxiv, ujv ovopa povov k o iv o v , o 6s xaxa xouvopa 
xrjg ouaiag Rogog sxspog)99
In interpreting Scripture and exposing his own views, i t  is an 
intense and permanent concern of Origen to carry out what he sets forth 
as a task of the biblical interpreter, namely to "clarify the homonyms". 
What is most significant, though, is that Origen himself uses homonyms 
in order to articulate his own conceptions. This fact, although highly 
significant for the comprehension of his thought, has not been adequately 
noticed nor has due attention been paid to it. At any rate, i t  has not been 
applied as a means to unravel crucial aspects of his theology. In our 
research, we have regarded i t  as an indispensable task to clarify the 
homonyms used by him, namely to determine the various meanings which
are attributed to the same term. Thus pivotal notions of his concept of 
time, such as zsffog (end) or atuiv (aeon) or atuiviog (eternal), Koopog 
(cosmos), ftvwoig (knowledge), oo<pia (wisdom), 9avaxog (death), can be 
elucidated only after they have been apprehended as homonyms. For the 
term end, for example, has no less than four significations (excluding 
the current meanings of it).100 Thus "end” may mean the end of a certain 
cosmic period (which is the beginning of the next); i t  may allude to an 
individual rational creature’s personal "goal", which may occur in any of 
the forthcoming aeons; i t  may also mean the final "subjection" of all 
rational creatures to Christ, as in I Cor. 15,25-27; or i t  may mean the 
absolute end, marked by the "subjection" of Christ to the Father, 
according to I Cor. 15,28.
Unless the different meanings of a homonym are pointed out and 
the different realities expressed by the same term are clearly 
portrayed, Origen’s conception of time could not be comprehended. As we 
shall argue, the confusion and appearing contradictions in Princ are due 
to the failure (both of Rufinus and Origen’s critics) to grasp the 
different realities indicated by the term "end", as well as of other 
homonyms -such as a itiv  and aituvtog, #v(jjmg,§tc. In this treatise i t  w ill 
be shown that many of the miscomprehensions of Origen’s authentic 
views are originated in failure to grasp the utmost significance of 
homonyms in his thought.
Finally, in discussing Origen’s views, we were fully aware of the 
fact that we are dealing with a thinker whose thought (or aliegec 
thought) has been highly and tempestuously controversial for more than 
seventeen centuries -from shortly after his death until our day. In 
studying Origen’s own words (especially all those in the original text) 
for years, we came very closely to his outstanding intellectual abilities, 
his brightness and, nontheless, his tenderness. The outcome of this study 
is not just an academical dissertation or whatever we are going to
write about Origen in future. We deem that the study of his thought 
brings to the student an existential benefit, mainly stemming from his 
honesty of thought and the quality of his life  itself. May we regard this 
as a personal benefit which is most important and far superior to any 
intellectual benefit out of a long and intense study of Origen's thought.
On the other hand, however, i t  was not without frustration that 
we have studied a vast number of works about Origen's thought. It is not 
just a question of distortions or miscomprehensions -already since the 
era of Jerome, later Justinian, until as late as 1986. But there s till are 
allegations which come to direct contrast to what Origen really held and 
explicitly stated. There are assertions which are supposed to be an 
"answer" to Origen - and yet they are nothing more than a mere 
repetition of Origen’s own words.101 And there are citations of Origen’s 
works, which are adduced in order to prove exactly the opposite of what 
the passages themselves show -and they would show the real views of 
Origen if  they were quoted and not just cited as references. Maybe it  is 
the barrier of the language, maybe i t  is because the study was not 
extended over the whole of Origen’s work, or because the references are 
considered out of context.102 -whatever the case may be the fact does 
not change. For i f  a passage of Origen’s is extant, i t  is unacceptable to 
be adduced in order to prove different (indeed the opposite) points.
Hence we have followed i t  as a principle that the views of Origen 
should not be cited as references but, whenever necessary, be quotec 
-even i f  the quotation would be somewhat long. In view of the reality of 
the nature of academical works referring to Origen’s thought, i t  has 
been a conscious practice of ours to ground our views not only on 
references to titles and chapters of his works, but to cite his words 
themselves. This constant way of discussing Origen’s thought may lead 
to a work perhaps somewhat lengthier than what i t  should be, but the 
scientific benefit out of this procedure great. It is a by-product that we
have taken the opportunity of rendering into English, for the firs t time, 
a vast number of crucial passages in Greek, which elucidate Origen's 
thought. What is more important is that this way of rendering Origen's 
thought leaves no room for controversy. For i t  is Origen himself who 
speaks and i t  is his own words which elucidate crucial aspects of his 
thought. We have strongly fe lt that i t  only through such an academic 
practice in composing our work that what Origen really believes could 
finally be established unquestionably. The conclusions which we have 
reached with respect to our topic prove that this procedure was worth 
while. For these conclusions pertain to the most crucial facets of 
Origen's thought, which are now seen under an entirely new light and 
against current misapprehensions. At any rate, our conviction that the 
conception of time constitutes the spine of a thinkers thought has 
become stronger than i t  was in the beginning of this research. For our 
conclusions eliminate fundamental misunderstandings and prove that 
Origen’s influence is far more extensive and decisive than has been 
reckoned hitherto.
Chapter 1: God. World and Time
§1. God and Time.
In treating the question or the being or Goa with respect to time, 
one can notice Origen's persistent concern to be precise In articulating 
his views. But on this speciric topic there is particular difficulty racing 
him: he knows that, in order to treat this question, the language is 
inadequate to express the reality he wants to depict, namely, the being 
or God; hence his constant concern ror accuracy cannot be ruiniled. The 
main reason is that the tenses or the verbs are always placed in a 
certain '■time,,;1 so a verb w ill be in a XP^V°£ , namely Present tense or 
Present Perrect tense or Past tense etc. It is impossible to use a verb 
apart rrom any implication or time; ror verbs (in contrast to nouns or 
adjectives) not only express an action or a passion or a state of the 
subject, but also express the time which this action or passion or state 
or the subject is rererred to.
Origen regards the divine reality as a timeless state, namely a 
reality radically transcendent to time. When, therefore, he intends to 
speak of God's being, the use of verbs is inappropriate a p rio ri)  for no 
verb can be used apart from the implication of time.
This is the difficulty facing Origen and he is conscious of this 
linguistic impasse. If he held another perception of God's being (for 
example, i f  he regarded it  as an everlasting duration or a perpetual 
present), then he would have no difficulty in expressing his views; he 
could use Present tense. But i t  is he himself who stresses that God’s 
being cannot be expressed by any of the forms of verbs, because this 
being is atemporal as God transcends radically all time.
In the Fragment CX of Codex HONAC. 208 Origen quotes John,1,1 "In 
the beginning was the Logos" and comments on this as follows:
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"In speaking about the Logos of God i t  would be more accurate to 
say "is" (eoxfv); but he (sc. John) has used "was" (fjv) instead if  "is" 
(soxiv) in order to relate the being of the Logos to his incarnation, 
which took place in a certain time; anyone nevertheless should know 
that, in referring to the atemporals, he should not regard the meaning of 
verbs like "was" (fjv)2 and "is" (eoxiv) and "will be" (soxai) literally; for 
Logos the god who is the son of the father is himself god; therefore the 
verbs applied to him should not be considered together with the time 
which they imply, for the son is not under time (uno xpovov); and we 
should note that a verb is what indicates time (xo npoariyaivov xpovov), 
as Aristotle says".3
In frJohn the same view of Origen’s is found, quoting the same 
passage John, 1,1:
"...and, since there are some who have fallen from the right faith 
thinking that i t  is only him who was born from the virgin that exists, 
very ably the theologos writes for them that "In the beginning there was 
the Logos" (sv apxfj fjv o fioftog) and using the verbs properly he applied 
the term "became" (egsvcxo) to the flesh and the term "was" (fjv) to the 
divinity.4 In speaking of the Logos of God it  would be more accurate to 
say "is" (eox(v); but he has used "was" (fjv) instead if  "is" (eox(v) in order 
to relate the being of the Logos to his incarnation, which took place in a 
certain time; anyone nevertheless should know that, in referring to the 
atemporals, he should not regard the meaning of verbs literally; for that 
which is signified by a verb implies the existence of time being together 
with its existence: for example, when we say "was" (fjv) we mean that 
which does not exist any more but existed only in the past; accordingly 
"is" (soxiv) denotes what exists now and "will be" (eoxai) denotes what 
w ill exist in the future. But one should not think that the time implied 
by a verb can be applied to the Logos of God, because he is timeless 
(aiBiog)".5
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When, therefore, Origen refers to the being of God he is fully 
conscious of the fact that it  is a reality which transcends all time; and 
he also knows that, in this case, language is inadequate to express this 
transcendent reality with the proper accuracy.
In expProv he refers to the passage; "It was me who was his 
delight" (Egw fj|iT]v rj npooexaipe)6 and he explains: "The "was" ( r jp q v )  
referring to God does not indicate any existence of time, as it  does when 
i t  refers to those that are under time, as when someone says "I was in a 
market place". And since she (sc. Sophia) "was befitting ( f jv  appo^ouaa)" 
God who is without beginning (xto a v d p x w ), then she is timeless (cdSiog), 
too".7
So Origen is clear in expressing his view that God’s being is an 
atemporal reality which transcends all time. Although the use of 
language for the portrayal of this reality is deemed as inevitably 
inadequate, he is very cautious of how he articulates his views. He takes 
the inadequacy of the expressions for granted, yet he is constanly 
vigilant and tries to reduce this inadequacy to the minimum possible. A 
passage in comm John is quite a characteristic one:
"I use all these terms, not because they actually apply to God, but 
because I find myself in an impasse as I stand before, to call them so, 
ineffable words (apprjxujv pqjidxojv)8 which only God or after him his only 
begotten son is able either to say or to think about himself"9.
In view of this opinion about the divine being, God is stated as 
being "out of the aeon (s§ aiuivog)"; in that case the preposition "ex" (ep 
whice literally means "out"10 is befittingly used. The deeper meaning of 
this expression w ill also be discussed later in this chapter, as well in 
chapter 5.
In view of those analyses of Origen’s, the assertion of R. Sorabji11 
that Origen did not always have a very firm  grasp of the idea of 
timelessness is not correct. The points where Origen seems to speak as
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i f  God had foreknowledge not timeless knowledge are nothing more than 
loose and inaccurate expressions used inevitably because of the limited 
possibilities of language to express what is beyond language. This is 
exactly the point which Origen has made here.12
It is also clear that by the term atStog here again Origen means 
what is timeless and applies it  to the reality which (as he calls it) is 
not "under" time.13
In view of these affirmations in Greek, similar ones found in the 
Latin version of the Princ can be regarded as expressing Origen’s 
authentic views:
"Of course, these terms that we use, such as "always" or "has 
been", or any similar ones that bear a temporal significance, must be 
interpreted with reservations and not pressed, for they relate to time, 
but the matters of which we are now speaking, though described in 
temporal language for the purpose of discussion, in their essential 
nature transcend all idea of time".14
Also by the end of the Fourth Book Origen makes a similar remark:
"This phrase that we use, however, that there never was a time 
when he did not exist, must be accepted with a reservation. For the very 
words, when or never, have a temporal significance, whereas the 
statements we make about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit 
must be understood as transcending all time and all ages and all 
eternity. The rest of things, however, which are external to the Trinity, 
must be measured by ages and periods of time".15
He also16 refers implicitly to time, as he states that "no thought 
of before or after can be entertained in respect of" the persons of the 
Trinity; but what he actually wants to indicate here is not so much the 
relation of the Trinity to time, but the relation between the Three 
Persons themselves as beings who are equally co-eternal. What Origen 
articulates here is his fundamental view that there was no time when
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the Son and the Holy Spirit did not exist with the Father also because 
the very being of the Trinity is timeless.17
It is most important for the further developement of our topic to 
make clear a point which we regard as fundamental for a proper 
understanding of Origen’s thought. It has to be emphasized that Origen 
holds a conception of God as radically transcending time not only with 
respect to time but also before all time. Although the term ‘‘before" 
here is inevitably used in a loose sense (for "before" makes no sense in 
the absence of time) the notion indicates is that Origen holds a 
conception of God regardeless of time's existence or non-existence. This 
comes to mean that Origen holds a conception of God in Himself, namely 
of God perceived in the absence of any creation or any thought of 
creation. To think of God in Himself does not necessarily entail to think 
of him as Creator. Hence when one perceives God as Creator, through 
observation of the outcome of his creative act, this by no means would 
mean that this perception of God applies to Him Himself.
As this view constitutes a major difference from Platonism and 
Neoplatonism, and since this facet of Origen's thought has been widely 
misunderstood, we shall persist on this point in order to make it  clear 
through Origen’s own words.
In Cels i t  is affirmed that "it is not absurd that we also should 
accept the view that the characteristics of God which we know do not 
apply to God H im self. For the attributes of God are superior to any 
which are known not only to human nature, but even by the natures of 
the beings which have ascended to the higher ranks of life."18
God Himself is "beyond what can be perceived through mind" 
(eneKSiva xuiv v o t^ x u jv ).19 Bo "everything we know about God is inferior to 
God Himself" (navxa a (apev eflaxxova eaxi Oeou)20
In selPs Origen explains how God is "known as Creator and Wise 
and Provident and Judge"; when he comes to explain the firs t of these
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conceptions of God he states: "And he is Creator because he brought 
creatures into being out of non-being (kcu Srpoup^og [le v  6ia xa 
gsgovoia ano xou \if\ ovxog eig t o  sivai).21
The knowledge of God as Creator is based on (and derived from) a 
because -namely God as Creator is known through an act o f h is w i l l . 
But God in Himself cannot be known at all. There is not any "because", 
there is not any "act", there is no creature through which God could be 
known in Himself. It is only through Christ and God’s self-manifestation 
that men may visualize a notion of God in Himself.
Thus Origen makes the fundamental distinction of God in Himseh 
(ftiftvuaKopevog) and God as creator (Sipoupftog).22 In observing creation 
one does not see anything of God in Himself; all he may see is the 
wisdom according to which everything has been created; for "In the 
corporeal heavens God inhabits as creator through his multi-embroidered 
wisdom"23
God in Himself "is unattainable by reason"24 and "no one knows the 
exact knowledge which Trinity has of herself"25
On this point Origen elaborates by offering brilliant analyses of 
his view, which is worth following verbatim. For i t  is through Origen’s 
own words that the distinction between God in Himself and God as 
Creator is made.
"No one can see God through a procedure of his own mind, as it  
happens with visible things which are said to be seen through an act of 
seeing. But God is seen to those whom he might judge that He should be 
seen by revealing himself. For if  one were seeing God, then he would see 
Him, so to speak, in His quality proper and His magnitude proper (otog 
kcu ooog eoxiv). But i t  is not a man who sees, but it  is God who shows 
what is seen; this is why God presents Himself to a way which might be 
comprehended by creatures. As the saviour says ’I w ill present 
myself’;26 he did not say ’he w ill see me’ but he said 'I w ill present
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myself'".27
Origen is particularly insistent that "the divine things cannot be 
seen without an action of their own" namely through God's "grace".28
Subsequently, creaturely mind "cannot see God through an 
intellectual act of its  own. So we conceive of God, to the extent that it  
is possible to us, through the theological notions about him -at least 
those which we have; even so, however, we conceive of Him obscurely. 
But God in Himself (auxog 6e o 8eog) has a knowledge of Himself not 
through any means of this kind, but He has a knowledge which is 
appropriate to Him. For i t  is Himself who is both the subject and object 
of comprehension. This is why it  is only the Son who knows Him; it  is 
the Son who is comprehended by the Father and he comprehends the 
Father".29
Origen knows that "there are many people who have a conception 
of God as Creator, yet they do not profess Him as a Father of the Son". 
(Kcu noRRoi $ouv exouaiv evvoiav 8sou 5q|iioupgou, ou jifjv opoRo^ouoiv 
auxov uiou naxepa). His view is, however, that to speak of "knowledge" of 
God is to know Him "in as much as He is God and in as much as He is the 
Father" (K a 9o 8e6g sail kcu  K a 9o naxrjp eaxi).30
In view of this, "even i f  we be found worthy of seeing God now 
through mind and heart, we see him not 'as he is'31 but as he appears 
according to his dispensation towards us;".32 However, there is  the 
objective reality of what God is in Himself, albeit creatures cannot now 
it; and this objective reality is clearly affirmed in the same passage 
through the expression o savtv (which God /is*).33
Thus it  is Origen’s view that, due to the radical chasm between 
God and the world, any knowledge of God in himself is impossible.34 He 
affirms that God is "creator and God of the prophets and Father and God 
of Christ and our father".35 But from a worldly point of view, one can 
see not God in Himself, but God as he presents Himself to us.36 In
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observing creation we have just "conceptions" of God and we do not know 
him himself but a "conception" of God as Creator.37
So "neither can anyone worthily know the uncreated and firstborn 
of all created nature38 in the way that the Father who begot him knows 
him; nor can anyone know the Father in the same way as the living Logos 
who is God’s wisdom and truth."39
Even when God w ill be seen by creatures "as he is",40 this w ill 
happen in the way it  is possible to creatures to know God (Ka9iijg eon 
Suvaxov xoig ^evT]xo(g ^vwvai xov 8eov). For i t  is not possible to 
understand the [expression] ’as he is’ as meaning God in Himself (ou ^ap 
oiov xs SKflaypdveiv xo Ka9ujg eaxiv o Beog auxog).41 This is the sense in 
which it  is said that "the prophets or patriarchs or angels have seen 
God."42 Again the notion of God Himself ( o 8eog auxog) is clearly 
explicated.
We know that there is an actual reality of God in Himself, yet this 
knowledge is not drawn from the observation of creation but from the 
self-revelation of God himself.
Origen clearly states that this knowledge is exclusively drawn 
from "the testimonies given" to us (xa papxupia xa napa5e6opeva).43 
What he means by "testimonies" (papxupia) is the divine scriptures44 and 
he distinguishes those of Old Testament ("...the testimonies having been 
said many times...") and those of the New Testament ("...I find new 
testimonies ... the testimonies of Jesus Christ...").45
There is no way to know that God is something more than Creator, 
but through His own revelation in the person of Jesus. It is through this 
historical event, namely "incarnation" (6ia xrjg aapKiuaeug) that the 
transcendent God became "approachable" (npooixog) to men.45 So using 
"truth and the testimony of events and all sorts of working of wonders 
as a kind of voice, God suggested His own height to men’’.47 Even so, 
however, divine guidance is necessary; for "the law can be known only by
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revelation" and no intellectual ability alone is adequate for that48 Which 
means that the "parables and obscure words" which have been uttered by 
the Holy Spirit through the prophets need to be "readable" and they 
become readable to those who are "participants" of the Holy Spirit and 
tought by him. For "no one who is unmarked and unguided can comprehend 
the divine Scriptures."48
God through his "great providence for the sake of man" guides him 
and enlightens him toward ways that "human nature itself does not 
know".50
What these affirmations of Origen show is that i t  is not creation 
which provides a hint of God’s very being, but it  is God’s own 
self-revelation. In the final analysis, this means that Origen holds a 
Theological and not a Cosmological conception of God. For his point of 
departure in thinking of God, and trying to form theological notions, is 
not the observation of the world, but i t  is the self-revelation of God 
through the scriptures and Jesus Christ. To depict in detail Origen's 
theology, namely his conception of God in Himself, is out of the scope of 
this work. We shall refer only to his conception of Wisdom and the 
Logos; and this, only to the extent which is necessary for the further 
developement of our topic. For the most important point which needs to 
be made is not only that Origen holds a conception of God in H im self far 
beyond the notion of God as Creator; but also that there is a 
visualization of a reality before any creation, namely a reality in which 
only God is  and there is no creation at all. This w ill lead to the 
conclusion that the current opinion that Origen cannot think of God 
without necessarily thinking of him as Creator is entirely erroneous.51
So, in spite of the fact that Origen regards God’s being as "above" 
time, as a radically transcendent reality, he goes ahead with a portrayal 
of God’s being in Himself. A major occasion for Origen to expound his 
views is when he undertakes the task to interpret the passage of John
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1,1 "In the beginning (ev apxrj) was the Logos".52
In attempting to interpret this passage, Origen faces the greatest 
challenge to his view of the divine being as a timeless reality. For the 
term "arche" (apxrj) is one of those which par excellence have a temporal 
implication -as "beginning". How is it  possible to speak of God’s being as 
an atemporal state and at the same time to speak of a certain "In the 
beginning" (ev apxg)? This is the challenge and he does face it, in order 
to articulate his views of the life  of God as a timeless reality.
Before any discussion about the actual meaning of the afore-stated 
passage of John, Origen remarks that there are many meanings of the 
word apxrj; and this "multi-signification" of the term (xo noBuoripov ifjg 
(pwvfjg) can be found not only among the Greeks but also into the holy 
scriptures.53 So he cites all the different meanings of the term apxq as 
found in the scripture. It is only after this long analysis that he 
approaches the passage of John, 1,1 in order to offer his own exegesis: 
"Having seen that the term apxq means so many things, we now 
enquire which one of them should be employed in the ’In the apxq was 
the Logos’ (Ev apxq qv o Floftog). It is clear that it  does not allude to any 
moving over or to any road or length; i t  is also obvious that i t  does not 
refer to any generation; i t  is nevertheless possible to consider that it  
refers to him, who is the maker, whom ’God ordered and everything has 
been made’54 For in a sense it  is Christ himself who is the creator, to 
whom the father says ’let there be light’55 and 'let there be a 
firmament’.56 Christ then is a creator as an apxq, for he is wisdom, 
being called apxq just because he is wisdom. For i t  is wisdom who, 
according to Solomon, says 'The Lord created me at the beginning of his 
works’ (0 8eog sktiosv  pe apxqv oStuv auxou e(g sp^a auxou),57 so that 
’the Logos is in the apxq, that is in the wisdom".58
Further, in the same work, Origen explains: "In interpreting the ’In 
apxq was the Logos’ it  is clear (for i t  is found in many passages of the
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Proverbs) that i t  is the wisdom who is meant by the term apxrj.59 Thus 
"one should understand that the Logos has always been in the arche, that 
is to say, in the wisdom".60
Hence Origen’s answer is virtually this: The passage in John, 1,1, 
"In arche there was the Logos" is a hypothetical answer not to a 
hypothetical question " when was the Logos" but to the question " in what 
was the Logos".
This is clearly stated further, when he points out that what we 
have learned from the passage John, 1,1, is the answer to "in what" (ev 
x(vi) was the Logos, and the answer was that the Logos was "in the 
wisdom" (ev apxq)61 Further in the same work he reiterates his 
affirmation that by apxq it  is the wisdom herself that should be 
understood and the passage of John means that the Logos was “in" the 
wisdom.62 If a "temporal" meaning should be applied to the "ev apxrj" this 
meaning would be nothing but a notion of atemporality, indicated by the 
fact that the Logos was "in" the wisdom; in such a case the hypothetical 
question "when was the Logos?" would be all the same to the question 
” //7 what was the Logos?". Indeed there is a point in the same work 
where Origen states that what we learn by this passage of John is "when 
or in what" the Logos was.63 After his analyses of the subject (which are 
extended before as well as after this point in the commJohtl i t  is 
obvious that the term "when" has been put in such a context that the only 
significance that remains for it  is an atemporal one This is obviously 
why Origen has no hesitation (when he says "when or in what”, twice in 
that passage) to indicate that, in this case, he regards the terms "when" 
as well as "in what" as being almost synonyms.64
It is therefore obvious that Origen holds a conception of God’s 
being as an atemporal reality; and he feels so strongly about this that he 
interprets terms like that of apxrj, which currently have a temporal 
significance, in such a way that the notion of temporality is totally
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abolished.
So Origen regards Wisdom as a living personal hypostasis who is 
identified with the Son of God.65 This personal being is exactly the 
person whom God spoke to when he created the world, as described in 
Genesis. Nevertheless this wisdom exists, as a timeless being, before 
the creation of the world; and she lives in God before time, as a 
personal subject, as a substantial living personal hypostasis.65 For 
wisdom "is herself a substance, who is begotten before the aeons and 
she existed as a timeless one even before creation".67
The Logos is also identified with the Son of God and he has 
timelessly been in divine being regardless of any perception of creation.
"But Logos becomes (givexai) only in respect to men who formerly 
were unable to conceive the advent of the son of God, who is the Logos; 
yet the Logos does not become ‘with God68 as if  he formerly were not 
there, but he is said to be always in the father (napa 6e xlj ae( auveivai 
tuj naxpi Rs^sxai): ‘And the Logos was (fjv) in God’ for ‘he did not become 
with God’ (ou $dp egevexo npog xov 8eov). And the same verb, namely the 
‘was’ (fjv) predicates the Logos both when he ‘was in apxfj’ and when he 
‘was with God’; this means that neither is the Logos separated from the 
apxg nor is he staying behind (anoRemopevog) the father; and again this 
means that neither ‘became* Logos in apxrj, as if  he were not in apxfp 
nor ‘became’ he ‘in God’ as if  he were not ‘with God' before; for before 
any existence of time or aeon ‘in apxfj was the Logos’ and ‘the Logos was 
with God' "59
It is also pointed out that "John did not say that Logos became or 
that he was made in arche, but he said that ‘In the beginning was the 
Logos'. For he was in the beginning creating the heaven and the earth"70 
yet he was existing "before them, being their beginning in the sense that 
i t  was him who caused them to be".71
Further Origen reaffirms that Logos "who ‘was in apxfj’ “ was
46
“always" (aeO “with God" being himself god; “he did not obtain this state 
as if  he previously was not with God" but he has always been in the 
"perpetual view (xfj aSiaRemxuj 9ea) of the paternal depth".72 So Origen 
refers to "the Logos who lives in himself and yet not separated from the 
father ( kcu Ro^ ov xoiouxov Ka9‘ eauxov gtiivxa). The Logos is not someone 
else apart from Christ, Logos the god, who is in the father, through 
whom has everything been created".73
In the First Book of the comm John Origen states that "it is 
necessary to examine painstakingly the conceptions of the son74 in order 
to see which of them have always existed in God before creation (ev 
paKapioxqxi) without any beginning. Is i t  only wisdom which existed 
without beginning or is i t  the Logos too and even life  and truth?75 But, 
at that point, Origen goes only as far as to articulate just the question. 
This passage, however, has been seriously distored by some scholars. C. 
Bigg76 has not understood the text itself at all and henceforth he has 
made serious mistakes on that. So he thinks that Origen here affirms 
that the son of God was as Wisdom and Logos and Life and Truth. But 
what Origen does here is just to pose the question: Which of the names 
of the son were in the divine life  before creation (ev paKaptoxqxi) and 
which of them became (enigegovaaiv)? And he continues: "Was he 
perhaps only Wisdom? or was he also Logos or Life as well? and 
certainly [sc. we should examine if  he was] also Truth as well as the 
rest of what he became for our sake.".77 The text reads thus: 
Baoavioxeov ouv auva^a^ovxa xag ovopaaiag xou uiou, noiai auxiov 
eni^egovaaiv ouk av ev paKapioxrjxi apgapevuv kcu peivavxwv xwv a^iuv 
gevopevai xa xoaaSe. xaxa ftdp aocpfa epevev povov rj Kai Ro^ og fj Kai £ujf), 
navxug 6e Ka( aRq9eia’ ou fifjv 6e Ka( xa aRRa oaa 6t‘ qpag npoaeiRqtpe.". 
C. Bigg has simply failed to undertand the text on the ground of 
translating it  incorrectly. As late as 1966, C. Blanc has made a similar 
mistake in translating the text in French78 Although he has grasped that
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Origen does here nothing more than to articulate a question (a question 
which he faces later in the same work, s. infra), he finally falls into the 
same mistake (even though he does not present Origen to be categorical 
on the point). C. Blanc’s main mistake is that he translates the term 
zdXQ' (which means perhaps) as "sans dout" (without doubt) and neglects 
the two rj (or) through which Origen poses the question without 
answering it  at that point It is Origen himself who clearly states what 
this passage is about. For the paragraph begins through the word 
Baeanarsov ouv (One then should enquire ... which of the names ... 
perhaps ... or ... or ...). In any case, C. Blanc has distorted the meaning of 
this crucial point of the comm John.
In the Second Book of the same work, however, Origen provides a 
systematic answer to this question. This answer provides also some 
quite significant points of his view of time. It is again through a 
scrupulous philological analysis of scriptural passages that Origen 
enunciates his views as he ponders upon two passages of John, namely to 
"In the beginning was the Logos" (ev apxq rjv o fio^og)79 and "life became 
in the Logos" (sv flop).80 Referring two these two passages he states:
"Let us regard these two In (ev) and examine their difference: 
First, let us see it  as it  appears in [sc. the expression] 'Logos in 
beginning’ and secondly in [sc. the expression] ’life  in Logos’. The Logos 
did not become 'in the beginning'; this is why it  is said ’in the beginning 
was the Logos’; for there was not when the apxfj was irrational 
(dfio^og); but life  became and this is why 'life is the light of men’.81 
This means that when there was not any man at all there also was not 
any ’light of men'; for the light of men is understood only in its  relation 
to men. And let no one accuse us, thinking that we are considering all 
those questions in a sense of temporal sequence; for there can be found 
no time at all when the third and fourth conceptions of the Logos did not 
exist yet. In the same way then that i t  is said that ’everything became
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through him62, not everything was through him, and ‘there was nothing 
that became without him*83, [it is] not [said] there was nothing that 
was without him, in the same way life is what became in him, not what 
was in him. And again, the Logos was not that which became in the 
beginning but that which was in the beginning".84
This the sense in which Origen states that Christ (regarded as 
Creator) is the "source" and "origin" of all virtues.85 Origen’s answer on 
this point is that, of all the apperceptions of the Son, it  is only Wisdom 
and Logos that were beginninglessly with the Father. The rest of them 
became, namely they had a beginning and are directly related to the 
creative act of God. This point is very significant in order to understand 
the relation of God to creation in Origen’s thought. This is why we 
elaborate on it  later in this chapter, namely on pp. 61-65. We have 
insisted on rebutting C. Bigg’s and C. Blanc’s understanding of this point, 
because it  is not just a simple matter of construing Origen's thought in 
a different way. Their rendering directly entails that Origen held a 
notion of beginningless creation. This is the point against which we 
argue, in the final analysis. For, as we extensively discuss and prove in 
§4 in this chapter, Origen did not hold such a notion.
R. Norris is one more scholar among those who firs t wore the 
glasses of Platonism and Neoplatonism and then tried to see Origen’s 
thought through these glasses. The serious mistakes therefore were 
inevitable, especially where the Princ was used as the main source. 
Thus Norris asserts that "the Logos appears in Origen’s system as the 
firs t step ’down’ from the One in the stream of existence. ... As such, he 
is, of course, "generated" -but not (as Justin and Tertullian seem to have 
taught) at some point prior to the creation of the world.’’.85
In the light of the abundance of passages where Origen has 
explicated his view of the Logos, assertions such as that of Norris seem 
astonishing. This is why we have regarded as an indispensable part of
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our method of exposition to quote Origen’s own words. For utterly 
distorting allegations such as those of Norris appear as views of the 
most of scholars. Norris is so much prejuduced that he seems 
determined to find Plotinus’ world-picture and perception of the Being 
into Origen’s thought. So he thinks that the Plotinian One must be 
Origen’s God. The Plotinian Mind (which is immediately down from the 
One) must be the Logos, and so on. He is determined to do so because he 
is too prejudiced with a false impression -this is why he is falls into so 
big mistakes.87
Subsequent to his decision to present Origen as a Platonist, 
Norris asserts that Origen "insists ... that one cannot think of God 
without thinking at the same time of the world in which God’s creative 
goodness is manifested.’’.88 This is a typical phrase (used so often by 
scholars, so that i t  has become triv ia l) describing Plato’s thought, as we 
have seen.
In fact, however, Origen holds a conception of God in Himself apart 
from any conception of creation whatever. In his perception, the Son of 
God (conceived as Wisdom and Logos) is in the divine reality as a person 
who is related to no one but to God. In this state there is nothing of 
creation but the only reality is the divine one, namely the being of God 
Himself.
§2. The providential creation.
The important element in our analysis hitherto is that Origen 
holds a conception of a reality ’’when"89 there is neither time nor world, 
a reality where there is nothing apart from God himself. This is why he 
states that i t  is God who is the original "place as it  were" (oiovei xonog) 
of the Logos.90
Certainly i t  is utterly d ifficult to portray this reality, for i t  is
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the divine life  itself. What is important at this point, however, is that 
Origen does hold a perception of a state before creation ( id  npc 
geveae&g)^
It is out of this reality that God decides to create and the notion 
of "coming into being out of non-being" begins to make sense.
This is the most crucial point of Origen's conception of God as 
creator. The question however is: "what did God create in the 
beginning?". Only when Origen's answer to this question is comprehended, 
his entire conception of creation w ill be comprehended, too.
Origen portrays the Wisdom of God as a "substance" (ouoia) who 
exists "before the aeons" (npo iq jv  aiwvujv) and existed before creation as 
a timeless (ai&tog) being; and when she established a relation tc 
creatures (id tfs vvq id j, then she became the "beginning" (apxq) of God’s 
ways, both of the constructional and providential ( tw v  noiqiiKuiv kcu 
npovorjiiKUJv); so this beginning (apxrj) has been yoked together with the 
creatures, as she became the ir beginning bg relating herself to them ir. 
creating them ; yet this wisdom is timeless and exists as a substantial 
subject with God before time (q 6e oo$(a a(6iog, ouq iu jS llj^  npo gulljvqjv 
napa xu 8eu unapxouaa)".92
The crucial element which is therefore introduced by Origen is the 
distinction of what he calls providential (npovoqxiKuiv) creation from 
the constructional (noiqxiKwv) one which came into existence as a 
material world.
In fact, Origen considers two different passages of Genesis in 
order to ground his view that the very creative act of God is but the 
fact that he brought these reasons (Ro^oi) into being out of non-being. 
What God "uttered" was not just "words" but i t  constituted a creative aa 
in itself93 and these "words (fiogoi) are exactly the "reasons" (Ro^oi) 
according to which the creation is provided.
The firs t passage is the saying "Let us make man in our image,
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after our likeness ... So God created man in his own image, in the image 
of God created he him; male and female created he them”.94
The second passage is the saying "And the Lord formed man of the 
dust of the ground".95
The conclusion which Origen draws from these scriptural passages 
is that God "created" human nature yet i t  is only later that the material 
element enters into the narration. This means that what was made "in 
image" of God had nothing to do with "matter" as "the firs t man" who 
was made in the image of God" was "immaterial and superior to any 
corporeal nature".96
What kind of "creation" was this? Is this a Platonic perception of 
an "incorporeal world" made in the beginning, a notion that so many 
scholars have attributed to Origen?
We can trace Origen’s views in other parts of his works in Greek 
and see that he holds a perception of the outcome of the creative act of 
God which is far from being what is currently thought to be.
When Origen speaks of the "incorporeal" which came into being out 
of non-being he refers to nothing else apart from those fld#oi which 
means both "utterances" of God and "reasons". This is the "incoproreal" 
that came into being out of non-being.
Origen takes particular care to make this point clear. Thus he 
states that when is is said that God made Adam, one should take into 
account that the term "Adam" translated in Greek means just "man". Thus 
the narration of Moses does not refer to "any individual" (oux ouxwg nepi 
evog xivog) but he refers just to "the human nature" (nepi xijg xou 
av9pwnou(puoeu)g)97
Accordingly, in commMatt, he points out that one should note that 
in the firs t of these passages of the Genesis is said of "male and female" 
and not "man and woman". He also remarks that the same phraseology is 
used in the Hebrew original text and he adduces the words used there.
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His view is that the difference is substantial. For the expression “male 
and female" refer to what has been created “in image" whereas either 
the term “man" or "woman" can never pertain to what is perceived as "in 
image" of God (ouSenoxe gap guvfj 10 Kax’ eiKova ou6e avrjp).98 Again 
Origen reiterates his fundamental conception that the fncorporea, 
creation does not re fe r to the creation o f any individual persons.
In the comm John he refers to the saying "and God saw that i t  was 
good".99 He again points out that this saying about what was created can 
pertain but to the "reasons" of things and not to the actual material 
things. This "creation" is but coming into being of the reasons of those 
which later came into existence. At that point he develops an extensive 
argument adducing passages from the Genesis. When it  is said about "sea 
beasts"100 and "cattle, and creeping things, and beasts"101 how is it  
possible to say that it  was the actual creatures that God saw that it  
was "good"? Are those beasts "good"? Certainly not, Origen affirms. 
Therefore it  was not these creatures themeselves that God saw that i t  
was "good" but "what was good was the reasons about them"102. The 
"creation" of the divine wisdom and providence by virtue of which these 
beasts came into being -this was what God saw as a "good" creature. 
This is the most subtle point of Origen’s conception of creation: Wisdom 
of God is called both his beginningless son and the product of his 
creative act, which came into being and "embroidered" the "body" of his 
son (s. in fra ).
Why (that is, the "reasons" for which) these beasts should come 
into being certainly are known to God alone. For God does nothing in vain 
or without reason as even the falling of a small sparrow does not take 
place independently from God’s providence but for everything there is a 
"reason" known to God only and existing in his wisdom.
So when Origen speaks about an "incorporeal" which was made in 
the beginning, he does not refer to anything which might be understood
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as a persona1 individual being. It was the reasons of the world that 
constitute what was created and these reasons were what came into 
being out of non-being.
It is in the light of this perception that "The son of God is also 
called wisdom, made as a beginning of his ways to his works, according 
to the Proverbs103, which means that wisdom existed only in relation tc 
him’ o f whom she was wisdom, having no relation to anyone else at ah 
(rj xou 8sou oocpia, npog xov ou sail aotpia unapxouaa, ouSepiav axeaiv 
npog sxepov xiva s(xev); but the son of God himself became God's 
benevolent decision (euSoxia Beou gevopevog) and w illed  (T]poufif|9r)) to 
bring creatures into being. This wisdom then w illed (rjSsflricrsv) tc 
establish a creative relation (oxsmv 5r}gioupyiKfjv) to future creatures 
(npog zdsaoyeva) and this is exactly the meaning of the saying that she 
has been made the beginning of God's ways.".104
According to this perception of the providential creation, Wisdom 
is an incorporeal (aowpaxog) living (guiaa) hypostasis (unoaxaaig) of 
various apperceptions (9eojpf)}iaxa), which apperceptions contain the 
reasons of everything that exists (nepiexovxwv xoug xuiv oFUuv flogoug). 
This wisdom is a living personal being, "having a soul as it  were" ( kcu 
oiovei spipuxov).105 By this definition Origen refers to both the son of God 
and the created wisdom, which came into being and "embroidered" the 
body of the son. We note, nevertheless, that the son of God is 
persistently regarded not only as living in the same way as God, but also 
as an individual personal hypostasis of his own. However, i t  is beyond 
our scope to elaborate on this point, which needs a full exposition of 
Origen's theology.
In view of this conception, Origen refers to the wisdom of God as 
"containing the reasons of everything which has been created"105; and 
"one by one the reasons of those ruled are being in God’s Logos and in the 
Wisdom of his" (01 kq9' sva flogoi xujv SioiKoupevuv siaiv ev xu xou 8eou
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Aogu kcu xfj Io(p(a auxou).107 This is the sense in which Origen 
distinguishes between the "concepts of God" (xa evvorjpaxa xou 8eou) 
which later "were somehow substansified and came into actuality" 
(ouoiojpeviuv nujg Kai eig epgov epxojievwv).108
Thus when Origen refers to wisdom, although he clearly regards 
her as a person, namely as the son of God, he also implies a notion of 
"multitude" in this wisdom, it is in view of this that he affirms that 
that "in" Wisdom there are the "reasons, according to which has 
everything been made by God in wisdom.".109
In any case, this "former" creative act of God is  not a creation 0/ 
individual personal beings and this is a very funadamental element in 
the discussion of Origen’s perception of God as creator. Furthermore, the 
outcome of this creative act of God is perceived to be in  God and more 
specifically, in his wisdom, namely in C hrist.
This is why Origen, although regarding wisdom as a personal 
living being, also appears to hold a notion of "multitude" in her. This 
"multitude" is but what was created by God, namely the "reasons" and the 
"system of apperceptions" which are in her.
The providential creation is perceived as a causing-into-being out 
of non-being of the "reasons" of the material world. This is the sense in 
which this "creation" is said to be incorporeal; for the "reasons" and 
"apperceptions" are obviously incorporeal.
What was "created" out of the providential creation was not a 
"man" or a "woman", but i t  was "male and female", namely it  was just 
"human nature" that came into being out of non-being. This is the sense 
in which Origen affirms that human being was "first" (npoxepov)110 made 
"incorporeal" and what is known as "man and woman" were created "at 
some later stage" (uoxspov gap noxe).111 The saying "Let us make man in 
our image after our likeness"112 "pertains to all men"; and what the 
"multitude" understand by the expression "in image" is "older"
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(npeopuxepov) than what Adam became when, "because of sin" he assumed 
"the image of the earthly".113
It is obvious then that this "first" creation of God is but the "clear 
utterances" of God which were "uttered before" (npoxpavuj9evxag) and 
actual material creation came into existence according to these "clearly 
pre-uttered words (or, reasons) which were in the wisdom 0<axd xoug sv 
xfj ao(pCa npoxpavw9evxag uno 8eou xwv eaopevojv rloftoug)". This is why 
Origen, in treating this notion, he constantly uses Future tense in order 
to refer to the actual creation.114
Indeed he affirms that "there are certain creatures which are 
invisible"115, namely incorporeal116. What he means by these 
"incorporeals" are but the "reasons" which were created in the Wisdom 
and are called "wisdom", too. These reasons are perceived as 
constituting the "body" of this wisdom and are assimilated to a "book". 
Origen clearly states that the content of this wisdom is "the reasons of 
Providence and judgement".117
Origen states that it  is possible to "see" this wisdom and to 
comprehend these "reasons". This happens when a rational creature is 
attains to eternal life118. There is a crucial notion of Origen’s here, 
which should be emphasized. Even when this "wisdom" is seen and clearly 
comprehended, this does not mean that it  is God in H im self that has 
been seen. Through this wisdom it  is only God as Creator that is seen by 
virtue of the fact that through this wisdom God has manifested himself 
as Creator, namely as what he decided and w illed  to do and not as he is 
in Himself, who is radically transcendend and beyond any comprehension. 
Origen clearly enunciates his view that all that can be seen through this 
wisdom is God "as creator and wise and provident and judge".119 And 
when i t  is said that the contemplation of incorporeals is a contemplation 
of God as Creator, this ensues from the fact that God is the creator not 
only of what is corporeal but also of what is incorporeal120, namely the
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“reasons" of providence and judgement. This is the “system of 
apperceptions” (xou ouoxfjpaxog xujv ev auxui vorpdixiijv)121 which 
constitutes the providential creation. What are understood to be 
"creatures" in this creation are the "reasons of providence and 
judgement"122 and this constitutes the object of " moral and natural and 
theological" knowledge123, namely the object of any kind of knowledge.
This is the context in which Origen speaks of "apperceptions" 
Osupfjpaxa) which have been created and placed into the Wisdom of God 
and they are called wisdom, too.124
So, in going on to portray God as Creator, Origen makes a further 
step and depicts his notion of "conceptions" (or ideas) (enivoiai) of the 
Wisdom. By this term he refers to certain predicates attributed to the 
son of God,, such as logos, light, truth, Christ, king, real vineyard, firs t 
and last, beginning and end, paraclete, propitiatory, consecration, good, 
great arch-priest etc. Origen calls all these names as "conceptions" 
which are "in" the Wisdom as well as "names of the son".125
He also speaks of the "apperceptions (9eujpfj|iaxa) of the truth" in 
order to indicate that "the father does not want to confine and keep 
them from dispersing (ou ouvexwv o naxgp); this is why he makes the 
figure of these apperceptions in the Logos in a form of "belching out" 
(epsuftexai) and this is why the Logos is called as image of the invisible 
God".126 It is remarkable that Origen ponders upon the use of the word 
"belch out" or "disgorge" (epeu^exai) which is found in the scripture.127 
He avers that other words might seem more appropriate such as "my 
heart has projected" or "my heart has uttered"; yet it  is said "disgorged" 
[ibid]. What he actually suggests is that the "prefiguration"128 of these 
"apperceptions" in the Logos is an act of God. It is through the 
contemplation of these "apperceptions" that one would "see" the father 
when he sees the son.
This is the sense in which Origen refers to the "apperceptions of
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the Logos” (xuiv xou Ro^ ou 9eu)pq|idxii)v).129
What, therefore, came into being out of non-being was a 
"multitude" of "wisdom” (ao<piav) and "reasons" (Rogoug) and "forms" 
Cxunuv) and "system of conceptions" (auoxfj|iaxoq vorijidxajv)130 and 
"apperceptions" (9ewpfjpaxa) and which were made "in wisdom" and were 
named "wisdom" and placed, as it  were, in the Wisdom of God. It is 
according to this latter conception that wisdom is stated as "created".i
Hence Origen’s conception of "coming into being out of non-being" 
pertains to the providential creation which is perceived as being in  the 
divine life. This is the sense in which he refers to the son of God as a 
"creature" although he certainly is the outstanding counter-point of what 
later was known as Arianism.131
Subsequently he affirms that "the firstborn of all creation" [Cf. 
Col.1,15] "is the oldest of all created beings and ... i t  was to him that 
God said of the creation of man: 'Let us make man in our image and 
likeness'.132 For "wisdom" is regarded as "created" in the "body" of 
Christ.
It then becomes obvious what Origen means when he regards 
wisdom not only as the person of the son, but also as the contemplation 
and apprehension of divine things. It is because in wisdom the father has 
figured the apprehensions of the truth that i t  is impossible to apprehend 
God unless through his wisdom. This is how Origen comprehends the 
scriptural saying that i t  is only through the "seeing" of the son that one 
might “see" the father.133
Those "theoremata” are held to be in wisdom out of an act of the 
father. This is why at some points Origen refers to the son of God using 
the word "creature"134 although he is clear in enunciating his 
fundamental opinion that the son is not a creature.
These "theoremata" constitute the "decoration" of wisdom, whom 
Origen quite often names by the scriptural adjective "multi­
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embroidered" (noRunoiKiRog).135 In those "theoremata" (9eujpf}|iaxa) and 
"reasons" (RogoO135 the explanation of everything in the world can be 
found. This is the sense in which Origen names as "wisdom" not only the 
Son of God, as a person, but also the knowledge of the "reasons" 
according to which everything can be explained and thus clearly known.
The "reasons" is what God created in the beginning. Taking into 
account that the term ftdtfoi means both "words" and "reasons", Origen's 
view is that these flogoi are the words of God when he was speaking to 
his son in the creation of the world according to Genesis. These flogot of 
God are but the creative fiew rjS fjw  (fia t) out of which the notion of 
"coming into being out of non-being" began to make sense. It is certainly 
God who brought them into being but the act of this "creation" is 
portrayed as an "utterance" of the father to the son. These "utterances", 
in Greek called by Origen flo$ot (which means "utterances", "words” and 
"reasons"), is what actually came into being out of non-being.
The "theoremata" and "reasons" decorate the "body" of wisdom and 
they are assimilated to "precious stones", yet living ones.137 It should be 
emphasized, however, that those "stones" are regarded as living, yet 
this life  is not anyone else's life, but i t  is the life  of wisdom herself, 
that is the life of the Son of God, as a living personal substantial 
incorporeal hypostasis. Speaking of "stones", in the Plural, no notion of 
"distinction" or "division" is implied at all, because this expression is a 
reference to incorporeal nature in which no notion of "division" makes 
any sense.
Hence the reality portrayed here is the divine one. There is no 
corporeal nature and there is no world at all. It is God who lives; for 
"life without a body is found in the Trinity alone".138 There is only God 
who is without parts as he "is entirely one and simple (o 9eog pev ouv 
ndviT] ev e o x iv  kcu anflouv)"139 Even the Logos (who exists in 
timelesseness) is "one although he comprises many apperceptions, each
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apperception being meant as a part of the Logos".140
This is the state which Origen calls "bliss" (p aK ap io xq g ).141 What 
he means by this term is this reality of the divine life;142 he also uses 
the term "the heavenly" ( tujv o u p av iu v ) or the term "up" (a v w ).143 It is in 
this context that he refers to "those holies (xtuv a ^ iw v ) who live a 
completely immaterial and incorporeal life  in bliss."144 It should be 
noted here that the term " holies ( xujv a^iujv)" denotes the reality of 
divine holines; i t  is in the same sense that Origen refers to becoming a 
"citizen of the holies of God", the term "the holies" being a neuter, not a 
masculin noun. And it  i t  in this sense that statements about "invisible 
creatures"145 should be understood. This is why he has no hesitation to 
call these creatures as "the invisible of God" (xo ig  aopdxotg  xou 9eou) 
and "eternal ones", being "eternal (a iu m o ig )"  by virtue of the fact that 
they are "invisible" (a o p a x o ig )145 namely because these "creatures" are in 
the divine reality. It is obvious that since, at this stage, any temporal 
notion is excluded, the term "eternal" indicates the quality of being in 
the eternal life, in the same sense that God is very frequently stated as 
"eternal"; hence this term "eternal" implies a quality of being and not 
any quantity of time, namely any everlasting or beginningless duration, 
since duration itself is excluded from that state.
The fundamental characteristic of this divine reality is "unity" and 
"agreement". This is actually the kind of unity which applies to the 
relation of the son to the father. To depict this unity has been a task 
regarded by Origen significant enough as to devote quite extensive 
analyses to this.147
This is why Origen, although has stressed the radical difference 
of wisdom from what is created, states:
"Wisdom is a sister of ours; for the Father who made incorporeal 
nature, made her too; but here it  is not the Son of God who is meant, but 
i t  is the contemplation of corporeals and incorporeals, as well as
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whatever exists in wisdom, either i t  is has to do with judgement or 
providence".148
So Origen points up that it  is possible to speak of wisdom in two 
ways: First, the term may refer to the son of God himself, who is a 
personal hypostasis (evunooxaxog). Secondly, i t  may mean the wisdom 
which has been given to the faithful either as an oral or as a written 
speech.149 This latter meaning actually means what Origen calls "a genus 
of education and knowledge” (Tfjv ootpiav evxau9a tug $evog eflape xfjg 
naiSetag xat xfjg gvtuastug) because "education and knowledge are included 
in the wisdom, which is bestowed by the Holy Spirit and this is why 
education and knowledge are called speech of wisdom".150 Elsewhere he 
says that wisdom is a deep understanding of divine reality (eniaxfjpr] 
9s(tov) as well as a comprehension of human things (av9punivuv 
npaftpaxtuv KaxafiT]t})ig) stating further that wisdom is Christ himself.151
This view of Origen’s does not imply that he holds two notions 
about the actual meaning of wisdom; his view remains constant as he 
fundamentally regards wisdom as a person, identified with the son of 
God bestowing the knowledge of divine mysteries (elsewhere called as 
"mystic teaching and contemplation of the truth"152), which are called 
wisdom too. Therefore he uses the term both in order to indicate the 
person of the son of God as well as to indicate what is bestowed by this 
person.
Thus in selDeut Origen refers to the "kingdom of heavens" saying 
that "it is Christ who irrigates this good earth providing the streams of 
wisdom".153 In selPs he refers to those who "reach the end" and find "a 
table of rational foods prepared by the Lord. For wisdom who is in the 
Lord w ill have prepared her own table of luncheon on which she is going 
to offer her own sacrifices".154 It is quite characteristic that, within 
one and the same passage, he speaks of wisdom implying the two 
meanings he attributes to this term at the same time. In the same work
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Origen elaborates on his view of the actual meaning of wisdom as he 
states: "And it  is not only a table of foods that wisdom has prepared but 
she also offers plenty of wine, which is made from her herself who is 
the real vineyard; and she offers this wine having mixed the divine mind 
with human words; and she distributes the wine taking it  from this 
vessel and offering a glass to each one".155
It is exactly the notion of the plentitude of divine mysteries 
existing in wisdom that makes Origen to regard her as being a 
"hypostasis of various apperceptions".155
This idea of conceptions of wisdom does not imply any notion of 
distinction or division of wisdom herself. Origen stresses that "no one 
should suppose that these conceptions attributed to the saviour imply 
any distinction in substance".157 This means that the various predicates 
attributed to wisdom do not introduce any actual division in the 
substance of wisdom herself. If there seems to be a notion of distinction 
it  only stems from the different ways in which human intellect 
comprehends the son of God.
Once Origen has made this point, he devotes a large part of the 
First Book of the commJohn in order to examine the names attributed to 
Christ in the various passages of the scripture; for he regards it  as 
"useful to ponder upon the meanings (xprjaipov eaxai to paaaviaai Tag 
svvo(ag) which stand behind those names".158
He is clear not only in portraying the full presence of the Logos 
in the atemporal being of God; but he also is clear in stating the relation 
of the Logos to Wisdom.
It is fundamental view of Origen‘s that although all the 
conceptions of wisdom are virtually pertain to the same person, namely 
to the son of God, i t  is not possible to change the terms mutually when 
speaking about him. For example, one does not denote the same thing by 
applying to Christ either the conception of "beginning" or that of the
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“end"; he certainly speaks of the same subject but he alludes to different 
perceptions of him. This is why Origen states that Christ “is not the 
same when he is named by the conceptions of his" (ou Kaia Tag enivoiag 
o auiog).159
It is in this context that Origen points out that the son of God is 
apxh only when he is conceived as Wisdom, yet he is not apxh when he is 
conceived as Logos. He points up that "no one should be surprised, that 
the saviour, as we said before, is many goods (nofirld ap9d) and there 
are many conceptions of his, one firs t, one second, one third;"160 and "if 
anyone is capable of scrutinizing the hidden truth of the scripture he 
might find the whole range of the conceptions cited there; yet I do not 
think he w ill find them all".151 He concludes that "if one examines 
painstakingly all the conceptions of the son of God, he w ill find that he 
is regarded as apxh only in as much as he is thought as wisdom, and he 
cannot be regarded as apxrj even if  he is conceived as Logos".152
What Origen wants to denote here is this: There is a whole 
succession of "conceptions" (enivoiai) which are perceived in a classified 
way. These conceptions are thought to be in an "order"163 such as 
Wisdom - Logos - Life - Truth - Justice- ...etc.164 This succession is 
long and it  is Origen's conviction that however well may one study the 
scripture he w ill not eventually be able to say that he has found all the 
conceptions of the son of God. In this "order" each conception is what it 
is "just because" (K a 9 ‘ o) it  is what the previous conception indicates.165 
This means that each conception in the order is understood to be 
"broader" in relation to its next Thus, he asserts is that wisdom is a 
conception of the son which is, as it  were, "broader" that that of Logos; 
for Logos "was in apxrj", that is to say that Logos was "in Wisdom" 
because it  is only Wisdom who can be conceived as apxrj. Since, 
therefore, Wisdom "contains",so to speak, the Logos, i t  follows that 
Wisdom is a conception "broader" than the conception of Logos. So the
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Logos cannot be regarded as apxq, exactly because apxq is a “broader” 
conception than that of the Logos.
Indeed it  is Origen's conviction that wisdom is apxf| because she 
is 6od‘s wisdom in herself, while Logos alone cannot be considered as a 
full manifestation of God's wisdom. Wisdom is apxq because she can be 
manifested as Logos and to be comprehended by creation which was made 
"in wisdom"; she is apxq because she "contains" Logos, she can be 
manifested as Logos. She "contains" the Logos yet she is not "contained" 
in him.
This is the meaning according to which the Logos cannot be 
thought as apxrj. Logos is a "particular", so to speak, manifestation of 
wisdom because (as stated in John,1,1) the Logos was in apxh, namely he 
was in  the Wisdom.
In like a manner Logos is thought to be broader to its next 
conception, namely to that of "life". For life  "was made in  the Logos".156
So the Logos is the Wisdom of God manifested in such a way that 
she can be conceived by rational creatures. Creation contains rationality 
and it  is in this way manifesting God’s wisdom. Again, the Logos is God's 
wisdom that creates life  and rationality.167 Logos is the way through 
which rational creatures receive a hint about God’s wisdom, because the 
Logos is Wisdom herself manifested in the creation as Logos.
There is therefore neither any difference between wisdom and 
Logos in substance nor any ontological classification of them, for the 
simple reason that there is no essential distinction at all. The 
distinction which Origen makes is nothing more than an intellectual one 
and this is why he speaks of conceptions of the son of God. And 
certainly there is no notion of temporal distinction between them 
whatever, as both the conceptions are clearly stated as being in the 
atemporal being of God.
Concerning the notion of providential creation, the question which
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arises is this: Do all the conceptions of Christ make sense when God is 
conceived in Himself without any notion of creative act? When God is 
perceived in Himself, and not as creator, when God is perceived as it  
were before he decided to create, does it  make sense to speak of 
"conceptions” of the son of God? And if  i t  does, which of them make 
sense in God's divine timelessness before any decision of His to create 
and before any creative act of his?168
it is actually Origen himself who poses this question in a certain 
point of his work;169 although he there leaves this question without any 
further examination, he does not fail to face it  later in the same work.
Having seen what the actual meaning of the succession of son’s 
conception is, Origen raised the question of their sense in relation to 
world and to time. His answer is that, among all those conceptions, i t  is 
only the Logos who has always existed in the atemporal being of God 
even in the reality that God had not yet decided to create. The Logos 
was present in God’s wisdom eternally when there was not any creation 
at all. It is him "through whom" the world was made, but the Logos was 
not himself made ad hoc, Logos was not "made" at all; for he always 
"was with God".170
The rest of the son’s conceptions, however, had a beginning. For 
they make sense only in as much as God is regarded as Creator. They 
appear providentially when God made the providential creation, into the 
"system of apperceptions that was created" but they make actual sense 
only when actual creation came into being. For in order to speak of 
"conceptions" there must be individuals who "conceive" of Christ in one 
way or another. Thus, in order to conceive of Christ as a "shepherd" 
there must be an actual "flock", otherwise this conception makes no 
sense.
It is only after those analyses that we can properly enquiry 
Origen’s assertion that the son of God "is many goods" (noRRa a^a9a
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uv).171 He clearly explains that those "goods" are not anything but the 
"conceptions" of the son. These "goods" therefore do not at all imply any 
kind of Platonic notion of "ideas". It is mainly in terms of time that 
Origen makes his point perfectly clear; for these "goods" are not of any 
Platonic sort of atemporal ideas existing in themselves; but they are 
meant to exist only "in our perception" ( kq x ’ enivoiav),172not in 
themselves as individual and distinct beings. Thus all the "conceptions" 
after Wisdom and Logos can make sense only in presence of time, namely 
in the presence of the actual material creation;173 for, as Origen 
enunciates, the rest of son's conceptions, from the third downwards, 
may exist only in presence of time.174 It is therefore obvious that there 
can be no similarity of these "goods", as stated by Origen, to any 
Platonic notion of atemporal "ideas" existing in themselves as distinct 
individuals.
With respect to this subject, there is a significant distinction that 
Origen makes of the conceptions of Christ. They are considered as 
distinguished in three categories:
First, conceptions which do not pertain to Christ in himself but 
only "to others" (oux auxw, arirV eiepotg);175 such are the predications of 
him as "shepherd", "way", "gate", "rod".
Secondly, conceptions which pertain both to Christ in himself and 
to others (auxtO kcu exepoig);176 such is the conception of Christ as Logos; 
also as Wisdom, to the extent that wisdom can be comprehended by 
creatures.
Thirdly, conceptions which pertain only to Christ in himself and to 
no one else (cauxw kcu ouScvQ .177 In this category there is the conception 
of Christ as Wisdom, inasmuch as a certain "system of apperceptions in 
him" (auaxfjjiaxog 9eupr][idxiijv ovxog sv auxiu) cannot be comprehended by 
any created nature.
In view of this third category of conceptions, Origen speaks of
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Christ stating that "there is a system of apperceptions in him, in as 
much as he is wisdom, some of which are incomprehensible to the rest 
of the created nature (xfj fiomrj nap‘ auxov gevv^xfj (puaei)."178 
Accordingly, he states that the "multitude of apperceptions" ( to  nfif)9og 
tujv 9stjjpT]fidniJv) about Christ is incomprehensible not only to human 
beings but also to all creatures, for i t  is only Christ and the Holy Spirit 
who can comprehend them.179
Referring to the conception of "life" (which is the pivotal 
indication of the actual spatio-temporal reality), Origen affirms that 
this conception belongs to the First category, namely Christ conceived as 
"life" is a conception pertaining not to him himself but to others (oux 
auxui afifld exepoig).180
It is our conclusion therefore that there can be no notion of "life" 
of rational creatures "before" the creation of bodily nature itself. If one 
speaks about life  "before" the existence of bodily nature he cannot speak 
of anything else than the life  of Sod himself. Life referred to "rational 
creatures" "before" the creation of bodily nature is unthinkable. It is 
also an absurd philosophical category when it  is applied to rational 
creatures "before" time.181 This is why Origen states that "life", as a 
conception of the son, did not exist in timelessness but it  "became" with 
creation.182
Therefore, one can speak of "creaturely life" only with respect to 
the actual creation when the notion of "others", namely when creatures 
come into existence and the notion of "diversification" begins to make 
sense. "Before" the actual creation, the term "life" applies only to divine 
life. For "the Father is life  and, being life, he sets forth life" and God, as 
life, "established a relation to rational creatures, as he willed to 
benefit them"183 and so "he brought them into existence".184 This 
creatures* coming into existence indicates the actual creation of the 
world and it  is directly related to a notion of "diversification" which
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stems from the fall out of the divine life. This conception of the 
fall is what we shall examine next.
§3. The Fall and Creation of the World.
In treating Origen's conception of the fall, our previous discussion 
about what he calls the state before creation ( id  npo ftsveaeujg) 185 
should be taken into consideration.
There is only one actual meaning which the term "life" can have 
when i t  is applied to that reality: This is the divine life. For in that 
state there is no actual world; subsequently, there is no corporeality 
and time as these realities are closely connected to the actual existence 
of the world.186
What therefore "lives" is the Trinity, as "life without a body can 
be found in the Trinity alone".187 We have nevertheless pointed that 
Origen holds a notion about the wisdom of God as a "multi- embroidered” 
(noflunouafiog) one (as in Eph.,3,10). This implies a notion of "multitude", 
but this "multitude" suggests no notion of "distinction"; "for i t  is 
impossible to speak of a part of what is incorporeal or to make any 
division in it".188 Yet Origen regards wisdom as a "living incorporeal 
hypostasis of various apperceptions",189 which are regarded as 
"containing the reasons of everything".190
In commEph there is a passage of utmost importance. He refers to 
the phrase of Paul’s "we, like everyone else, were in our nature children 
of wrath"191 and he comments on it  as follows:
"We do not know what those who introduce the theory about 
spiritual natures existing in the beginning would answer to the [saying] 
'We, like everyone else, were in our nature children of wrath’; for how 
is it  possible that someone who by nature is son of God be named as son 
'of wrath'? this is what they have to answer to. But i t  is because of our 
'body of humiliation'192 that we think we have become 'children of wrath
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in our nature', when our mind 'had since our youth been inclined toward 
evil things'193 (s(g 6s to 'rjjis9a <puasi xexva op^rjg wg Kat o( RomoC, ouk 
oiSayev o,xi noxe spouaiv o( Tag nvsupaxiKag apxrj9ev (puaeig eiaa^ovxsg' 
nwg $dp o (puaei uiog 9sou (puaei sivai Re^sxai uiog ‘opgrjg’ anoKpivea9waav. 
r][isig 6s oiops9a 6ia xo 'awpa zf\g xansivwasujg' ^o vsva i 'xsKva (puasi 
op^gg' oxs 's v s k s ix o ' t][jiuv 'fj 6iavoia sn( xa novr]pa sk  vsoxrjxog')''.194
The notion implied in this passage is that the world is a product 
of wrath. It is certainly not accidental that Origen alludes to his notion 
of the fall referring both to the bodily nature itself (from Paul's 
Phil.3,21) and to God's wrath because of men's disobedience, as implied 
in the cited passage from Genesis. Both those notions imply, to a certain 
extent, to his conception of the fall, as constituting the “cause" of 
world's coming into existence.
Origen's conception of the fall, as stated in his works, is the most 
delicate of the notions which constitute his entire theology. We certainly 
refer to his written thought; for although he held a certain conception of 
the fall, he has deliberately avoided to expound it  explicitly in writing. 
We shall argue that many of the misapprehensions of his thought are due 
to failure to grasp this paricular facet of his thought.
There is nowhere in Origen's works preserved in Greek that a 
systematic exposition of his conception of the fall can be found. 
Systematic analyses of the various meanings of apxh have been 
preserved; exegeses on the notion of "world" are extant too; but Origen 
does not explicate his conception of the fall. As we shall argue, this is 
not accidental at all.
Many things have been said about Origen's mysticism;195 yet these 
analyses are actually drawn from what he has actually expressed. Origen 
himself was in fact haunted by the fear that he might articulate those of 
his mystical perceptions that he was not allowed to. He was always 
bearing in mind that there are certain mystical truths that God granted
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some people, yet he forbade them from saying them aloud. He was 
constantly thinking of what Paul says in 2 Cor,12,4 about "ineffable 
words, that man is prohibited from uttering".
As a preacher he always fe lt himself on the horns of a dilemma: 
On the one hand he was feeling that i t  was not his right to deprive 
people from the wisdom which God granted him; on the other hand his 
fear was that he might utter more than what he was allowed to. This 
agony is with particular strain expressed in his D ia l) intending to speak 
about the soul (a topic directly related to the concept of fall) he makes 
a long introduction emphasizing that "The ideas are delicate" and 
therefore they demand listeners who are able to apprehend the deeper 
truths196 because "we have reached a mystical doctrine" (eni Ro^ ov 
rjR9o[isv puoxiKov).197 And here is how he feels on saying a few words 
about this mystical truth:
"I feel agony intending to speak; I feel agony intending not to speak 
(A^wvitu emsiv, a^wviw kcu firj emeiv). Because of those who are worthy I 
want to speak, lest I be accused of depriving of the word those able to 
understand it. Because of the unworthy I shrink from speaking for the 
reasons I have given, lest I should be flinging holy things to dogs and 
casting pearls before swine. !t was the work of Jesus only to know how 
to distinguish among his hearers between those without and those 
within, so that he spoke to those without in parables, but explained the 
parables to those who entered into his house.198 To remain without and 
to enter into the house have a mystical meaning (p u ox iK o v  e o x iv ). ’Why 
should I judge those that are without?’199 Every sinner is without. That 
is why those without are addressed in parables in case they should be 
able to leave the things without and enter the things within. To enter 
the house has a mystical meaning ([iu o x ik o v  e o x iv ) ; he who enters Jesus’ 
house is his true disciple. He enters by holding the doctrine of the 
church, by living a life  according to the teaching of the church. ’Within’
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and ‘without’ have a spiritual sense."200
He regards the concept of fall as a mystical truth, which should be 
not uttered or articulated at all. For, as he points out, to enquire deeply 
in and speak about "the creation of the Lucifer, is beyond our ability. For 
the doctrine about this question is great and d ifficult to speculate" 
(nofiug gap o nepi xouxou rlogog Kai 8ua9£iijpr|xog).201
Accordingly he states that "only few people are able to
comprehend those who more systematically expound the doctrines about 
the state before creation ( id  npo ^evsastug) and the deeper meaning of 
creation [m i xa sv gsvsasi) of each one; these doctrines might embarass 
one (xapd^ai dv xiva xa xoiauxa) who w ill have heard but not exactly 
understood them (ouvevxa psv xauxa, \if\ axpipouvxa 6e); this is why we 
imperil ourselves in relation to these [doctrines]; for to speak about and 
elaborate on them is precarious (smacpafleg) although the doctrines are 
true Cxo fiegsiv Kai avanxuaasiv xa xoiauxa saxiv snia^aReg Kdv
afiT]9£ur)xai)".202
This concern that his thought might be misundersood haunted 
Origen thoughout his life.203 However, despite his cautiousness and his 
reticence about doctrines which might be misunderstood, history shows 
that he finally did not avoid what he was afraid of, namely to be 
miscomprehended.
This is Origen’s personal background against which, in Cels, he 
refers to the conception of the fall; yet all he says on this subject is 
this: "And the man who is evicted from paradise together with his wife
... has a meaning which is ineffable and mystical".204 In view of what he
held about those truths which are "ineffable and mystical" it  is not 
surprising that he has deliberately avoided to set forth a systematic 
analysis of his conception of the fall.
We can, however, find some references that Origen makes on this 
subject at some points of his work in Greek. Consequently, we could
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identify some vital elements of his conception of the fall. We can also 
use the Latin rendering of the Princ;but in this case vve should use this
u  •
work with mush more caution than usually. In the Introduction we have 
argued that this work should not be used (as it  usually is) in order to 
interpret Origen's thought; but i t  should be used as an ancillary source. 
What is stated fn the Princ, should be interpreted in the light of Origen's 
views as found in his writings in Greek. As regards the conception of the 
fall, the Princ, should be cleared from many of Rufinus' 
misinterpretations as well as from views falsely attributed to Origen by 
others and most unfortunately embodied in Koetchau's edition. 
Nevertheless this work w ill be taken into account where statements 
extant only in Latin are corroborated by affirmations preserved in 
Greek.
Considering Origen’s perception of God and creation there are two 
existential realities which have been distinguished so far:
First, the reality of God, the divine life  in which there is nothing 
but God in himself.
Secondly, the divine reality in which God "decorated" the "body" of 
the "multi-embroidered" wisdom, namely the providential creation which 
came into being out of non-being. This marks the creation of incorporeal 
nature, yet this is not anyone else but it  is the person of Christ who 
lives as Wisdom whereas the created “reasons" and "theoremata" are 
also called "wisdom"205 and are regarded as decorating the "body” of 
Christ.
Thirdly, the fall out of the "body" of Christ. It is then that the 
actual creation comes into being out of non-being, namely space-time 
comes into existence and rational creatures, as individual personalities, 
come into being.205
This explicit statement of Origen's views, once i t  has been 
enunciated in words, seems already paradoxical. For how the Second
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reality can be said to be "after” the First one since there was no time?
We see, therefore, that the explicit statement requires 
compromise to discuss what appears as a paradox only once artfcu/atec 
in words. For there is no doubt that any one can conceptually think of a 
reality "before" creation, which however cannot be stated as "before". In 
any case the paradoxicality of expressions does not stop here.
The Second reality is that in which incorporeal nature was made. 
Origen has already affirmed that what in Genesis is stated to have been 
made "in image" of God has nothing to do with "matter" as “the firs t 
man" who was made "in image of God" was "immaterial and superior to 
any corporeal nature".207 The question here is: "Was this life  ?". The 
answer to this question is undoubtedly negative. For the category of life  
pertains only to what is related to time since the conception of "life" 
is directly related to the actual creation of the world.208
Thus, when Origen speaks of "first" creation he does not refer to 
anything else but to an "act" of God in his wisdom. Speaking of life  in 
that reality it  is the divine life which should be understood.
Thus there is a reality which appears paradoxical, too: On the one 
hand there is  a created re a lity  yet, on the other, there is  no creaturely 
life . For, at that state, it  is only the Son of God whom the predication 
of life  pertains to.
When, therefore, Origen speaks of "first" creation which was 
"incorporeal" he does not refer to any "incorporeal world" whatever. For 
in a stric t sense there is no world at all. The reality is the "body" of 
Christ, which was "embroidered" by those "made". To those who attribute 
a Platonic conception to Origen209 it  should be said that Origen makes a 
very fundamental distinction:
Although God is incorporeal and what was made was incorporeal 
too, there is a profound difference between them: The “made" 
incorporeal is explicitly said not to be oyoouoiov (co-essential) with God
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himself.210 The difference lies exactly in the fact that the latter 
incorporeal nature is created whereas God himself is uncreated. Thus 
Origen's conception is actually different from any Platonic one. For Plato 
never made such a substantial distinction which in Origen is indicative 
of his entire conception of the whole question.211
When G. Florovski212 states that the "difference" between God and 
the world lies in the fact that they are not "co-essential" he is unaware 
that he does nothing but merely repeat the views of Origen, whom he so 
often rebuked for what he thought to be Origen's conception of the 
world.213 This is why Florovski feels it  necessary to appeal to Augustine 
who said; “non Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihile ... quapropter 
creaturam universam neque consubstantialem Deo, neque coaeternam fas 
es dicere, aut credere" (Nature was not created from God but by God ... 
Hence we should not say or believe that universe is co-substantial or 
co-eternal with God).214 For what Florovski adduces as Augustine's views 
are actually Origen's affirmations about the "non-consubstantiality" of 
God and creation. He also speaks about a distance between of God and the 
world, yet "not a spatial one but pertaining to nature" (ou xonuj afiRd 
(puasi) appealing to John of Damascus215 whereas it  is but an affirmation 
of Origen in the comm John (ou xonw)215 employed by John of Damascus.
What was "made" as incorporeal was not a world of living 
individual persons, as already discussed. On the other hand, however, it  
is not quite that simple to say that i t  was not liv in g , namely that it  
was just a whole of "ideas" or "forms" in God’s mind as Philo might have 
said. If those "made" incorporeals were just something like that, then it  
would be extremely difficult, i f  possible at all, for the conception of the 
fall to make sense. For another substantial difference between those 
"made" incorporeals and the divine essence lies in the fact that the 
created incorporeal is susceptible of a kind of "change". As Origen 
argues those which are "co-essential are also susceptible of the same
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properties” alluding to the notion of fall on which though he does not ' 
wish to elaborate.
This is the most delicate point of Origen’s entire conception. What 
one would comprehend at that point is that those incorporeals were 
living  yet not a life  o f th e ir own, but the life  of Christ. This is what 
seems to be a paradox and which Origen did not wish to elaborate on. A 
figure of this perception might be traced in Paul's saying ”1 live; yet not 
I but Christ lives in me"217 a saying which Origen quite often appeals to 
and we are going to discuss about Origen’s deeper perception of i t  in 
chapter 5. It is also in the saying of Paul’s who speaks of being "one 
flesh" and that marriage is "a great mystery" concerning "Christ and the 
church".218
It is out of this state that fall occurs. In Origen’s view the fall is 
a fa ll from  God. 219 It is because of this view that he criticizes 
Heracleon who wrote that the Logos in his relation to creation is not he 
" from  whom" or "by whom", but he only is he "through whom" creation 
was made.220 Origen objects to this view, but he does not further 
elaborate, just because he holds the doctrine of the fall to be a mystical 
one; he only says that he also has treated the notion of "through whom", 
but Heracleon, as it  seems from the above-mentioned opinion of his, 
seems not to have been taught by the divine writings.221
Elsewhere, however, Origen states more clearly that the world 
has come "out" of God.222 For it  is Paul who, in Rom. 11,36, has portrayed 
the beginning of everything by the expression " out o f him {jk\ auxou)".223
In general the scriptural passages where Origen grounds this 
view, namely, that the world came out of God are the following: The I 
Cor.8,6 stating "yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are 
all things and for whom we exist..."; the above- mentioned Rom,11,36 
"For from him and through him and to him are all things..."224 as well as 
the saying in John 13,3225
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Origen is extremely cautious in adumbrating26 how this fall 
occured. The step he makes towards this direction is to introduce the 
notion that a "moulting (nispoppuqoig)" is possible from the body of 
wisdom227 This is the most mystical point of this conception of Origen; 
and he tries to express this view in a manner appropriate to the case, 
namely not by words of his own, but through scriptural ones, namely 
appealing to the prophet Ezekiel. A significant passage in Prfnc, reads as 
follows:
"But let us now see what the actual words of prophecy teach us. 
The word of the Lord', i t  says, came unto me me, saying, Son of man, 
take up a lamentation for the prince of Tyre, and say unto him, Thus 
saith the Lord God: Thou wert a signet of likeness and a crown of honour 
in the delights of the paradise of God. Thou wast adorned with every fine 
stone and gem, and wast clothed with sardius and topaz and emerald and 
carbuncle and sapphire and jasper, set in gold and silver, and with agate 
and amethyst and chrysolite and beryl and onyx; with gold also didst thou 
f i l l  thy treasuries and thy store-houses in thy widst. From the day thou 
wast creatd with the cherubim, I placed you in the holy mount of God. 
Thou wast in the midst of the fiery stones, thou wast stainless in thy 
days, from the day thou wast created until the time that iniquities were 
found in thee; from the multitude of thy commerce thou didst f i l l  thy 
storehouses with iniquity, and thou didst sin and wast cast wounded out 
of the mount of God. A cherub drove thee forth from the midst of the 
fiery stones. Thy heart was lifted up at thine honour; thy knowledge was 
corrupted with thy beauty; for the multitude of thy sins I have cast thee 
down to the earth in the presence of kings.228
Origen’s opinion about this passage is that it  refers to "an adverse 
power" which "was formerly holy and blessed" and "fell from this state 
of blessedness and was cast down into the earth ... from the time that 
iniquity was found in him", and that his fallen condition was not due to
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his nature.”.229
The fall is regarded as a fall of "one"; in the passage above it  is 
Rufinus rather than Origen that feels i t  necessary to f i l l  the expression 
by saying "an adverse power"; for Origen himself avoids to say anything 
more about this, speaking just of "one"; he leaves this numerical just 
like that, avoiding elaboration as to "who" or "what" is this "one". Thus 
he speaks of "one, who fell from the bliss",230 further he speaks of "one" 
applying the adjective "ruler" without stating any noun again; "while 
there were many rulers (apxovxwv) who were made (gevopsvujv), i t  was 
one who fell".231
It is not without significance that Origen does not apply any noun 
to that "one" who fell. This directly stems from his view that in that 
divine reality what really exists is "unity".232 It should also be noted 
that the adjective "archonton" (apxovxujv) (which means "rulers") comes 
directly from the word "arche" (apxrj).233
Whenever Origen speaks of the fall, he refers to that as a fall of 
"one"234 who has "moulted" (nxspoppurjaag) and therefore fell from the 
"bliss";235 for he formerly was in the paradise of God but he, as i t  were, 
satiated and was lost, according to him235 who said mystically; ‘you have 
come to a dreadful end and shall be no more for ever1 ”.237
Origen calls also this "one" as "the firs t" (o npwxog),238 for "after 
the moulting of the firs t (xw nptoxu nxspoppuijoavxi) others moulted too 
(kcu 6xi ano xivuv nxspoppuqaavxujv) and followed this firs t one down 
(kcu KaxaKoRou9r]odvxuJV xuj npujxtu)".239 He also describes this "one" as 
"malicious" (novqpou) and it  is quite characteristic that he there uses 
the Past participle "ekpessontos" (eKneaovxog) of the verb exninxw which 
means "fall down out of a place"; in this way Origen denotes both his 
notions about the fall, namely that this is a fall out of the divine being 
as well as a fall down. 240
Certainly when Origen refers not to the very occurence of the fall,
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but to the aftermath of it, he attributes a number of names to this "one” 
who "first" fell. He names him as a "dragon" or as a "big sea-monster" 
(as in Job,3,8) as well as he attributes to him other names, usually 
drawn from allegorical interpretations of the scripture241
Once Origen has articulated this fundamental notion about the fall 
of the "one", he refers to "some others" who "moulted" too and "followed" 
the "first" "down".242
There is a characteristic point which Origen makes in the 
commJohn. He refers to the devil who fell and in John is stated as 
"man-killer" (av9pwnoKx6vog).243 He there states that the devil, who 
killed the man who was made "in image" of God, did not perpetrate this 
"killing" to any particular individual creature; but this expression 
refers to human nature in general (ou 6ia uvaeva i5(wg noiov, afifia 5i' 
oRov to $svog o aneiacivsv)244 In this way Origen reiterates his view 
that the providential creation of man does not refer to any individual 
creature but it  signifies human nature in general. In the same passage, 
however, Origen affirms his view that this creature was not just an 
"idea" in God’s mind but it  was living. As this fall of Adam is stated as 
"death", Origen argues that "strictly speaking, no one can be said to be 
dead unless he lived  before".245
The very result of the fall is the creation’s coming into existence 
out of non-existence. More specifically, it  means the creation of bodily 
nature, the creation of matter itself for those who "needed a material 
life" and this is why the "world has become a material one’’.246 He also 
states that "once the dragon fell down from the clear life" which was 
"immaterial and absolutely incorporeal" he has "before anything else 
been bound with matter and body".247
There is, however, a more substantial fact which stands behind 
the emergence of corporeality; the fundamental result of the fall is the 
destruction of the original unity; what appears is a "multitude of
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number" (nflfj9og api9fiou), "schism" (axfojja), "division" (Siaipeaig) and 
"disagreement" (5ia<pujv(a). in Origen’s view, all those are "signs of 
wickedness". So strong a conviction on his this point is, that to regard 
all these characteristics as "signs of wickedness" is explicitly 
established as an exegetical principle. Thus he states that whenever 
these notions are found in the scripture, they should be regarded as 
significations of evil and the relevant passages should be interpreted 
accordingly.248
There is nevertheless a crucial question which is a fundamental 
prerequisite for an apprehension of Origen’s conception of the fall. The 
question is "what was that who fell?’’; and from this a subsequent 
question follows; "what constitutes the personal identity of the rational 
creatures?".
This question is directly related to Origen’s concept of "moulting" 
(niepoppuqaig) which as we said above is the most mystical point of the 
conception of the fall; yet it  has to be answered, at least to the extent 
that it  might be possible, because it  is the pivotal point of this whole 
conception.
It is a fundamental view of Origen's that the "end" w ill be like the 
"beginning".249 Although he does not elaborate on the "essence" of this 
"one" who fell, he does so when he exposes his view about the end. We 
cited above a significant passage from the Princ, where Origen speaks 
that this "one" had been placed by God "in the midst” of precious 
stones.250 He does not say however what this "one" was in himself; we 
learn "where" he was (namely, that he was in the divine reality), we 
understand that he was incorporeal (because he was in divine reality).251 
We learned also "in the midst" of what he was (namely, that he was in 
the midst of precious stones), but we may learn nothing more about this 
"one" in himself.
It is in Cels that we learn that this "one", in his original and
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immaculate state, was a "precious stone" himself; this sense in which he 
was placed in the divine reality among other precious stones; he was 
placed in the “body" of the wisdom and he was an “ornament” of the 
"multi-embroidered" wisdom; he was a "living stone",252 yet the life  was 
not his life, but i t  was the divine life  of the wisdom herself. Origen 
stresses that the reference of the scripture to "precious stones" has a 
"mystical meaning" yet he notes that "those just are meant to be every 
species of select and precious stones"253 and "the divine utterances 
teach about resurrection in a mystical way for those who are able to 
listen to the voice of God by a more divine hearing and they say that" 
"the body of Christ ... w ill be rebuilt with stones which are living as 
well as precious ones".254
What, therefore, fell was an "ornament" from the "body" of 
Wisdom. We cannot however say that this "ornament", this “precious" 
"living stone", was living as an individual in divine eternity; for there 
can be neither "distinction" nor "division" in divine life  which is 
incorporeal; and it  is Origen who clearly states “we cannot speak of 
parts of what is incorporeal"255 as well as that what was created in the 
providential creation was not any individual creature.
It should be emphasized that i t  is mainly this point on which 
Origen has deliberately avoided to express his views explicitly. Even 
though he has said certain things of his doctrine of the fall, yet he 
continues thus: "We have exposed a few of our views according to our 
faith in the scripture; we did so having made a bold venture upon the 
subject (anoisioRpTipevug), and having made a risky venture 
(napaK SK ivS uvsupsvu jg); but we have actually said nothing.".256
It is out of this "said nothing" of Origen’s that one should try to 
portray his conception of the fall. There is no other way as he 
deliberatly does not state his views on the question explicitly. But to 
attribute to Origen a Platonic notion about pre-existing incorporeal
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rational creatures which received a body is just a simplistic and 
misleading solution which utterly garbles his views.
Origen himself was aware of the Platonic theory on the question. 
Yet he says that "the man who is evicted from paradise together with 
his wife “clothed in garments of skins",257 which were made by God 
because of the human offence, has an ineffable and mystical sense, which 
is higher than the notion of Plato who holds that soul comes down and 
moults ’until i t  finds something solid’.".258 And in se/Gen he again 
comments on the same passage of Genesis and clearly rejects the 
exegesis that the "garments of skins" mean the assuming of a material 
body and he argues on that saying: "If the garments of skins signify flesh 
and bones, how is i t  possible that before that Adam says: This is now 
bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh’?"259 He, again, however, does 
not explicate his opinion on the question. He deems it  enough to contrast 
explicitly his own views from the Platonic ones referring to them by 
name; all he says here is thet one "should enquire into the hidden 
treasure of the scriptural letter.".260
Since, therefore, it  is Origen himself who quotes Plato and 
contrast his own views from the Platonic ones, it  would be at least a 
simplistic opinion to attribute Platonism to him on this notion.251
In Origen’s view the personal life  of creatures begins only with 
the actual creation coming into existence. For it  is only then that they 
begin to exist as individual and personal beings; it  is only then that they 
acquire a life  of their own. This is why he refers to rational creatures 
speaking of "the firs t moment of their creation by God’’262 as well as 
about "the time their personality f irs t emerged".263 These are of course 
expressions from the Latin rendering of the Princ, where, as we have 
noted, temporal terms are used too frequently and too awkwardly; yet 
we can discern Origen’s core of thought on the question behind 
expressions of this kind.
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What might seem as a paradox in Origen’s understanding of this 
question is that while coming into being out o f non-being refers to an 
occurence into the divine life, creaturelg life  pertains to space-time. 
This is the slight difference which should be taken into account in 
enquiring into Origen’s views. This former notion refers to the Second 
of the realites stated above, whereas the latter refers to the Third one. 
The former refers to the unity in the "body" of Christ, the latter refers 
to the creation of diversity and individuality, out of the divine reality, 
namely the "world". When Origen affirms that life  is one of the 
conceptions that does not pertain to Christ in himself but only “to 
others" (oux auxw, aflfi’ sxepoig}254 it  is obvious that a fundamental 
premise has been established: The predication others in itse lf implies a 
notion of distinction  -a notion which by no means can be applied to 
divine life. Distinction is virtually a notion which quite clearly denotes 
the existence of the material world.255 This is why the predication of 
creaturelg life  cannot be applied to the reality "before" the creation of 
the world. It is worth while, therefore, to ponder a litt le  further upon 
Origen’s conception of that reality.
Referring to the actual creation of the world Origen portrays it
thus:
"...Accordingly, as life  became in the Logos so the Logos was in the 
beginning. And you should know that it  is possible to assert that ‘in the 
beginning was the Logos’ so that everything be made according to 
wisdom and the forms of the system of forms which exist in the Logos 
(iva Kaia xrjv aotpiav Ka( xoug xunoug xou auaxrjpaxog x l l j v  ev auxai 
voqpaxuv xa navxa ftivqxai); for I think that, as a house or ship is built 
or made according to architectural forms (and hence it  is said that this 
house or ship have their beginning in the forms and reasons which exist 
in the architect) in similar way everything has been made according to 
the reasons of future beings, which reasons were distinctly articulated
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in wisdom by God (ouuu id  oupnavia gsgovsvai xaid xoug sv if) aotpia 
npoipavwSsviag uno 8sou il jv  saopevwv Rogoug); for "he has made 
everything in wisdom".265 And I should say that once God made wisdom 
who, so to speak, has a soul (xiioag, iv’ ouiwg einw, epipuxov ao<piav o 
8sog), allowed individual creatures and matter and species (and I do 
believe that even their substances) receive their being (nRdmv) from the 
forms being in her (ano iwv sv auirj luniuv)".257
This is the context in which Origen’s affirmation that the "reason" 
of this world (xov nspi io u  xoofiou Rogov), regarded from a worldly point 
of view, is the "last of corporeals and the beginning of incorporeals" (og 
Rogog psv sail isRsuiaiog iiDv atjpaiiKidv, apysf\ 6s xm  aaiupaiujv)268 
Indeed, this "reason" (Rogog), according to which the world came into 
existence out of the fall, is in itself a creature by virtue of which the 
providential incorporeal creation comes into the closest relation to the 
actual creation which came in existence as a spatio-temporal reality. 
Thus, it  is through the contemplation of this "reason" that the 
"transitional" point from providential incorporeality to corporeality 
could be visualized.
So whereas God’s former creative act was an "utterance" to his 
wisdom, the actual world comes into existence after God allowed the 
Logos to bring into existence the material creation and indeed matter 
itself. This creation was made according to the "pre-uttered reasons" 
(npoipavuj9sviag Rogoug) which came into being with the "providential" 
creation.
Thus Origen makes a crucial distinction as he discerns between 
the "former", namely the providential creation and the latter, which is 
the "constructional" creation the world as a spatio-temporal reality. He 
persistently makes this distinction throughout his work.
Accordingly, he distinguishes between notrjatg and nfldaig. The 
former is used in Genesis 1,26, where God says "Let us make (noifjaujpsv)
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man in our image and likeness". The latter is used in Genesis 2,7, where 
it  is said that God "made (snflaoev) man".269 This is why in the passage 
above he refers to the actual creation’s coming into existence through 
the term nflaoig. Accordingly, he distinguishes between $evsmg and 
tfevvqaig. The former pertains to the firs t making by God whereas tha 
latter pertains to the existence out of the fall.270 At another point he 
also makes a similar distinction between tfsveatg and Kumg, where the 
latter means the creation of space-time.271
In all three cases Origen alludes to his view that the firs t "act" of 
God pertains to a reality which is no other than the divine one. Since, 
therefore, there is no corporeality and time there can be no category of 
life  applied to creatures. As he points out, that f irs t making pertains to 
the "making of the substance" (ouauuaiv)272 of "rational creatures" yet 
this "making" was "in Wisdom"273 This is the sense in which wisdom is 
said to have been created by God as a beginning towards his works.274 
What was actually created in the former creation was a "wisdom" 
perceived as a "system of apperceptions .. and forms and reasons" 
according to which "future beings" were made.275 So "matter and 
creation and the species ... and the substances" were made "out of the 
forms which were in wisdom" and those forms were made, too.
Thus noirjcrtg and gsvsmg refer to the providential creation 
whereas nfldaig, dst/yqatg and Kumg refer to the actual creation of the 
world. The distinction between these two categories in actual content is 
this:
The nofrjaig and gevsaig refer to "coming into being out of 
non-being"275 as the creation of the "essence" or what Origen calls as 
the "substantification" (oumwoigj277 of rational natures (and not of 
individual rational creatures). This means that what was created was 
the essence of rational natures and not any individual hypostases or 
persons. Thus when Job as well as David say "your hands have made me
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and fashioned me" Cat X£ipe£ aou snofqadv pe Kai snffaadv pe)278 there 
is a "great doctrine"279 suggested by the notions of notqmg and nflaaig 
on which, however, Origen explicitly states that does not wish to 
elaborate.280
It is quite significant to remark how Origen treats the question of 
what "essence" is. When he comes to explain this point, all he does is to 
expound the views of philosophers of various schools of thought. Thus, he 
gives an account of "what essence is" according to either those who 
maintain that the reality of incorporeal things is primary"281 or 
according to "those who hold that the reality of incorporeal things is 
secondary and that of corporeal things is primary".282 He provides a 
quite detailed account of both those definitions of "essence".
It is quite characteristic, however, that he does not articulate any 
view of his own of this question -and certainly this is not incidental. On 
the contrary, it  is indicative of his perception of rational creatures as 
only conceptually (and not actually) consisting of a corporeal and an 
incorporeal element. When he speaks of a providential creation his 
perception of it  has nothing to do with any Platonic view of some 
pre-existing "spiritual world". If this was his view, he would have no 
difficulty in enunciating it. Subsequently he could have employed that 
definition of "essence" which stems from a virtually Platonic perception 
of the world and its origin. But he did not employ either a idealistic or a 
materialistic or an Aristotelian view283 of what essence is and he 
obviously wishes to stay impartial in respect of these definitions of 
"essence". The reason for this is that a certain definition of "essence" is 
directly related (actually it  stems from) a certain conception of the 
world and its origin, be it  created or uncreated. That Origen here wishes 
to hold aloof and not to take on anyone of these views exactly denotes 
that his conception of creation had nothing to do with those of the pagan 
schools of thought. In order to explicate his own perception of "essence"
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he had to provide previously an detailed account of his conception of 
what he held as "mystical" doctrine about the soul. This is exactly what 
he consciously wished not to do and actually did not do. And this is why 
he states that "the doctrine about essence is a matter great and 
difficult to contemplate" (noflug 6’ o nspi xrjg ouoiag flo^og xat 
5ua9eL)pr]xog)284
in any case Origen’s view is that "essence" that was made as God 
"found substance uncreated" (xov 8sov a^evvqxov supovxa xrjv ouaiav)285 
whereas God himself is "beyond substance" (unepexsiva xrjg ouoiag)286 he 
is "beyond mind and substance" (eneiceiva vou Kai oua(ag)287 and "God does 
not participate to substance at all" (afifl’ ou&' ouoiag jjexsxei o 0sog).288
So when Origen speaks of "essence" of God he just uses this term 
in a loose sense. There is no "oscillation", as H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti 
allege289 attributing to Origen a Platonic attitude, and regarding that a 
similar to that of Philo and Clement. Origen is unequivocal on this 
question and has enunciated his view in many parts of his work. This is 
not the only point where he employs a current philosophical cetegory in 
a loose sense -once, however, he has explicated his s tric t views on a 
question. This is what he does with the notion of "eternal death", or 
"infinite time” or "infinite souls"290 or even when he speaks of the Logos 
as "having soul" whereas he is explicit in his view that the term "soul" 
applies only to human beings. These figures are not rare in Origen’s 
works; this is why expressions like "as it  were" (oiovsQ or "so to say" 
Civ’ ouxug emu) are not rare either. Thus when he articulates the radical 
transcendence of God from any created nature, he says that "the essence 
of God is distinguished from any created nature" -yet this affirmation 
(as usually in such cases) agains begins with the expression "as it  were" 
(oiovsi a(piaxavxi xfjv ouaiav xou Qsou ano navxuv xwv gcvvqxwv).291 In any 
case, the assertion that Origen "oscillates" about the relation of God to 
"essence" is not correct. Even at the point where he states that the
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doctrine about essence is “great and difficult to contemplate", the 
phrase begins with the affirmation that "God does not participate in 
essence".292
The crucial point which has eluded H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti is 
this: It is one thing to speak of the substance o f human nature but i t  is 
quite another to speak of the substance o f an individual human being. 
The former came into being out of non-being with the providential 
creation. The latter (namely, the substance of individual persons) 
appears only with the actual material creation. Origen is quite explicit 
that what was created in the actual creation was not only "matter" (uRg) 
and "species" (eC&rj) and "individual beings" (ouoi) but also it  was the 
substances of these individual beings -and Origen takes particular care 
to stress this point through the expression s^ui 6e stptaxqpt ei Kai lag 
ouoiag.293
The crucial conclusion out of this statement is this: The substance 
of human nature (which involves no individuality whatsoever) was 
created in the providential creation. This is why the providential 
creation is stated as incorporeal. For, even today, speaking of "human 
nature", who would possibly assert that this is either something 
personal or corporeal? On the other hand, the substance of individual 
rational creatures came into being only with the actual creation. This is 
why what is personal is also corporeal, as we shall further argue later 
in this chapter.
This analysis makes clear why Origen, speaking of "essence", does 
not take the Platonic on the question -in spite of the fact that createc 
"incorporeality" is affirmed as prior to created corporeality. To him the 
substance of an individual person is not p rio r to it, as a Platonist 
would assert, according to a doctrine of some "pre-existing spiritual 
world". This substance comes into being simultaneously with the actual 
creation of a personal spatio-temporal creature.294 Whereas there is
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“substance of human nature"295 since the very beginning of creation, it  is 
only with the material creation that the notion of "substance of an 
individual person" begins to make sense. This is the crucial point which 
has eluded all, without a single exception at all, those who make 
assertions about Origen’s conception of creation.
Beyond that, what Origen seems to find in common with the 
secular philosophical definitions of "essence" which he expounds, is that 
a fundamental characteristic of "essence" is the "unchangeability" of 
it.295 This is exactly what does not pertain to rational creatures 
according to Origen’s views. His view is that indeed rational creatures 
possess something of their origin, namely they possess an incorporeal 
element in themselves. But this in no sense is understood as pre-existing 
in itself as it  is now, namely as an individual personality. Creation of 
individual beings means that they appear as individuals possessing both 
a material and an immaterial element. Matter in itself is not held to be 
evil;297 is is rather held to be a symptom of the existence of evil and it  
came into being just because evil appeared. On the other hand, the 
"incorporeal" of rational creatures does constitute a kind of affinity 
with God, yet there is a substantial difference: This incorporeal is 
created whereas God is uncreated.
The difference between Origen’s conception of essence and the 
secular ones lies exactly in the distinction made above. If a rational 
creature was but a "soul" clothed with a body (in a merely Platonic 
sense) then it  would be simple to search for the essence in the 
self-existing "persona incorporeal" or (as many scholars attribute 
Origen) the personal "spirit". Yet the case is not like that at all. A 
rational creature is an inseparable entity and not an incorporeal spirit 
(least of all a pre-existing one) clothed with a body. And the essence of 
its existence does not lie is any unchangeable incorporeal personality 
(there is no room for such a notion in Origen’s thought) but it  the
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relation  of the rational creature to God -as we shall discuss shortly 
below.
In the Princ there is a passage which expresses Origen’s views on 
this subject:
"God has created two universal natures, a visible, that is a bodily 
one, and an invisible one, which is incorporeal. These two natures each 
undergo their own different changes. The invisible, which is also the 
rational nature, is changed through the action of the mind and w ill by 
reason of the fact that it  has been endowed with freedom of choice; and 
as a result of this it  is found existing sometimes in the good and 
sometimes in its opposite. The bodily nature, however, admits of a 
change in substance, so that God the Artificer of all things, in whatever 
work of design or construction or restoration he may wish to engage, 
has at hand the service of this material for all purposes, and can 
transform and transfer it  into whatever forms and species he desires, 
as the merits of things demand. It is to this, clearly, that the prophet 
points when he says, ‘God who makes and transforms all things’ (Amos, 
5,8)."298 This passage can be deemed as authentic as there is a similar 
affirmation in the same work preserved in Greek: "God created a nature 
which is indestructible and akin to him" (a * p 9 a p io v  #ap  (p u a iv  n s n o ir jK S  
Kai sauxij a u ^ s v r j ) . 299
This is also a point where Origen’s thought it  completely diferent 
from the Gnostic one. The incorporeal of rational creatures is "akin" to 
God but not "consubstantial" with him. Such a distinction would be 
inconceivable for the Gnostics. This incorporeal in the world is 
"changed" and i t  is not regarded as "intact" throughout the "episode" of 
its mixture with matter. This would be unacceptable to the Gnostics. 
Finally, this incorporeal was "made" as well as matter; there is no 
question about the "reality" of the material world, which is regarded as 
true as the state before the fall was. In a Gnostic's view, "true being" is
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only that of the transcendent world. On these three topics, Origen's 
thought is entirely different from that of the Gnostics. H. Puech regards 
these three topics as the fundamental characteristics of Gnostic 
thought.300 Irenaeus301 states that, to the Valentinians, the “pneumatic 
generation" (10 Kurjpa nvsupaxiKov) is and remains consubstantial with 
the "Mother", the feminine entity which is an Aeon of the pleroma 
(opoouoiov unapxov xrj pqxpQ. Clement of Alexandria deals with these 
views of cosubstantiality of God and man in Gnosticism in the 
Stromateis.302
Indeed Origen affirms that "incorporeal nature" was "made" by 
God.30° In view of this he states that not only “corporeals" but also 
"incorporeals" are "made" (gs^ovoxwv).304
Thus he avers that both incorporeal and corpreal nature are 
susceptible of change; the former changes in mind (namely moral quality) 
whereas the latter changes in quality of matter. He also affirms that 
creatures are susceptible to change by virtue of the very fact that they 
have been created Hence, when Origen speaks of "creation" of "essence" 
(ouoiwoig) he does not actually mean that there was any entirety of 
personal individuals that was made. This latter is understood to have 
taken place only when the actual creation came into existence.
Thus the nftdatg yevvqmg and Kifmg refer to the actual creation 
of the world, namely to the creation of rational creatures having a 
personal identity and a life  o f the ir own, being in a "fallen" status and 
completely distinguished from the divine life.
Therefore, what lives before the actual creation is God’s Wisdom 
herself, her body being "multi-embroidered" with "precious stones" 
which are living, as they are in the living body of Christ. What lives 
after the actual creation are those fallen "stones" having aquired 
corporeal bodies and having been "substantificated" as individual 
personalities. There is nothing in common between those two "lives".
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For the former is life  of God, namely life  in Wisdom, while the latter is
the fallen life of creatures, the life  out of God. The "chasm" between
divinity and creation is a radical one. The world is absolutely “out" of 
the divinity305 and there is no Plotinian notion about the world as an 
"effluence" of divinity.
The point which Origen makes, namely that creaturely "spiritual 
nature" is not "homoousios to the uncreated nature" of God305 is a crucial 
one. For this is exactly a point where Origen rejects Platonic and
Neoplatonic views, according to which incorporeal nature is one and 
therefore there is a sort of continuity from the highest down to the 
lowest modes of existence. Indeed Origen here reiterates his conviction 
of the radical "chasm" between God and what is "created". Hence his 
conception of the fall is not as simplistic as a notion of pre-existing 
spirits which have "fell" and therefore been clothed with material
bodies.
If there is a notion of Platonic "dualism" here (namely a dualism 
of spirit-matter) it  is only an intellectual not an actual one. Origen was 
fully aware of the Platonic views on the subject and he does not fail to 
stress his views in contrast to them; although he does not elaborate on 
his own conception of the fall, he stresses its difference from the Greek 
views:
"Our Lord and Saviour indeed alludes to yet another world, which 
is difficult to describe and depict in actual truth, beyond this visible 
one. For he says, ‘I am not of this world’307 and the words ’I am not of 
this world’, suggest that he was of some other world. We have already 
said that it  is difficult for us to explain this other world; and for this 
reason, that if  we did so, there would be a risk of giving some men the 
impression that we are affirming the existence of certain imaginary 
forms which the Greeks call 'ideas’. For it  is certainly foreign to our 
mode of reasoning to speak of an incorporeal world that exists solely in
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the mind’s fancy or the substantia] region of mind; and how men could 
affirm that the Saviour came from thence or that the saints w ill go 
thither308 i do not see"309
Origen totally rejects the Platonic dualism; rational beings, as 
individual personalities, are conceived as entitites having a corporeal 
body as well as something incorporeal in them; yet these beings are 
entities and this separation is nothing more that an intellectual 
portrayal of their nature. Origen stresses that "it is only in idea and 
thought that a material substance is separable from them, and that 
though this substance seems to have been produced for them or after 
them, yet never have they lived or do they live without it;"; for "life 
without a body is found in the Trinity alone"310
It is in the light of these analyses that statements in the Princ* 
referred to rational creatures, such as "All these are incorporeal in 
respect of their proper nature, but though incorporeal were nevertheless 
made"311 should be understood. G. Butterworth, in his translation of 
Princ, considers this passage quite isolated from any other context in 
order to draw the conclusion that Origen held a notion of an original 
spiritual world of rational creatures. As for the above mentioned 
passage where Origen explicitly rejects such a view, he considers that it  
has just been modified by Rufinus.312 It is obvious that he is totally 
unaware of Origen’s notion that those "precious stones" which are 
"ornaments" in the body of the "multi-decorated" wisdom are also named 
as "creatures"; for i t  is Origen himself who says that "God is invisible 
and there are some creatures invisible, that is to say intelligible 
(voT]Td)"313 using the same term Paul uses in Rom. 1,20, namely "the 
invisible things of God". It is in the same sense that Origen refers to 
"God and the invisible things of God",314 explaining his fundamental view 
that "what is signified by the term ’invisible’ is incorporeal".315 Again 
into the Latin rendering of the Princ\ one can trace the authentic views
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of Origen:
"It is proved by many declarations throughout the whole of 
scripture that the universe was created by God and that there is no 
substance which has not received its existence from him; which refutes 
and dismisses the doctrines falsely tought by some, that there is a 
matter which is co-eternal with God or that there are unbegotten souls, 
in whom they would have it  that God implanted not so much the principle 
of existence as the quality and rank of their life.".315
Thus, in spite of Origen’s distinction between corporeality and 
incorporeality, he holds that the very nature of rational beings has an 
existential unity and no notion of dualism can be applied to their 
existence per se; there is only an intellectual conception of 
incorporeality applied to the rational creatures and it  stems from the 
very conception of Origen about the fall. Indeed it  is not rarely that he 
states or suggests that this incorporeality, applied to rational creatures 
in the above mentioned sense, is an element of a certain “affinity" 
between God and the world317
Thus all rational beings, regardless of their rank of life, have the 
same origin, that is the divine reality. Once they were created they were 
dispersed in the various ranks of life, yet all of them have something in 
common. This common is the "rational essence" (fj Ro i^Kfj ouoia), part of 
which is human nature, which is called "soul".318 Thus rational being is 
"an existence which is rationally capable of feeling and movement".319 
Origen also provides a definition of what rational creatures are in 
respect to God: they are living beings which receive commands from God; 
for commands are not usually given to any but living beings.320 Origen 
actually believes that "rational creatures are of one nature",321 for 
"things which have one definition have also undoubtedly the same 
substance".322
It is then this incorporeal in rational beings that allows them a
kind of communication with God through the Logos323 In the final 
analysis the element which constitutes the personal identity of the 
rational creatures lies exactlu in this relation with God. Their bodies
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change as "it is possible for matter, which stand below all qualities, to 
change quality (Suvaxov aysifteiv noioxrjxag xrjv unoKCiyevqv naaaig 
noioxnaiv uRqv"324 The quality of bodies of rational creatures change 
according to their m erits /ye t what remains unchangeable is their 
faculty of communication with God through the Logos, as they are 
endowed with rationality; it  is through this "incorporeal" of theirs that 
they communicate to God.
It should be noted that Origen's apprehension of the personal 
identity of rational creatures does not at all imply any actual existence 
of the afore mentioned dualism (matter-spirit) in the rational creature 
itself in some kind of Platonic sense. The personality of rational 
creatures is not compound but it  is single; the quality of their body 
reflects the quality (namely, the moral mood or disposition) of their 
incorporeal; and vice versa. This means that the body has a certain 
quality, because this is the moral quality of the incorporeal; i f  a 
rational creature is a daemon, it  is not the quality of his body but the 
quality of his mind that w ill dictate the morality of the actions of this 
person. Thus it  is not the incorporeal itself (understood abstractly, as 
an independent individual existence) but it  is the faculty of the creature 
in his relation to God that constitutes his personal identity. The quality 
of mind changes; the quality of body changes,too, and it  changes 
accordingly; what remains unchangeable is the capacity of this entirety 
"mind-body" to stand in a dialectical relation to God, to be distinct in 
the eyes of God as an individual personality and to be free to obey or 
disobey God's will. There can be no notion of personal incorporeal mind 
existing in itself in this fallen state; mind existing in itse lf into the 
world is an intellectual abstraction, not a reality in itself. Mind does not* u
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live in itself either "before" or after the fall. For after the fall i t  is the 
rational creature, as an inseparable being, who lives; while "before" the 
fall it  is God’s Wisdom who lives;325 in either case mind is regarded as 
participating, as it  were, in life; yet it  is not in any case regarded as 
living itself as an independent incorporeal being. Speaking of "soul", 
Origen points out that this is the state of mind applying to human being 
only; thus he explains that speaking of "man" he means "a soul using a 
body".326 Yet it  is himself who stresses that this is only a figure of 
speech not related to any Platonic notion whatever; for this figure of 
speech is just a "metaphor".327 indeed, in commJohn, he states that a 
human being is an inseparable whole; although "soul" and "body" are 
regarded as "contrary in nature" (<puosi svavxia) yet human being is 
actually "one unity" (Kpamv p(av).328 This "unity" of human nature applies 
even to Christ himself who is stated as "altogether assumed human 
nature" (naviT] av9pii)nov aveir)T](psva0329
What constitutes the personal identity of a rational creature is to 
be found in its  relation  to God rather, than in this creature itself 
regarded as isolated and in itself.
This is why Origen states: "Moreover when the scripture says that 
God created all things "by number and measure”,330 we shall be right in 
applying the term "number" to rational creatures or minds for this very 
reason that they are so many as can be provided for and ruled and 
controlled by the providence of God;’331 God "made all things by number 
and measure; for to God there is nothing either without end or without 
measure";332 "every created thing, therefore, is  distinguished in God's 
sight by its being confined within a certain number and measure, that 
is, either number in the case of rational beings or measure in the case 
of bodily matter.".333 Rational creatures are distinguished in the sight of 
God; this happens "from the time their personality f irs t emerged".334
Thus the very fact of the individual personal re la tion  to God
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constitutes the personal identity of a rational creature. This is why 
Origen considers “to receive commands from God"335 as a definition of a 
rational being in itself. This personal and concrete dialectical relation 
to God, as a fact, is what actually remains constant and unchangeable 
throughout the alterations of rational creatures (both in their 
incorporeal and corporeal nature) from one “aeon" to another. For if a 
conception of "relation" is applied to a certain being this is mainly to be 
understood as its relation to God. In the selEz, Origen enunciates this 
conception thus: "Regarding our birth in flesh, we have both a father and 
a mother. But a father or mother is not a such of the soul; for i t  is God 
alone who is the creator and father of the soul. This is what God teaches 
saying that ’All souls are mine’,336 and each soul has its own hypostasis 
and stands for reasons of its own and not [for reasons] of anyone else 
(im i S K d a ir] ipuxrj i5(av unoaxaaiv e x s i,  ev xu) i6(tu Ro^ iu laxapevr], Kai ouk 
sv daauj)."337
It is the very fact that God has established a personal relation to 
each rational being that endows it  with its individuality, which is 
thereafter free to come in a dialectical relation either to God or to 
other rational beings.
This is the answer that Origen offers as a result of his 
fundamental view that the rational creature is an inseparable entity, in 
which the distinction between body and matter are just intellectual 
conceptions. A rational being is in itself indivisible, single and not 
compound. Thus what is intellectually described as "incorporeal" of a 
rational creature may in no way be understood to live personally in 
itself independently from the body.
The concept of world. There are serious reasons, which render 
the study of Origen's concept of cosmos an indispensable presupposition 
for the study of his concept of time. As we shall see in the proper place 
of this treatise, the concept of time in itself is defined in close
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correlation to that of cosmos. So, it  is reasonable to expect that some 
fundamental characteristics of time w ill be possible to be defined in 
correspondence to similar characteristics of the cosmos; for instance, 
if  the cosmos is considered as “eternal", then time should be regarded as 
“eternal" too, in the sense of "endless duration". Besides, it  has been 
argued that Origen holds the notion of a "world” "before" time (though it 
is very doubtful i f  the term "before" can make any sense in this case); 
this is obviously a Platonic notion. But, again, it  is exactly a thorough 
examination of the concept of cosmos in Origen's thought that w ill show 
whether or not we can, in any case, speak of "cosmos" without 
necessarily implying the coexistence of time; that is, we should inquire 
whether the term "cosmos" can make any sense in absence of time, it is 
exactly in this context that Origen’s idea of "restoration of all" (which 
also stands in the core of Origen’s concept of time) should be placed in 
order to be properly compehended.
The analysis of Origen’s concept of time would be either 
impossible or misleading, unless it  has been clear how Origen conceives 
and illustrates the concept of "cosmos" as well as what is the content 
(or, contents) he attributes to it. It is therefore fundamental that, 
before any discussion of Origen's time, an elucidation of his concept of 
"cosmos" has taken place.
The study of Origen’s theology shows that he was fully conscious 
of the crucial and fundamental importance of the concept of cosmos; this 
becomes apparent by the fact that he very often concentrates his 
analysis upon the meaning of the term "cosmos"; in fact there are many 
points in his work where he tries to illustrate (sometimes in quite an 
extended way) the meaning of "cosmos" and offers his views of the 
actual content of the term.
The "Commentary on Genesis" is that work of Origens which would 
offer the most systematic analysis of his views on the question; i t
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would be reasonable to expect that it  was there that Origen has 
discussed the subject in the clearest and most integrated way; but this 
work is lost. This is indeed a serious gap in Origen's extant work. For, 
in his exegesis of the First Chapter of Genesis, he had provided 
extensively and clearly his views about cosmos. This is not just a 
conjecture; it  is Origen himself in certain points of his work who states 
that he has fully discussed his views of creation in the work.338
Nevertheless he states his views of the meaning of "cosmos" in 
other points of his extant work; for the purpose of our subject here 
these references should be regarded as satisfactory; for our main 
purpose here is not the discussion of Origen's whole Cosmology, but only 
that of the meaning of cosmos.
In Origen's view the term cosmos, as found in the Scripture, is 
a"homonym" (opiuvupia). In his commGen Origen explicitly states that "... 
the word (sc. "cosmos") should be examined as a homonym" (ifjv fis^tv tug 
opiuvupov s§eid£so9ai).339 It is a task of the interpreter to attribute to 
the terms of the Scripture each time that meaning which maintains the 
reverence to the grandeur of God.340 Origen argues that those who have 
neglected the fact that the term cosmos is a homonym have commited 
the fault of making most irreveraridassertions about God.341
So he sets forth the rule according to which a specific content 
should each time be attributed to the term cosmos: This rule is 
reverance for God and the avoidance of "malicious intepretations" 
(pox9gptuveK5oxiuv).342 So, in interpreting the passage of the Scripture I 
John,5,19, "The world is lying in the power of evil", we should assert 
that by the term "world" John refers only to “ the earthly and human 
affairs" (uuv nspi^siiuv Kai av9piuniviuv); for if  someone thinks that the 
term refers to "the system of heaven and earth and those contained in 
them" he would be led to the most impertinent and irreverent assertion 
about God, namely, that the sun and the moon and the stars "lie in the
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evil" although they just perform a regular movement by order of God.343 
Accordingly, the scriptural passage in John, 1,29 "This is the lamp of God 
who bears the sin of the world" refers to "earthly places" (nspi^sioig 
xonoig) and only those who "ignore the homonym" (6ia irjv a^voiav xqg 
opwvupiag) would "stupidly argue" ((piRoveiKouvxsg qBiSiug) that here the 
term "world" would have a broader meaning.344 Again, in the passage I! 
Cor.5,19, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" the term 
"world" refers only to the earthly and human reality and not "to those 
existing in the whole world" (nepi xwv sv oRiu xw k o q j j u ) )345
In commJohn\ i t  is once more stated that he is fully conscious of 
the fact that there are many meanings of the term cosmos ( s k  xng 
"Koopog" (pwvrjg) in the Scripture,346 and in commMatt he again 
undertakes the task to clarify the various meanings of this “homonym" by 
selecting and interpreting several passages of the Scripture where this 
term appears. Quoting Matthew 18,7-14, "Woe to the world for the 
temptations to sin", Origen states his intention: "Intelligere autem 
aliquid poterimus, si congregemus scripturarum exempla in quibus 
nominatur mundus";347and so he does by referring to numerous passages 
of the Scripture where the term "cosmos" appears. So, "one should not 
think that it  is the same thing to speak simply of the world or of the 
world of the heaven or of the world of Esther"348
The conclusion in that point is that the usual meaning of cosmos 
in the Scripture is not that of the "system consisting of heaven and 
earth" (xo oupavou Kai ^fjg auaxqpa)349 but "only the earthly place" (o 
nspi^siog povog xonog).350 Sometimes the meaning of cosmos is even 
narrower alluding just to that part of the earth which is inhabited by 
people, that is the "ecoumene" CoiKoupsvq).351 In Cels i t  is stated that it  
is usual (s9og) to use the term cosmos in the Scripture meaning just 
"the earth".352
We see then that there are various meanings that Origen
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attributes to the term cosmos: It may mean the visible whole which 
consists of "heaven and earth",353 namely the visible firmament 
consisting "of the moon and the sun and the heavenly bodies called 
'planets' or wanderers354 or just the earth (nep($siog xonog) or that part 
of the earth which is inhabited by people (oiKoupevq) or even the human 
environment itse lf355 However, one should constantly bear in mind that 
all these various meanings are employed for the sake of the 
interpretation of the Scripture; in interpreting a certain passage, one 
should employ that meaning of cosmos which would not in any case lead 
to irreverent implications about the grandeur or the goodness of God; 
any interpretation of cosmos which would put the grandeur or the 
goodness of God in question is rejected and another meaning of the term 
(either broader or narrower) should be adopted in order to interpret a 
particular passage.
It is therefore obvious that all these interpretations of the term 
"cosmos" are adopted in order to serve a purpose which is primarily a 
theological one. The question which then arises is this: Did Origen hold a 
notion about the actual content of "cosmos" which would be a "natural" 
one? That is, did Origen have a personal natural view of the world, a 
theory independent from the circumstantial need to interpret a 
particular passage of the Scripture? Did he hold a picture of the
(asserted as) "objective" structure of the world? Had he a theory about 
the cosmic structure that would serve to him as a basis for the
deployment of his Cosmology itself?
As a matter of fact, beyond all the specific meanings of the term 
“cosmos" which are adopted for the sake of the exegesis, Origen held a 
clear personal conception of "cosmos"; this conception is exposed both in 
Princ and in many of his works preserved in Greek.
In the Second Book of the Princ\ Origen attempts “to inquire into
the meaning of the actual term ’world1; for i t  is a term which is
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frequently shown In the holy scriptures to possess different 
significations.".355 In fact he makes a systematic inquiry into the 
meaning of the term; he does not fail to stress that the very name 
cosmos does not only mean the world but it  also (and originally) means 
"ornament" and this meaning is alluded in certain points of the Old 
Testament.357 It is stated that in the Scripture cosmos means our earth 
together with its inhabitants; i t  is also pointed up that this visible 
universe which consists of heaven and earth is also called a world, as 
Paul says "The fashion of this world w ill pass away".358
Continuing the "topography" of his world, Origen makes a step 
further: He states that there is another heaven, of another broader 
sphere; this heaven contains and encloses that earth which Jesus in the 
gospel promises to the "meek" and "gentle’359 and this sphere is called in 
the holy scriptures the "good land" and the “land of the living". So, 
Origen's view is that there is another "heaven" and another "earth" 
besides this visible firmament. But this place is only one, namely the 
"highest" among those which constitute Origen’s world; this is an abiding 
place for the pious and blessed, in as it  were a "good land" and a "land 
for the living", which the "meek" and gentle w ill receive for an 
inheritance. Nonetheless there are also other places in the world. He 
explains that by the term "world" he finally means "all that is above the 
heavens, or in them, or on the earth, or in what is called the lower 
regions, or any places that exist anywhere; together with the beings who 
are said to dwell in them. All this is called the world.".350
The conclusion then is that "the entire universe of things that 
exist, both celestial and supercelestial, earthly and infernal may be 
spoken of in general way as a single perfect world, within which or by 
which those other worlds that are in it  must be supposed to be 
contained’’.351
This is Origen's fundamental view and can be traced throughout
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his work in Greek, where there are references to various "spaces” in the 
world. In Cels he refers to "most pure celestial spaces of the world" 
(ev xoig Ka9apu}xaxoig xou koguou x^pioig enoupavioig) and to "even purer 
supercelestial ones" (rj Kai xoig xouxwv ■ Ka9apuixepoig unepoupavioig)362 
He also refers to the "aether and those places which are located above 
it" (ev ai9epi Kai xoig avwxepw auxou xonoig)353 In homJer i t  is pointed 
out that the "kingdom of God" "comes from the better spaces" (ano xwv 
Kpeixxovajvxiupiwv);364 and in commJohn i t  is stressed that when we say 
that the gospel has been given to the whole world, by "world" is meant 
not only the "earthly place" (xw nepi^euu xonw) but "the whole system 
consisting of heaven and earth or heavens and earth" (xiu auaxfjpaxi xw sE; 
oupavou Kai ^rjy J] oupavuiv Kai gfjg).365
He also refers to those regions which are "lower" than the human 
one speaking of "down in hades or in any space like that" (ev a5ou Kdxiu rj 
xivi xoiouxuj xwpiw),356 but also those spaces that are "up" are numerous 
and there are differences among them, too367In commMatt Origen refers 
to the "heavenly spaces" (oupavioi xonoi)358 and it  is quite significant 
that he uses the term in Plural; similarly in seJPs he refers to the 
"dimmer spaces" (aKu9pujnoxspoig x ^ 01?)369 and uses Plural too; in the 
same work he speaks of "diverse worlds" (xoug noiKiRoug Koapoug) which 
"contain the diverse bodies of rational creatures" (xd 6id<popa awpaxa 
xwv flo i^Kiuv)370 Accordingly, in expProv he speaks of all "rational 
natures" (Ro^ ikwv (puoewv) which "are sorted in various worlds and bodies 
in proportion to their existential state" (Siaipouuevujv Koapoig Kai awpaxi 
Kaxa avaRo i^av xrjg Kaxaaxaasiug)371This is the sense in which Origen 
speaks of "bodies, which comprise the world"372 making the distinction 
between "life in flesh and blood" and life  "in aetheral body".373 The latter 
sort of body is understood to be that of creatures "resurrected"; they 
are held to live in "spaces" (xwpioig) which are of most pure aether and 
regarding their thinness they are more translucent than light itself (Kai
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Rsnxoxqxi (puxog Siau^saxepoig).374 Their "matter" itself is one, yet its 
quality is determined by the moral status of creatures. This is why 
Origen speaks of "aetheral places" (ai9spioug xonoug)375 Indeed this 
affirmation constitutes a kind of natural explanation of why these bodies 
are "not seen": Their material quality (which is proportional to their 
moral superiority) is so fine that it  is "more translucent" than light 
itself and therefore light cannot help make them be seen by human 
beings.
The differences among rational creatures of different ranks of 
life  lie in the different degree of their participation to and knowledge of 
the Logos.376 Christ nevertheless is present in all the ranks of life  as 
"all rational creatures participate in Christ"377 Rationality (o Ro^ og) is 
what establishes a certain affinity between God and creatures.378 It is 
due to rationality (regardless of its degree) that creatures "cannot be 
regarded as totally alienated from God".379 Christ, as Logos, descends to 
all ranks of life380 and "is present in each rational creature".381 Indeed 
"daemons are regarded to have been created by God, not as daemons but 
in as much as they are rational creatures" 0<a96 Ro^ ikoi xivsg).382 The 
higher a "heaven" is, the closer to the Logos it  is held to be. This is the 
sense in which it  is affirmed that Christ is "the kina of heavens" and his 
"kingdom is not a reigning of a part of lower places or of a part of the 
higher ones, but it  is [the kingdom] of all the higher places which have 
been named as heavens"383 as he has full domination "not only on one 
heaven but on all the heavens".384
This is the context in which Origen’s affirmations about the 
incarnation of the Logos should be understood. Indeed he speaks of Christ 
as him who came on the earth "descending not only one heaven but all of 
them, whatever their number is" (Kaxapdg oux sva povov oupavov, aRRa 
navxag, oaoi noxs eia(v).385 Although he rejects the opinion about the 
existence of “seven heavens"386 he affirms that "the Bible does seem to
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teach that there are heavens, perhaps meaning the spheres of the planets 
of which the Greeks speak or perhaps something else more 
mysterious.".387 Thus he appeals to Moses who "says that in a divine 
dream our forefather Jacob had a vision in which he saw a ladder 
reaching to heaven and angels of God ascending and descending upon it, 
and the Lord standing s till at its top;388 perhaps in this story of the 
ladder Moses was hinting at these truths or at yet more profound 
doctrines. Philo also composed a book about this ladder, which is worthy 
of intelligent and wise study by those who wish to find the truth.".389
This statement, as well as others similar to this, should be 
understood in the light of Origen’s conception of the world as comprising 
different particular spaces or particular "worlds".
This is exactly the context in which a particular point in the 
Princ\ should be understood in order to avoid misunderstandings of his 
authentic views: Origen asserts390 that Jesus "alludes to yet another 
world, which is difficult to describe and depict in actual truth, beyond 
this visible one. For he says, ’I am not of this world;391 and the words, ‘i 
am not of this world’, suggest that he was of some other world". At that 
point it  is also stated that this notion can in no way be related to the 
Greek one about a spiritual "world of ideas". What he implies is that 
Jesus, in descending to the human rank of life, has passed through the 
higher worlds; this is why in the Latin version of the Princ it  is stated 
that the "world", which Jesus speaks about, "excels in quality and glory 
but is nevertheless contained within the lim its of this world".392 
obviously alluding to the topmost rank of life, in which Christ is 
understood to reign, too.393
The term used to denote these particular "spaces" which comprise 
the whole "single"394 world is x^piov; this is derived from x^P°C which 
means "space"; thus xwpmv means a "particular space". It is quite 
remarkable that the same term x^P°£ is used modern science and
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particularly in the mathematical theory of spaces. It is significant to 
note that Origen has a very clear conception of what the ,,cjifferences,, 
among these particular "spaces" are: He does not conceive these 
differences in terms of spatial distance; these spaces are radically 
separated each from another yet their "distance" is a qualitative not a 
geometrical one. If those spaces are to be examined only in terms of 
geomterical distance, then there is no actual distance among them; all 
these spaces are here, on the earth. Origen clearly holds this notion; in 
the Latin version of the Princ he is presented as appealing to Clement 
of Rome who "speaks of other parts of the world which none of our 
people can reach, nor can any of those who live there cross over to us; 
and these parts themselves he called 'worlds', when he says, The ocean 
is impassible to men, and the worlds beyond it  are governed by the same 
ordinances of God the Ruler’.".395
This passage has been preserved only in a Latin version, yet we 
can accept it  as rendering the authentic views of Origen’s. For we can 
find this assertion in a Greek passage which expresses his views more 
clearly; indeed in the passage above, though Origen appeals to Clement, it  
is not absolutely clear that the latter was regarding the "distance" 
among the "worlds" as not a spatial one.396 Origen nevertheless is 
categorical on this point; in seJEz he explicitly states that those other 
worlds are "on the earth": "There certainly are other worlds on the 
earth and this can also be shown from our knowledge (ya9rjyaia); for it 
is also Clement who says, 'The ocean is impassible to men and those 
worlds beyond it  are governed by the same ordinances of the Ruler’."397
So, although Origen's world is one and "single"398 it  is supposed to 
be consisted of "particular" worlds. What nevertheless should be 
stressed is this: Origen is primarily interested not in these particular 
"worlds", as "places", but in the "inhabitants" of these worlds; the 
articulation of his view in Princ is quite eloquent: "The entire
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constitution of the world is various and diverse; for it  consists of 
rational beings, and others more divine, and of bodies of different 
kinds;... then secondly of places, such as heaven or the heavens..."399 The 
"places" are only "secondly" regarded; what is significant is the 
"hierarchy" of the creatures: "In this world some creatures are said to 
be supercelestial, that is placed in the more blessed abodes and clothed 
with the brighter and more heavenly bodies; and among these many 
differences are revealed".400 Using the laguage of I Cor.15.40, he avers 
that "Some creatures, however, are called "earthly", and among these, 
too, there are no small differences, for some are barbarians, others 
Greeks, and of the barbarians some are wilder and fiercer, whereas 
others are more gentle...".401 "There are also certain invisible powers, to 
which the management of things upon earth is entrusted; and we must 
believe that among these, too, no small differences exist, just as is 
found to be the case among men. The apostle Paul indeed intimates that 
there are also certain "infernal" powers and among these in like manner 
a condition of variety must undoubtedly be looked for".402
Therefore, when Origen refers to the "world", he primarily has in 
mind and wands to indicate the entirety of rational creatures of this 
world. "These are who dwell ’in heaven and on earth and under the 
earth’403 the three terms indicating the entire universe.".404
Hence, although Origen is very clear in expounding the “topography" 
of his world, his main interest is not in the particular "spaces" 
themselves but in the "inhabitants" of these spaces; each of them is the 
dwelling place of a particular mode of existence of the rational 
creatures.
It is again on the Scripture that Origen seeks to ground his notion 
about the different modes of existence and ranks of life; he appeals to 
Paul (Col. 1.16) where the apostle speaks of "thrones, dominions, 
principalities and powers" and since, in the Eph. 1.21, the same apostle
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speaks of Christ "Who is above every principality arid authority and 
power and dominion, and every name that is named not only in this 
world, but also in the world to come" Origen comes to this conclusion: 
"Here he (sc. Paul) plainly shows that besides those beings he has 
mentioned, there are certain others, which may be named indeed in this 
world, but yet have not on the present occasion been enumerated by him, 
and which perhaps were not known to any other person; and there are 
others s till, which cannot be named in this world, but w ill be named in 
the world to come."405
This view, as expressed in the Princ\ can be found in and 
confirmed by his works in Greek. In the commJohn that Origen refers 
to the creatures of other spaces and affirms that they have been created
by God through the Son405 In the same work he states:
"I think therefore that rational beings are classified in various 
ranks and among them there is the highest one, then the second, then the 
third and so on, until the last of the whole; it  is not within human 
capability but it  is above out nature to say for certain which is the 
highest rank of life, which is the second and which is the third and to 
classify them down to the last one.".407 At this point, Origen attempts a 
classification of the higher rational beings by their names based on 
scriptural passages where those names are stated. Thus he discerns 
these beings in "gods"408 "thrones", "dominitions", “principalities", 
"powers".409 In commMatt Origen speaks of rational beings which are 
"better than human beings" (id  Kpsinova avSptunuv)410 yet his general 
view is that "it is only God who knows the various regiments of souls or 
the powers who are with them" and it  is only himself who knows the 
causes of this classification.411 In like a manner he refers to the ranks 
of life  below the human one, namely the daemons.412
The conclusion is that what is strictly meant by the term "world"
is the entirety of particular worlds each of which contains a certain
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rank of life; although this cosmos is consisted of many particular 
"spaces", i t  is regarded as one, single and perfect.413 Although this 
world contains places as well as rational beings, as inhabitants of these 
places, the main interest of Origen’s thought is mainly focussed upon 
these inhabitants, while the place as a just spatial category is not 
treated as a subject of prime significance. So Origen’s world is actually 
the entirety of persons, endowed with the capability of free moral 
action.414
The notions of "not seen” and "invisible": As regards corporeality, 8 
fundamental distinction made by Origen plays a significant role in the 
understanding of his thought. He appeals to Paul who says that “AH 
things were created in him (sc. Christ), things in the heaven and things 
on earth, things visible and invisible, whether thrones, dominions, 
principalities or powers, all were created through him and in him, and 
he is before all creatures, and he is the head’’.415 Origen’s interpretation 
of that passage is that the term "visible" applies to what is corporeal, 
while the term "invisible" alludes to what is incorporeal.415 What he 
holds to be suggested through the term "invisible" is "a substance in 
which we can discern neither colour nor shape nor possibility of touch 
nor size, a substance perceptible to the mind alone which anyone can call 
whatever he pleases. The Greeks speak of this substance as "asomaton", 
or incorporeal; but the divine scriptures call i t  ’invisible' ”.417
Origen also appeals to another passage of Paul's, namely the II 
Cor. 4,18, where the distinction between "things which are seen" and 
"things which are not seen" is made. Origen explains: "Now the things 
which are invisible are not only not seen, but do not even possess a 
nature which admits of their being seen; they are what the Greeks have 
called ’asomata’ or incorporeal. But the things of which Paul said, ’they 
are not seen', possess a nature which admits of their being seen; he is 
explaining, however, that they are not yet seen by those to whom they
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are promised.1,418
It is very often that Origen appeals to these two passages of Paul 
in order to depict his fundamental view of the distinction between 
incorporeal and corporeal nature. This is a distinction in terms of which 
he portrays the radical transcendence of God to the world, and 
particularly to space. As we shall discuss later, the same perception of 
God (namely his transcendence) is also articulated through the notion of 
atemporality in order to depict his being beyond time.
Thus "invisible” is what cannot be seen due to its essence, because 
it  is conceived as incorporeal, whereas "not seen" is that which is 
invisible due to the invisible (to human beings) kind of the matter of its 
body. Thus what is "not seen" is not immaterial but iust made of an
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aetheral kind of matter which cannot be seen by human beings. What is 
invisible is incorporeal and beyond any connexion with any matter at all. 
The term "spiritual" is sometimes used to denote the same perception 
which suggests the notion of immateriality.419
. God is incorporeal*. Origen states that "the apostle declares that God 
is invisible when he says that Christ is the "image of the invisible 
God"420 and it  is where he grounds his view that "the substance of the 
Trinity, which is the beginning and cause of all things, ‘of which are all 
things and through which are all things and in which are all things421 
must not be believed either to be a body or to exist in a body, but to be 
wholly incorporeal".422
This point is futher elaborated thus: "God must not be thought to 
be in any kind of body, nor to exist in a body, but to be a simple 
intellectual existence, admitting in himself of no addition whatever, so 
that he cannot be believed to have in himself a more or less, but is 
Unity, or if  I may so say, Oneness throughout, and the mind and fount 
from which originates all intellectual existence or mind. Now mind does 
not need physical space in which to move and operate, nor does it  need a
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magnitude discernible by the senses, nor bodily shape or colour, not 
anything else whatever like these, which are suitable to bodies and 
matter", it is further pointed out that " only the species of deity, i f  i 
may so call it, has the privilege of existing apart from all material 
intermixture ... That mind needs no space in which to move according to 
its own nature".423 So there is a constant reference to "the invisible and 
incorporeal God",424 to the divinity which “in virtue of the majesty of its 
incorporeal nature, i t  is confined to no place, in no place"425 since "the 
nature of the Trinity is one and incorporeal".426
The inference that Origen makes out of his views of the divine 
nature is that "it is impossible to speak of a part of what is incorporeal 
or to make any division in it.".427 The significance of this axiom of 
Origen's w ill become clear when we shall have discussed his view of 
corporeality which our next topic.
The world is material: As opposed to the divine nature, creation is 
bound with matter and distinction; so "every created thing ... is 
distinguished in God's sight by its being confined within a certain 
number or measure, that is, either number in the case of rational beings 
or measure in the case of bodily matter" -which makes up the bodies of 
rational creatures, since all of them "make use of bodies"428 Further, "a 
body has a shape".429 "Every body is made of matter" and has "shape and 
size and colour" which "are properties of bodies"4,50 as well as "To see 
and to be seen is a property of bodies, which it  would certainly not be 
right to apply either to the Father or to the Son or to the Holy Spirit in 
their relations with one another. For the Trinity by its nature 
transcends the lim its of vision, although it  grants it  to those who are in 
bodies, that is to all other creatures, the property of being seen one by 
another. But incorporeal, and above all intellectual nature is capable of 
nothing else but to know and to be known"431 At that point is clearly 
pointed out that the expression "those who are in bodies" indicates the
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entirety of creatures, that is to say the whole "world", namely the 
entirety of ranks of life.
This is the context in which the distinction between "things 
invisible" and "things not seen" should be understood. For as we saw 
above, Origen considers that those things referred by Paul as "not seen" 
should be understood as "not yet seen" and not as not admitting of being 
seen at all; that is to say, they are not invisible in their essence.432 
This, in the final analysis, means that we do not see those things, not 
because they are not capable of being seen, but just because it  is the 
physical structure of ours in this rank of life, namely the human one, 
which does not allow us to see those things.433
We should also notice one more property applied to bodily nature, 
which is ultimately a property of the world itself. It is asserted that 
"this nature (sc. the bodily one) is proved to be changeable and 
convertible by the very condition of its being created -for what was not 
and began to be is by this very fact shown to be of a changeable 
nature"434 and therefore "rational nature is changeable and 
convertible"435 Again it  is stressed that "since these rational beings, 
which as we said above were made in the beginning, were made when 
before they did not exist, by this very fact that they did not exist and 
then began to exist they are of necessity subject to change and 
alteration"436
Let us then see what the conclusions are out of these affirmations 
about corporeality.
Since incorporeal nature can be applied to God alone and that "life 
without a body is found in the Trinity alone"437 and "bodily nature was 
created out of nothing after a space of time and brought into being from 
non-existence"-438 it  follows that the entire "world" is a "material" one. 
We put this term into quotation marks, because "matter" in this case has 
a broader meaning; for this term is attributed not only to the bodies
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being "seen" but also to the "not seen" ones, and yet material -as they 
are made from a matter of diferrent quality. For according to Origen 
"material substance possesses such a nature that i t  can undergo every 
kind of transformation. When therefore it  is drawn down to lower beings 
it  is formed into the grosser and more solid condition of body and 
serves to distinguish the visible species of this world in all their 
variety. But when it  ministers to more perfect and blessed beings it  
shines in the splendour of "celestial bodies"439 and adorns either the 
"angels of God" or the "sons of the resurrection"440 with the garments of 
a "spiritual body"441 All these beings go to make up the diverse and 
varied condition of the one world";442 this is why there is reference to 
"a variety and diversity of bodies, out of which a world is always 
composed"443 and "the diversity of the world cannot exist apart from 
bodies" and "bodily nature admits of diverse and various changes to such 
an extent that i t  can undergo every kind of transformation,".444
The conception of the "world" as a material one, is a fundamental 
one for the overall understanding of Origen's thought445 and it  is 
possible to corroborate the aforestated points of the Princ from 
passages preserved in Greek.
Thus, in the commJohn\ Origen refers to the "world" (Koauog) 
which has been made "material" (uRiKog ^svopsvog) saying that i t  has 
"various places" (xonoug exei 6ia<popoug) some of which are lower as 
other are higher (e(ev av xivsg xonoi 01 kcxiuj kcu aRRoi 01 avu); yet all 
these "places” of the world should be regarded as being "down" if  they 
are to be compared to what it  is "immaterial and invisible and 
incorporeal". What Origen does not fail to stress is that the term "down" 
has not any spatial significance at all (ou xooouxov xonw) but it  denotes 
the qualitative superiority of the invisible and incorporeal nature over 
the corporeal one (ooov xfj npoq xd aopaxa augKpiaei). It is therefore in 
this sense that incorporeal nature (xd s|u) atijjidxwv) is stated as being
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“above a l l the  heavens"; and in  th is  sense a l l the  c re a tu re s  o f the  w o r ld  
should be cons ide red  as being in h a b ita n ts  o f a p lace being "down" even i f  
th is  "p lace" is  the  h ighes t rank  o f l i f e  o f the  w o r ld  (kcu ^dp ndg 6 xwv 
pRsnojisvujv noRrcrjg kcu napepxoyevujv kcu npoaKaipwv sk xwv kocxw eax iv , 
Kav sv au^K p iasi xonwv sk xujv avtuxaxiu xu^xavr]).445
We see therefore that in Origen’s thought the term "world" is 
closely connected to corporeality; the term itself, whenever used, 
implies corporeality of necessity. What follows then is that this term 
cannot be used in expressions such as "spiritual world” or a "world of 
incorporeal rational creatures before time"; for what is "spiritual" is of 
necessity “incorporeal" as what refers to "world" is of necessity 
"corporeal". "Spiritual" (that is, incorporeal) life is exclusive to the 
Deity. The terms "world" and "spiritual" (which means "incorporeal") are 
incompatible with each other and the use of the one exludes the other. 
This is why the expression "spiritual world" makes no sense in Origen’s 
thought as there is no room for that at all and this is why it  is absurd 
to apply such a term in discussing about Origen’s theology.
The world as Ktrrapoan. The above-mentioned notion, namely that 
there is a qualitative difference of the world with respect to 
incorporeality, is expressed, as we saw, by the word "down"447 This is a 
very conscious expression of Origen's; and he articulates it  in similar 
way using the word "katabole (KaxapoRrj)". in the Princ appears a 
treatment of this question:
"Still, there is a point which I do not think we ought lightly to 
pass by, and that is that the holy scriptures call the foundation of the 
world by a new and peculiar name, terming it  katabole. This word is 
very incorrectly translated into Latin by constitutio or foundation, for 
katabole in Greek has rather the significance of de/cere, that is, to 
cast downwards, and is, as we have said, incorrectly rendered into Latin 
by constitutio. An example occurs in the gospel according to John, when
113
the Saviour says ‘And there shall be tribulation in those days, such as 
hath not been from the foundation of the world’.448 Here “foundation’’ 
stands for ’’katabole", the meaning of which term must be taken to be as 
we have explained above. Moreover the apostle used the same word in the 
epistle to the Ephesians, when he says, ‘Who chose us before the 
foundation of the world’;449 for here, too, the "foundation" represents 
katabole, which must be taken to have the same meaning as that given in 
our interpretation above."450 The inference out of this discussion is that 
"A descent ... of all alike form from higher to lower conditions appears 
to be indicated bu the meaninq of this word katabole” 451w  w
There would be no question about the authenticity of these views, 
since the same reasoning appears in the commJohn in the exposition of 
the qualitative difference between corporeality and incorporeality. It is 
exactly at the place where Origen says that we would, "in a sense" (Kaid 
i i  iujv aqpaivopevuv)452 term the son of God himself as "world” (Koopog). 
As it  is discussed in Appendix A, Origen uses the term here as a 
metaphor in order to indicate the "multi -decorated" wisdom of God. 
Thus he affirms that this "world" is but the son of God, as "the Logos 
who is perfectly apart from any matter".453 it is there that he states 
that there is nothing in common between that "world", who is "up", to 
this world which is "down" and which is a ’katabole" (KaxapoRrj) from 
that world. Origen's opinion is that it  is not accidental that "the saints" 
have "invented this term" (10 ovopa nRaaavxwv) -namely the KaxapoRf|- 
in order to articulate the conception (6ia xoiauxqv sn(voiav) of the world 
as being "down"; for they would have just said ’before the foundation of 
the world’, yet they did not; they said ’Before the katabole of the 
world’ 454
As a matter of fact, the term "katabole” (KaxaftoRfj) litera lly 
means "thrown down"; hence the term implies a notion of a "fall". This is 
exactly why this term is most suitable to Origen on a scriptural basis
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(though not the only one) to which he alludes when he refers to his 
conception of the fall, as discussed in this section. The very notion of 
fall indicates that the material world had a beginning and it  is quite 
clear that the providential creation had a beginning, too. However, 
Origen's views on this question have been widely miscomprehended. Thus 
he has been attributed a notion of "eternal creation" in a Platonic sense, 
namely a notion of a beginningless world of personal spirits, out of 
which the fall occured. Our analyses hitherto have made quite clear that 
such an allegation is entirely wrong. However, since this view is 
established among scholars and since the question of the "duration" of 
the world is closely related to Origen’s conception of time, we shall 
make a further ad hoc discussion on this subject in the ensuing section 
in order that no doubt should remain that this allegation about Origen’s 
thought is entirely erroneous.
§4. The notion of "eternity of the world".
Origen’s opinions about the "duration" of creation have been a 
matter of controversy as a notion of "eternity of the world" has been 
attributed to him. This is one of the main points on which Origenism (or, 
what was thought to be Origen’s thought) has been condemned.455 As time 
in itself is defined in close relation to the world (as we shall discuss in 
chapter 2), Origen's views of the "duration" of the world affect directly 
his view of time. Thus the discussion of this question is quite a crucial 
point for a proper understanding of his concept of time.
In discussing this question we shall take into account the fact that 
it  is Origen himself who stresses the different significations denoted by 
the tenses in which verbs are used.456 Thus he is fully conscious of the 
fact that the Imperfect tense implies what has always existed (like 
"was"); this is also what he believes about Present tense (as in the case 
of "is", which denotes the timeless being of wisdom, in the same way
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"was" does). As opposed to this structure, Origen is conscious of what 
the Past tense denotes,457 namely that it  indicates what happened at an 
indefinite moment in the past.458 A similar view is found in the 
Commentary on the Song of Songs: “Because of these, therefore, it  is 
said to the holy body of the Bride: ’How lovely have thy cheeks become!'. 
And notice that He did not say ’How lovely your cheeks a re !’ -but 'How 
lovely have thy cheeks become \ He means to show that previously they 
were not so lovely.’459
The analyses of Origens on the actual implications of the term 
“became" (referring to the Logos in his being "with" God) elucidate his 
views and show that he was conscious of the actual meaning of the 
tenses. This is why we have asserted that a philological analysis of 
Origen’s terminology can provide significant conclusions about his 
authentic views. For when he uses terms, and particularly verbs, he is 
particularly scrupulous in respect of the philosophical and theological 
implications entailed out of the way he uses these terms.
In the beginning of this chapter we saw how Origen interprets the 
scriptural language as well as how he articulates his own views when he 
refers the divine being itself. Indeed it  is he himself who draws the 
reader’s attention upon the use of verbs in the scriptural language and 
he extensively ponders through such a point of view.450 Let us then now 
see how he uses the language himself when he refers to the "creative 
relation’’451 of God to the world.
Origen’s conception of the divine being is quite clear: Wisdom was 
timelessly in God apart from any creation, be it  providential or actual. 
This means that God in himself is conceived apart from any creation or 
even thought of creation. God created because he w illed  so. Thus Wisdom 
“was being in herself in no relation to anyone" (oocpia unapxouaa 
ou5sp(av axsaiv npog exspov xiva si'xev)452 This is exactly the state in 
which God is conceived in himself and not as Creator.
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It is out of God’s decision to create that the son of God , as 
Wisdom, "became" (gsvopsvog) “God’s benevolent decision" (euSoKia) and 
"wanted" (r|pouRf)9T]) and "willed" Crj9sRr|aev) "to establish a creative 
relation to future creatures (xd eo6|ieva)"463
So wisdom was in God’s atemporal being; and this wisdom "willed" 
(T]poufif|9r|, r|9srlrjasv) "to establish a creative relation" (avarlapeiv 
axeaiv Srjpioup^iKfjv) to what was to come into being out of non-being 
out of God's decision. Besides, Origen refers to a reality where "time 
cannot be found’464 and "the third and the fourth conceptions of the 
Logos did not exist"465 since there was no creation yet.
It is stated that "God brought(ijga^sv) everything into being";466 
also "God made (snoirjosv) beings out of non beings";467 "life is the holy 
Trinity who gives life to everything and it  is her who brought 
(npoa^a^ouoa) beings into being out of non being";468 "those who did not 
exist before (xd yrj npoxspov ovxa) have been handed to Jesus by the 
father himself; and it  is not said about just some of them, but about 
all".469 He refers to all those who "have received their being from God" 
(uno $dp xou 0sou xo sivai 6s|d{isvoi);470 and he states that we are 
indebted to God because “he made (snoirjosv) us who did not exist 
before"471 In Cels Origen speaks of "God who made everything"472 and
elsewhere he explains that in this "everything" time should be included
too: "If everything has been through him, it  is well said that he exists 
before the aeons; and this is whence we learn that the aeons came into 
being out of non being"473 He also states that Christ is said to be the 
beginning "for it  is him who gave (6i6oug) being";474 accordingly, God is 
said to be "creator, because i t  is he who brought things Q^ovoxa) into 
being out of non being’’475 as "heaven and earth and everything in them 
have been produced into being out of non being";476 again he refers to the 
son saying that "the Son and Logos of God is a hypostasis, it  is him who
produced (napagagovxa) everything non being into being, by his
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wisdom477 Accordingly, in excPs i t  is stated that by the term "works" 
of God (as in Psalm 144,9) David means "the rational natures" (vuv epga 
xag <puaeig xag fio i^Kdg Re^si)478
These are not the only points where Origen states his view that it  
is God who brought everything into being; he expresses his view 
elsewhere too479 What is of interest in these passages is not the view 
itself,480 namely that God is the creator, a view which of course is 
neither unexpected nor an original one481 What is significant is the 
manner in which Origen articulates this view. One should notice that he 
constantly uses Past tense, in order to indicate that the world had a 
beginning, God was "before" any notion of creation and he created 
because he "willed" so. Studying the manner in which Origen expresses 
the notion of creation one can see that there is nothing to indicate or to 
imply that God has "always" decided to create the world and that he just 
realized this decision at a "moment" which marks the beginning of the 
creation. "Coming into being out of non-being" is a notion which began to 
make sense only once God decided to create. There was nothing to 
compel him to do so. He did it  out of a "benevolent decision" (suSoida), 
namely out of an act o f freedom. This is a point of particular 
significance and we should elaborate on that a little  further.
If Origen held the view that creation has "always" been God’s 
decision, it  should imply that the "will" of God to create was existing in 
him "always" too, even though creation had not yet been realized. But 
what Origen denotes is quite the opposite. And this is clearly portrayed 
both explicitly as well as by the way he uses language.
Origen uses Past tense in a most conscious way, namely knowing 
that this tense indicates that something occured, something "became" 
while it  did not exist before; Past tense itself implies a kind of 
progress or change from one situation to a next one. This is why Origen 
so strongly excludes the use of Past tense when he tries to portray the
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life  of God Himself; and this is why he stresses that “the Logos did not 
become in the beginning, but he was what he was in the apxn"482 What 
this means is that if  Past tense is used it  would imply that there was a 
reality in which the Logos was not in the apxq, that is in Wisdom.
He knows and has stated483 that no verb can adequately express 
the reality when it  is referred to the being of God; nevertheless he uses 
language in such a way that the inevitable inaccuracy should be 
diminished to the minimum possible; so he deems either the Imperfect 
tense484 or the Present tense485 as more appropriate (or rather, less 
inaccurate) in order to refer to the being of God Himself. On the other 
hand, i t  is the Past tense which is deemed as more appropriate to 
express what came into being out of non-being. In the same sense that 
Origen states that "the Logos did not become in the beginning, but he was 
what he was in the beginning"486 he states, refering to John: "... using 
verbs in an appropriate way he applied the form 'Became* to his flesh, 
while 'Was' indicates his divine nature."487
So it  is quite clear that Origen is perfectly aware of the 
significance of Past tense, namely that i t  denotes what came into being 
at a moment of the indefinite past, while i t  before was not at all.
This is the conceptual background against which Origen’s constant 
use of the Past tense with respect to God’s creative act should be 
considered. What should be emphasized is that this way of expression, 
(namely that the world is an "occurence" brought into being out of 
non-being) is used not only for the actual creation but also for the 
providential creation. This means that the w ill and decision o f God tc 
create originated in his benevolent freedom . This is clearly and 
paistakingly portrayed by Origen.
He stresses that wisdom "wanted" (r)PouRrj9r|) and "willed" 
( r |9 s R T ]o s v )  the creatures to come into being, using Past tense; he also 
says that wisdom "became" (gevoysvog) God’s benevolent decision
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(euSoKta), which actually means that God himself ■‘became" creator488
The very creative act out of this decision is portrayed in the 
same way: He refers to the providential creative words of (and "reasons" 
created by) God as "pre-uttered words" (npoxpavujQevxag Rogoug)489 It is 
again significant that the term npozpavtuSsvmg is a form of verb in 
Past tense, namely the past participle; and this means that this "uttered 
words" of God to his Wisdom is not an infinitely existing fact in wisdom, 
but it  "became", so to speak, "when" God willed so.
In the same way Origen states that the Wisdom, conceived as life, 
"established (ave&e^axo) a relation to rational creatures (xd Ro i^Kd)" 
because this "life" willed (pouRofievT]} to benefit them; so she brought 
their substance to participating in life (eni xo £fjv auxd npoaRapovxa 
[isxouaiag xponuj)."490
It is quite obvious that there is only one and universal way, in 
which Origen refers to God’s w ill to bring creation into being out of 
non-being; this is the constant use of Past tense. And this clearly 
denotes that God's w ill did not always exist, but it, as it  were, 
"emerges" and it  is realized in the actual creation of world.
In Origen’s view there is a decision of God to create the world; 
yet this decision is depicted not as an eternal one, in the sense of 
beginningless duration; but it  is expressed as a "will" which actually 
"emerged" out of God’s freedom.
Origen does not say that the wisdom of God "wants' or “wills" 
(which would be "9sRei" or "pouRexai"); nor does he use Imperfect tense 
(which would be "f|9eRev" or "epouRexo" and might be rendered in English 
as "used to want" or "used to will") both tenses here, namely Present or 
Imperfect tense, implying that this "will" of God had not any beginning in 
the past.491 But the forms Origen uses are "wanted" and "willed".
Accordingly, he does not say that wisdom established a creative 
relation to world "being" himself (which would be wv) God’s "benevolent
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decision" (euSokio); but he says that she "became" (gevojievog) God's 
"eudokia"492 and "established a relation" (oxemv npoq auxd aveSe^aio) 
because she wanted “to benefit" (utpeRrjaai- this form is in the Past 
tense too) "the rational creatures" (id  fiogiKd)493 which however are 
called as "future beings" (id  soopeva)494 using the Future tense of the 
verb "to be" in order to denote that the actual creation is subsequent to 
the providential one.
It has been asserted that the Christian view differs from the 
Platonic one by virtue of the role of w ill.495 The Platonic illustration of 
body and shadow, or sun and light, has been regarded as excluding God's 
w ill and choice; on the contrary the Christian idea is that creation 
involves divine w ill, not necessity, and this had already been articulated 
before Origen.495 On the other hand, however, the notion of w ill is not 
altogether absent from Platonic texts. Ths notion can be found in 
Timaeus.497 Notions of w ill are found in Plotinus, too, (pouRqoig, 
9eRqoig, etpsoiq)498 but he mainly uses them in order to dismiss the idea 
that secondary beings exist through the w ill of the One.499 At any rate, 
however, Plotinus allows the lower levels of reality to create by will 
(9eRqoig) but he regards the creation of lower levels of reality as 
necessary 5m
So the very notion of w ill, regarded in itself, is a distinction 
which has not been unchallenged (due to that a notion of wvy/can be 
found in Plato as well as in PlotinusP01 as a criterion for the 
distinction between the Platonic and Christian conception of creation. 
However, there is a point in Origen's thought which does distinguish 
these two views of creation.
The contrast which Origen established to all versions of Platonism 
is to be found in what actually the notion of w ill of God denotes and 
entails.
The notion that Origen actually establishes is the radical "chasm"
121
between God and the world. Thus In his thought it  makes no sense to 
speak of necessity in "lower" levels of reality or absence of necessity 
in "higher" levels of reality. These Plotinian affirmations stem from the 
Neoplatonic conception of the world and particularly his conception of 
continuity from the One down to the Intellect and Soul and matter. 
These affirmations are totally alien to Origen’s thought. To him there is 
no essential difference between the ranks of life. Either they are higher 
or lower there are two fundamental elements which determine their 
being in its essence.
First, all rational beings are of one nature, due to their being 
created and due to their relationship to the Logos to a certain extent for 
all species. In respect of this, there is a universality of nature of all 
rational creatures, namely ra tio na lity , albeit its degrees vary.
Secondly, the world is out of God, it  is the absolute "down" from 
the divine being; hence even a supreme rank of life is regarded as being 
"down".502
In Origen, "strictly speaking" (xu aKpij3sg egeid^ovTi)503 there are 
not "lower" and "higher" levels of reality of the world proper in the way 
Platonists regard it. What actually exists is the absolute distinction 
between "up" and "down", namely between the timeless divine being and 
the world. The notion of the radical hiatus between those two realities, 
so often stressed by Origen in the most strong and vivid terms, is 
exactly the ground on which he rejects any notion of necessity 
concerning the creation of the world. Thus, even the supreme ranks of 
life  are regarded as being "down" in exactly the same sense that all the 
other ones are "down", too.
Beyond that, there is another point which radically contrasts 
Origen’s throught from Neoplatonism. The conception of God who creates 
because he wills to benefit constitutes a major difference from the 
Plotinian conception of creation -a difference which has eluded those
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who make assertions on Origen’s thought.
In Plotinus the creative beings' thought and w ill is turned upon 
itself; this thought is not directed towards producing a creature and 
(which is a most striking difference) it  is not fo r the sake of the 
creature. The creator simply creates not because it  decides to create in 
order to benefit the creatures (least of all regarded as future 
creatures), but creates simply by being what it  is, namely the creative 
act is a mode of the creator’s very being.504 The role of w ill in the 
Neoplatonic view has rather the meaning that anything which is already 
perfect w ill generate something of itself, like the light which surrounds 
the sun.505 So, even in the few cases that the role of w ill is indicated in 
one way or another, the creation itself has a character of cosmic law 
rather than a free decision -and, least of all, the character of a 
benevolent decision So although Plotinus indicates a w ill, this w ill 
suggests a cosmic law of creation is beyond whatever possesses choice 
(npoaipeaig), or even life. It is a stark contrast that, in Origen it  is not 
w ill which is beyond God, but its God Himself who is beyond the 
notion of God's will.506
Following the preceding discussion, the contrast to Origen’s view 
of God as Creator is quite obvious. For our analyses right since the 
beginning of this chapter show that in Origen the notion of God Himseh 
stands in an absolute ontological p rio rity  to the notion of God as 
Creator
This, in the final analysis, means that the existence of creation in 
itself has a contingent character and it  is not originated in any 
necessity whatever.507
This is the sense in which Origen affrims that the ’’so to speak, 
essence” of God should be distinguished from the essence of any created 
nature (oiovet acpiaxavxi xfjv ouafav xou 8eou ano ndvxojv xuv gevvqxwv) to 
which God "has no connexion" (o(g ou koivojveO at all;508 the expression
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"as it  were" implies Origen's fundamental view that God is “beyond 
essence",509 namely that he "does not participate in essence at all"510 
and it  is him who created "essence" since essence was "uncreated" 
(a^evvrjxov) before creation; and God "is transcendent to anything that 
pertains to the world" (xov uneppaivovxa navxa xd xou Koapou 
npagpaxa)511 It is due to this emphasis on God's radical transcendence 
to the world that there can be no question of "essence" or "non-essence" 
of God. His being is beyond any problematique about "essence" 
whatsoever. For essence began to make sense only when creation came 
into being for the firs t time and, therefore, essence proper is 
ontologically posterior to God Himself.
So the remarks of G. Florovski512 about the "distance of essences" 
between God and the world is but a notion of Origen. It is indicative of 
how litt le  he knew about Origen's thought that he attributes this notion 
to John of Damascus.513 He also appeals to Augustine who said "nihilque 
in ea esse quod ad Trinitatem pertineat, nisi quod Trinitas condidit" 
(There is not anything which is related to the Trinity, apart from the 
fact that the Trinity has created i t ) 514
In fact, however, it  was Origen who had preceded Augustine by 
affirming the complete irrelevance of the Wisdom to anything created 
and the "establishement" of a "creative relation" to the world out of 
benevolence of God (suSoKia 0eou).
Concluding this analysis we may say this: In referring to God's 
creative act, Origen uses the verbs in a way which is quite indicative of 
how he conceives the "creative relation"515 of God to creation:
When he refers to the being of V/isdom, namely the son of God, he 
uses the Present tense and he stresses that "wisdom is being" (eaxi 
unapxouaa)516 thereby denoting his view of the atemporal being of God; 
for he considers Present tense as the most appropriate one in order to 
talk about the being of God.517 He also quotes the Imperfect tense used
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by John in the beginning of his gospel and he very emphatically stresses 
that the being of the Logos of God is articulated through the term "was 
(fjv) and not to any form such as "became" (s^evexo); he stresses that the 
latter is appropriate only for what came into being out of non-being, 
like "life", as John himself says that life "became" in the Logos518
When he refers to the actual creation he states it  as "future 
beings" (xd saoyeva) using the Future tense. He is perfectly conscious of 
the meaning of this tense, namely that it  is used to indicate something 
not existing at present but comimg into existence in the future,519 
namely "after" what is indicated by the Present tense.
Finally, when he refers to the decision of God to create and the 
w ill of Wisdom to establish a creative relation to what was to come 
into being out of non being, he uses Past tense, in order to suggest that 
this decision came out of God’s freedom and it  is not a predication which 
would be applied to God Himself. By referring to the “creative relation" 
of the Logos to the creation through the use of Past tense, Origen 
indicates an "occurence" appeared as of an indefinite moment of the past 
and not existing before that moment at all.520
The point which we have just tried to make is quite a crucial one, 
not only for the portrayal of Origen's concept of time, but also for his 
theology as a whole. For it  is generally asserted that Origen held the 
so-called doctrine of the eternity of world. What is attributed to him is 
that he regards the world as something like an "eternal companion" of 
God. Koetschau, in his edition of Princ, embodies in the text two 
Fragments, in which Origen is presented as holding such a view. Vet 
these two passages521 do not actually belong to this work; for they are 
nothing more than allegations of Justinian, cited in his 1/W r; there is 
no reason to accept either that these passages belong to this work or 
that, at any rate, they have something to do with Origen’s authentic 
views themselves, as stated in his original works. Far from it.
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If Origen had a view of the world being with God apart from any 
notion of beginning, then this world (whatever its nature would be)522 
should stand in a relation to God not too different than the relation of 
the father's to the son. For both, world and the Son, would be regarded 
as timelesss as well as beginningless. Yet it  is very interesting to see 
how Origen articulates his view on the one hand of God's relation to the 
world and on the other of the father's relation to the son. For it  is again 
in implicit terms of time that Origen depicts the radically different 
nature of the relation in either of these two perceptions.
As far as the world is concerned we need not to make any further 
analyses; for God's creative relation to world has already been 
discussed; God "willed" to bring world into being out of non being and so 
he did. We have accordingly argued that this notion entails that there 
was a "when"523 that only God was; and there was a "then" that there 
were both God and his decision to create beings out of non-being.524
Let us then see how Origen depicts the relation of the father to 
the son. A passage from homJer reads as follows:
"If 'anyone who commits a sin is said to be begotten by the devil' 
[l John,3,8], then we have been begotten by the devil as many times as we 
have committed sins; miserable then is he who is always (aeO begotten 
by the devil and, again, blessed is he who is always (aeO begotten by 
God. For I shall say that a just man has been begotten by God not only 
once (ou gap dna£), but he is always (aeO begotten in each particular 
good deed in which God begets a just man; and if  I let you know about the 
saviour, that the father did not just beget-the son and was thereafter 
detached from him, but he always begets him (ouxt egevvqaev o ncrcfjp 
xov uiov kcu aneRuoev auxov ano xqg gsveaeujg auxou, aRR' asi gevva 
auxov), then I shall say something similar about any just man. Let us 
then see what our saviour is. He is an 'effluence of glory'525 We cannot 
say either that the effluenge of glory has been begotten (ouxf dna^
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gegevvqxai kqi ouxi gevvaxai) but the effluence of God's own glory is 
begotten exactly for as long as there is the light which creates the 
effluence. Our saviour is God's wisdom and this wisdom is an 'effluence 
of eternal light'.525 If therefore the saviour is always begotten (e( o 
ourcfjp aef gevvaxai), this is why he says 'he begets me before all 
mountains'527 (he does not say that he has begotten me before all 
mountains, but he says 'he begets me before all mountains') and the 
saviour is always begotten by the father (kqi aef gevvaxai 6 awxfjp uno 
xou naxpog)."528
The same notion is found in the Pr/nc: "...the Father begets the
only begotten Son and brings forth a Holy Spirit, not as beings who did
not exist before, but in the sense that the Father is the origin and 
source of the Son or the Holy Spirit and no thought of before or after- 
can be entertained in respect of them..."529 Origen explicitly rejects any 
idea that "God the Father ever existed, even for a single moment, 
without begetting his wisdom"530 It is remarkable that, at that point of 
Prfnc, he refers to the relation of the father to the son by commenting 
on the same scriptural passage (mamely, Prov.8,25) as in the Greek 
passage in his Homily on Jeremiah. What he affirms there is this:
"God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was
born indeed from him and draws his being from him, but he is yet
without any beginning, not only of that kind which can be distinguished 
by periods of time, but even of that kind which the mind alone is wont to 
contemplate in itself and to perceive, i f  I may so say, with the bare 
intellect and reason. Wisdom, therefore, must be believed beyond the 
lim its of any beginning that we can speak or understand."531
What we see here is that Origen again stresses that it  is the 
Present tense which can (with the minimum inaccuracy) express the 
relation of the father to the son.
What Origen strongly re jects  here is any implication that the
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birth of the son is an "occurence" which occured "once" and the son 
exists thereafter. This is just an ontological relation and no notion of 
"beginning", as a “coming into being out of non-being", can be applied 
there.
But this is exactly what Origen affirm s  about creation. The 
expression "to come into being out of non-being" is typical of the way in 
which Origen depicts creation. It is exactly through this expression that 
he contrasts the son’s being from the creation:
"Christ's birth532 is not, as some people think, a way from 
non-being into being, but it  is a way from 'being in form of god533 to 
undertaking the 'form of a servant'."534 And, as we already noted, 
Origen's phrase about Christ, o u k  eoxiv oxe o u k  f j v  was later largely 
used against Arianism535
The contrast in the two different ways Origen regards these two 
different relations to God is quite obvious. The world came into being 
out of non-being. Such a notion can by no means be applied to Christ, 
even when we speak of his incarnation. It is quite indicative of how 
strongly Origen feels about this view that he remains remarkably 
scrupulous when he refers to the two meanings of the term "wisdom". 
Thus when he regards the "theoremata" and "reasons" (which are also 
called "wisdom") he stresses that they are "made"535 and not 
beginningless, in this way distinguishing this "wisdom" from the person 
of the Son of God who timelessly was (not became) with the Father.537
According to this perception of the relation of the creation to God, 
Origen in a number of places states God as the "cause" of creation. It 
should be emphasized that he applies this notion to the conception of 
"coming into being out of non-being", namely to the creative act of God, 
that is to the creation of both incorporeal and corporeal nature. Thus 
God is stated as a "cause" by virtue of the fact that he created both 
“corporeals and incorporeals" (xwv aajyaxiKiuv kqi xujv aaiuyaxajv, kqi
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xouxujv andvxujv aixiou Osou).538 The same predication is also attributed 
to Christ, in as much as he is regarded as Creator of what came into 
being out of non-being, namely as Wisdom who ,,willed,, to "establish a 
creative relation to future beings" [s. supra}. Thus Christ is also stated 
as a "cause" because it  is he who gave the "being" (aixfa ... tug xo eivai 
5i6oug) out of non-being.539 In another passage, too, Christ is stated as 
the "cause" of everything, be it  "visible or invisible", in the sense that he 
"is before them and is cause of them" by virtue of the fact that he gave 
them their "being" (xo eivaO540 At that point Origen is particularly clear 
that he alludes not only to the actual creation but also to the 
providential one; thus he speaks not just of the making but of the 
"substantification" (ouauuasi)541 suggesting that Christ is a "cause" not 
only of the actual existence of things but also of the creation of the 
"reasons" of them -a notion to which par excellence Origen applies the 
predication of "coming into being out of non-being".542
In the context of his erroneous prejuduces about Origen’s thought, 
C. Bigg tries to connect Origen’s conception of creation to Platonism. He 
knows, however, that he cannot do that with a direct relation to Plato at 
this point. For in the Timaeus the world of Ideas appear.to have an 
independent eternal existence from the Demiurge -and Bigg acknowledges 
that.543 Thus, as regards this point, he tries to maintain his allegation 
of "Platonism" in Origen through a connexion to Philo’s notion of 
creation, namely that the Ideas exist in the divine Mind.544 But he is 
wrong again. For in Philos’ thought there is a Platonic notion to which 
Origen's conception of creation is entirely contrasted: Philo regards a 
"world of ideas" which function not only as "models" but also as efficient 
causes545 -which is a notion alien to Origen's thought, in which these 
"patterns" are creatures and the only "cause" of creation is God.
Further, what Bigg did not comprehend is this: As Philo refers to 
an “original matter"546 there is a conception which excludes creation ex
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nihilo  in a strict sense. This latter has been pointed out by A. Chroust 
as an inference; but we can support this conclusion by appealing to a 
passage where he presents God creating in a Platonic sense, namely as 
"puting in order on what is disorderly" (xqv aKoapiav ev Koayui xi9eig), 
his only difference from Plato being that Philo perceives this eternal 
"disorderly" cosmic state as "incorporeal"547 Besides there are at least 
two statements of Philo that creation out of non-being is impossible.548 
So Origen's conception of providential creation has actually nothing to 
do with Philo's views. For in Origen the "patterns" are created out 0/ 
nothing and they are not regarded as "causes" of the actual creation. On 
both these decisive points Origen's thought stands in direct contrast to 
the respective views of Philo's.
The very notion of "cause" that Origen applies to the "being" (and 
by this general term we allude to both the providential and actual 
creation) is of utmost importance. For the adoption of this notion is 
strikingly indicative of his conception of creation as having an actual 
"beginning". It is a fundamental principle stated by Origen that what 
proceeds from a cause must necessarily have a beginning 549 The very 
fact, therefore, that creation had a cause entails that it  had a 
beginning, too.550 Although Origen clearly states that this "cause" does 
not imply any notion of causality but suggests the very fact that 
creation came into being out of non-being551 and "cause" is He who 
brought it  into being,552 the very adoption of the category of cause 
clearly indicates his constant view that creation is not beginningless 
whatever. And not only that. The beginning of creation implies clearly 
that the being of God in Himself is p rio r to what was created. For 
Origen regards as a principle that " What creates is  older than what is 
created (ndv gap xo noiouv npsapuxepov xou nenoirjfievou)"553 The 
relation of God to creation is radically different from the relation of 
the Father to the Son.554 There can be no perception of a reality in which
130
the Son was not. But there is a clear conception of the divine being 
where there was no creation at all, neither a providential nor an actual 
one.555
Hence, Origen's views themselves as well as the manner in which 
he articulates those views clearly denote that in his thought there is no 
room for any notion like that of "eternity of world". It is Origen himself 
who vehemently attacks Heracleon who "most impertinently" "says that 
neither aeon nor what is in aeon was made through the Logos, thinking 
that they were made before the Logos".555
The very notion of "beginning" denotes that creation was created 
out of non-being. This is why, in Cels, Origen challenges "those who hold 
that the world is not created" stating that "they cannot speak of any 
beginningof the world" (tljg ouk eoxiv ouv xoig agevrjiov u<piaiapevoig i.6v 
Koopov apxgv au iou  sme(v)557 They are those who believe in any kind of 
beginningless of the world (like the Platonists who held the notions of 
an intelligible world and of a beginningless matter) and Origen explicitly 
opposes them, as he himself throughout his theology does speak of the 
beginning of the world, namely of its creation out of non-existence. 
This is why he has no difficulty in speaking of a "before" the creation 
of "ang rational nature" (npo ndarjg riogiKfjg fuaeujg).558 This is what he 
does at that point of Cels, too, as he reaffirms his view that "the world 
came into existence" (o Koopog gegsvrjiai) and "God gave existence to 
everything" (8eog e<peaxr|KSV xoig oRoig)559
In contrast to those who "cannot speak of any beginning of the 
world"550 Origen himself quite often uses the notion of beginning. Thus, 
in denying that evil exists in rational nature by nature, he expounds his 
views speaking of "natures existing in the beginning" (apxfj9sv (fuosig)551 
asserting that a rational nature is what it  is (in term of moral quality) 
due to its own responsibility and not because it  was made as such in tht 
beginning {cipjfgSsyJ
Although God's decision to create appears in a timeless reality 
(namely, the divine reality) Origen inevitably has to express this notion 
in temporal terms and this is why he calls on the reader not to be 
embarrased by using temporal terms speaking of a timeless reality552 
Behind this literary convention, however, we can see Origen's deeper 
perception of either God in Himself and God as Crest or and the 
ontological priority of the former to the latter.
In his thought there is a notion of "when" God decided to create. It 
is quite significant to ponder upon this "when" and to see Origen's view 
on this. He states that "The wisdom of God is a substance in herself 
existing before the aeons as a timeless one; and when{oxs) she accepted 
a relation to creatures then ( t o t s )  she became the beginning of God's 
works, either they are constructional or providential; so this beginning 
is yoked together with creatures of which she became beginning, and we 
mean her relation to creatures; but wisdom herself is timeless existing 
substantially in God before the aeons".553
Thus, although Origen is constantly stressing the atemporal 
character of wisdom's being, yet he holds a notion that creation, even as 
a thought or w ill or decision of God, does not exist in wisdom herself 
eternally in timelessness.
There is a notion of “ when... then " which clearly implies Origen's 
conception of God as being Creator not of necessity and the fact that he 
visualizes a reality of God being no Creator get. Although the term "yet" 
is obviously not meant literally, it  is indicative, however, that Origen 
holds a conception of God in Himself quite apart from any notion of 
creation.
The conception of God in Himself as quite distinct from his being 
known as Creator, is exactly what allows Origen to hold that creation 
does not introduce a change in God Himself. This is why Origen had no 
reason to deal with the pseudo-question "What was God doing before
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creation?". R. Sorabji564 attributes this concern to Origen but his 
mistake is that he grounds this view on the Princ whereas the whole of 
Origen's work in Greek proves that he needed not to deal with such a 
nonsense. For such a question is based on a completely unreasonable 
premise: When one speaks of before he has already established the 
entirely arbitrary presupposition that time exists. He speaks of divine 
life having postulated that this is a temporal reality. This is why he 
speaks of “before". But once it  has been explicated that divine reality is 
timeless then no question of the sort can be posed. For in such a case, 
an unacceptable irrationality is arbitrarily introduced into the 
discussion. It is as irrational as like torturing somebody during an 
interrogation asking him "What did you do in America?" ignoring his 
affirmations and the established fact that he has never been in America.
Origen was a man of sound logic and a profound knowledge of the 
rules of dialectics. This is why he did not feel it  necessary to deal with 
a pseudo-question like this. Once he had affirmed, in the clearest 
possible terms, that divine reality is timeless, he knew that terms such 
as "before" or “after" or "later" are just inevitable (yet conscious) 
linguistic inaccuracies.565 Least of all, he would take this inevitable 
linguistic inaccuracy as an actual philosophical problem and deal with it 
seriously. For the notions of "before" or "after" applied to divine 
timelessness suggest nothing more than the ontological relation of the 
w ill of God to creation.
So Origen did not need to discuss in the way R. Sorabji556 does, 
how it  is possible for creation to imply no change to God Himself. The 
ususal mistake (made there, too) over Origen’s conception about the 
"generation" of the Son from the Father is this: Scholars speak of 
"eternal generation" of the Son, as if  i t  were a continuous action of the 
Father. Yet the fact is that Origen speaks of “generation" portraying an 
ontological relation  within the divine life, and not an act whatsoever.557
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By contrast, creation came into being out of non-being through a 
creative act of God, namely out of his creative "utterance" revvrjdfjiu 
(Let be). In fact it  is quite crucial a point that creation is regarded as 
not "co-substantia!" to God, whereas the Son is portrayed as opoouoiog 
to the Father, a notion of Origen's which has serious implications for his 
thought. Again, however, we shall not elaborate on this point, which is 
beyond our scope. For such a discussion requires an extensive exposition 
of Origen's theology.
At any rate, the fact that creation is a product of God's free w ill t 
as well as that what came into being out of non-being is "not 
co-substantial" with God Himself, are two main points which underline 
Origen's conviction that the fact that God created does not establish any 
change in God Himself, indeed, the distinction between God in Himself and 
God as known to the world is one of the most fundamental conceptions of 
Origen's, stated throughout his work.568
Human intellect, being in time by necessity, would be tempted to 
pose a question such as "does this decision of God coincide with the 
realization of creation or is it  prior to this?". The stric t answer is that 
this question itself does not make any sense at all, because in 
timelessness there can be no notion of "before". Yet Origen does affirm 
that the providential creation was brought into being "before" the actual 
one. What this notion of “ when... then" indicates is that this creation of 
reasons, according to which the world was made, is not something which 
characterizes Wisdom in herself. This means that the relation of 
Wisdom, even as Logos, to creatures is not an element of the substance 
of wisdom herself. This is exactly expressed by the affirmation that 
wisdom "accepted" (s6e£axo) this relation to "future" creatures (xd 
soopisva). Hence if  i t  is asked whether or not can we visualize a state of 
Wisdom without necessarily thinking of creation or implying it  at any 
way, Origen's answer is that indeed we can think of Wisdom in such a
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way. For c rea tion  i t s e lf  is  but a product o f God's own freedom. This is  
the actual perception suggested by the expression "when... then" and by 
the verb "accepted" (sS s^a io ), as w e ll as by the verbs "wanted" 
Cf|Pouafj9T]) and "w ille d "  (r)9sRr)ocv) in  the passages discussed in the 
previous pages.
In v iew  o f th is  conception, the basic idea o f the conditionality o f 
c re a tion  lie s  in  Origen's works. R. S o rab ji's  asse rtion ,569 th e re fo re , tha t 
th is  idea is  a d iscovery o f Augustine is  not co rre c t, i t  was Origen who 
c le a r ly  exp lica ted th a t c rea tion  is  a product o f God's fre e  w i l l ,  namely 
th a t God would have never created i f  he did not w i l l  to  do so.
R. N o rris570 has taken fo r  granted th a t Origen holds a P la ton ic  
v iew  o f an "e te rn a lly " p re -e x is tin g  “w o rld  o f in te lligences", namely he 
has taken the typ ica l v iew  which has been regarded as convenient by so 
many scho lars in p o rtra y in g  Ori gen's thought. Yet he fin d s  h im se lf 
somewhat confused -as  he finds  c e rta in  notions w hich are u n like ly  a 
P la ton is t: "From a po in t o f v iew  o f a P la to n is t, the re  is  a co n tra d ic tio n  
involved in  saying both th a t som ething is  inco rpo rea l and th a t is  
generate.".571
The only comments which we should lik e  to  make here is  th a t 
N o rris  would be more confused is  he had grasped one m ore po in t o f 
Origen’s thought, which has to ta lly  eluded him: Not only Origen held th a t 
something can be incorporea l as w e ll as generate, but also th is  
"generate" is  not "co -sub s ta n tia l"  w ith  the d iv ine in c o rp o re a lity  -a  
d is t in c t io n  which P lato would not even dream o f making whereas to  
Gnostics i t  would seem outrageous. As we discuss la te r  in  th is  w ork , 
the re  are d is t in c t iv e  face ts  o f Origen's thought w hich are not ju s t  not 
P la ton ic , but ac tu a lly  co n s titu te  a cou n te r-p o in t o f P latonism .572 A t any 
ra te , the "con tra d ic tion " does not l ie  w ith  Origen but w ith  those, such as 
N o rris , who a p rio ri postu la ted him  as a "P la to n is t"  and tr ie d  to 
construe h is thought on th is  erroneous prem ise.
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There should be no doubt th a t, in  Princ, Rufinus has u t te r ly  
obscured the notions a rtic u la te d  th e re 573 For the perception  o f Origen 
about the ,,reasons,‘ coming in to  being out o f non-being in to  the Wisdom 
(a notion so c le a r ly  enunciated in  h is  w orks in  Greek) is  not c le a rly  
a r tic u la te d , and rendered in  an obscure (and we th ink , labo riou s ly  
obscure) manner. Rufinus obviously had not grasped Origen’s d is t in c tio n  
between God in H im self, on the one hand, and God as Creator out o f a 
fre e  decision and w ill o f h is, on the other. So he apparently  was a fra id  
th a t c rea tion 's  coming in to  being would en ta il some kind o f "change" in 
God in H im self. We th ink  th a t those po in ts  o f th is  w ork  (in  w hich the 
so -ca lled  "Why not sooner?" argument appears to  be im p lic it ly  faced) is  
but a ca tas troph ic  in te rp o la tio n  o f Rufinus,574 w hich has aroused so 
many m isunderstandings o f Origen's thought. Rufinus was obviously 
a fra id  th a t Origen's theology could not answer a question such as "What 
was God doing Before C reation?" o r "Why did he not c rea te  sooner?"575 
But such a question was posed not by Origen but by Gnostics and 
Manichaeans,576 namely the h e re tics  whom Origen a ttacks  so many tim es 
e ith e r im p lic it ly  o r by name.
This was a m a jo r m istake  o f Rufinus' -and the ju x ta p o s itio n  of 
te x ts  extan t both in  Greek and La tin  show th a t he was a man o f good w i l l  
but also o f not p a r t ic u la r ly  high in te llig e n ce  o r in te rp re ta t iv e  a b ility . 
For a ll o f the w r it in g s  which are extan t in  Greek c le a r ly  show th a t 
Origen did not need to  face th is  fake-question ; fo r  he c le a r ly  
d is tingu ishes the conception o f God in Himself fro m  the notion o f God's 
decision and w ill to  create. That God decided to create does not e n ta il 
any change in H im self. On the co n tra ry , in  sp ite  o f the fa c t th a t God 
decided to  c rea te , He Himself rem ains unchanged. Origen's s ta tem en ts  
in Cels leave no room fo r  doubt on th is  question: He e x p lic it ly  contends 
th a t "the teaching o f Jews and C h ris tians  preserves the unchangeable 
and una lte rab le  of God ( t o  axpenxov m i avaRRoiiiixov xou 8eou) ... For in
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p rayers  to  God the s c r ip tu re  says ’But You are the same’. And i t  is  
believed th a t i t  is  God who has said ’I have not changed* " 577
F urthe r, in  the same w ork , he exp lica tes th is  conception o f God 
qu ite  unequivocably:
" I f  he (sc. Celsus) had read the w ords o f the prophets, where David 
says, ’But You are the same' and where Malachi, I th ink , says ‘And I have 
not changed’,578 he would have seen th a t none o f us say that change takes 
place in God concerning either His action or our conceptions about Him. 
Remaining the same He co n tro ls  the th ings th a t are sub jec t to  change, 
as th a t is  th e ir  nature; and they are governed through the power o f h is  
Logos."579
The on to log ica l p r io r i ty  o f the notion o f God H im se lf to  any 
conception o f Him is  again c le a r ly  explicated. So the "conceptions" o f God 
as C rea tor o r as Judge o r as P rovident o r w hatever one would conceive 
him  o f, do not suggest any change in  God H im sef, who is  beyond any 
p o s s ib ility  o f change. P a r t ic u la r ly /a s  fa r  as the c re a tive  act o f God is  
concerned, the notion of h is  decision and w il l  plays a dec is ive  ro le  in  
th is  d is t in c t io n , which at any ra te  is  a fundamental prem ise o f Origen's 
thought.
What Rufinus has not grasped in i t s  fu l l  s ign ifica nce , was the 
m a jo r break between P la ton ic  thought and the thought o f Origen: Th is 
break lie s  in  the notion o f "coming in to  being out o f non-being".
P la to did adhere to  the general t ra d it io n  o f h is  day th a t nothing 
ever becomes out o f nothing.580 To h im  "crea tion " i t s e l f  co n s is ts  in 
b ring ing  o rder and "measure" in to  chaos581 and in nothing else. The te rm  
cre a tion  as found in  the Timaeus does not im p ly  any o r ig in a l genera tion  
ex nihilo, but an act o f o rdering  and b ring ing  sym m etry  in to  the 
p re -e x is tin g  chaos of the o rig in a l "cosm ic s tu ff" . This is  the po in t o f 
m a jo r co n tra s t between P lato and Origen. According to  P la to , Being and 
A ction , tru e  existence and i ts  c re a tive  action , Substance and Function,
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are synonymous, ^ in fa c t, according to  P lato, God would have never 
re a lly  existed before  He a c tu a lly  created. I t  is  God's in f in ite  c h a r ity  and 
h is p e rfe c tio n  th a t a lw ays compels Him583 to  exerc ise  His c re a tive  
power in  a c tu a lity .
On the co n tra ry , Origen did  hold the idea o f coming in to  being out 
o f non-being, and he repeated ly s tresses  th is  notion. I t  is  because o f th is  
th a t he does not need to  employ any P la ton ic  notion o f e ve rlas tin g  
exerc ise  o f d iv ine c re a tive  a c tiv ity . God in  H im se lf and God as C rea tor 
are by no means synonymous (as they w ere to  P la to) -on the con tra ry . 
Th is is  the po in t which Rufinus did not grasp and hence h is 
in te rp o la tio n s  in to  the Princ in  which he deals w ith  a problem  fo r  which 
the re  is  no room in  Origen’s theology.
Besides, a t the same po in t o f the Princ?34 Rufinus presents Origen 
as holding th a t c rea tion , as na rra ted  in Genesis, is  not the ve ry  
beginning o f the w orld . In fa c t Rufinus appears unaware of Origen's 
conception o f p ro v id e n tia l and actual crea tion . His concern is  to  present 
Origen as holding th a t God never was " id le ”. Thus he considers only the 
actual w o rld  and in te rp o la te s  the asse rtion  th a t the n a rra tio n  in Genesis 
re fe rs  only to  the c re a tion  o f the present w orld . Thus Rufinus confuses 
the notion of succesive w o rld s  (s. chapter 2) w ith  Origen's conception of 
the c re a tive  act o f God. The la t te r  has to ta lly  eluded Origen's tra n s la to r. 
Hence, anyone who would re ly  on such s ta tem ents  o f the Princ is  bound 
be confused and be led to  m isleading conclusions. Th is is  exac tly  what 
has happened w ith  the vast m a jo r ity  o f those who have o ffe re d  accounts 
o f Origen's thought on th is  point.
However, i t  can be c le a r ly  drawn fro m  the passages in Greek th a t 
Origen regards the n a rra tio n  in Genesis as re fe r r in g  to  the ve ry  
beginning o f creation.585 For, both the notions o f p ro v id e n tia l and actual 
c rea tion  are grounded on pasages o f Genesis, as we have seen. Thus the 
p e rtin e n t d iscussion in these tw o  paragraphs in  the La tin  ve rs ion  o f the
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Princ should be regarded as an in te rp o la tio n  of Rufinus. For one th ing, 
he regarded the "why not sooner?" pseudo-question as a rea l problem  and 
deemed th a t he ought to  "defend" Origen's thought on th is  ground. A t the 
same tim e , however, he was unaware of c ru c ia l aspect o f Origen's 
thought, such as the d is t in c t io n  o f the notions o f God H im se lf and God as 
C rea to r, the conception o f tim e  as w e ll as the whole conception of 
c re a tion  in the A lexandrian 's thought.
What we have a ttem pted in  th is  d iscussion is  to  p o rtra y  Origen's 
v iew  o f one o f the m ost m ys tica l d oc trines  o f h is  e n tire  theology 
exc lus ive ly  based upon h is  own a ff irm a tio n s  and w ith  no deductions or 
conclusions drawn d ia le c tic a lly . C e rta in ly  the re  are some po in ts  in  th is  
exposition  which seem to  be paradoxical. For example, i t  would be asked 
how is  i t  possible to  speak o f a "beginning", as coming in to  being out o f 
non-being, in  a re a li ty  which is  tim e less. S im ila r ly , one could ask how is  
i t  possible to  speak o f actual c rea tion  coming in to  being “a fte r "  the 
p rov id e n tia l creation .
In fa c t th is  is  the ve ry  po in t where Origen's d is t in c t io n  between 
God in Himself and God as Creator appears as the most dec is ive  fa c to r  
fo r  understanding h is thought. Th is d is t in c tio n  co n s titu te s  a tru th  which 
can be apprehended through bare m ind, but Origen did know th a t th is  
do c trine  was bound to  be m isunderstood once a rticu la te d . Th is is  exac tly  
why he regarded th is  doc trine  as a "m ys tica l"  one. And th is  is  why he 
s ta te s  th a t th is  do c trine  is  " d i f f ic u l t  to  a r t ic u la te "  (S uao ifj^q iov ) and 
" fa r  beyond our l in g u is t ic  a b il ity "  (kcu noRRw xfjg BeEisug qpuiv ps igov)585 
We should re c a ll, however, th a t Origen emphasizes th a t h is  use o f 
tem pora l ca tegories when speaking o f the d iv ine  tim e lessness should be 
regarded in a loose sense because the non-existence o f tim e  is  c le a r ly  
exp licated.587
This is  exac tly  what renders a c e rta in  conception "m ys tica l". 
Origen was fu l ly  aware o f tha t. He does comment upon the p o in t w here
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Celsus speaks of the Greek opinions about why man has assumed a body 
yet he does not se t fo r th  h is  own v iew s o f the question588 He only makes 
an im p lic a tio n  using the S to ic  expression KcaaflrjniiKfj (pavzaaia (d ire c t 
apprehension)588 a ff irm in g  th a t th is  indeed co n s titu te s  a " c r ite r io n "  fo r  
knowledge o f a c e rta in  s u b je c t580
This is  how he alludes to  h is  perception of th is  m ys tica l d oc trine , 
namely th a t one could aqcuire  a c e rta in  knowledge o f i t  ye t th is  
knowledge would be grasped not through w ords but through bare mind 
and reason. The same S to ic  expression, namely KGzaflqnztKfj (pavzaai'a, 
is  used in o rder to  a f f i rm  th a t "an a ttem p t to  substan tia te  a n a rra tio n , 
even i f  i t  is  tru e , and to  produce a fu l l  knowledge o f i t  (KaxaRr)nxiKf]v 
s jino iqoa i nspi auxrjg ^avxaa(av) is  one o f the most d i f f ic u l t  tasks and is 
in some cases impossible 581
This is  a po in t on which much would be said; however, since 
Origen h im se lf does not discuss i t  and the question is  a c tu a lly  beyond 
our scope we sha ll make only a few  h in ts  about the deeper conception of 
"grasping" t ru th  through "bare reason".
In conceiving God in  H im se lf and God as C rea to r the re  is  a 
co rre la tio n  o f the tem pora l human in te lle c t w ith  the atem pora l d iv ine  
being. Human expressions can be but tensed, as Origen enunciates, in  
th is  agreeing w ith  A r is to tle . Th is is  the so -ca lled  discursive thought 
which takes one th ing  a fte r  another progressively and i t  depends on 
im p rin te d  images and, consequently, th is  thought is  spread out in  tim e. 
So, in d iscu rs ive  thought the re  is  an in t r in s ic  complex charac te r. In 
co n tra s t to  th is  the re  is  the non-discursive thought w hich invo lves no 
com p lex ity  and is  not d irec ted  to  p ropos itions , which are complex. The 
Greeks arid, much more, o rie n ta l th in ke rs , acknowledged th is  kind of 
perce iv ing  tru th , namely through the most d ire c t and non-p ropos itiona l 
way. The S to ics spoke o f KaxaRqnxiKfj (pavxaaia; P lo tinus  (although 
d issenting  fro m  the S to ics on so many po in ts) regarded th is  kind o f
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thought in  te rm s  o f con tact w ith  the h igher r e a l i t y 592 in Origen the case 
is  qu ite  d if fe re n t,  since h is  w o r id -p ic tu re  and mode o f thought is  qu ite  
d if fe re n t fro m  e ith e r the S to ic  o r the Neoplatonic one. In fa c t, the 
contem pla tion  o f tru th  through non-d iscu rs ive  thought invo lves an 
apprehension w hich has a timeless ob jec t o f knowledge, namely the 
d iv ine re a lity . Th is is  why i t  is  s ta ted  th a t "the re  are c e rta in  th ings, 
the meaning o f w hich is  im possib le  to  explain by any human language, but 
which are made c le a r ra th e r through s im ple  apprehension than through 
any power o f words. This ru le  m ust co n tro l our in te rp re ta t io n  even of 
the d iv ine w r it in g s , in  o rde r th a t w hat is  said th e re in  may be estim ated 
in accordance not w ith  the meanness o f the language but w ith  the d iv ine 
power o f the Holy S p ir it  who insp ired  the composition.".593
Besides, i t  is  Origen's v iew  th a t no progress is  so adequate th a t 
one m igh t come in  con tact w ith  God. Th is is  one o f h is  m a jo r po in ts  o f 
d iffe re n ce  fro m  P lo tinus594 and stem s fro m  the C h ris tia n  notion of a 
rad ica l gap and d is co n tin u ity  between the d iv ine re a li ty  and the w orld . I f  
Origen can hold (as he does) a notion o f non-d iscu rs ive  apprehension 
d iv ine re a lity  th is  is  not because man "ascends" through m ys tica l 
p rogress, but because God "descends" as Logos and is  p resent in to  each 
ra tio n a l c rea ture . We sha ll fu l ly  discuss th is  aspect o f Origen's thought 
s h o rtly  below. So the apprehension "through bare m ind and reason" o r the 
KaxafiqnxiKrj (pavxaaia, as Origens c a lls  i t ,  is  a c tu a lly  a kind o f 
" in s tru c tio n "  o ffe re d  by the Logos. In the fin a l analys is i t  is  an 
in s tru c tio n  pe rta in ing  to  timelessness w hich, however, is  o ffe re d  in to  
temporality . In tim e lessness there  is  no com p lex ity , the re  is  no 
"progress" and the d iscussion about th is  re a li ty  is  beyond any s o r t o f 
d ia le c tics .
This is  the ve ry  fa c t due to  w hich th is  apprehension "through bare 
reason" (in  fa c t, "reason" is  the ve ry  te rm  fo r  Logos) cannot be 
expressed in d iscu rs ive  thought. For once one a tte m p ts  to  do i t ,  he w i l l
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in e v ita b ly  invo lve  what is  timeless (and thus not susceptib le  of 
extension and p rogress) in to  a d iscu rs ive  thought and p ropos itions which 
are a p rio ri bound w ith  progress and spread out in tim e. This means 
th a t one m igh t a tte m p t to  express a timeless re a li ty  through means 
w hich are by nature  bound w ith  tim e , they presuppose tim e  and th e ir  
d iscussion in e v ita b ly  invo lves the discussed re a li ty  w ith  tim e  -w h ich  is  
absurd. This is  the ve ry  reason why Origen d e lib e ra te ly  and cons tan tly  
avoided d iscussing th is  tim e le ss  re a li ty  through a d iscu rs ive  thought and 
he only appealed to  apprehension "through bare mind and reason" and to  
the kaxaRTinxiKTj (pavxaaia o f those who w ish  to  comprehend these 
doctines. And th is  is  an a tt itu d e  w hich is  ind ica tive  not onlu o f h is
w
respect to  the transcendence of the d iv ine re a lity ,  but a lso of h is  sound 
d ia le c tic a l d isc ip line . In fa c t th is  a tt itu d e  cannot be challenged by 
anyone who c la im s to  s tic k  to  the ru le s  o f log ic  and d ia le c tics . No one 
could ask o f any "before" the p ro v id e n tia l c rea tion , in  w hich "before" 
the re  was only God but no c re a tion  at a ll. The very  question is  absurd. 
For once one poses a question about any "before"59*  (o r im p lie s  any 
s im ila r  tem pora l notion) he has a lready postulated time into 
timelessness, namely he grounds h is question on an e n tire ly  a rb it ra ry  
and absurd prem ise. By appealing to  KaxaRrjnxiKf) (pavxaaia, Origen 
exactly  w ishes to  a ve rt h is  readers fro m  pseudo-questions o f th is  so rt.
Thus the re  is  a po in t w hich we w ish  to  make p e r fe c tly  c lear. In 
approaching th is  Origen's thought one should get r id  o f p rem ises w hich 
are p lausib le  only in  a tem pora l s itu a tion . For instance, i f  we say th a t 
something was w h ite  and i t  became blue, i t  is  reasonable to  assume 
th a t the re  is  a "moment" which m arks the succession fro m  being w h ite  
to  becoming blue.595 But such an assum ption is  not p laus ib le  in 
tim elessness. Unless th is  po in t has been fu l ly  apprehended, one is  bound 
to  th in k  of tim elessness on the same prem ises th a t he th inks  of 
tem poral s ta te . In th a t case the m islead ing conclusions are inev itab le .
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Thus, In discussing Origen's v iew s o f tim e  and c re a tion  w ith  
respect to  God, one has a lw ays to  s t ic k  to  the fundamental prem ise 
exp lica ted  by Origen h im se lf, namely th a t d iv ine  re a li ty  is  a s ta te  o f 
timelessness -n o t e ve rla s tina  d u ra tio n 597
By v ir tu e  o f the ve ry  fa c t th a t a te m p o ra lity  is  atem porality, one 
cannot th ink  o f e ith e r succession o r some turning point in to  
tim e lessness, as i f  th is  s ta te  w ere sub jec t to  (o r, bound w ith )  tem pora l 
flu x . There are no turning points nor moments nor succession nor 
temporal flux  in  tim elessness. Subsequently, any question pe rta in in g  to  
tim e lessness and invo lv ing  notions o f th is  s o r t is  groundless and 
m isleading. Once time/esness is  regarded as a kind o f duration the 
d iscussion is  bound to  be m islead ing and p re ju d ic ia l to  Origen's au thentic  
views. For the fundamental prem ise (th a t o f tim e lesness), estab lished by 
him , is  disposed through the ve ry  fa c t th a t tem pora l notions of 
"succession", and the s o rt, are a r b it r a r i ly  in troduced in to  the discussion.
To a r t ic u la te  th is  re a li ty  in  w ords (w hich, in  them selves 
c o n s titu te  a tem pora l fu nc tio n  and they are a m a n ifes ta tio n  o f the 
tem pora l re a lity )  is  e n tire ly  im possib le. To v isua lize  i t ,  o r to  fee l i t ,  (in  
a way w hich is  in e v ita b ly  vague) is  not im possible. A t any ra te , i t  would 
be a fundamental m istake (w hich would thoroughly m islead the whole 
problem atique and perception o f the question) to  es tab lish  tem pora l 
notions and through them to  a r t ic u la te  tem poral questions in 
tim elessness. This is  exactly  what Origen cons tan tly  and d e lib e ra te ly  
avoided to  do.
Our conclusion is  th e re fo re  th a t the re  is  no notion o f any "e te rn ity  
o f the w o rld " in  Origen's thought. What Origen a c tu a lly  holds is  qu ite  the 
opposite. C reation came in to  being out o f non-being by an act o f God's 
w i l l 598 This pe rta ins  not only to  the c re a tion  o f the w o rld  but even to  
h is p ro v id e n tia l c rea tion , even to  h is  w ill to  c rea te  and indeed to  h is  
decision to  create. In any case, Origen does hold a percep tion  o f God in
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H im se lf, th a t is  a perception of God w ith o u t necessa rily  th in k ing  of him  
as C reator.599
§5. God, World and Time
The "place" of the Logos. I t  is  in  respect o f the w o rld  i ts e lf ,  as a 
ph ilosophica l ca tegory, by w hich the in te lle c tu a l d is t in c t io n  between 
Wisdom and Logos is  made. For Logos is  perceived as the Wisdom h e rs e lf 
in  her re la t io n  to  the w orld . Speaking e ith e r o f Wisdom o r o f Logos one 
a c tu a lly  re fe rs  to  the same person, namely the son o f God h im se lf. The 
d iffe re n ce  neverthe less is  th a t Wisdom ind ica tes  the liv in g  inco rpo rea l 
personal substance in  h e rse lf, w ith o u t any a llus ion  to  the w o rld  o r to  
anything else, w h ile  the Logos is  the Wisdom conceived in  her 
"com m unication to  ra tio n a l c rea tu res" (kqxq pev xfjv ouoxaoiv xrjg nepi 
xwv ofiwv Sswpiag kcu voTjiidxwv xr)g ao(piag vooujievgg, Kaxd 5e xrjv npog 
xa flotfiKd Koivwviav xou flogou fjaypavopsvou)600 Th is means th a t when a 
ra tio n a l c rea tu re  a t any ra te  communicates to  Wisdom he comprehends 
her as Logos.
Origen’s notion about "conceptions" o f the son is  e xac tly  what 
a llow s him  to  p o rtra y  h is perception  o f the c o rre la tio n  o f tim e le ss  God 
to  the tem pora l w orld . This c o rre la tio n  is  possib le through the 
asse rtions o f Origen’s about the Logos. For the Logos a c tu a lly  becomes a 
kind o f span, through which th is  re la t io n  is  established. Th is is  how the 
re la t io n  between the Logos and the w o rld  is  portrayed:
"...it is  along those ways th a t the son o f God is  moving (kq8' dg 
o5oug SianopsuexaO decorating, tak ing  thought fo r ,  making benefaction , 
favouring , in to  th is  [sc. the w o rld ] which was made in wisdom. In saying 
th e re fo re  th a t the Logos was in apxh i t  is  not im p lied  th a t the Logos is  
d if fe re n t fro m  her (sc. the apxp, th a t is  the w isdom ) in  te rm s  o f 
substance, but only in  te rm s  o f conception and re la tio n , so th a t i t  is  the 
same being who in  named in the s c r ip tu re  and who, in  as much as she is
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conceived in  her re la t io n  to  God h im se lf, is  named w isdom , and again, in 
as much as conceived in her re la t io n  to  c re a tu res  she is  ca lled  as Logos 
the c rea to r." (apxfjv <ouv> eCvai xov Rogov $aa(v oux exepov ovxa auxfjg 
kqx' ouaiav aRR' enivoia Ka( axeaei, (v‘ ouxwg emu, fj pev ajKeiuxai xw Gsw 
ao<pia, fj 5s vsvsuksv, iv ’ ouxwg emu, npoc xd 5 rpoupg f}paxa  6 
SrpoupgiKog Rogoq)601
Origen re ite ra te s  here h is v iew  o f the re la t io n  o f the Logos both 
to  God h im se lf and to  the w o rld ; but the re  is  som ething more said in 
th is  passage: The Logos did not only c rea te  the w o rld ; but he also is  
constan tly  re la te d  to  i t ,  as he acts  pe rpe tu a lly  "decora ting , tak ing 
thought fo r ,  making benefaction, favouring".602 On the o the r hand, the 
w o rld  is  regarded as something "ex te rna l" to  God.60^ Hence we should 
conclude th a t Origen conceives the Logos as being both "in" w isdom , tha t 
is  to  say in to  tim e lessness, and in to  the w o rld , th a t is  "out" o f the 
T r in ity .
Indeed th is  is  what Origen holds and i t  is  through th is  b e lie f tha t 
the Logos may be regarded as a m ed ia to r between the tim e le ss  God and 
the tem poral w orld .
I t  is  Origen's v iew  th a t God is  the o r ig in a l "place, as i t  w ere" 
(oiovei xonog)604 But th is  is  not the only "place" where the Logos is  to  be 
found; fo r  he is  also fu l ly  present in the w o rld , ye t not being h im se lf 
p a rt o f the w o rld ; he is  "extended alongside w ith "  the w o rld  
(oupnapsKxeivopevog). There is  also another "place" where the Logos is  
present; th is  "place" is  each ind iv idua l ra tio n a l being.
So Origen s ta te s  th a t C h ris t " is  as pow erfu l as to  be in v is ib le  
(aopaxog)505 in h is  d iv ine nature as w e ll as to  be present in every 
ind iv idua l man and also to  be extended alongside w ith  the whole w o rld  
(oRw xw Koopw oupnapsKxeivopevog). I t  is  he who is  declared by [the 
saying] 'He stood in the m ids t of us’.”605 He a f f irm s  the presence o f the 
Logos in the “whole w o rld ", th a t is  in  a il the ranks o f l i f e ;  and i t  is
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exactly  th is  presence of the Logos th a t makes c re a tu res  to  be ra tio n a l 
ones. This Logos, being w ith in  ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  is  a c tu a lly  an educator; 
"This is , as i t  w ere, a teacher o f those rece iv ing  in s tru c tio n , ex is tin g  
inseparably in  the nature  o f ra tio n a l c rea tu res , in s tru c tin g  tow ards 
what should be done, even though we decline to  obey h is  in s tru c tio n s ";507 
and he adds: "Hence he (sc. C h ris t)  says; ’I t  is  the Logos503 which i have 
pronounced to  you him  who w i l l  judge yo u '509 and th is  is  equiva lent to  ’I 
m yse lf the Logos, who is  a lw ays speaking w ith in  yourse lves, w i l l  
condemn you and the re  w i l l  be no room  fo r  you to  ju s t i f y  youselves’."610 
Indeed i t  is  th is  presence of the Logos who, being w ith in  men, announces 
the fa th e r to  them.511
It  is  th e re fo re  Origen’s conv ic tion  th a t the Logos is  p resent both 
in  tim elessness and in  tim e ; and i t  is  through h im  th a t a perpetual 
com m unication between the w o rld  and God. is  being kept up. Thus Origen 
m a in ta ins h is fundamental opinion th a t God is  ra d ic a lly  transcendent to  
the w o rld ; ye t i t  is  through the Logos th a t a re la t io n  between the w o rld  
and God ex is ts . Th is is  a po in t o f h is  d iffe re n ce  fro m  c e rta in  schools o f 
the secu la r (m a in ly  the S to ic ) thought w hich regarded god as immanent 
in  the w orld . Origen is  conscious o f th a t and in Cels s ta tes: "...the logos 
o f everyth ing  is  according to  Celsus god h im se lf, but in  our v iew  i t  is  
the son o f God..." (aflrld kccl o zwv n a v iu v  fiogog s o i l  Korea, pev Keflaov 
auxog o 8sog, K a ia  6s qpag 6 uiog a u io u )512
This v iew  o f the Logos in Origen has to ta lly  eluded H. Chadwick. 
Thus he renders Origen’s a ff irm a tio n  o f the Logos as the m ed ia to r 
between God and c re a tion  as in  h im se lf being "m idway between uncreated 
na ture  and th a t of a ll created th in g s "513 He th inks  th a t Origen holds a 
notion s im ila r  to  th a t of Philo , according to  whom "the Logos is  n e ith e r 
uncreated lik e  God nor created lik e  us, but m idw ay"514 At th a t po in t, 
however, Origen re fe rs  to  the Logos as ‘ o ld |ie xa |u  ovxog xrjg xou 
agevrjxou k c u  xrjg xiuv gevTjxuiv n a v iu v  <&uaetijg"515 in o rde r to  a r t ic u la te
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the function o f the Logos fo r  the sake of the w orld . For the Logos //; 
him self is  before  the w o rld  and Origen has no h a s ita tio n  to  a f f i rm  tha t 
he is  begotten616 but c e r ta in ly  th is  p red ica tion  p o rtra y s  an onto log ica l 
re la t io n  between the Father and the Son and i t  in no way is  re la ted  to 
the kind o f '’genesis" w hich means “ to  come in to  being out of 
non-being".617 I t  is  c h a ra c te r is t ic  th a t, in selPs, Origen comments on 
Ps. 109,3 by p o rtra y in g  the Father saying to  the Son "I begot you before 
any ra tio n a l nature". The Logos is  a " ru le r"  o f the w o rld  ye t he is  also 
"toge the r w ith "  the Father.618 This is  c le a r ly  s ta ted  in comm John, where 
Origen developes h is argum ent bu considering the passages Gen, 1,1 and 
John, 1,2, namely "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth " 
and "He was in  the beginning w ith  God". His in fe rence  is  th a t the 
expression "’He was in the beginning’ c le a r ly  suggests a s e n io r ity  to  
what was created in the beginning"; th e re fo re  "the Logos is  o lde r" than 
a ll c rea tion  ( t o  5s ‘Ev apxfj rjv' oatpug npeopuxspov s o u  xou sv apxn 
nenotqpsvou, ou povov oxepswpaxog ko i aRRa oupavou koi gng
npsapuxspog eoxiv o Rogog).519
This is  the sense in  which Origen regards the te rm  "P an tocra to r" 
(riavxoKpdxojp) applied to  C hris t.620 C h ris t is  “P an to cra to r" because 
"everyth ing  has been given to  him " by the Father.621
Thus the Logos is  both in  God and in the w orld . I t  is  not in h is  
nature  to  be "m idway" as H. Chadwick asserts. For to  Origen the re  is  no 
question about the nature  o f the Looos in h im se lf. His na ture  is  the 
d iv ine one. Even before  any c re a tive  decision o r c re a tive  w i l l  o r c re a tive  
act o f God, the Logos has a lways been in the d iv ine being.
I t  is  through h is v iew  o f the Logos th a t Origen can c o rre la te  tw o  
notions: F irs t,  God is  tim e le ss  and ra d ic a lly  transcendent to  the w orld : 
Secondly, God is  the c re a to r o f th is  w o rld , he com m unicates w ith  i t  and 
indeed acts w ith in  i t .  This is  the path through which Origen has been 
able to  step fro m  h is  Theology (th a t is  h is  conception of God in  H im se lf)
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to  h is Cosmology.
World and Time. There is  one fin a l po in t we should make in 
exam ining God, W orld and T im e, in  th e ir  mutual re la t io n  in th is  chapter. 
I t  is  the appearance o f tim e  in respect to  crea tion .
Regarding the a ff irm a tio n  th a t T r in ity  alone transcends a ll tim e  
whereas "the re s t of th ings ... which are exte rna l to  the T r in ity ,  m ust be 
measured by ages and periods o f t im e "622 Origen expla ins th a t th is  
"ex te rna l" means the w o rld  its e lf .623
Origen’s notion th a t w o rld  was made through the Logos m ain ta ins 
h is v iew  God is  changeless. I t  is  the ve ry  fa c t th a t God is  above tim e  
th a t makes Origen to  regard  h im  as not su b je c t to  change. A ccord ing ly , 
ra tio n a l c rea tu res  are sub jec t to  a lte ra tio n  and change624 due to  the 
very  fa c t th a t they came in to  existence out o f non-existence th a t makes 
them. I t  is  also due to  h is  v iew  th a t the w o rld  is  "out" o f God, namely 
th a t i t  is  something “ex te rna l"625 to  him , th a t the existence o f the w o rld  
does not im p ly  any notion o f change in  God H im self.
Indeed i t  is  Origen's v iew  th a t c re a tion  is  c lose ly  re la te d  to  the 
existence o f tim e. He has a lready pointed out th a t the te rm  "genesis" 
means "the way o f coming to  being out o f non-being";626 accord ing ly , i t  
means the "s u b s ta n tifica tio n " (ououuoiv) o f ra tio n a l natures.627 F u rthe r, 
i t  is  h is  v iew  th a t w hatever is  sub jec t to  actual c re a tion  (namely, 
c o rp o re a lity ) is  sub jec t to  tim e , too. Th is is  why he s ta te s  th a t "m ind 
which is  s t i l l  sub jec t to  c rea tion , and i t  because of th a t is  also sub jec t 
to  tim e , cannot see God as i t  should";628 and he fu r th e r  exp la ins th a t 
tim e  is  "som ething" ( i f ) 629 which is  c lose ly  connected to  "m a te ria l l i f e  
(xfj svufiu ^tu fj)630 A t th is  po in t Origen does not fa i l  to  enunciate h is  
view s re la ted  to  th is  question. He says th a t i t  is  not the same th ing  to  
speak o f "not seen" (xo pfj opao9ai) and " in v is ib le "  (xo aopaxov), namely 
"not to  be seen does not en ta il being in v is ib le "  but "to  be in v is ib le  does 
en ta il being not seen"; " fo r  the re  are many bodies w hich are not seen,
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although they are v is ib le  e ith e r because they are, as i t  w ere , covered or 
because we are not in  the place where they a re ” ; but when we re fe r  to  
the " in v is ib le "  i t  should be stressed  th a t not even those ra tio n a l 
c re a tu res  which are in the supreme ranks of l i f e  are able to  see God, 
not so because o f th e ir  own d is a b ility  but because o f the fa c t th a t God is  
in c o rp o re a l531
Besides, Origen p o rtra ys  the close existence o f tim e  to  the actual 
c re a tion  o f the w o rld  a ffrm in g  th a t “ tim e  cannot be found" when what is  
s ta ted  as " th ird  and fo u rth  conceptions" o f the son o f God "did not e x is t 
a t a l l " 532 I t  is  " l i fe "  th a t Origen regards as the " th ird "  conception of 
the son o f God arid he also holds th a t " l i fe "  is  o f those conceptions o f the 
son o f God which do not pe rta in  to  C h ris t in  h im se lf but only "to  o thers" 
(oux auxu afiRd sxepoig)633 This means th a t tim e  is  c lose ly  connected 
w ith  " l i fe " ,  which, in  the f in a l analys is, means, "d is tin c tio n " , 
"d iv e rs if ic a tio n "  and "co rp o re a lity ".
Thus the rad ica l transcendence of God in  respect to  w o rld  is  
po rtrayed  in  a tw o fo ld  way, namely both in te rm s  o f space (m a in ly  
expressed in  te rm s  o f c o rp o re a lity ) and tim e . What came out o f the 
actual c re a tion  o f the w o rld  is  o f necessity and by i t s  na ture  a 
corporea l being. Again, w hat came out o f the c re a tion  o f the w o rld  is  of 
necessity  and by nature  a tem poral being. This is  why Origen says th a t 
any being, o f any rank o f l i fe ,  is  a "tem pora l" (npoaKaipuv) one "even i f ,  
in regard  of h is  p a r t ic u la r  place (xdv ev ougKpioei xonujv) he is  one o f 
the supreme ranks of l i f e  (sk xqjv avuxaxu  xugxdvr])534
Conclusion
What we have discussed in  th is  chapter is  the re la t io n  between 
God, W orld and Time.
As fa r  as the re la tio n  o f God to  tim e  is  concerned, Origen's v iew
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is  th a t God ra d ic a lly  transcends tim e. No tem pora l ca tegory can be 
applied to  him  a t a ll. Whenever human necessity  is  compelled to  re fe r  to  
God by the use of language, i t  is  c lea r th a t expressions (espec ia lly  when 
using verbs) are a p rio ri inaccura te  and th e re fo re  ju s t  conventional. God 
is  also incorporea l and i t  is  only h im  who is  incorporea l. L ife  w ith o u t a 
body is  a c h a ra c te r is tic  o f God only. There is  no o the r way in  which the 
te rm  " li fe "  applied to  incorporea l nature  can make sense. Thus God's 
being w ith  respect to  tim e  is  a tim e le ss  being. As God is  absolu te ly  
exempt fro m  a ll tem pora l ca tegories, any notion o f "du ra tion" cannot be 
applied to  him ; fo r  God's being is  not an e ve rla s tin g  du ra tion , which 
necessa rily  im p lie s  being in to  tim e  in  a mode o f dom inating i t ;  but God 
is  above and outside tim e ; th e re fo re  h is  being should be apprehended as 
being not in e ve rlas ting  du ra tion  but as a being in  tim elessness.
The w o rld  is  a c re a tu re  o f God's w i l l ;  i t  came in to  existence 
"when" the fa l l  occured and was made by the Logos according to a 
p rov iden tia l c rea tion  o f a "w isdom " w hich is  a c re a tu re  in the Wisdom 
(namely, the Son) o f God and came in to  being out o f non-being. God w ille d  
to  crea te  out o f a benevolent decision of h is  own freedom. Conceiving o f 
God as C rea tor is  qu ite  d if fe re n t fro m  the notion o f God H im se lf -a  
notion which has an absolute on to log ica l p r io r i ty  to  any o the r conception 
o f God o r any theo log ica l notion employed to  speak o f God.
The w o rld  is  c lose ly  connected w ith  tim e  in  the sense th a t a ll the 
ranks o f ra tio n a l c rea tu res , w hich are understood to  com prise the one 
and s ing le  w o rld , are w ith in  tim e , they are tem poral. As the re  was not 
tim e  before  c rea tion , s t r ic t ly  speaking i t  makes no sense to  speak o f a 
"before" the c re a tion ; but using the te rm  “before" loose ly i t  can be said 
th a t in  Origen’s v iew  the re  was no w o rld  "before" crea tion . The w o rld  is  
m a te r ia l, consisted o f m a tte r o f d if fe re n t q u a litie s . The v is ib le  
firm a m en t is  made o f ju s t  one of the many kinds of m a tte r.
The notion o f "w o rld " im p lie s  o f necess ity  the existence o f both
150
c o rp o re a lity  and tim e. "W orld" apart fro m  c o rp o re a lity  and tim e  is  
unth inkable, e ith e r as a ph ilosophica l ca tegory or as a re a lity . Hence, in 
Origen’s thought the re  is  no room  fo r  any notion o f ’’incorporea l w o rld " 
"before" tim e. The te rm  "inco rporea l w o rld " applied in Origen’s thought 
is  s e lf -  c o n tra d ic to ry  and th e re fo re  absurd. For the notion of 
" in c o rp o re a lity "  excludes any existence o f "w o rld " and vice  versa. 
Subsequently, Origen’s v iew  is  th a t, as w o rld  came in to  existence out of 
non-existence, the re  is  a lso no room fo r  any notion o f any "e te rn ity  o f 
the w o rld ", in  the sense th a t the "w o rld " in  any mode may have existed 
before  th is  crea tion . Origen’s thought to ta lly  re je c ts  such a notion. I t  is  
h is  v iew  th a t i t  was only God h im se lf th a t was "be fore" c re a tion  and 
nothing was apart fro m  him. The w o rld  is  the ra d ic a lly  "out" o f God, yet 
God in te rvenes and acts in to  i t  through h is Logos.
Origen dep icts God’s transcendence in  respect to  the w o rld  in 
te rm s  o f Space (m ain ly  expressed in  te rm s  o f c o rp o re a lity )  and Time. 
We have h ith e rto  discussed the re la t io n  between God, W orld and Time. 
Whatever tim e  is , we a lready know th a t Origen holds a notion of 
a te m p o ra lity ; we have a c tu a lly  seen the l im its  o f t im e ’s existence, 
namely where tim e  does not e x is t and w here i t  does ex is t. Th is means 
th a t we have seen Origen's notions of a te m p o ra lity  and te m p o ra lity  as 
w e ll as the re la t io n  o f each other. Our next step should th e re fo re  be to  
discuss what Origen’s conception o f tim e  in i t s e l f  is.
Chapter 2: The conception of Time
§1. Time In I ts e lf
In speaking o f the study o f the concept o f tim e  i t  should be noted 
th a t scho la rs have paid l i t t l e  a tte n tio n  to  the S to ic  v iew s o f the subject. 
In a w ork  meant to  deal w ith  the conceptions o f tim e  in  a n tiq u ity , John 
Callahan1 does not deal w ith  the S to ic  v iew  o f tim e. In co n tra s t, when 
scho lars  speak o f the in fluence th a t S to ic ism  exerted on Origen, they 
confine them selves to  h is apprec ia tion  of the S to ic  e th ics  as w e ll as to  
h is  v iew  o f freedom  o f w il l .  Origen, however, was very w e ll aware of 
the S to ic  philosophy as a whole; and h is re fe rences (p a r t ic u la r ly  in  Cels 
) show th a t he had a d ire c t acquaintance w ith  the S to ic  w r it in g s  
themselves.
The fundam entals o f the S to ic  v iew  o f tim e  w ere  discussed in the 
In troduc tion  is  somewhat more de ta il than others. For, as we pointed up 
the re , we w i l l  a sse rt th a t Origen has, to  a ce rta in  e x ten t/em p loyed  the 
S to ic  tra d it io n  on the subject. This does not mean th a t he adopted some 
fixed  "S to ic  v iew  o f tim e "; fo r  the re  is  not ju s t  one S to ic  v iew  o f tim e ; 
the re  is  ra th e r an evo lu tion  and fu r th e r  e labora tion  o f an o rig in a l 
conception o f tim e.2 We shall a sse rt th a t Origen fo rm ed h is own 
personal v iew  o f tim e  according to  h is ove ra ll theo log ica l fa ith ;  in  doing 
so, he se lected fro m  pagan philosophy w hatever seemed to  h im  as 
p rope rly  helping to  the a rtic u la t io n  o f h is own conception o f tim e. 
However, beyond w hatever m igh t be regarded of pagan o r ig in , we sha ll 
aver th a t the re  is  a d is t in c t iv e  co n tr ib u tio n  by Origen tow ards  the 
fo rm a tio n  of a C h ris tia n  v iew  o f tim e , which had a decis ive  (though not 
as yet acknowledged) im pact to  the C h ris tia n  w r ite r s  a f te r  him.
Time as an "extension" (6idoin|ic[). Origen’s v iew  on th is  question
c le a r ly  stands w ith in  the S to ic  conception o f tim e. This does not mean 
th a t he deals w ith  tim e  a ttem p ting  to  provide a s c ie n t if ic  d e fin it io n  of 
i t  nor did he devote any ad hoc t re a tis e  to  th is  question. He never was 
in te re s te d  in  composing any sys tem a tic  tre a tis e  on tim e , l ik e  th a t in  the 
Physics o f A r is to t le  o r th a t o f the A r is to te lia n  A lexander of 
A phrod is ias3 who was a lm ost contem porary to  Origen. I t  m ere ly  was in 
the S to ic  philosophy th a t Origen found the essentia l conception o f what 
t im e  proper is ; and he adopted i t ,  as m ost su itab le  to  h is  own ove ra ll 
thought and conception of the w o rld  and i t s  perspectives. The choices in 
fro n t o f him  (namely, the tra d it io n  on the question) w ere  e ith e r to 
consider tim e  as an ‘'image" (o f e te rn ity ) , o r as a “number o r measure" 
(o f m otion), o r as an "extension". We have a lready argued (in  the 
In troduc tion ) th a t the S to ic  v iew  o f tim e  was qu ite  independent fro m  
e ith e r the P la ton ic  o r the A r is to te lia n  one. He employed th is , because he 
regarded i t  as, in  the f i r s t  place, expressing h is own conception o f what 
tim e  is  and according w ith  h is ove ra ll theo log ica l views.
In o rder to  es tab lish  th a t Origen holds tim e  to  be a kind of 
"extension" (S id o ir jya ) the re  is  no need to  make any log ica l in fe rences 
whatever. For i t  is  Origen h im se lf who a rtic u la te s  h is tem pora l notions 
using the very w ord extension. In co n tra s t, he never uses ca tegories  
which would even rem ote ly  rem ind anything o f e ith e r P la ton ic  or 
A r is to te lia n  views.
Thus he re fe rs  to  periods o f tim e  using the expression " th is  
tem poral extension" ( to  xpovikov xouxo 5 iaoxrjpa)4 and "the tem pora l 
extension i ts e lf "  (auxo 6e xo xpovixov 6 ia a xq [ia )5 A ccord ing ly , (quoting 
and expla in ing the parable in  Matt. 2 0 ,1 -16 ) he speaks o f "extensions 
(6 iaax fj|iaxa ) between the th ird  the s ix th  and the n in th  hour" as w e ll as 
o f the "extension (5 iaoxr|[ia )" fro m  the tim e  of Moses u n til the tim e  o f 
Jesus C h r is t5 In the same w ork he ponders upon the deeper meaning of 
the “ th ree  equal extensions(ipia ioa  S iaaxfjjiaxa ) [between] the th ird  and
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s ix th  and n in th  hour" and o f the "sm a lle r extension (e fla txov 5 ida ir|p .a)" 
between the eleventh and tw e lv th  hour as w e ll as o f the "extension 
(S ida iT jfia ) fro m  the dawn u n til the th ird  hou r"7
The same te rm , namely didazqfja , had also been used by 
Athenagoras in De ResurrecUone Mortuorum . He used the expression 
loops ipo ig  XP0V0U S iaaxijpaa iv (equal in te rv a ls  o f t im e )8 However, i t  
could by no means be regarded as something more than a S to ic  in fluence 
-on th is  po in t we endorse M. Spanneut's view. Athenagoras did nothing to 
e laborate  a C h ris tia n  v iew  o f the essence o f tim e  -a t  h is  tim e  the re  was 
no such a soph is tica ted  notion lik e  th a t which Origen developed. Besides, 
th is  S to ic  v iew  had i t s  counte rpo in ts  even among C hris tians. U n til now i t  
is  only T a tian ’s b r ie f  s ta tem ent on tim e  which has enjoyed a lo t o f 
a tte n tio n  among scholars. However the re  is  another v iew , spelled out by 
a C h ris tian  w r ite r ,  and (as fa r  as we know) neglected h ith e rto . V/e re fe r  
to  Jus tin , who was contem porary to  Athenagoras. In a w ork  intended to 
re fu te  ce rta in  v iew s o f A r is to t le ,  he f i r s t  quotes A r is to te lia n  passages 
and then h is own argum ents against them. The reader can see in  qu ite  a 
number of po in ts  th a t although Ju s tin  re je c ts  c e rta in  A r is to te lia n  v iew s 
o f tim e  (such as beginninglessness and in f in i ty  o f tim e ), he rem ains 
fa ith fu l to  the A r is to te lia n  v iew  o f tim e  as a "number" o f motion.9 Thus, 
a t the tim e  o f Athenagoras and Jus tin , (w hich is , m ore o r less, seventy 
years before Origen) the re  was no v iew  of tim e  proper estab lished as a 
C h ris tia n  one; leas t o f a ll the re  seems to  have been agreement on th is  
issue. I t  was Origen who e laborated and established the C h ris tia n  
conception of tim e ; and, as we sha ll see la te r  in  th is  section , C h ris tia n  
w r ite r s  a fte r  Origen employed h is fundamental conception o f tim e  
proper as w e ll h is  te rm ino logy, in  o rde r to a r t ic u la te  th e ir  tem pora l 
notions.
Thus Origen constan tly  regards (and names) tim e  as “extension". He 
speaks of the " e x te n s io n one day (jiidg  rjjispag S ia a iq p a io g )"  compared
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to  the du ra tion  o f “an e n tire  aeon (xov oflov a iw va)"10 and ponders upon 
s c r ip tu ra l tem pora l ca tegories considering them as possib ly a llud ing  to 
actual “ tem poral (5 id  xpoviKwy 5iaoir||idxtL}v)“.11
It  is  apparently because tim e  is  regarded as an "extension" th a t 
Origen accord ing ly regards human l i f e  as a kind o f "road (o66g)", s ta tin g  
th a t " th is  l i f e  is  a road being walked by a ll men (o56q gap 6 pEog, uno 
ndvxujv av9piunwv napooeuojjeyog)";12 i t  also in  the same con text, namely 
o f the conception o f tim e  as "extension", th a t Origen speaks of "length of 
tim e  (pf|Kog gap xpovou).13 The same notion is  also c le a r ly  denoted when 
he says th a t God dispenses a ll th ings in such a way so tha t “ through tim e  
th a t the whole w o rld  re tu rn s  to  h im se lf (ko i 5 id xpoyou ofiov 
sniaips(peiv npoq eauxov".14 I t  is  s ig n ific a n t here th a t th is  "through tim e " 
notion uses the p repos ition  5idt which has exac tly  the meaning o f 
"extension" (S iaaxrjya).15
It  is  out o f th is  conception of tim e  as an "extension" th a t Origen 
regards man's m otion in  tim e  as a mode of w a lk ing ; thus he re fe rs  to  
those who "did not walk the way they ought to  n e ithe r did they c a rry  
out the deeds they ought to " (ou ts  gap rjv e5ei nopeiav nepienaxrjaev ouxs 
ag exprjv npa^sig snsisReasv);15 and fu r th e r  he speaks about the walking 
tow ards the re a liz a tio n  o f "v ir tu e "  (6sov oSsuaai em xo neneipov Kai 
gflUKeiav noiqaai xfjv xfjg apsxfjg axa(puRfjv).17 A ccord ing ly , he s ta tes  th a t 
"he who is  in  the p re lim in a ry  stage o f exerc ise , beginning fro m  the 
words o f Jesus C h ris t, s t i l l  walks along the tough road, w hich to  
beginners appears as steep, and he v io le n tly  captures the kingdom of 
heavens which can be fo rc e fu lly  captured" (apndyei pia xfjv paaiReiav xtuv 
oupavwv, pEav unopevouaav).18
In comm John the eschato log ica l perception o f acting  in tim e  is  
po rtrayed  through the expression "the road which goes above a ll 
heavens" (xrjv (pepouaav o56v eni xa unepavu ndvxuv xaiv oupaviuv).19 in the 
same w ork  he t r ie s  to  in te rp re t the passage o f John 1,1 "In the beginning
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was the Logos” ('Ey o:p>(f| ijv 6 Aogoq)20 and ponders upon the d if fe re n t 
meanings21 o f the te rm  apxq. When he reaches the s ig n if ic a tio n  o f apxrj 
as a "beginning" he ne ithe r regards i t  as a beginning o f movement o f a 
(P la ton ic ) "moving image of e te rn ity ” nor does he consider i t  as a 
beginning of some (A r is to te lia n )  "number"; but he p o rtra ys  the tem poral 
s ig n if ic a tio n  o f apxrj as “beginning" thus:
"This is  something lik e  a w a lk ing , i t  is  lik e  the beginning o f a road 
o r o f a length; th is  is  declared by the saying To com m it ju s t  deeds is  
the beginning o f a good road’22 As th is  'good road' is  ve ry  long, one 
should know th a t firs t comes action, which is  denoted by 'to  com m it 
ju s t  deeds' and then comes contem pla tion; th is  is  where I th in k  tha t 
th is  road is  terminated and th is  is  the end o f th is  road a t the so ca lled  
re s to ra tio n  because i t  is  then th a t the re  w i l l  be no enemy rem ain ing, 
because i t  is  tru e  th a t ‘he m ust re ign , t i l l  he hath put a ll enemies under 
h is  fe e t; the last enemy th a t shall be destroyed is  d e a th '"  I t  is  then 
th a t the re  w i l l  be only one action  o f everyone tow ards God ...; and i f  one 
enquires d ilig e n tly  as to  when those to  whom the son revea ls  the father- 
w i l i  know the fa th e r, he would fin d  th a t at present one sees 'through a 
glass, da rk ly ',24 as he does not yet knows 'as he ought to  know';25 i t  
would not be wrong to  say th a t no one, even i f  he is  an apostle  o r a 
prophet, knows the fa th e r, but (sc. the fa th e r  w i l l  be known) when they 
become one, as the fa th e r and the son are one. And i f  someone th inks  
th a t we have deviated fro m  our sub jec t, because we have m entined a ll 
these th ings w h ile  our task was to  c la r i fy  a c e rta in  meaning o f apxfj, i t  
m ust be shown th a t th is  devia tion  was necessary and use fu l; fo r  i f  opp~f 
as ‘beginning' is  something like a walking, it  is  like the beginning o f t 
road or o f a length and 'To com m it ju s t  deeds is  the beginning o f a good 
road ',26 then everyone should know th a t each good road has as a kind o f 
beginning 'to  com m it ju s t  deeds' and a fte r the beginning comes 
contem pla tion  and [sc. everyone should know] how th is  con tem pla tion
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comes” 27
In th is  passage Origen provides h is v iew  of the tem poral meaning 
o f apx'fj, as a “beginning". F urtherm ore , he a lludes to  the raison d' e trt 
of tim e  i t s e lf  (w hich vie d iscuss in chapter 5), as he c le a r ly  im p lies  
th a t th is  tem pora l “road" is  the way along which ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  w i l l  
"w a lk" s tr iv in g  tow ards s a lva tio n 28 In try in g  to  enquire in to  the 
meaning o fa p x i]  as "beginning" he s ta te s  th a t th is  meaning o f apxrj is  
"something lik e  the beginning o f a ro a d "29 I t  is  also the use o f th is  
fig u re  th a t c le a r ly  suggests h is  v iew  o f tim e  as a kind o f "extension" and 
c e rta in ly  i t  is  not accidenta l th a t he likens  i t  to  a road o r a length. 
A lthough i t  is  a pure ly  temporal notion th a t he has to  expla in here, one 
can see th a t the te x t is  fu l l  o f spatial ca tegories through which tim e  is  
c le a r ly  po rtrayed  as a kind o f extension 30
The same fig u re , namely tim e  as a kind o f extension o r road, is  
employed pe rta in ing  to  God's action  in  tim e. Thus is  is  s ta ted  th a t God 
"c a rr ie s  out h is  benefaction to  c re a tu res  not a ll a t once but 
m ethod ica lly  and in  o rder" (o6w kqi x d y s i)31 What we tra n s la te d  as 
"m ethod ica lly" is  the te rm  o5to w hich is  the ve ry  w ord  road in  a Dative 
fo rm . I t  is  c e rta in ly  not inc iden ta l th a t i t  was the S to ics  who used th is  
fo rm  o f the te rm  "road" in  th is  sense.32 For indeed, in  th a t expression, 
the te rm  "road" expresses w hat is  done in  due tim e  - t im e  i t s e l f  
fundam enta lly  being perceived as an "extension".
So Origen h im se lf makes la rge  use o f the te rm  "o56g" (road) and 
the verb derived fro m  i t ,  namely "o6susiv" (to  w a lk) in  o rde r to  ind ica te  
the tim e  or the course of e ith e r c re a tu re ly  o r d iv ine  a c tio n 3,3 
A ccord ing ly , when he propounds h is conception o f c re a tu re ly  ac tion  in 
tim e  fo r  a ce rta in  purpose, and s ta tes  the ra ison  d’ e tre  o f tim e , he 
again uses the same expression, namely o6(S aw" rd f si in o rd e r to 
ind ica te  the very re a li ty  o f tim e.34 The conception o f tim e  as an 
"extension" is  again c le a r ly  ind icated not only through the very  te rm s
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used, but also through the whole context a t th a t po in t o f the comm John
Thus, whenever - Origen re fe rs  to  tim e , o r he alludes to  i t  by 
various tem pora l expressions, he alw ays im p lie s  h is  fundamental 
conception of i t ,  namely th a t tim e  is  a kind o f extension. We say as “a 
kind" o f extension, because, although he employed the o rig in a l S to ic  
conception of tim e , he is  not com p le te ly  s a tis fie d  w ith  the use o f the 
te rm  "extension" (S idoxrjya) alone; o r, a t lea s t, he does not fee l th a t th is  
te rm  alone fu l ly  expresses h is  conception o f tim e. For although the te rm  
"extension" c e rta in ly  is  an essentia l conception o f what tim e  p roper is, 
i t  in  no way can be regarded as an exhaustive analysis o f the question of 
tim e  in  i ts e lf ;  and i t  is  tru e  th a t the S to ics did not develop a 
comprehensive analys is o f th is  question.
P lu tarchus rem arks th a t S to ics  define tim e  as an "extension of 
m otion" (S idoxrjua K ivfjasug) "and nothing else" (drirte) o' ouSsv); and he 
adds th a t they only "acc iden ta lly  define" tim e  (and auypepqKoxog 
opi^ofjevoi) w h ile  they “fa i l  to  consider i t s  essence as w e ll as i ts  
fa c u lty "  ( ir jv  6' ouoiav auxou kcu xfjv Suvapiv ou auvopwvxeg).35
P lo tinus in  the Enneads is  s im ila r ly  c r i t ic a l:
"But i f  someone w ere to  say th a t the extension o f m otion is  tim e , 
not in the sense o f extension i ts e lf ,  but th a t in  re la t io n  to  w hich the 
m otion has i ts  extension, as i f  i t  was running along w ith  i t ,  what th is  is  
has not been stated. For i t  is  obvious th a t tim e  is  th a t in w hich the 
m otion has occured. But th is  was what our d iscussion was try in g  to  fin d  
fro m  the beginning, what tim e  e sse n tia lly  is ; since th is  is  lik e , in  fa c t, 
the same as, an answer to  the question 'What is  tim e? ' w hich says th a t 
i t  is  extension o f m otion in tim e. What, then, is  th is  extension w hich you 
ca ll tim e  and put outside the proper extension o f the m otion? Then, 
again, on the o ther side, the person who puts the extension in  the m otion 
i ts e lf ,  w i l l  be hoplessly perplexed about where to  put the d im ension o f
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res t. For something else could re s t fo r  os long as something was moved, 
and you would say th a t the tim e  in each case was the same, as being, 
obviously, d if fe re n t fro m  both. What, then, is  th is  extension, and what is  
i t s  nature? For i t  cannot be sp a tia l, since th is  also lie s  outside 
movement.".37
I t  is  obvious th a t th is  P lo tinus ' c r i t ic is m  re fe rs  to  the o ldest 
conception o f tim e , namely to  th a t o f Zeno’s; ye t he fu r th e r  extends h is 
rem arks to  the la te r  S to ics, who defined tim e  as "an extension which is  
alongside fo llo w in g  the w o rld ", namely to  Chryssippus -though P lo tinus 
does not name any S to ic  philosopher at a ll:
"As fo r  ca llin g  i t  an accompaniment o f m otion, th is  does not 
explain a t a ll what i t  is , nor has the sta tem ent any content before  i t  is  
said what th is  accompanying th ing is , fo r  perhaps ju s t  th is  m igh t tu rn  
out to  be tim e. But we m ust consider w hether th is  accompaniment comes 
a fte r  m otion, o r a t the same tim e  as i t ,  o r before  i t  - i f  the re  is  any 
kind o f accompaniment which comes before, fo r  w hichever may be said, 
i t  is  said to  be in tim e. I f  th is  is  so, tim e  w i l l  be an accompaniment o f 
m otion in time.".38
These rem arks o f P lu tarchus and P lo tinus are not u n ju s tifie d . For, 
in  fa c t, the S to ics do not o ffe r  an exhaustive th e o re tica l ana lys is  o f 
th e ir  o r ig in a l conception o f tim e  as an "extension"; yet i t  is  ne ithe r 
accidenta l nor is  i t  due to  negligence; on the co n tra ry , i t  can be said 
th a t i t  is  a c o n s titu tiv e  element o f the S to ic  v iew  o f tim e  not to  
e labora te  too much on th e ir  o rig in a l conception o f tim e  as an 
"extension". This is  a d ire c t re s u lt o f th e ir  general v iew  th a t i t  is  only 
"bodies" which are "re a l"  -as  "re a l" considered only what is  "ac ting " or 
"su ffe ring ". Thus the S to ics would regard  tim e  as "rea l" only i f  they had 
accepted the presupposition  th a t tim e  is  a "body"; but since tim e  
obviously is  not a body, the spontaneous S to ic  rea c tion  on the f i r s t  place 
would be to  re je c t the fa c t the tim e  "e x is ts " -w h ich  is  equally absurd as
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co n tra ry  a t lea s t to  im m ediate human phychological experience.Thus the 
S to ics solved the problem  by accepting th a t there  are fou r 
" inco rporea ls", namely tim e  (o xpovog), space (6 X^P0?)-' speech ( t o  
Re k t o v ) ,  the void (xo k s v o v ). I t  is  apparent though th a t in S to ic  
philosophy, and i t s  m a te ria lis m , the te rm  "inco rpo rea l" is  a cause of 
embarassement. Subsequently, a fu r th e r  analysis o f the question of tim e  
would be a m a tte r o f more p e rp le x ity  arid th e re fo re  they avoided that. 
To S to ics tim e  has alw ays remained a "something" w hich stands between 
"being" and "non-being".
The S to ics in  general d is tingu ished th ree  degrees of re a lity : The 
o v ia  (beings) w ere regarded o f fu l l  re a li ty  and such w ere only bodies. 
Incorporea ls w ere ca lled  xtvd (som ethings) but they w ere  not regarded 
as ovxa. Below them i t  was the ouxiva (noth ings) w hich w ere mere 
conceptions (svvoqpaxa). T im e belongs to  the second grade o f re a lity .39 
Another d is t in c t io n  o f degrees o f re a li ty  is  between w hat is  ucpeoxwg 
(subs is ting ) and w hat is  ov (being); the fo rm e r seems to  correspond to  
xtvd (somethings).40
This is  why P roclus rem arks  th a t P la to ’s conception o f tim e  was 
fa r  too d if fe re n t fro m  th a t o f the S to ics o r the P e rip a te tics . For to  the 
S to ics "tim e  was one of w hat they ca lled  inco rpo rea ls , w hich are 
despised by them as ina c tive  and not being, and e x is tin g  only in  bare 
m ind "41
It  is  reasonable to  assume th a t Origen knew both the S to ic  
tre a tm e n t o f tim e  as w e ll as the c r i t ic is m  o f tha t. We can guess tha t 
not only because o f Origen’s e ru d itio n  in general, not even only because 
of h is profound knowledge o f S to ic  thought (as i t  is  ou tstand ign ly  
revealed in  Cels'), but also because P lo tinus was contem porary to  Origen 
(about 20 years younger than him  -n o t to  m ention the s trong  p o s s ib ility  
o f th e ir  being persona lly  acquainted) th a t Origen should be aware of the 
a fo re-m entioned c r i t ic is m  of P lo tinus against the S to ic  tre a tm e n t o f
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tim e.
We should neverthe less note th a t the above-mentioned c r it ic is m  
o f P roclus applies more to  the old S to ic ism  and not so much to  tha t 
which is  a lm ost contem porary to  Origen. This la t te r  S to ic ism  has m ain ly 
been expressed by Marcus A ure lius.
Regarding the conception o f tim e , V. Goldschm idt42 asse rts  tha t 
Marcus A u re liu s  is  a c tu a lly  a fo llo w e r o f Cryssippus. He believes tha t 
Marcus's only divergence fro m  old S to ic  conception is  h is  pessim ism  on 
the sub ject. J. R is t,4,5 however, holds th a t in  Marcus's era (w hich is  
s h o rtly  before  Origen's one) the problem  o f tim e  had a to ta lly  d if fe re n t 
content fro m  th a t in  the e a rly  S to ics. To Zeno and Chryssippus, tim e  is  a 
problem  o f Physics; the problem s concerning tim e  a rise  fro m  the na tu ra l 
observation  of bodies; th e re fo re  th is  problem  is  not re la te d  to  m o ra lity . 
I t  is  fro m  th is  po in t o f v iew  th a t they consider i t  as a second class 
problem.
To Marcus, tim e  is  i t s e lf  a m oral problem. What is  the sense th a t 
m oral l i f e  may have since a ll actions and deeds w i l l  vanish in to  
t r iv ia l i t y ?  This was Marcus's impasse and th is  is  the po in t w here tim e  
i ts e lf  is  re la ted  to  eth ics. Nowhere in  h is  Meditations does Marcus 
re fe r  to  any d e fin it io n s  o f tim e , lik e  those o ffe re d  by e a r lie r  S to ic  such 
as Zeno or Chryssippus o r Apollodorus; n e ithe r is  the d e fin it io n  o f tim e  
in  i ts e lf  th a t w hich in te re s ts  Marcus when he deals w ith  th is  problem, i t  
has been argued th a t in  Marcus's tim e  S to ic ism  had degenerated in to  an 
a r id  m ora lism . J.R ist contends th a t th is  is  a m isleading gene ra liza tio n , 
yet he concedes th a t Marcus A u re liu s , who knew many o f the th e o rie s  o f 
the ea rly  Stoa, had lo s t the sense o f th e ir  im po rt. R is t asse rts  th a t the 
fundamental in te rre la tio n s h ip  o f e th ics  and physics has eluded Marcus.44
Origen meets S to ic ism  exac tly  a t the tim e  when th is  philosophy, 
as expressed by Marcus A u re lius , d isp lays symptoms o f degeneration and 
sta lem ate; yet he was w e ll acquainted w ith  e a rly  S to ic  thought as w e ll.
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Th is  was h is  advantage; fo r  he knew the whole process of thought and 
the evo lu tion  of ideas which had at h is tim e  led th is  philosophy to 
degeneration and s ta le m a te 45 A t the same tim e , he knew the Neoplatonic 
c r i t ic is m  against S to ic  tre a tm e n t o f tim e.
It  is  p lausib le  th a t Origen adopted the fundamental S to ic  
conception o f tim e  proper as “extension” only because i t  stood in 
agreement w ith  h is  C h ris tian  b e lie f as a whole. As the question o f tim e  
(espec ia lly  a t h is  era) was not ju s t  a problem  o f physics, he obviously 
would not be s a tis fie d  w ith  the ove ra ll S to ic  trea tem e n t o f the question. 
Hence, in g iv ing h is own account o f tim e , he had to  avoid the o rig in a l 
S to ic  fa ilu re s . Besides, he had to  e laborate  the notion o f tim e  fro m  a 
C h ris tia n  po in t o f view. As a m a tte r o f fa c t, he ploughed h is  own way by 
taking  some decis ive steps tow ards both these d irec tions .
To S to ics tim e  is  an “extension" re la te d  to  the m otion of the 
w o rld ; but in Origen's v iew  the te rm  "w o rld ” has a to ta lly  d if fe re n t 
meaning, namely a broader one, yet i t  is  also a “m a te r ia l"  w o rld , as we 
have seen. Once Origen has adopted the o rig in a l conception o f tim e  as an 
"extension", the question is  how he considers the re la t io n  o f th is  
"extension" to  h is "w orld".
The term crujincipEKieivEiiSai. We have a lready discussed the 
prec ise  way in  which Origen uses h is language; we have seen how 
scrupulous he is  both in o ffe r in g  substan tia l and ph ilo lo g ica l exegeses o f 
s c r ip tu ra l passages as w e ll as in  expressing h is own thoughts; and how 
conscious he is  o f the philosophical and theo log ica l iim p lica tions o f the 
te rm s  he uses in  a r t ic u la tin g  h is own views. The same s c ru tin y  and 
sop h is tica tio n  is  found in the way Origen re fe rs  to  tim e.
There is  one te rm  constan tly  applied to  tim e. Th is is  the verb 
“s im pa re tk tin es the " (au(inapsKravsa9aO  which means "to  be co-extended 
alongside w ith ". Th is is  the te rm  used whenever he re fe rs  to  tim e  o r he 
w ants to  denote a tem pora l function.
Thus a passage in expProv reads as fo llo w s : "By the te rm  aeon he 
means the period of human l i f e ,  in  lik e  a way th a t Paul says; ’ I w i l l  eat 
no meat in  the aeon, so th a t i w i l l  not occasion a tem p ta tio n  fo r  my 
b ro th e r1;46 he has named as aeon what is  co-extended alongside w ith  ( t o  
$dp ou[inapeKT8iv6|isvov) the s tru c tu re  o f h is  l i f e  (xfj ouaxdosi xrjg gwijg 
auxou)"47 S im ila r  to  th is  expression, Origen speaks o f tim e  as 
"measured alongside w ith  (napcqjexpouysvog) everyone’s l i f e 43 I t  should 
be noticed th a t, in  the passage above, Origen re fe rs  to  tim e  using not a 
noun a t a ll;  he ju s t  uses the p a r t ic ip le  aufjnapeKT£tv6jjevov as an 
ad jec tive  which is  a p red ica te  o f tim e  i t s e l f 49
The same pred ica te  is  used in  another case as w e ll: "...and when i t  
is  said to  him  (sc. to  the son o f God) the w ord 'You are my Son, I have 
begotten you today1,50 to  him  ‘today1 is  a lways (aeO; fo r  to  God there  is  
not any evening and I th ink  th a t the re  is  no m orning too, but the tim e , so 
to  speak ( iv 1 ouxug emu), which is  co-extended alongside w ith  (o 
oupnapsKxsiviov) h is  unbegotten and tim e less  (al'SCoj) l i f e ,  th is  is  the day 
named as today, on which the son has been begotten; fo r  the re  can be 
ne ithe r a beginning nor a day o f h is  b ir th .11.51
I t  is  obvious th a t th is  passage does not in troduce  any no tion  o f a 
"tim e " o f God; not only because here Origen again e x p lic it ly  s tre sse s  the 
tim elessness o f the being o f God; but also because he uses the te rm  
"tim e " consciously in  a loose sense and th is  is  why in  using the te rm  
"tim e " he im m ed ia te ly  adds the expression "so to  speak ( iv 1 ouxug emu)". 
The task facing Origen at th is  po in t is  to  provide an exegesis o f the 
te rm  "today" as found in the above-mentioned passage fro m  the Psalms; 
w hat Origen a c tu a lly  does is  to  in te rp re t the te rm  "today" in  a way 
which is  in  agreement w ith  h is fundamental v iew  o f the tim e lessness of 
God. The task is  hard indeed; ye t Origen copes w ith  i t  in  a tw o fo ld  way; 
f i r s t ,  he again e x p lic it ly  s tresses  the tim elessness o f God’s l i fe ;  
secondly, he a c tu a lly  considers "today" as the tim e le ss  environm ent o f
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d iv ine l i fe ,  in  the same sense th a t he has done i t  in the passage fro m  his 
"Hom ilies on Jerem iah". Besides, in  enunciating the notion of r e la t iv i ty  
o f the conception tim e , he sta tes: "And you should see th a t we may 
consider as day the whole of the present aeon, w hich is  long w ith  
respect to  us, but i t  is  sh o rt and cons is ting  ju s t  o f a few  years w ith  
respect to  the l i f e  o f God and of C h ris t and o f the Holy S p ir it . " 52 It  is  
in te re s tin g  to  rem ark  th a t he compares human time to  d iv ine  life , not 
to  any "d iv ine tim e " whatsoever.
Th is a r tic u la t io n  o f Origen has exerted a profound in fluence upon 
h is successors, who, obviously found th is  te rm  p a r t ic u la r ly  useful and 
expressive -and so they employed i t  verbatim . However, the re  is  a very 
substan tia l d iffe re nce , which has eluded those who employed h is
te rm ino logy. Origen nowhere in  h is  e n tire  w ork  says th a t the divine life
(w hich is  regarded as being expressed a lle g o r ic a lly  as "today") is  ca lled 
aim. The s c r ip tu ra l te rm  aiuviog (e te rna l - in  the sense o f tim e le ss ) is  
c e rta in ly  applied to  God throughout Origen’s work. But he nowhere 
a ff irm s  th a t the d iv ine l i f e  should be applied the te rm  aiwv, w hich a fte r  
a ll is  a P la ton ic d e fin itio n . The reader should p a r t ic u la r ly  no tice  th a t, in 
the passage above, Origen uses no noun a t a ll when he re fe rs  to  the 
d iv ine life . He ju s t  uses the ad je c tive  auptnapsKveivw as an obvious 
metaphor. On the co n tra ry , h is  successors employed th is  d e fin it io n  in 
o rder to  define the d iv ine  l i f e  as aiwv.
Thus Gregory of Nazianzus s ta te s  th a t "aeon is  not tim e  nor is  i t  a 
p a rt o f tim e  ... but what fo r  us is  tim e  ... th is  is  aeon to  the tim e le ss , 
namely what is  extended along side w ith  beings.53 This was in the end of 
the Fourth century. As la te  as the Eighth cen tu ry , John o f Damascus 
employs the same te rm ino logy  o f Origen, but fo llo w s  the d e fin it io n  o f 
Gregory. He recognises th a t the te rm  "aeon" has many s ig n if ic a tio n s
(such as a life t im e , o r a ce rta in  period o f long tim e). Regarding the
s ig n if ic a tio n  of "aeon to  come" (aiwv o jisRrlwv) he s ta te s  th a t th is
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"endless s ta te  a fte r  the re s u rre c tio n  .. is  not tim e  n e ithe r is  i t  a p a rt of 
tim e  ... but th is  is  what is  co-extended along side w ith  the tim e le ss ; ... 
thus what tim e  is  to  the tem pora l beings, th is  is  aeon to  the tim e less.54
The repetition  of the te rm ino logy  estab lished by Origen is  
s tr ik in g  indeed. Yet the distortion  of Origen's a r t ic u la tio n  fo rced  by 
these authors tow ards an un -O rigen is t (and v ir tu a lly  P la ton ic ) d ire c tio n  
should not pass unnoticed. For the re  is  a fundamental d iffe re n ce  between 
him  and those who used h is a rtic u la tio n s . Origen does not say th a t the 
oupnapsKmvdpsvov wig ai'51'oig (w hich v ir tu a lly  ind ica tes the d iv ine  
l i fe ,  the "today" in  the passage above) co n s titu te s  a d e fin it io n  o f cutov. 
For what Origen regards as aim  is  a pu re ly  natural re a lity ,  a 
spa tio -tem p o ra l re a li ty  as exp lica ted  by him  in the c lea re s t possible 
te rm s  through an ad hoc d e fin it io n 55 On the co n tra ry , both Gregory of 
Nazianzus and John o f Damascus regard  the te rm  cam as the te rm  
ind ica ting  the d iv ine l i fe ,  namely they regard  aiwv as a super-naturd/ 
re a lity . E ffe c tiv e ly , both, in le t te r  and in content, employ the P la ton ic  
and Neoplatonic conception o f a iuv , according to  which cam is  not time 
though i t  has a s im ila rity , an analogy, to  tim e.
It  is  then an irony  (o r a tragedy?) tha t these au thors (who are 
supposed to  be the exponents o f “orthodoxy") fin d  i t  convenient to  employ 
Origen’s o rig in a l te rm ino logy  and yet d is to r t  i t  tow ards  a P la ton ic  
d e fin it io n  o f owv which is  d ire c t ly  opposed to  Origen's natural (and 
e n tire ly  un-P la ton ic) conception o f a iuv -and ye t i t  was Origen who was 
accused as a "P la ton is t".
A t any ra te , in Origen's thought, everyth ing  re fe r r in g  to  tim e  is  
susceptib le  o f being predicated by the te rm  oupnapsKxeivuv or 
auynapsKxsivopsvog. This p red ica te  is  used in  o rder to  speak o f e ith e r 
tim e  i ts e lf ,  o r o f du ra tion  or even to  denote a presence in  tim e. In h is  
commMatt he re fe rs  to  the in ca p a b ility  o f human nature  to  reach a 
p e rfe c t apprehension of God and he sta tes: "For we cannot hold an
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enduring (SiapKrp and co-extended alongside (ouutnapeKxsivofievrjv) 
memory o f the nature  o f apperceptions (9supr|ydxtuv) because o f th e ir  
vast m u ltitu de  (xw nnf|9eG’’55
What the te rm  "co-extended alongside w ith "  suggests here is  a 
tem pora l apprehension which would be extended throughout the length of 
a l ife t im e , an apprehension which would have du ra tion ; th is  is  why in the 
passage above the te rm s  "enduring" (5iapKfj) and "co-extended alongside" 
(auynap£KxsivojisvT]v) are synonyms.
Even the tem pora l presence i t s e l f  is  denoted through the same 
te rm  "sim parektenesthe". In the commJohn Origen expounds h is  opinion 
th a t the Logos of God is  present both in  d iv ine tim elessness and in the 
tem pora l w o rld ; i t  is  exac tly  th is  notion o f the presence o f Logos in 
tim e  th a t is  denoted by the te rm  "sim parektenesthe". I t  is  s ta ted  th a t 
C h ris t " is  so pow erfu l as to  be in v is ib le  (aopaxog) due to  h is  d iv ine 
nature, to  be present in to  each ind iv idua l man and to  be also co-extended 
alongside w ith  the whole w o rld ; th is  is  what is  declared by the ’He has 
stood in the m ids t o f you’."57
According to  the fundamental conception of the te rm  " in v is ib le ", 
Origen uses th is  te rm  in o rder to  denote the d iv ine nature  o f the Logos 
and, again, he uses the te rm  "co-exterided alongside w ith "  
(aupnapeKxsivoyevog) in  o rder to  denote the presence o f the Logos in 
tim e. We should emphasize th a t th is  la t te r  te rm  is  re fe r re d  to  tim e  
only, not to  the whole space-tim e.58 For Origen c le a r ly  denotes the 
presence o f the Logos in to  the w o rld  by the expression "and in the whole 
w o rld " (kqC oRqj m  Koopiu); i t  is  through the te rm  "co-extended alongside 
w ith "  (ouynapeKxeivopsvog) th a t the presense o f the Logos in tim e  is  
portrayed.
In th is  case one m ight ask w hether Origen h im se lf makes the 
d is t in c t io n  between tim e  arid w orld . The answer is  th a t he does, i t  is  
again through the use o f the te rm  "co-extended alongside w ith "  th a t he
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not only d if fe re n t ia te s  tim e  fro m  the "s tru c tu re  o f the w o rld " but he 
defines tim e  in i ts e lf .
Thus, in  exp la in ing the te rm  of Paul "the aeon of th is  w o rld "59 he 
s ta te s  th a t what would be understood by th is  expression is  " tim e  which 
is  extended alongside w ith  the s tru c tu re  o f th is  w o rld  fro m  the 
beginning to  the end (xov oupnapsKxsivojievov xpovov xfj xouxou xou 
Koayou an’ apxrjs psxpi xeRouc KaxaaKsufp.50 So i t  is  Origen h im se lf who 
makes the in te lle c tu a l d is t in c tio n  between tim e  i ts e lf  and the "s tru c tu re  
o f th is  w o rld " in  the same way th a t he d is tingu ishes between "tim e " of 
Paul's l ife t im e  fro m  the "s tru c tu re  o f h is l i f e " 51 What these 
d is tin c tio n s  a c tu a lly  do is  to  in troduce an in te lle c tu a l abs tra c tion , 
i l lu s tra t in g  ju s t  the "s tru c tu re "  o f the w o rld , o r the "s tru c tu re  of l ife " ,  
conceived ( i f  such a conception can be possib le) w ith o u t any existence of 
tim e.
In the same w ork  o f Origen uses the te rm  "co-extended alongside 
w ith "  in o rde r to  denote what e x is ts  in  tim e. In in te rp re tin g  the passage 
o f Paul "according to  the riche s  o f h is  grace w here in  he hath abounded 
tow ard  us in  a ll w isdom and prudence"62 he comments as fo llo w s :
"And thus the whole richness o f the grace o f God, w hich was 
abounded to  the sa in ts , has fro m  a ce rta in  beginning to  be ’nourished' 
arid ’inc rease th ’ [Col.2,19] and is  m u lt ip lie d  in such a way th a t e ith e r one 
has these a fo re -sa id  g if ts  co-extended alongside according to  h is  m e r its  
o r he lacks them in as much as he fa i ls  to  do w hat he has to  do"63
This passage is  o f p a r t ic u la r  s ign ificance , as Origen here a lludes 
to  h is  conception of the s ta te  before  the fa l l  as w e ll as to  h is  
conception o f the beginning o f tim e ; i t  is  qu ite  rem arkab le  th a t the 
expression " fro m  a c e rta in  beginning (ano xivog apxpg)” conta ins the 
te rm  apxp in  a tw o fo ld  sense: i t  ind ica tes the w isdom fro m  w hich those 
who deserve i t  are "nourished”54 and i t  also ind ica tes the fa c t th a t the 
fa l l  m arks the "beginning" of tim e  and i t  is  fro m  th a t “beginning"
onwards tha t the grace of God is  "co-extended alongside w ith "  the w o rld  
in  o rde r to  help i t  tow a rds  i t s  re s to ra tio n  by i t s  own fre e  w il l .65 In th is  
case, th e re fo re , the te rm  "co-extended alongside w ith ” s ig n ifie s  the 
bestowal o f God’s g if ts  upon c rea tu res  w ith in  tim e ; and i t  more 
s p e c if ic a lly  a lludes to  Origen’s notion th a t those g if ts  may be bestowed 
upon a c rea tu re  fo r  a period o f tim e  (and in  such a case th is  c rea tu re  
does have those g if ts  "co-extended alongside w ith ")  w h ile  fo r  another 
period o f tim e  they are not, because o f the c rea tu re 's .ow n  m e rits . Thus 
i t  is  through the tem poral im p lica tio n  o f the te rm  "co-extended 
alongside w ith "  th a t Origen a r tic u la te s  h is asse rtion  o f the 
non-permanent bestowal o f d iv ine grace upon c rea tu res  and, 
subsequently, h is  v iew  of tim e  as a means where a d ia le c tic a l re la tio n  
between God and c re a tu res  takes place, as we sha ll argue la te r  in  th is  
work.
The use of the te rm  “sim parektenesthe" by Origen is  very 
s ig n ific a n t innovation tow ards the estab lishm ent o f a te rm ino lo gy  of 
tim e. For i t  provides ce rta in  c ru c ia l e lem ents o f h is  conception o f tim e  
and espec ia lly  o f what he believes th a t tim e  proper to  be. In the f in a l 
analysis, Origen does not abandon the o rig in a l conception o f tim e  as i t  
has been a rtic u la te d  by the S to ics , namely the conception o f tim e  proper 
as an "extension"; ye t he fu r th e r  e labora tes, re fin e s  and c la r i f ie s  the 
re levan t te rm ino logy  in e labora ting  h is own C h ris tia n  conception o f 
tim e. For Origen does not only provide an answer as to  what tim e  
proper is  but he also handles the question o f the re la t io n  o f tim e  to  the 
"s tru c tu re  o f th is  w orld".
C e rta in ly , the S to ics Chryssippus and Apollodorus had made an 
a ttem p t to  denote the re la t io n  o f tim e , as an "extension", to  the w o rld , 
by using the te rm  napaKoRou9ouv 5 ida ir)|ia .56 The te rm  napaKoRou9ouv, 
however, means " th a t which accompanies fo llo w in g ”. Hence th is  te rm  
i ts e lf  im p lie s  a notion of "coming behind o r a fte r" ; in th is  sense,
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th e re fo re , tim e  is  regarded as "standing beside" the "w o rld ",67 yet 
" fo llo w in g " it .  Indeed, the S to ics  appear to  be uncerta in  as to  w hether 
tim e  was created "toge the r w ith "  the "w o rld " (ouv auxw) o r "a f te r  i t "  
(yex* auxov); and subsequently they appear uncerta in  as to  w hether tim e  
"has the same age w ith  the w o rld " (lofjRiKa xou koouou gs^ovsvai) o r 
tim e  is  "younger" than the w o rld  (rj vewxepov e m v o u )6- On th is  
u n ce rta in ty  Philo  fo llo w s  the S to ics; the only th ing he seems to a sse rt 
fo r  sure is  th a t tim e  could not be "o lder" than the w o rld ; " fo r  i t  is  
u n b e fittin g  a philosopher to  dare a f f irm "  that.69 The S to ics  regard  god 
as the c re a to r o f tim e  ye t they consider the w o rld  as the “ fa th e r"  o f 
tim e 70 because tim e  is  being rea lized  out o f the m otion o f the w orld . 
The re fo re  i t  is  not a t a ll accidenta l th a t they used the te rm  
napai<oRou9ouv S idaxqya, the te rm  composed o f the p re po s itio n  napd 
which means "beside" and the p a r t ic ip le  cxkoRou9ouv w hich means 
"fo llow ing ". I t  is  then obvious th a t the S to ics have never been able to  
overcome the d if f ic u lt y  o f exac tly  expressing the re la t io n  between tim e  
proper and the w orld .
Origen h im se lf has been able to  a r t ic u la te  h is  own conception o f 
t im e  by using the verb oupnapsKxsivoyevog o r "to  be extended alongside 
w ith ".
As a m a tte r o f fa c t, th is  verb did not e x is t in  c lass ica l Greek;71 i t  
appeared during the H e lle n is tic  period and especia lly  in  the f i r s t  
cen tu ries  o f C h ris tia n ity . Among Origen’s predecessors i t  was Galen,72 
Asclepiodorus Tacticus (1s t cen tury  A.D.) and Cleomedes (M athem atic ian, 
2nc* century  A.D.) who had a lready used the te rm . The meaning applied to  
th is  was th a t o f "to  have the same extension w ith  som ething else". Of 
the S to ics i t  was Marcus A u re liu s  who had used the te rm  
oupnapsKxeivsiv73 in  the sense o f "extending p a ra lle l to " and th e re fo re  
"to  co n tra s t" o r "to  compare". C e rta in ly  the te rm  was used in  the 
subsequent cen tu ries  and Suidas the Lexicographer (960 A.D.) included
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the  te rm  In h is  le x ico n  as aupnapsK xsivso9ai.
Yet i t  was O rigen who f i r s t  used the  te rm  oupnapsKxeivsoSai and 
ouunapsK xsivs iv in  o rd e r to  exp ress a concep tion  o f t im e  p ro p e r as w e ll 
as the  re la t io n  o f t im e  to  the w o rld . And we sh a ll argue th a t both  th is  
concep tion  o f t im e  i t s e l f  as w e ll as h is  te rm in o lo g y  have e xe rte d  3 
p ro found  and d e c is ive  in flu e n ce  upon O rigen 's C h r is tia n  successo rs  -an  
in flu e n ce  not ackow ledged, not even suspected, h ith e r to . Le t us then see 
w h a t is  the  concep tion  o f t im e  p ro p e r as expressed by the  te rm  
oupnapsKXSiveoSai.
This te rm  is  a compound w ord cons is ting  o f the w ords "ouv-", 
"-n a p a -", "-SK-" and "-xeiveoSai". The f i r s t  th ree  are p repos itions ; the 
fo u rth  is  a verb. What we have, th e re fo re , is  a verb p red ica ted  by th ree  
prepositions.
The main body of the te rm  is  c e rta in ly  the verb "xs(veo9ai" which 
means "to  be s tre tched" o r "to  be spread". The p re pos ition  "sk" means 
"out" and the verb "sK-xe(vsa9ai" means "to  be s tre tche d  out" o r "to  be 
extended".
A t th is  po in t Origen m ain ta ins the fundamental S to ic  conception o f 
tim e  as an "extension"; fo r  the Greek w ord fo r  "extension" (w hich is  
sKxacng) is  exactly  the noun coming out o f the verb "BK-xeivso9o:i".
The fu r th e r  step of Origen is  to  employ the p repo s ition  "-n o p d -" 
which means "beside". We have a lready seen th a t although Zeno does not 
seem to  employ th is  notion, we find  the p repos ition  "nopd-" in the 
te rm ino logy  o f Chryssippus and Apollodorus, namely in the te rm  
"nap-aKoflou9ouv Sidaxrjpa". Yet Origen has discarded the te rm  
"nap-aKoRou9ouv" because o f i t s  im p lic a tio n  th a t tim e  “ fo llo w s ", as i t  
w ere, the w orld . This is  why he does not use i t  a t a ll.
In contrast, he maintained the preposition "-napa-" which renders 
the verb "-nap-SK-xs(vsa9ai" which means what "extends beside".
F ina lly  Origen adds the p repos ition  "ouv" w hich means "w ith "  in
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o rder to  depict h is  conception o f tim e  as an "extension" which "is  
extended" "beside" and ye t "w ith "  the w o rld , namely accompanying, not 
fo llow ina .
There is  a co n tra d isn ti fic tion  which should be made a t th is  point: 
P lo tinus, too, held the notion th a t tim e  "runs toge ther with  l i f e  and 
keeps pace in i ts  course (fj ouvSei kccC auvxpexei).74 In h is  m ytho log ica l 
p o rtra ya l o f the beginning o f te m p o ra lity  he speaks o f "a re s tle s s ly  
ac tive  nature  which wanted to  co n tro l i t s e lf  and be on i t s  own, and 
chose to  seek fo r  more than i t s  present s ta te , th is  moved, and tim e  
moved w ith  i t ; " 75 Although in the o rig in a l Greek te x t the te rm  "w ith "  (as 
A rm strong  tra n s la te s  i t  here) is  not a c tu a lly  used, i t  is  neverthe less 
s ta ted  th a t "once th is  nature  moved, tim e  moved, too" (eKivf|9i] pev auxrj, 
£Kivrj9r] 6e Kai au iog ); yet the notion o f "accompanying" is  im p lied  and i t  
becomes c le a re r once the above-mentioned passage is  taken in to  account, 
too.
The d iffe re n ce , however, lie s  in th is : The Neoplatonic conception 
o f t im e ’s being with  the w o rld  m a in ta ins the fundamental P la ton ic  
c h a ra c te r is tic  o f a "dynamic" v iew  o f tim e. Time is  perceived to  move 
i ts e lf .  In P la to i t  is  a moving image, in P lo tinus tim e  runs. C e rta in ly  
the e n tire  P lo tin ian  perception o f tim e  is  a “dynamic" one, due to  the 
fa c t th a t tim e  proper o rig in a te s  fro m  the "m otion" o f the Soul. By 
co n tra s t, Origen does not hold such a conception o f tim e. The notion o f 
with  does not suggest any m otion o f tim e  proper a t a ll. Th is d iffe rn e ce  
fro m  the P la ton ic  thought is  due to  the conception of tim e  as "extension".
This is  the fundamental s tru c tu re  o f Origen’s te rm  about tim e. Let 
us then see the im p lic a tio n  of the steps th a t Origen has taken tow ards  
th is  d irec tion .
Although he accepts the fundamental S to ic  v iew  o f tim e  as a 
S ia o ig p a  (extension), he uses a verb w hich has a com p le te ly  d if fe re n t 
ro o t, namely the verb xeivea9ai. We assume th a t he did so because he
wanted to  c ircum ven t somehow the pure ly  spa tia l notion im p lied  by the 
te rm  Sidaxrjpa. For he knows p e r fe c tly  w e ll (as undoubtedly the S to ics 
did, as w e ll)  th a t th is  "extension" is  not a spa tia l one; the te rm  i ts e lf  is  
nothing but a metaphor. Since, th e re fo re , th is  is  not a spa tia l 
"extension", w hat is  the re la t io n  of th is  "extension" to  the Space i ts e lf  
- th a t is , to  what he names theough the te rm  "s tru c tu re  o f the w o rld "?
The S to ics undoubtedly w ere conscious o f the fa c t th a t tim e  is  
something d if fe re n t fro m  space;76 they knew o f course th a t th is  
"extension" had no sp a tia l s ign ificance. But by th e ir  te rm ino lo gy  they 
have not achieved to  provide an accurate  account o f what tim e  proper 
is. This is  exac tly  the po in t on which P lo tinus focused h is c r i t ic is m  
against the Stoics. Zeno seems to  have thought th a t i t  is  enough to  take 
as obvious th a t the te rm  "extension" is  ju s t a metaphor. Chryssippus and 
Apollodorus s im p ly  added the p a r t ic ip le  napaKoflouSouv ("being beside and 
fo llo w in g ") which is  not a ve ry  subs tan tia l co n tr ib u tio n , as i t  confuses 
ra th e r than e luc idates the re la tio n  o f tim e  proper to  space proper. And, 
as we said, i t  is  not accidenta l th a t the scrupulous Origen d iscards th is  
te rm  napaKoflou9ouv altoge ther. What he does instead is  to  make a 
sim ultaneous use o f the p repos itions "ouv" ("w ith ") and "napd" (“beside"). 
Thus, in Origen’s v iew , tim e  is  a s o r t o f "extension" w hich is  extended 
"along w ith "  space yet i t  is  "beside" i t .  T im e is  something d if fe re n t fro m  
space yet i t  is  extended alongside toge the r w ith  i t ;  the re  is  no notion of 
"fo llo w in g " one another; they are ju s t  being “ together".
The adoption of the S to ic  conception o f tim e  as an "extension", 
completed by the in tro d u c tio n  of the te rm  aupnapsK is(vso9ai by Origen 
is  a h igh ly meaningful and accurate p o rtra ya l o f h is  conception o f what 
tim e  proper is  as w e ll is  i t s  exact re la t io n  to  space p roper and th is  is  
why i t  had an enormous im pact upon the C h ris tia n  w r ite r s  who lived  
a fte r  Origen’s tim e.
6. F lo rovsk i77 re fe rs  to  the c re a tion  o f the w o rld  and tim e
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asse rting  th a t i t  was w ith  Augustine tha t th is  re la t io n  was c le a r ly  
portrayed. .What he is  unaware o f, however, is  th a t i t  was Origen who 
in troduced the concrete  perception o f the re la t io n  between space and 
tim e. F lo rovsk i asse rts  th a t i t  was Augustine who f i r s t  c le a r ly  
pronounced th a t the w o rld  was not created "in  tim e " but "toge the r w ith "  
t im e 78 The t ru th  is , however, th a t before  Augustine i t  was Origen who 
had a lready a rtic u la te d  the notion th a t tim e  came in to  existence when 
the w o rld  came in to  existence. As fo r  the passages o f Augustine c ited  
here, one should no tice  th a t he makes the d is t in c t io n  between the 
"w o rld " arid "tim e " whereas Origen had made the conceptual d is t in c t io n  
between "the s tru c tu re  o f the w o rld " and "tim e". In th is  way he has not 
only preceded Augustine but has also provided a more soph is tica ted  
a r tic u la t io n  o f h is  perception.
I t  would be not an exaggeration at a ll to  say th a t the im pact o f 
the conceptual as w e ll as te rm in o lo g ica l e labo ra tion  by Origen 
estab lished a C h ris tia n  v iew  o f the essence of tim e. Not only the te rm  
& id a ir jya  but also the te rm  aupnapsKzsivm w hich Origen adopted in 
o rder to  p o rtra y  the sub tle  perception o f tim e  as an elem ent o f the 
make-up o f the w o rld  as w e ll as i t s  re la t io n  to  space, was adopted by 
la te r  C h ris tia n  w r ite r s ;  thus one can c le a r ly  see the decis ive  im pact o f 
Origen's conception o f tim e  upon h is successors.
Gregory o f Nyssa,79 Gregory o f Nazianzus,80 Basil o f Cesarea,81 
Theodoretus C yrrhensis,82 Hesychius o f S inai,83 Athanasius o f 
A lexandria ,84 Maximus Confessor,85 C y r illu s  o f A le xa n d ria 85 John 
Chrysostom ,87 Procopius G'azaeus,88 John o f Damascus,89 are some of 
them who echoed what Origen estab lished as a C h ris tia n  te rm ino lo gy  for- 
speaking o f tim e.
Nevertheless, the te rm  aupnapEKxe(vea9ai alone, although dec is ive , 
can in  no case be regarded as an exhaustive analys is o f tim e  in  its e lf .  
We should then enquire w hether Origen made any steps tow ards
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p o rtra y in g  h is  v iew s o f what P lu ta rhus c a lls  as "essence and fa cu lty "90 
o f tim e.
Tim e is  a crea tu re . In fo rm u la tin g  h is opinion about the re la tio n  
o f tim e  to  space, we saw th a t Origen regards tim e  as som ething which 
is  extended alongside w ith  the s tru c tu re  o f the w o rld ; yet he has no 
hes ita tio n  a t a ll in  a ff irm in g  th a t tim e  i t s e l f  is  a c rea tu re , in h is  v iew , 
the re  was a s ta te  th a t tim e  did not e x is t a t a il;  "... fo r  tim e  cannot be 
found when the th ird  and the fo u rth  conceptions o f the Logos did not 
e x is t a t a ll.";91 and "... before any e x is tin g  o f tim e  arid aeon ‘in the 
beginning was the Logos' and 'the Logos was w ith  God'."92 Tim e i ts e lf  is  
regarded as something "outside" T r in ity .93
There fo re , the re  was a s ta te  in which tim e  did not ex is t. Since 
tim e  does e x is t now, i t  would be p lausib le  to  in fe r  th a t tim e  is  regarded 
as having come in to  being out o f non-being; yet the re  is  no need to  in fe r  
i t  d ia le c tic a lly ; fo r  i t  is  Origen h im se lf who enunciates th is  opinion: He 
re fe rs  to  Ps.54,20 "God sha ll hear and w il l  h u m ilia te  them, he who is  
before  the aeons; fo r  they have no changes, as they fe a r not God" and h is 
comment upon i t  is  th is :
"Since everyth ing  has been made through him , i t  is  w e ll said th a t 
he e x is ts  before  the aeons. Arid th is  is  whence we lea rn  th a t aeons have 
come to  being out o f non-being"94
In comm John i t  is  pointed out th a t the expression "through whom" 
(as in John,1,3) " is  never s ta ted  in the f i r s t  place, but is  a lw ays 
employed in the second p lace"95 This asse rtion  is  grounded by appealing 
to various s c r ip tu ra l passages. One o f these passages is  the Heb.1,1-2, 
according to  which God "has in these la s t days spoken unto us by h is son, 
whom he hath appointed h e ir  of a ll th ings, by whom also he made the 
aeons (xoug aiuvag)". Origen quotes Paul as "teaching us th a t God made 
the aeons through the son, and by making the aeons i t  is  the 
on ly-begotten  whom the 'through whom' is  re fe rre d  to ."95 Th is is  the
con text in which Origen a tta cks  Heracleon fo r  holding th a t "ne ithe r the 
aeon nor what is  in the aeon has been made through the Logos; holding 
th a t they have been made before the Logos"97
There should be no doubt th a t i t  is  tim e  i t s e lf  what Origen means 
by the te rm  "aeon"; fo r  he regards "aeons" cons is ting  o f "years" and 
"days", as he accord ing ly  sta tes: " He who has learned the ine ffab le  and 
se cre t th ings o f God, he also has the m em ories o f the past aeons, and of 
the years in them and o f the old days w hich com prise them ."98 
A ccord ing ly , a t another po in t he speaks o f "days o f the aeon";99 and 
e lsew here he s ta tes: " i t  is  good to  say th a t one should pray to  God day 
a fte r  day, and to  sing p ra is ing  the name of God in  the aeon o f the aeon". 
Regarding th is  Psalm o f David (namely, Ps.61,9) [the expression] "to  sing 
p ra is ing  the name o f God is  understood as extended (nape jaefveiv) u n til 
the next aeon whereas the expression "to  pray to h im " re fe rs  to the 
tim e , which com prises days, namely the tim e  which is  counted alongside 
(napaysipoufisvog) everybody's life t im e . "There fo re , as long as we are in 
l i f e  le t us pray, so th a t we become able to  sing p ra is in g  the name o f God 
in the aeon o f aeon.".100
So Origen employs the te rm  aiwv in  o rder to  ind ica te  tim e  i ts e lf  
and, in  deOr, he speaks o f the "day o f so g rea t an aeon” ( ir jg  xou 
irjR iKouiou aiwvog ppepag), the te rm  aiuiv c le a r ly  in d ica ting  a tem pora l 
du ra tion .101
A ccord ing ly , in  the commEph, he a f f irm s  th a t the te rm  “aeon of 
th is  w o rld " ind ica tes  "the tim e  w hich is  extended alongside w ith  the 
s tru c tu re  o f th is  w o rld  fro m  the beginning to  the end"; and i t  is  in  the 
same place th a t Origen appeals to  the same s c r ip tu ra l passage, namely 
Heb. 1,3, in  o rder to  say tha t the expression "through whom he has made 
the aeons" may w e ll ind ica te  th a t the aeons “ is  a c re a tu re  (SoEpi K iio u a  
fiegeiv xoug auovag)". Nevertheless, he does not fa i l  to  s tre s s  th a t i t  is  
again fro m  Paul th a t we learn  th a t th is  "c rea tu re " is  not a liv in g  one (as
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the expression o f Paul, in Gal. 1,4, " th a t he m igh t d e live r us fro m  th is  
present e v il aeon" m igh t be taken to  sugges); in  Paul's E p istle  to the 
Galatians i t  is  e x p lic it ly  s ta ted  th a t the days are not liv in g  beings (nflfjv 
sxsi xrjv avxsnsixetpT]oiv xo bk xrjg npog randxag sniaxoRng prjxov, ensi 
Kai nspi rjpspwv flegexai, xwv opoRogouysvajv log quk ouaiuv euqjuxwv).102
in co n tra s t to  Marcus A u re liu s , Origen does not p e rson ify  tim e. 
Such a v iew  o f tim e  derives fro m  h is ove ra ll conception o f i t  as w e ll as 
fro m  the purposes o f h is  thought, in one case th a t he seems to  pe rson ify  
tim e , i t  is  obvious tha t i t  is  ju s t  a l i te r a r y  expression. Thus in seJJoh 
Origen comments on the passage Job,32,9 " i t  is  not those who have lived  
long th a t are w ise" as fo llow s :
"He says th a t i t  is  not necessary th a t only old men are w ise ; but i t  
is  possib le to lis te n  to  something im p o rta n t even since youth. For i f  
tim e  makes people w ise , God does so much more".103
Even in  th a t case, however, the a tt itu d e  o f Origen tow ards  tim e  is  
to ta lly  d if fe re n t fro m  th a t of Marcus A u re liu s ’. Marcus p e rson ifie s  tim e  
in o rde r to  prove th a t i t  is  a "destroyer". He stands before  the re a li ty  
w ith  a fee ling  o f melancholy and fru s tra t io n . He believed in the 
recu rrence  of id e n tica l w o rld s104 and so held th a t nothing is  c rea ted  and 
nothing is  lo s t.105 His b e lie fs  are o ften  combined w ith  an acute sense of 
the trans ience o f th inqs and events, sub iected by fa ta l v ic is s itu d e s  to
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perpetual change;106 he endeavours to  "love" th is  poor and heavy 
des tiny107 but ac tu a lly  he is  deeply depressed by what he sees as van ity  
and n u ll i ty  o f man's s ta te  on th is  “clod o f ea rth ", namely the w o rld .108
By co n tra s t, in the above-mentioned passage, Origen p e rso n ifie s  
tim e  in  o rder to  im p ly  a benevolent in fluence  o f i t  upon men. In any 
event, he e x p lic it ly  re je c ts  what he c a lls  "the m ythology about aeons" 
(xrjv nspi xuv aiwvwv pu9onouav)109 obviously a llud ing  to  the ta le s  o f the 
Gnostics.110
Thus Origen is  c lea r in enunciating h is  v iew  th a t tim e  i t s e l f  is  a
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crea tu re . As God "made aeons through the son"111 tim e  Is a c rea tu re  
which “came In to  being out o f non-being"112 when "God made beings out 
o f non-beings"113 since "the holy T r in ity  brought ... every th ing  ... in to  
beina out of non-beina".114
On th is  po in t 0. Cullmann's asse rtion  is  tha t the te rm  "aeon" (as in 
Heb.1,2) means only "w o rlds" and th a t "aeon" has only an "extensional" 
meaning, namely th a t a ll God did was to  arrange tim e  in  an o rde r o f 
consecutive “aeons" (the number o f w hich, in  Cullmann’s v iew , is  three.). 
His v iew  is  th a t tim e  "was not created".115 But th is  is  exac tly  a pure ly  
P la ton ic  way o f th ink ing , to  which Origen is  e sse n tia lly  opposed. I t  
makes l i t t l e  d iffe re nce  th a t Cullmann holds time as non-created 
whereas P lato held m atter (w hich means v ir tu a lly  "space" i t s e lf )  to  be 
uncreated. In e ith e r case the re  is  "som ething" which is  perceived as a 
"com pulsory" e te rna l companion o f God, namely as a lw ays ex is ting . 
Cullmann was obsessed w ith  h is  preoccupation to  avoid any spa tia l 
re fe rence  which would be regarded as a Greek "con tam ination "115 o f 
C h ris tia n ity . In th is  e f fo r t  he v ir tu a lly  fo llow ed  P lato 's way o f th inking. 
That P lato would speak o f some kind o f everlastingness o f space 
whereas Cullman spoke o f a kind o f everlastingness o f tim e  i t s e lf  does 
not co n s titu te  a substan tia l d iffe rence . In both cases, the essence of 
th ink ing  is  v ir tu a lly  the same. For lik e  P la to , who held th a t the w o rld  is  
uncreated and the Demiurge ju s t  put m a tte r  in  o rd e r, Cullman takes the 
v iew  th a t a ll God did was to  put a p re -e x is tin g  tim e  in o rd e r, namely to  
arrange i t  in to  "aeons". P lato held th a t m a tte r a lw ays ex is ted  and the 
Demiourge established “o rde r" and "tim e " in it .  Cullman a sse rts  th a t tim e  
alw ays existed  and God estab lished "o rde r" (namely, "aeons") and a 
"w o rld " in i t .  Thus what Cullmann does is  nothing m ore than a "reversed" 
ve rs ion  o f a fundam enta lly P la ton ic  conception and a P la ton ic  way o f 
th ink ina .117
C erta in ly  i t  is  not the only po in t where P la ton ic  way o f th in k ing  is
found in  a w ork  which is  supposed to  have as a main purpose to  co n tra s t 
fro m  what is  thought to  be Greek. For i t  is  Cullmann who speaks o f the 
"flesh " as the "g rea t opponent o f the s p ir i t " 118 and a f f irm s  th a t the 
"communion w ith  C h ris t"  becomes m ore e s s e n tia lly  ac tive  " i f  we aet r id  
of th is  na tu ra l body as soon as possible".119 We do not c r i t ic iz e  the 
actual content o f a ff irm a tio n s  lik e  these. V/e only note th a t i t  is  qu ite  
iro n ic a l th a t they are a ff irm a tio n s  o f a w r i te r  in  a w ork  in w hich Greek 
thought, and espec ia lly  P la ton ism , are regarded as a kind o f dangerous 
"contam ination" of C h ris tia n  way o f th inking.
When Origen a ff irm s  th a t tim e  in  i t s e lf  is  a c re a tu re  he a c tu a lly  
goes beyond th is  P la ton ic  way o f th inking. He was able to  do so because 
he regarded the Greek schools o f thought ju s t  as something "outs ide" the 
C h ris tia n  way of th inking. But he was not haunted by the Greek thought 
regard ing  i t  as a “danger" o r something "contam inating". He, was able to  
employ th is  stance fo r  the s im ple  reason th a t (in  co n tra s t to  many 
modern scho lars) he a c tu a lly  knew in depth the Greek a ttitu d e s . This 
calm  and c le a r-s ig h te d  fa m il ia r i t y  w irh  th is  thought was w hat a llow ed ' 
h im  to  face Celsus -and yet i t  is  in  th a t w ork  th a t he po in ts  out: "We 
have employed the stance not to  despise good teachings, even i f  th e ir  
au thors are outside the fa ith  yet teaching w e ll, nor to  ra ise  ob jec tions  
aaa is t them, nor to  seek to  o ve rth row  s ta tem ents w hich are sound"120u  *
This is  only a sm all example o f w hat we said in  the in tro d u c tio n  about 
Origen's iro n  w i l l  coex is ting  w ith  peaceful and c o n c ilia to ry  s p ir i t  o f 
s c ie n t if ic  education and e rud ition .
Origen had the feeling ( i f  not the c lea r conception) of the re a li ty  
o f space-tim e; yet he did not o b jec t to  th is  perception (w hich is  a lready 
ju s t if ie d  by modern science) ju s t  because th is  perception  contained the 
notion o f "space". To him , th is  notion was ne ithe r "con tam ination" nor a 
"danger". Hence he was not obsessed w ith  tru in g  to  avoid any spa tia l 
ca tegory and deal only w ith  tem pora l ones.121 Thus, he also holds tha t
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the te rm  ‘‘aeon" may e ith e r mean tim e  o r space -b u t s t r ic t ly  speaking, i t  
a c tu a lly  suggests both tim e  and space, namely the re a li ty  o f
space-tim e, as we argue in  chapter 4.
in v iew  of th is  fa c t, 6. F lo rovsk i is  to ta lly  m istaken when he says 
th a t i t  was Augustine th a t "discovered" th a t "tim e  should be regarded as 
a c re a tu re "122 For as our d iscussion shows i t  was Origen who 
estab lished the v iew  th a t tim e  in i t s e lf  is  a c rea tu re . A ccord ing ly , R. 
S o rab ji is  equally m istaken when he a ttr ib u te s  the idea th a t "the re  was 
no tim e  before  the c re a tion "123 to  Augustine. He po in ts  out tha t th is  is  
"the best o f so lu tions o ffe re d  by Jews and C h ris tia n s "124 to the 
so -ca lled  "why not sooner?' argument about the crea tion , i t  c e rta in ly  
was a b r i l l ia n t  notion, yet i t  was Origen h im se lf who enunciated th is  
idea. On th is  po in t Augustine was but a fo llo w e r o f Origen.
What we see, neverthe less, is  something more than the conception 
of tim e  as a crea tu re . In Origen's v iew  tim e  is  a "being" which was made 
out o f "non-being";1253 and th is  leads to  the conclusion th a t Origen 
considers tim e  as rea l. He uses the te rm  gegovaaiv125 which means "have 
been made"; and th is  is  the te rm  th a t Origen uses to  enunciate the 
re a lity  o f c rea tion 's  being; he s ta tes , fo r  example, th a t God "... is  a 
c re a to r because o f the beings (gegovoxa) brought in to  being out of 
non-being";127 he also says th a t "God as c re a to r is  in  a ll beings 
(gsftovooiv)".128
Thus Origen s ta tes  th a t tim e  i t s e l f  is  a being - in  h is  thought 
the re  is  nothing o f the S to ic  doubts and embarassements on th is  sub ject. 
A ccord ing ly  he holds th a t i t  is  a being o f fu ll re a lity ; and he also 
a r tic u la te s  h is notion th a t tim e  is  a being o f fu l l  re a li ty  w hich is  a 
creature, crea ted  by God together w ith  a ll c re a tion  and i t  is  p a rt o f the 
make-up o f the whole w orld .
Tim e is  a continuum. Whether tim e  is  a continuum  o r not was a 
m a tte r o f d ispute in  an tiqu ity . The S to ics  in  aenerai w ere  re ie c t in a  the* w  •_? J  w
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do c trine  of Xenocrates about "a to m ic -tim e -e le m e n ts "129 which was an 
Epicurean v iew  in general, in v iew  o f Origen's contem pt fo r  Epicureans 
and the fa c t th a t both A r is to te lia n s  and S to ics  (in  sp ite  of th e ir  o ther 
d iffe re nce s ) regarded tim e  as continuous, i t  would be p lausib le  to  expect 
th a t Oriqen regarded tim e  as a continuum. Besides, th is  is  a d ire c t
w  U  /
consequence o f the ve ry  conception o f tim e  as "extension" and c e r ta in ly  
the co n tin u ity  of tim e  is  a necessary elem ent o f Origen's conception of 
i t ,  as we sha ll also discuss in chapter 3, §4, tre a tin g  h is notion o f 
"kairos". However, th a t tim e  is  a continuum  can be also drawn fro m  h is 
own expressions. He makes the d is t in c tio n  o f what is  d is t in c t and 
discontinuous fro m  what is  continuum ; to  the counting o f the fo rm e r he 
applies the te rm  “number" wheras he applies the te rm  "measure" to  the 
la t te r .  Thus, when he speaks o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res  (w hich are d is t in c t 
beings) he uses the te rm  "number" and in  speaking of "m a tte r"  he uses 
the te rm  "measure":
"Moreover when the s c r ip tu re  says th a t God created a il th ings 'by 
number and measure',1'50 we sha ll be r ig h t in applying the te rm  ’number' 
to  ra tio n a l c rea tu res  o r m inds by th is  ve ry  reason th a t they are so many 
as can be provided fo r  and ru led  and co n tro lle d  by the providence o f God; 
whereas 'measure' w i l l  correspond ing ly apply to bodily  m a tte r, w hich 
we m ust believe to  have been created by God in  such quan tity  as he knew 
would be s u ff ic ie n t fo r  the o rde ring  o f the w orld . These then are the 
ob jec ts  which we m ust believe w ere created by God in the beginning, 
tha t is , be fore  everyth ing  else.".131
He also uses the te rm  "number" when he re fe rs  to  "men", who are 
ind iv idua l beings;132 and he again s tresses  th a t God "made a ll th ings  by 
number and measure; fo r  to  God the re  is  nothing e ith e r w ith o u t end or 
w itho u t measure";133 and he concludes: "Every created being, th e re fo re , 
is  d istingu ished in God's s igh t by i ts  being confined w ith in  a c e rta in  
number and measure, tha t is , e ith e r number in the case o f ra tio n a l
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beings or measure in  the case of bod ily  m a tte r.".104
i t  is  against th is  background th a t Origen applies the te rm  
"measure" to  tim e , c le a r ly  suggesting th a t i t  is  a continuum. This is  why 
he accord ing ly declares; "the re s t o f th ings, however, which are externa l 
to  the T r in ity ,  m ust be measured by ages and periods o f tim e ";105 and 
phrases such as "im m easurable ages" can be found in  some po in ts  of the 
Prina 155 The same conception o f tim e  is  found in frM att, where tim e  is  
c le a r ly  s ta ted  as continuum  (SirjveKsg) and action  in  tim e , u n til the end 
o f i t ,  is  s ta ted  to  have a cha rac te r o f action  "in  co n tinu ity " 
(O ir jV S K U jg ).137
I t  is  th e re fo re  Origen's e x p lic it  s ta tem en ts  as w e ll as h is 
te rm ino logy  i t s e lf  th a t denotes h is v iew  o f tim e  as a continuum. But i t  
is  not only th a t; as w ith  the S to ics ,108 i t  is  the very conception o f tim e  
as an "extension" th a t e n ta ils  a conception o f tim e  as a continuum  which 
is  p a r t ic u la r ly  held to  be "extended alongside w ith "  the w orld . F in a lly , i t  
is  the conception o f the close connexion o f tim e  to  space, namely, the 
re a li ty  o f space-tim e out o f which tim e  is  regarded as a continuum ; and 
th is  conception o f co n tin u ity  o f tim e  is  a basic one in the a r t ic u la tio n  of 
h is v iew s o f judgement as w e ll as o f p ro longation  o f tim e , w hich w i l l  be 
discussed la te r  in  th is  chapter.
Tim e as a dimension. Oriaen adopted the fundamental S to icu 1
conception of tim e , being h im se lf aware o f the d if f ic u lt ie s  th is  question 
was causing to  S to ic  thought. The S to ics in general considered tim e  as 
inco rpo rea l.139 They would not eas ily  say th a t tim e  does not e x is t, not 
only because the re  is  the psycological and phenomenological experience 
o f tim e  but also because the S to ics  them selves used both the te rm  and 
the conception o f tim e. They w ere obviously re lu c ta n t to  consider tim e  
as a pure ly  in te lle c tu a l co n s tru c tion , as they thought P la ton ic  ideas to 
be. Tim e is  rea l in  a sense; th e re fo re , as i t  is  obviously not co rpo rea l, i t  
was a ttr ib u te d  the q u a s i- re a lity  o f one o f the inco rpo rea ls .140
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When Origen a f f irm s  th a t tim e  is  re a l, th a t i t  is  a "being" and he 
estab lishes the v iew  th a t i t  is  "c re a tu re ", he expresses a personal v iew  
on a very d i f f ic u lt  and h ig ly  co n tro ve rs ia l m a tte r; the ph ilosophers who 
ra ised  the questions surrounding th is  m a tte r have never provided fu lly  
s a tis fa c to ry  and genera lly  accepted v iew s; and i t  is  c e rta in ly  not 
accidenta l th a t although questions re la te d  to  space have enjoyed general 
agreement fo r  long periods o f tim e , questions o f tim e  have a lw ays been 
m a tte rs  o f con troversy.
in S to ic  philosophy a theo ry  a ttr ib u te d  to  Chryssippus was tha t 
only something “fu l ly  re a l"  should be considered as "ex is tin g " (unapxsiv). 
They used to  make a d is t in c t io n  between "undpxeiv" and “u fso id vcu ";141 
the la t te r  is  not a fu l l  re a li ty  but a "p o te n tia l" re a lity . What they mean 
bu th a t is  th a t " fu llu  re a l"  is  a p red ica te  when the pred ica ted  action  is
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a c tu a lly  tak ing place; fo r  example, "w a lk ing" fu l ly  e x is ts  fo r  as long as 
one w alks, yet is  does not fu l ly  e x is t when one in ly ing  o r s it t in g .142 in 
the lig h t o f th is  v iew  the S to ics  a sse rt th a t i t  is  only present tim e  tha t 
is  fu l ly  rea l. On the o ther hand, they regard  i t  as a p ro p e rty  o f tim e  to  
be both in f in ite  in  both d ire c tio n s  (namely, th a t o f the past and the 
fu tu re ) and to  be in f in ite ly  d iv is ib le , i t  is  th e ir  fundamental v iew  o f 
tim e  as a continuum th a t makes them in fe r  th a t tim e  is  in f in i te ly  
d iv is ib le .14,3
P lu ta rchus a lleges th a t to  S to ics , "present" is  considered as tim e  
so in f in ite ly  sm all th a t i t  is  a c tu a lly  "crushed" between past and fu tu re  
(w hich, as we sta ted , are regarded as not fu l ly  rea l). F in a lly , the present 
i t s e lf  is  regarded to be extinguished because o f th is  "crush ing", and not 
to  e x is t i t s e lf  in  re a lity ;  fo r  w hat rem ains out o f th is  "crush" is  past 
and fu tu re , which neverthe less are considered not as " fu l l"  but as 
"po ten tia l"  re a lit ie s .144 I t  is  according to  th is  a rgum enta tion  th a t 
P lu tarchus a ttr ib u te s  to  the S to ics  the opinion th a t tim e  is  not in  i t s e l f  
a "being".145
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Such w ere the m a tte rs  surrounding the question o f tim e. 
P la to n is ts , fo r  example, w ere a sse rting  th a t i t  is  tim e 's  “co n tin u ity " 
i t s e l f  tha t a ttr ib u te s  an u n re a lity  to  tim e ;146 yet Chryssippus re je c ts  
th is  asse rtion ; fo r  he does not believe th a t to  regard  tim e  as a 
continuum e n ta ils  an u n re a litu  o f present tim e  o r o f the events o f thew  *
present tim e  and he subsequently develops a whole a rgum entation on th is  
sub ject. What the S to ics a c tu a lly  did was make the d is t in c t io n  between 
what “e x is ts " (as va rious m a te ria l ob je c ts  o r an action  fo r  as long as i t  
takes place) and w hat is  "re a l"  (and th is  includes m a te ria l ob jec ts  as 
w e ll as inco rpo rea ls  lik e  tim e). Vet, even i f  we accept th a t th is  
d is t in c tio n  eluded P roclus in h is  c r i t ic is m  o f S to ic  v iew  o f tim e ,14/ 
what rem ains is  the fa c t th a t tim e  was a question e n ta iling  a number of 
problem s in  i t s  trea tm en t.
In sp ite  o f the fa c t th a t Origen should be regarded as indebted to 
the S to ics  fo r  h is fundamental v iew  o f tim e  as an "extension", he has 
taken decis ive  steps o f h is  own in  o rde r to  overcome the impasses of 
S to ic  as w e ll as pagan thought in  general. What is  o f subs tan tia l help to  
him  tow ards th is  d ire c tio n  is  the d if fe re n t conception o f "w o rld " which 
he holds.
The notions o f “body" and "inco rpo rea l" have a to ta lly  d if fe re n t 
meaning in Origen’s thought fro m  th a t in the Stoics. To them 
"inco rpo rea l" is  a "something" between being and non-being; i t  is  only o f 
necessity  th e t they are compelled to  accept the fo u r inco rp o rea ls148 ju s t 
because ne ithe r can they deny th a t they "e x is t"  nor can they a sse rt th a t 
they are bodies.
By s ta rk  co n tra s t, in  Origen's v iew , incorporea l na ture  not only 
pe rta ins  to  fu l ly  rea l existence, but also i t  is  th is  w hich par excellence 
/5 .  I t  is  God, and only God, who is  incorporea l. On the o th e r hand, 
Origen's re fe rence  to  c o rp o re a lity  p e rta ins  to  fa lle n  ra tio n a l beings, 
which w ere created w ith  the fa ll.  What Origen regards as co rporea l
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nature  is  o rig ina te d  in m oral causes, i t  has a m o ra l goal and w il l  be 
te rm ina ted  a fte r  proper fre e  m oral action  (as we sha ll discuss in 
chapter 5). F urtherm ore , c o rp o re a lity  is  applied not only to  the v is ib le  
w o rld , but also to  w hat is  "not seen'' and yet regarded as m a te ria l.
There fo re  the re  are tw o  main d iffe re nce s  o f Origen's though on 
the sub jec t, w ith  respect to  the Stoics.
F irs t,  Origen holds the v iew  th a t the whole w o rld  (accord ing to  
h is  conception o f "w o rld ") is  a m a te ria l one; ye t he does not a llo w  th a t 
only w hat is  a “body" is  a "being" (ov), as the S to ics did.149 As he holds a 
notion o f transcendence w ith  respect to  the w o rld , he not only a f f irm s  
th a t incorporea l is  re a l, but also h is conv ic tion  is  th a t i t  is  th is  
incorporea l nature  which is  the fundamental re a li ty  -n o t in  the degree, 
so to  speak, o f re a lity ,  but in  the q u a lity  o f i t .
Secondly, the d is t in c t io n  between co rp o re a lity  and in c o rp o re a lity  
in te re s ts  Origen fo r  reasons pure ly  theo log ica l, not na tu ra l. The bodies 
th a t in te re s t Origen are those which have a theo log ica l s ign ifica nce  and 
those are the bodies o f ra tio n a l beings.150 In the fin a l ana lys is  the
conception o f co rp o re a lity  p e rta in s  to  the w o rld  as a "dow n fa ll"
(Kaxa|3oflrj) and underlines the rad ica l transcendence and s u p e r io r ity  o f
incorporea l d iv ine l i f e  compared to  the e n tire  w o rld  w hich is  corporea l.
Given these presuppositions, Origen had no reason to  wonder as to 
w hether tim e  i ts e lf  is  a body. He, as w e ll as the S to ics , knew the s im p le  
and apparent phenomenological datum th a t tim e  is  not a body. The 
d iffe re n ce  is  th a t w h ile  to  S to ics  th is  datum was a source of
embarassement, to  Origen i t  was not. The reason lie s  in th e ir  d if fe re n t 
conceptions o f the w o rld  i ts e lf ,  th e ir  d if fe re n t opinions about the 
s ign ificance  o f co rp o re a lity  and in c o rp o re a lity , and the no tion  o f 
transcendence (w hich the S to ics  did not a c tu a lly  hold at a ll)  - a l l  o f 
them w ith  respect to the conception o f what is  real.
in Origen's v iew  the fa c t th a t tim e  is  not a body does not c rea te
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any problem  a t a ll. Time is  not a body in the same sense th a t "space" 
i t s e lf  is  not a body, the fu nc tion  o f "speaking" (namely, expressions, 
phrases, a ff irm a tio n s , etc.) is  not a body, "void" is  not a body,151 in lik e  
a manner th a t a “p red ica te " o r an "axiom" o r the a b s tra c t notion of "to  
be attached" o r "to  be in te rw oven  w ith " 1- -  are not in them selves bodies. 
Origen was fa r  removed fro m  the S to ic  d oc trine  th a t "only what is  a 
body is  rea l. T here fo re  he never faced the dilem m as o f the S to ics, who 
remained im prisoned in  these impasses ju s t  because they never held a 
notion of transcendence to  the w o rld ; they p re fe rre d  to  rem ain  in to  the 
v is ib le  m a te ria l w o rld  and i ts  impasses. This is  what Origen c a lls  as 
"the a bsu rd itie s  o f the fo llo w e rs  o f Zeno and Chryssippus" dec la ring  th a t 
he does not hold v iew s which would lead h im  to  “ fa l l  in to  these 
absurdities,,.15':,
To the S to ics  th is  w o rld  is  "the whole". Origen, too, names the 
w o rld  by the same expression. Yet he regards th is  "whole" not as an 
absolute and a ll-e m b rac ing  re a li ty  but as a re a li ty  created, dependent, 
re la ted  to  the transcendent God and, in  i ts e lf ,  being out o f God. This is  
a s tr ik in g  d iffe re n ce  between Origen and the S to ics -a  d iffe re n ce  which 
had serious im p lica tions .
When Origen re fe rs  to  tim e  as " th a t which is  extended alongside 
w ith "  ( to auiina-psKTeivousvov) he, by th is  ve ry  te rm , ind ica tes , a lo t o f 
h is  conception o f tim e  and i ts  re la t io n  to  the "s tru c tu re  o f the w o r ld ” , 
as we have seen. Yet he does not emply any p a rt ic u la r  noun fo r  tim e  
proper to  be pred icated by the ad je c tive  cjujinapsKieivousvov. He does so 
when he re fe rs  to  tim e  as th a t which is  "extended alongside w ith "  the 
“s tru c tu re "  o f Paul’s " life " .154 A lthough i t  is  obvious th a t th is  "extension" 
is  not a spa tia l one Origen does not say what would be the m ost 
appropria te  noun to p o rtra y  tim e. He ra th e r  in s is ts  upon the te rm  
5iaoTT]pa (extension) and h is notion o f the close connexion o f th is  
S taa irjua  to  the "s tru c tu re  of the w orld ".
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Yet., a pa instaking study of Origen's thought revea ls  an add itiona l 
substan tia l c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f the essence o f tim e  proper. In fa c t, the re  
are po in ts  o f h is  w ork  where he appears to  consider tim e  as a 
'■dimension" o f the w orld .
i t  should be noted th a t In Greek the te rm s  "diastem a" (extension) 
and "d ias tas is " (d im ension) have the same ro o t and th e ir  meaning has an 
inner connexion. "D iastas is" (d im ension) is  d e fin ite ly  a "diastem a" 
(extension) along which l i f e  is  going on. We today regard  tim e  as the 
fo u rth  dimension o f the space-tim e, w hich stands in close connexion to 
the th ree  spa tia l dimensions. A ccord ing ly , the te rm  "ad ias ta tos" 
ind ica tes  what is  w ith o u t “d iastases" (d im ensions), th a t is  to  say, 
"dim ensionless". I t  is  exactly  th is  te rm 'W h ich  is  used by Origen in tw o  
cases a t least.
Origen's conv ic tion  is  th a t i t  is  d iv ine l i f e  w hich is  the ve ry  l i f e  
and i t  is  th is  s ta te , namely the d iv ine  one, which Origen c a lls  as 
"perpetual l i fe "  (aeiguuag).155 i t  is  obvious th a t Origen here re fe rs  to  the 
l i f e  o f God. i t  is  the very same te rm  "perpetual l i fe "  th a t Origen uses at 
another po in t o f the same w ork , expProv, again in o rde r to  ind ica te  the 
d iv ine l i f e  as the fin a l goal o f a ll c re a tion ; and i t  is  th e re  th a t he 
describes th is  l i fe ,  as "calm  and dim ensionless" (axapaxou kq i 
a S ia a ia io u  ^wfjg).155 So the co n tra s t between the a tem pora l d iv ine  l i f e  
and the tem poral w o rld  is  pointed up through the te rm  "a d ia s ta to s ”.
This is  a po in t in Origen's thought which deserves to  be 
p a r t ic u la r ly  noticed and studied. Our previous analyses have shown th a t 
the rad ica l transcendence o f God to the w o rld  is  po rtrayed  in te rm s  o f 
space and tim e. The l i f e  o f c rea tion  is  con tras ted  by d iv ine  l i f e  by the 
fa c t th a t God's l i f e  trenscends a ll space and all. tim e , namely th a t d iv ine  
l i f e  is  spaceless and tim e less. When th e re fo re  Origen dep ic ts  d iv ine  l i f e  
as a “ l i fe  w ith o u t dimensions" i t  is  obvious th a t he means space and 
tim e , a llud inq to  the absence o f space and tim e  in the d iv ine  life .
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Thus Origen considers tim e  as a dimension. This Is  how the te rm s  
‘‘d iastem a" (extension) and "d ias ta s is " (d im ension) are re la ted , not only 
because they are c lose ly  re la ted  to  each o ther on the grounds of 
ph ilo logy, but also because i t  is  Origen h im se lf who c o rre la te s  them, in 
o rde r to  express a subs tan tia l face t o f h is  conception of tim e.
I t  is  w o rth  w h ile  re f le c tin g  upon th is  v iew  o f tim e  as dim ension, 
in  o rde r to  enquire what is  the inner meaning he a ttr ib u te s  to  th is  
notion.
I t  should be noted fro m  the beainnina th a t the te rm  "d ia s ta s is "
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(d im ension), applied to  tim e , is  not an invention  of Origen's, ju s t  as the 
te rm  "diastem a" (extension) also is  not; w h ile  the la t te r  is  o f S to ic  
o r ig in , as we have a lready discussed, the fo rm e r is  a te rm  employed by 
the N eoplatonists in o rde r to  re fe r  to  tim e. The ve ry  te rm  "ad ia s ta to s ” 
can many tim es be found in  P lo tinus, in  the Enneads, 111,7-13, namely in  
the chapter where he deals w ith  the question of tim e  and e te rn ity . ’1,57 So 
i t  is  obvious th a t, in tre a tin g  the question o f tim e , N eoplaton ists w ere  
using the te rm  "adiastatos". The te rm  "d ias tas is " (d im ension) was used, 
too ,153 as P lo tinus regards tim e  as a “dimension o f l i f e "  (S iaaxaaig 
giuqg)159 and th a t "e te rn ity "  (auuv) is  "d im ensionless" (aS iaaxaxov). and 
“non tem pora l" (ou xdovikov).150
This by no means suggests th a t Origen’s v iew  o f tim e  has been 
influenced by th a t o f P lotinus.
F irs t o f a ll,  Origen was tw e n ty  years o lder than P lo tinus  and he 
w ro te  h is com m entaries o f the P roverbs (w here the notion  o f d im ension 
is  found) probably around 238 AD.161 Takina in to  account th a t theU
Enneads w ere composed when P lo tinus was in an old age, i t  fo llo w s  
tha t, when Oriaen made these a ff irm a tio n s , the Enneads w ere  not 
w r it te n  uet.
Beyond th a t, however, to  Neoplatonism tim e  is  the m otion  o f the 
soul and the fundamental P la ton ic  notion o f tim e  as an "im aqe" o f
e te rn ity  is  preserved the re , too.
in the lig h t o f our analyses h ith e rto , i t  should be s tressed  th a t 
Origen’s v iew  of tim e  is  in  essence fundam enta lly  d if fe re n t fro m  the 
P la ton ic  one as regards th is  c ru c ia l point: To P la to , t im e  is  a "moving 
image of e te rn ity "  and th is  ve ry  te rm  of image denotes th a t tim e  was 
estab lished in  the w o rld  by the Demiurge so th a t a c e rta in  a ffin ity  
e x is ts  between the w o rld  and the w o rld  o f ideas. T im e, as an "image", is  
exactly  th a t elem ent by which an a f f in i ty  is  estab lished between Here 
and Beyond.
By sharp co n tra s t, Origen’s v iew  is  exac tly  the con tra ry : I t  is  
exac tly  in te rm s  o f space and tim e  th a t the ra d ica l "schism ", the "gap", 
between the ra d ic a lly  transcendent God and the w o rld  is  portrayed. Tim e 
not only does not es tab lish  anu ’’a f f in i t y ’’ between d iv ine  l i f e  and the
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w o rld , but i t  is  exactly  in terms o f time th a t the ra d ic a l'"h ia tu s "  
between God arid the w o rld  is  portrayed.
There fo re  Origen is  qu ite  fa r  away fro m  P la ton ism  and 
Neoplatonism. Besides, in  P lo tinus ' v iew , tim e  was not crea ted  as a being 
out o f non-being, but i t  fo llow ed  down a " re s tle s s ly  a c tive  na tu re" w hich 
was in " th a t qu ie t l i f e ’’162 and so th is  “nature" “moved and tim e  moved 
w ith  i t " ; 150 so tim e  was e x is tin g  "before" tim e  and "was a t re s t w ith  the 
e te rn ity  in rea l being"164 and "although i t  was not ye t tim e " " i t  kept 
qu ie t too";165 in  h is  v iew , too, tim e  was made "according to  the p a tte rn  
o f e te rn ity , and as i ts  moving image".165 In sh o rt, whereas to  P lo tinu s  
tim e  is  life  (o f the sou l),167 to Origen is  but a natural element, namely 
an elem ent o f the make up p f the w orld . The d iffe re n ce  between 
P lo tinus ' and Origen's v iew s o f tim e  is  fa r  too s tr ik in g  to  need any 
fu r th e r  comment.168
Yet Origen has no h es ita tio n  in  employing the te rm  "ad ias ta tos" as 
w e ll as the notion im p lied  by i t ,  namely o f tim e  as a “dim ension o f life " .
The in te lle c tu a l d is t in c t io n  between tim e  and the "c o n s tru c tio n  of
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th is  w o rld " o r the "s tru c tu re  o f l i fe " ,  as we have pointed out, im p lie s  
the conceptual d is t in c t io n  between space and tim e, i t  is  Origen's v iew  
th a t ra tio n a l nature  is  "changeable and conve rtib le  by the ve ry  cond ition  
o f i t s  being created - fo r  what was not and began to  be is  by th is  very 
fa c t shown to  be o f a changeable na tu re";169 and he repeats th a t 
"ra tio n a l nature  is  changeable and co n ve rtib le "170 and i t  was "necessary 
fo r  God to  make a bod ily  na tu re , capable o f changing a t the C rea to r's  
w i l l ,  by an a lte ra tio n  o f q u a litie s , in to  everyth ing  th a t c ircum stances 
m igh t requ ire ".171 I t  is  through the estab lishm ent o f tim e  as a c re a tu re  
and p a rt o f the make-up o f the w o rld  th a t "change" and "a lte ra tio n "  make 
sense. What Origen ca lls  "s tru c tu re "  o f the w o rld  provides the "scenery" 
( in te lle c tu a lly  and a b s tra c tly  conceived, o f course) fo r  the drama o f the 
w o rld  to  take place ; the "s tru c tu re ” , th e re fo re , provides the "place"; i t  
is  through time th a t "action" and "movement" (and thus, change and 
a lte ra tio n ) can make sense and be rea lized. Tim e th e re fo re  is  a 
"dimension o f l i fe "  fo r  freedom  o f ra tio n a l c rea tu res  to  make sense and 
to  be rea lized ; fo r  i t  is  obvious th a t freedom  o f ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  can 
make no sense in  absence o f tim e. T im e, th e re fo re , as a S idaxrjua 
(extension) is  the S ia a ia a ig  (dim ension) alongside w hich w o rld  moves 
tow ards the end.172 This is  whu Oriqen saus "...and throuah tim e  the
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whole re tu rn s  to  i ts e lf . " 1713 He does not m ention space a t th a t p o in t; fo r  
i t  is  tim e  i t s e lf  which co n s titu te s  the "dimension" fo r  the " re tu rn " , 
namely fo r  “m otion" its e lf .  This is  the sense, namely dim ension fo r  
m otion to  be re a lized , in  w hich tim e  is  conceived as an "extension" o f 
motion.
Origen's v iew  o f "ad iasta tos" (d im ension less) applied to  d iv ine  l i f e  
ind ica tes h is  conception o f d iv ine l i f e  as to ta lly  beyond tim e , as God 
h im se lf is  beyond any notion o f change o r a lte ra tio n ; and c e r ta in ly  i t  is  
not accidenta l th a t Orioen uses the te rm  “dim ensionless" too e th e r w ith
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the te rm  “calm " when he re fe rs  to  the s ta te  o f d iv ine  re a lity .174
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What is  in  d iv ine l i f e  is  unchanaed as i t  is  p e rfe c t; th is  is  whyw  * * w
Origen, a t another po in t uses the te rm  "ad iasta tos" in  o rder to  ind ica te  
what is  c e rta in , p o s itive  and not sub jec t to  change.175 R. S o ra b ji170 
expounds the v iew s o f Gregory o f Nyssa on th is  question as a " fu l le r " 177 
account o f the d iv ine  re a lity . What he s ta tes  th e re ,17d however, are but 
Origen’s v iew s employed by Gregory.179 The ve ry  d e fin it io n  of tim e  as 
oidazqpa , i t s  re la t io n  to  the w o rld  po rtrayed  by the te rm  
aupnapSKzsivdpevov, the p o rtra ya l o f d iv ine l i f e  by the te rm  adtdazazoc 
, and, in  general, the conception o f both tim e  and d iv ine  tim elessness, 
are a ll ju s t  a re p e tit io n  o f Origen’s own ideas and expressions.180
There fo re  th a t is  not the case o f a " fu lle r "  account; i t  is  one in 
which the Cappadocians repeat the v iew  o f tim e  and d iv ine  re a li ty  as 
estab lished by th e ir  m aste r, Origen.
R. S o ra b ji181 also a sse rts  th a t Philoponus "p icks up the very 
w ords" which "P roclus and e a r lie r  P lo tinus, Basil and Gregory" used in 
th e ir  d iscussions on tim e  and d iv ine re a lity . P roclus c e r ta in ly  fo llo w s  
P lotinus. How ra d ic a lly  d if fe re n t Origen’s v iew s w ere w i l l  be discussed 
again fu r th e r  on. As fa r  as the Cappadocians are concerned, i t  is  not 
th e ir  "very w ords", as R. S o rab ji asse rts , but Origen’s ones th a t 
Philoponus a c tu a lly  "p icks up” .
Our conclusion, th e re fo re , is  th a t Origen fo rm s  h is  own v iew  o f 
tim e  according to  h is  fundamental C h ris tia n  conv ic tions; in doing so he 
has no h e s ita tio n  o f employing the te rm ino logy  o f pagan ph ilosoph ica l 
schools, being se lec tive  to  the exten t th a t the exposition  o f h is  own 
conception o f tim e  is  served.
Origen considers tim e  as a “dimension" o f the w o rld  and 
in troduces the te rm  "co-extended alongside w ith "  (auunapsKTStvoysvog) 
in  o rder to  p o rtra y  the very re la t io n  o f th is  "dim ension’’ to  w hat, by 
abs trac tion , he c a lls  "s tru c tu re  of th is  w o rld " (a llud ing  to  space only, as 
a c o n s titu tiv e  elem ent o f the w orld ), in doing so, he a c tu a lly  seems to
have an inner conception o f what only in  the tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  was 
conceived as “space-tim e". We cannot know to  what ex ten t Origen was 
conscious and had a c lea r conception o f th is  re a lity ;  yet even i f  he had 
such a conception he would have never expounded th a t in  a separate 
tre a tis e ; fo r  he s tresses  th a t h is purpose is  to  enunciate theo loo ica l* • w
view s, not v iew s on m a tte rs  o f nature  (<puaioRogeiv).182 Had he 
neverthe less o r had he not a c lea r conscious conception o f the re a li ty  o f 
“space-tim e", we may say th a t he had an in tu it io n  o f tha t.183
Conseauentlu, in  Or i Gen’s v iew  i t  would be “absurd"184 to  wonder 
w hether o r not tim e  is  a body, in  the same sense th a t he would consider 
as absurd to  wonder w hether o r not "length" o r "he ight" o r "w id th " are 
bodies in  themselves, i t  is  the fundamental presuppositions o f h is 
thought th a t prevent Origen fro m  such "absurd" questions; and i t  is  these 
presuppositions w hich a llow  Origen to  a f f i rm  e x p lic it ly  th a t tim e  is  a 
c re a tu re  o f fu l l  re a lity ,  keeping away fro m  the p e rp le x it ie s  th a t S to ic  
thought en ta ils .
Nevertheless a c la r if ic a t io n  should be made. When Origen a f f irm s  
th a t tim e  is  a "being" and a "c rea tu re " he c e rta in ly  means the tem pora l 
nature  o f the w o rld ; in  o the r w ords he means tim e  as an elem ent o f the 
make-up o f c rea tion , due to  w hich "course" and "m otion" make sense. 
However, as reaards the “ lenoth" o f tim e , th is  has been "made" onlu u n til1 w ; w  /  w
the present, no m a tte r how th is  p resent is  conceived fro m  the va rious 
po in ts  o f v ie w ;185 tim e  is  an “extension" fo r  the movement to  take place 
alongside th is  "dimension" o f l i f e ;  ye t th is  extension is  not a com pleted 
c rea tu re  u n til i t s  end. What was created was the te m p o ra lity , the 
fa c u lty  o f the w o rld  to fu nc tion  in th is  c e rta in  way; the extension 
neverthe less has been ac tu a lly  re a lized  u n til the present; " fu tu re "  is  not 
a pre-m ade extension alongside w hich the w o rld  w i l l  move; fu tu re  is  an 
expected, not a pre-m ade, re a lity . However, i t  is  the ve ry  fa c t th a t 
te m p o ra lity  was created and tim e  is  a continuum  th a t Guarantees the
tim e  as "co-extended alongside w ith "  the "s tru c tu re "  o f th is  w o rld ; what 
is  "in  fro n t" , as a fu tu re , is  to  be rea lized , but not re a lize d  uet.* . * w
The conclusion at th is  po in t is  th a t tim e , as a c re a tu re , is  the 
tem pora l nature  o f the w o rld ; i t  is  not a p re -fa b r ic a te d  "extension" 
ava ilab le  to  the w o rld  "in  fro n t"  o f it .
I t  is  qu ite  c h a ra c te r is t ic  th a t Origen re fe rs  to  the fu tu re  tim e  
(th a t is  to  the tim e  which is  to  come, but not ye t re a lize d ) using the 
te rm  napeK ie ive ta i, which means "extended alongside", but he does not 
use the p repos ition  "au v -“ (w ith )  (as he does w ith  the te rm  
auunapsKxsivuJV.185 This is  the way in  w hich he makes the d is t in c t io n  
between the tim e  which has a lreadu been rea lized  and the tim e  w hich is  
s t i l l  to  be rea lized. In the f i r s t  case (th a t is , in the case o f past and 
present), tim e  is  a c re a tu re  "made"; in the second case (th a t is , in the 
case of fu tu re ) tim e  is  a c rea tu re  "planned beforehand" (o r, "provided"). 
Thus, a t another po in t, he accord ing ly  notes th a t "God as c re a to r is  in 
a ll c re a tu res ; ... somewhere (he is  present) in p o te n tia lity  (Suvduei) and 
somewhere (he is  p resent) in a c tu a lity  (evspgsia)".187 What th e re fo re  
Origen considers as a created "dim ension" is  tem porality as a 
fundamental p ro pe rty  o f the make up o f the w orld .
Moreover he holds the psycolog ica l and phenomenological d iv is io n  
o f tim e  in to  past, present and fu tu re . Thus, in  seiEz, he re fe rs  to  
Ezek., 16,30 "and you have th ree  tim es com m itted  fo rn ic a tio n "  and 
comments as fo llow s : " fo r  the th ree  tim es (oC ip s iq  xpcvo[} com prise  the 
whole aeon".188 in expProv, he again re fe rs  to  "the fo rm e r and the 
present and the fu tu re  th ings".188 Yet i t  is  in  the comm John (a t the 
po in t where he' re fe rs  to  the actual meaning o f the tenses) th a t he 
enunciates h is v iew s about "existence" in  re la t io n  to  the p a rts  o f tim e , 
namely to  past, present and fu tu re . I t  is  the re  th a t Origen enunciates 
th a t the fu tu re  re fe rs  to  what " w i l l  e x is t"  ( to uennov undpE,ca).18u i t  is
also qu ite  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f h is  v iew s on the sub ject th a t he re fe rs  to 
the “kingdom o f God" as a "contem plation" o f the past aeons as "aeons 
made" (gevofievuv. cciujvujv) w h ile  the fu tu re  aeons are s ta ted  as "aeons 
which w i l l  be made" Qjsvrjootievtov aiwviuv).191 The meaning o f th is  
"contem plation" has a d if fe re n t cha rac te r in  re la t io n  e ith e r to  the past 
o r to  the fu tu re ; re fe rre d  to  the past (w hich is  a lready "made" th is  
contem pla tion  means a "mem ory" (p v rp q v ) o f the past aeons;192 in  the
case o f the fu tu re  aeons th is  should be understood as a kind of
foreknowledoe. Thus Oriaen conceives tim e  not onlu in te rm s  o f an
o b je c tive  re a li ty  re la te d  to the w o rld  but he holds also a psychological 
conception o f it .
In the lig h t o f our d iscussion in  th is  section, we can now come to 
a po in t which up to  now seems to  be puzzling. We can now e s ta b lish  the 
v iew  th a t i t  was' Origen who was a c tu a lly  the source o f Augustine 's 
theo ry  o f tim e. J. Callahan has w r it te n  a w o rk19j in w hich he argues 
th a t i t  was Basil o f Caesarea who dec is ive ly  in fluenced Augustine in 
fo rm ing  h is theory  o f tim e.
He is  w rong fo r  the s im ple  reason th a t what c o n s titu te s  B a s il’s 
a ff irm a tio n s  about the nature  o f tim e  are Origen's d e fin it io n s  o f tim e  
verbatim. Perhaps th ings would have been c le a re r i f  the Cappadocians 
(and we re fe r  to  Basil and Gregory o f Nyssa) w ere s tra ig h t enough as to  
s ta te  th a t th e ir  a ff irm a tio n s  could riot c la im  actual o r io in a litu  but theu
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w ere mere re p e tit io n s  o f Origen’s perceptions.
John Callahan w ro te  h is  w ork  in  1958. As la te  as 1983, R.
S o ra b ji194 re fe rs  to  Callahan’s asse rtions  and although he has some 
doubts re fe r r in g  to the alleged in fluence o f Gregory o f Nyssa upon 
Augustine he cannot h im se lf solve the m ystery. He suggests 
A r is to te lia n s  as a possible source o f in fluence upon Augustine190 but he
h im se lf saus195 th a t he is  de te rred  fro m  draw ino conclusions due to
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w rote .
in arguing th a t Basil Is  the source of Augustine’s theory  of tim e , 
Callahan, too, speaks o f a "puzzle"19/ because there  Is no evidence tha t 
B a s il’s re fu ta tio n  o f Eunomius (the w ork  in which B a s il’s v iew s o f tim e  
are found and adduced as an evidence by Callahan) was ever tra n s la ted  
in to  La tin , in  whole o r in  p a rt; and he, too, re fe rs  to  the cu rre n t 
opinions about Augustine’s knowledge o f Greek (espec ia lly  at the 
re la t iv e ly  e a rly  age when he w ro te  the Confessions)- according to  these 
opinions, Augustine would not have been able to  read B a s il’s Greek w ith  
the fa c i l i t y  th a t the adaption o f B a s il’s ideas th is  chapter o f the
*. Q r iConfessions would seem to re q u ire .’1-'0 F in a lly  he says th a t he cannot 
a ttem p t any so lu tion  to  th is  question199 and a ll he says at the end o f h is , 
w ork  is  th a t Basil in fluenced Augustine "through some con tact tha t 
cannot a t present be de term ined ’’.200
We th ink  i t  is  high tim e  th a t a d e fin ite  and subs tan tia ted  answer 
should be provided to  what fo r  too long has been regarded as a d i f f ic u l t  
question and "m ystery". Th is answer can be provided out o f our 
d iscussion h ith e rto .
There is  no need to  search fo r  "connexions" between Basil and 
Augustine (as J. Callahan does), because, in  fa c t, Augustine never rest 
Basil's w ork . For i t  was not Basil (n e ith e r h im se lf nor through any 
“connexion") but Origen who influenced Augustine’s theo ry  o f t im e 201 
How Augustine came in  contact w ith  Origen's w r it in g s  could not be a 
m ystery. A t the tim e  o f Augustine, Origen's w orks had been tra n s la te d  
in to  Latin. For i t  was during Augustine's l i fe t im e  (3 5 4 -4 3 0 ) and indeed 
during h is m a tu r ity  th a t Jerome tra n s la te d  a la rge  p a rt o f Origen's 
"H om ilies on the Song o f Songs" (380) and Rufinus tra n s la te d  the 
"Commentary on the Song o f Songs" (400), the De P rincip iis  and o the r 
w orks  of Origen. Besides, in re la t io n  to  o the r m a tte rs , Augustine 
h im se lf re fe rs  to Oriqen by name.20-
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The te x t o f Basil w hich Callahan alleges to  have Influenced 
Augustine Is In Adversus Eunomium, 1,21. Basil s ta te s  th a t tim e  is  not 
the movement o f heavenly bodies I ts e lf  (as Eunomius a lleged) but i t  is  
"the extension which is  extended alongside w ith  the c o n s titu tio n  o f the 
w o rld , in  which a il movement is  measured ... and thus we sau th a t i t  is
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qu icker o r s lo w e r"20,3 As the reader can see (through m ere ju x ta p o s itio n  
w ith  Origen's passages a lready quoted in the previous pages), in  B asil's  
s ta tem ent the re  is  not a te rm  o r expression p e rta in ing  to  the d e fin it io n  
o f tim e  w hich has not been used by Origen. Basil here does noth ing more 
than m ere ly  to reproduce Origen's conception o f tim e. That he did not 
th a t w hat he says here are but v iew s o f h is  g rea t m aste r is  a h is to r ic  
and serious om ission, indeed Basil is  accountable fo r  th is  fa i lu re  and he 
owes an apology to  the judgement o f H is to ry .
A t the same po in t o f th is  w ork , Basil a f f irm s  th a t the movement 
o f s ta rs  does not ind ica te  "w hat" tim e  is  by "how much" tim e  is  (ou xdp 
noidv, aRR' emsp dpa, noafjv udRRov fjv eineiv oiksioxbdov. aRRd x(c ouxu 
naig navxsRwg xrjv Siavoiav woxs a^voeiv oxi npspai uev kqx tupai kqx 
u ijveg Ka( sviauxoi uexpa xou xpovou e ia iv, ouxJ p.epq;)204
in a column beside th is  section  o f Adversus Eunomium (w h ich , o f 
course we have not quoted) Callahan c ite s  a passage fro m  Augustine 's 
Confessions (X ,23ff). Then he goes on to  compare the passages and to  
around the v iew  th a t i t  is  due to  the d e fin it io n  o f tim e  as an "extension"
w
(5idoxT]Lia) and "extended alongside w ith "  (ouunapsKxsivLuv) th a t 
Augustine has been able to  a r t ic u la te  the v iew  th a t tim e  is  som ething 
d is t in c t fro m  the movement o f heavenlu bodies.205 But, in v iew  o f our
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discussion in th is  chapter, Augustine did not have to  th ink  much on th is  
o r to  make any inferences. Origen had a lready potrayed th is  no tion  ve ry  
c lea rly .
in vain Callahan t r ie s  to  re la te  the te rm  "day" as found both in 
Basil's  and 'Augustine 's  compared passages, asse rting  th a t the la t te r
re fe rs  to  "day" because the fo rm e r does so205 We repeat th a t Augustine 
never read the passace o f Basil w hich Callahan adduces here. The 
connexion o f "day" to  the d e fin it io n  o f tim e  as "extension" (S tda ir iua ) and 
"extended along side w ith "  (auunapsK isivov) was made by O rigen207 i t  is  
also Origen who e x p lic it ly  s ta te s  th a t the te rm  "day" does n o t  mean "the 
course o f  the sun” ( t o y  5p6uov xov rjriiaKov)208
Furthe rm ore , Callahan asse rts  th a t i t  is  also due to  the same 
tem pora l ca tegories th a t Augustine was able to  depict tim e  as a 
"d im ension"209 No doubt th a t, a t th is  po in t, Callahan is  r ig h t. Whet he 
does not konw though is  th a t, here too, Augustine did not have to  make 
much speculation o r o rig in a l conceptual perception. For i t  was Origen 
who had perceived tim e  as a "dimension" due to  the ve ry  fundamental 
perception of tim e  as a Sidazrjpa and aupnapSKzetvov w hich he h im se lf 
had established and e laborated as a C h ris tia n  v iew  o f tim e.
So, when Augustine speaks o f tim e  as a distent io he has not 
a c tu a lly  made any d iscovery o f h is own. He ju s t  employs the v iew s 
perceived, e laborated and presented by Origen. For i t  was he who f i r s t  
saw th a t to  regard  tim e  as a "dimension" is  an im m ediate consequence o f 
the ve ry  a ff irm a tio n  o f tim e  as an "extension" w hich is  som ething 
d if fe re n t than space and yet “extended alongside w ith "  space. The 
perception, the log ica l in fe rence  and the use o f the te rm  "dim ension", a il 
had been made by Origen, not to  m ention the notion o f the re la t io n  of 
tim e  to  m otion (w hich Augustine also employed) which also Origen f i r s t  
in troduced in a r t ic u la tin g  a C h ris tia n  v iew  o f tim e. As fo r  the 
expression in tempore employed by Augustine210 we have a lready seen 
th a t, a t th is  po in t, too, Origen had preceded him.
We endorse Callahan's argum ent th a t when Augustine in troduces 
the te rm  distentio speaking o f tim e , what he has in m ind is  the 
expression aupnapsKzsivopsvov zrj auazdasi rod KoapoiP1 But we do not 
endorse h is c la im  th a t th is  p a r t ic u la r  po in t, too, co n s titu te s  an
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in fluence  of Basil's  upon Augustine. Callahan is  c e r ta in ly  r ig h t in 
asse rtina  tha t Auaustine became able to  take th is  v iew  o f tim e  due tow  w
th is  fo rm u la tion . Yet, as we said, th is  v iew  i ts e lf ,  too, had been a lready 
taken by Origen h im se lf. In any case, Augustine's expression spat fun: 
temporis2n is  but a l i t e r a l  tra n s la tio n  of Origen's expression jpoomdi- 
dtdazrjpa so o ften  used by him , as we a lready discussed in  th is  chapter.
Due to  Origen's d e fin it io n s  o f tim e  Augustine did not s t ic k  to  an 
a lto ge the r psychological conception o f tim e  but expounded h is  conception 
o f i t  in  a way in  w hich the psychological aspect o f tim e  inceasing ly  
fades o iv ina  room to a more ob ie c tive  d e fin it io n  o f it .  Th is is  whu
W  W  mJ W
Augustine v iew  o f tim e  is  less psychological a t the end o f h is 
ph ilosophiz ing about i t  in  the Confessions than i t  was in the beginning.
So when Augustine comes to  regard  the th ree  fu nc tions  o f the 
m ind,21^ no longer regarded as d istingu ished a c t iv it ie s  but ra th e r  as 
th ree  aspects o f a s ing le  distent io, he ju s t  comes in  lin e  w ith  Origen's 
v iew  o f tim e.
It  is  because Origen had considered tim e  as som ething d if fe re n t 
than P lo tinus ' tim e  as didazaatg gturjg (d im ension o f l i f e )  th a t 
Augustine's distent io is  r ig h t ly  regarded as som ething d if fe re n t than 
the P lo tin ia n  perception o f tim e. Callahan is  r ig h t in  regard ing  th is  v iew  
o f tim e  as a "rad ica l tra n s fo rm a tio n "214 For indeed th is  didazamg 
(d im ension) has nothing to  do w ith  the mental phenomena o f m em ory, 
a tte n tio n  and an tic ipa tion .
Origen, as we saw, also held a psychological pe rcep tion  o f tim e , 
namely tim e  perceived as com pris ing  past, present and fu tu re .215 I t  was 
th is  aspect th a t influenced Gregory o f Nyssa more.215 But th is  v iew  o f 
tim e  was secondary in  Origen's whole conception o f i t .  He c e r ta in ly  
speaks o f "memory" (yv fjupv) o f past tim e217 and o f "con tem p la tion" 
(9sajpia) o f fu tu re  o r past tim e218 as w e ll as o f “knowledge" (gvwaiv) o f 
th inas "past, present and fu tu re "219 but they are a lw ays re fe re nce s  to
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psychological s ta tes  accompanying m otion in  tim e  ra th e r  than de fin ing  
and ind ica ting  tim e  in i ts e lf .
Indeed th is  is  what co n s titu te s  a fundamental d iffe re n ce  between 
Origen’s conception o f tim e  and th a t o f P lotinus. To P lo tinus , tim e  is  //; 
the soul; but he th inks  o f a "soul" which is  a un iversa l p r in c ip le  th a t 
c rea tes the w o rld  and everyth ing  in i t  [s. Introduction], in such a v iew , 
tim e  is  s im p ly  the p roductive  life  o f th is  soul, in  w hich the un iverse 
and i t s  m otion have th e ir  existence. As tim e  is  reaarded as the power 
which produces m otion (and does not measure i t ) ,  eve ry th ing  is  said to  
be in  tim e. Thus tim e  is  s ta ted  as a dtdazamg Ccorjg (d im ension o f l i fe )  
only in so fa r as i t  produces motion.
To Origen, however, the d is t in c t io n  o f tim e  in  i t s e l f  fro m  space, 
estab lished by the te rm  aupncipsKzslvtUY (extended alongside w ith ) , 
renders tim e  as a dimension e x is tin g  in i t s e l f  besides space and 
th e re fo re  the te rm  dtdazamg in  th is  conception o f tim e  has a ra d ic a lly  
d if fe re n t meaning than th a t in  P lotinus.
W ith respect to  th is , and w ith o u t anu basis a t a ll,  P. PI ass makes 
the w rong asse rtion  th a t, in  Origen, tim e  is  "the unsure, f ra g ile  m otion 
o f m inds” 220 This is  one more p roo f th a t th is  scho la r has approached 
Origen's thought a lready determ ined to  read Neoplatonic thought in  it .  
But th is  p a r t ic u la r  asse rtion  is  also iro n ic a l; fo r  the conception o f tim e  
in  Origen was exactly the opposite to  what here Plass alleges. In fa c t, 
Basil used th is  conception of tim e  in  h is a ttack  to  Eunomius, who 
asserted tha t "tim e" is  in i t s e lf  “m otion"; what Plass does here is  to  
a ttr ib u te  to Origen a conception o f tim e  which is  abso lu te ly  c o n tra ry  to  
th a t which he re a lly  held.221
Regardless o f the fa c t th a t Callahan is  w rong in  th in k in g  th a t i t  
was in  Basil th a t Augustine found the sources fo r  h is  theo ry  o f tim e , he 
is  r ig h t in asse rting  th a t, w ith o u t the d e fin it io n  o f tim e  as an extension 
extended alongside w ith  the co n s titu tio n  o f the w o rld , Augustine 's
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a ff irm a tio n  of tim e  as the distentio animi would be regarded as s im p ly  
a tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f P lo tinu s ’ didammg ga//fg . But the "rad ica l 
tra n s fo rm a tio n ” o f the P lo 'tin ian conception o f Sidazamg in to  a qu ite  
d if fe re n t conceptual ca tegory was undoubtedly an achievement of Origen, 
as our analyses in th is  section  com paring Origen’s v iew  o f tim e  to  tha t 
o f e ith e r P la to 's o r P lo tinus ' have shown.
There is  a po in t though w hich Callahan would not suspect a t a ll. I t  
is  tru e  th a t Origen’s (according to  Callahan: B as il’s) perception  o f 't im e  
enabled Augustine to  re la te  tim e  to  any motion. But is  i t  accidenta l tha t 
such a perception o f tim e  leads to  th is  ra d ica l re s u lt?  The answer is  no. 
For when Origen estab lished and e laborated h is own conception o f tim e  
he held a conception of the w o rld  consisted o f many ranks o f l ife . Time 
was perceived as e x is tin g  in a ll ranks o f l i f e  and motion in them e x is ts  
too.222 Thus he devised a conception o f tim e  which can be re la te d  not 
ju s t  to  the movement o f the heavenly bodies o f the v is ib le  firm a m e n t, o r 
even only to  the movement o f what is  v is ib le . He estab lished a 
conception o f tim e  which is  re la ted  even to  movement o f w o rld s  w hich 
are "not seen" and yet they are ‘’m a te ria l". Th is is  why Origen 
estab lished a v iew  o f tim e  w hich is  re la te d  to  any motion and not ju s t  
to  the movement o f the v is ib le  heavenly bodies o r o f the movement o f 
anything v is ib le . We sha ll discuss th is  conception o f Origen in §3 in th is  
chapter.
Augustine did not go fu r th e r  than Origen on the percep tion  o f tim e  
as a dimension s im p ly  because Origen did not ( fo r  h is  own reasons, 
namely th a t an ad hoc tre a tis e  on tim e  was not in h is plans). Thus, i t  is  
because Origen leaves the question unelaborated and speaks by c o n tra s t 
ra th e r, namely o f tim elessness as "d im ensionless", th a t Augustine 
h im se lf sta tes: “Thus i t  seems to  me tha t tim e  is  nothing o the r than an 
extension ( distentio ), but what i t  is  an extension o f I do not know'. I t  
would be su rp is ino  i f  i t  w ere not an extension o f the soul (anim us)
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its e lf ." .22’* I f  Origen had exp lica ted  h is v iew  of tim e  as a d im e n s io n -^  
then Augustine would “know" w hat kind of "dimension" tim e  is. Thus he 
seems to  seek refuge ra th e r  in  P lo tinus ' conception of the na tu re  of th is  
“dimension" and subsequently i t  has been argued th a t h is  conception of
v-v—
tim e  was influenced by th a t o f P lo tin u s “
This is  one more tra g ic  iro n y , s im ila r  to  the case w ith  Gregory of 
Nazianzus and John o f Damascus discussed in  th is  chapter. For, again, 
although i t  was Origen who made the rad ica l tra n s fo rm a tio n s  in  the 
conception o f tim e  and i t  was h im  who dec is ive ly  estab lished a v iew  of 
tim e  e n tire ly  d if fe re n t fro m  any P la ton ic  o r Neoplatonic one -he is  now 
regarded outside “orthodoxy". Augustine however rem ained w ith in  c e rta in  
perceptions of P lo tinus and fu r th e r , he has been proven unable even ju s t 
to  fo llo w  Origen to  the l im its  o f h is  insp ired  es tab lishm ent o f a 
C h ris tia n  v iew  of tim e.
In fa c t Augustine was not able to  fo llo w  Origen's percep tions a ll 
the way -p robab ly  because he did not come in contact w ith  a tra n s la t io n  
o f the e n tire ty  o f Origen's works. He c e r ta in ly  had a fa lse  knowledge of 
c ru c ia l face ts  o f Origen’s theology, as h is  a ttack  against Origen by name 
show.225 Thus Augustine did not comprehend Origen’s b r i l l ia n t ly  c lea r 
notion th a t tim e  is  one and i t  is  an extension o f the entirety  o f the 
w o rld , namely th a t a ll ra tio n a l c re a tu res  liv e  in th is  tim e. Hence, he 
in troduces a notion o f “angelic tim e"227 w hich he depends on the m ental 
movements o f the anaels.228
On th is  notion Augustine is  ra th e r vague, as he cannot say e ith e r  
th a t these movements are tim e  nor th a t they are not. F in a lly  he seems to  
plump fo r  the v iew  th a t they are tim et ye t o f a kind o f i t s  own; i t  is  a 
s o r t o f q u as i-tim e  -a  notion employed in o rde r to  put the angels between 
tim e  and the d iv ine  re a lity , in any case, one can ha rd ly  help th in k in g  th a t 
the re la tio n  o f th is  "tim e" to  movements o f souls o f angels is , in 
essence, qu ite  re m in iscen t o f P lo tinu s ’ v iew s on the question As our
discussion has shown, none of th is  vagueness appears in  the v iew s of 
Origen. We th ink  th a t th is  is  due to  the fa c t th a t Augustine was not fu l ly  
aware o f the ra d ica l tra n s fo rm a tio n s  which the Neoplatonic v iew  o f 
tim e  underwent through Origen. We assume th a t th is  is  a reason fo r  
w hich (in  co n tra s t to  what happens in Origen) the "psycho log ica l" aspect 
o f tim e  p re va ils  over the “o b je c tiv is t"  one in Augustine ’s thought. 
P lo tinus ’ general idea was th a t tim e  is  somehow dependent on changes in
the soul. Auaustine has never been able to  overcome ra d ic a lly  the
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Neopl a ton ic  p r in c ip le  o f close connexion o f the essence o f tim e  to  soul 
-even though he regards the notion o f "soul" in an apparen tly  d if fe re n t 
context.
In any case, the notion o f tim e  as com pris ing  th ree  p a rts  is  
c e rta in ly  found in  the Greek thought, too and i t  is  e x p lic it ly  s ta ted  as 
such bu the S to ics; uet as the S to ics re la te  past and fu tu re  w ith  aw » •—1 -
conception o f in f in i ty ,229 i t  would be in te re s tin g  to  enquire how Origen 
conceives the re la t io n  o f tim e  to the in f in ite .
The re la tio n  o f tim e to the In fin ite . The concept o f in f in i te  plays 
a p a r t ic u la r  p a rt in Origen's thought; ye t i t  is  a po in t on w hich some 
m isunderstandings o f h is  thouaht have taken place. I t  has been c o r re c t lyw  w  • w
asserted th a t, fo r  Origen, what is  in f in ite  is  incom prehensible. What has 
not been c le a r ly  said, however, is  th a t i t  is  c re a tion  th a t Origen has in 
m ind when he re la te s  the notions o f " in f in ite "  and "incom prehensib le", in 
the Princ there  is  a passage which reads as fo llow s;
“We m ust suppose, th e re fo re , th a t in  the beginning God made a 
number o f ra tio n a l . and in te llig e n t beings, o r w ha tever the 
before-m entioned minds ought to  be ca lled , as he fo r  saw would be 
s u ffic ie n t, i t  is  c e rta in  tha t he made them according to  some d e fin ite  
number fo re -o rda ined  by h im se lf; fo r  we must not suppose, as some 
would, th a t the re  is  no end of created beings, since w here the re  is  no 
end there  can ne ithe r be any comprehension nor l im ita t io n . I f  th e re  had
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been no end, then ce rta in !u  created beinas could n e ithe r have been 
co n tro lle d  nor provided by God. For by I ts  nature  w hatever Is In f in ite  
w i l l  also be beyond comprehension."200
There Is also a passage preserved in  Greek and named by 
Koetschau as Fragment 24; but, although inco rpo ra ted  in the Pr/nc, i t  is  
not an Origen's w r it in g  but a passage fro m  Jus tin ian 's  lihO r2o1 This 
te x t reads thus: "For we m ust m a in ta in  th a t even the power o f God is  
f in ite ,  and we m ust not, under p re te x t o f p ra is ing  him , lose s igh t o f h is 
lim ita tio n s . For i f  the d iv ine power w ere in f in ite ,  o f necessity  i t  could 
not even understand i ts e lf ,  since the in f in ite  is  by i ts  nature 
incom prehensib le” 202
It is  fro m  the same te x t o f Jus tin ian200 where the fo llo w in g  
opinion is  a ttr ib u te d  to  Origen: "Let no one take o ffence a t the saying, i f  
we put l im its  even to  the power o f God. For to  encompass th ings th a t are 
in f in ite  is  by nature  an im p o s s ib ility ."234
Those te x ts  (inco rpo ra ted  in  Koetschau's e d ition  o f Princ, although 
not Origen's w r it in g s )  co n s titu te  one more m isleading in te rp re ta t io n  o f 
Origen's au thentic  views. For i f  they w ere tru e , i t  would e n ta il th a t God 
h im se lf should not be regarded as “ in f in ite "  because in  such a case he 
would be unable to  comprehend h im se lf. Thus, the notion of " in f in ite "  
could not be applied to  God in any way at a ll.
But th is  is  not the case in  Origen's thought. For he does apply the 
notion of in f in ite  to  God h im se lf. He s ta te s  th a t " f in ite  knowledge" 
applies only to  w hat has been crea ted; the "knowlege" o f Holy T r in ity  
though is  "w ith o u t any l im it "  (anspav iog )205 The a llega tion  o f Ju s tin ian  
(th a t the notion o f " in f in ite "  v ir tu a lly  cannot be applied to  God because 
in such a case God would not comprehend h im se lf) is  then a d is to r t io n  of 
Origen’s au thentic  views. For Origen h im se lf s ta tes  th a t God h im se lf is  
" in f in ite "  (xw cmsipaj)205 and elsewhere he says th a t God is  " fro m  in f in ite  
to  in f in ite "  ( s |  aneipwv en' dnsipov);2°7 he .also uses an expression w hich
incon testab ly  applies the notion of in f in ite  to  God, as he s ta te s  th a t "to  
the greatness o f God" (rj uspd iuouvn  xou 8sou) "the re  is  no l im it "  (kcu 
o u k  eaxi nspag xfjg pegafifxiouvng auxou) and h is providence (noovoia) o f 
c re a tu res  is  said as being “ fro m  the in f in ite  to the in f in ite  and even 
beyond" (ey aneipou en' ansipov kgT svTSu9sv)2iS Hence i t  is  in 
accordance w ith  h is  v iew  when Origen s ta te s  th a t God is  "om nipotent" 
(navioSuvauogj2,59 and speaks o f h is  " in e ffa b le  power" (a<pdxw ouvdu s i)240 
The very  use o f the notion  o f " in f in ite "  i t s e lf  c o n s titu te s  an 
outstanding po in t o f co n tra s t between the Greek and the C h ris tia n  
thought. Whereas the Greeks are very shy in  a ttr ib u t in g  in f in i ty  to God, 
the C h ris tia ns  (on th is  fo llo w in g  Ph ilo } speak o f God as in f in i te  w ith o u t 
any h e s ita tio n  at a ll. indeed in  the C h ris tia n  Fathers the re  is  a close 
connexion between the in f in i ty  and the inco m p re he n s ib ility  o f God 241 
Our d iscussion here shows th a t Origen h im se lf has no h e s ita tio n  
w hatever in  o rde r to  a ttr ib u te  the notion of in f in i ty  to  God in  the m ost 
e x p lic it  te rm s, in th is  way es tab lish ing  what today is  regarded as a 
m a jo r conceptual (as w e ll as l in g u is t ic )  co n tra s t o f the C h ris tia n s  w ith  
respect to the Greeks.
in Origen's thought, neverthe less, what is  in f in i te  is  re la te d  to  
w hat is  incom prehensib le; but th is  notion is  applied only d ia le c tic a llu  in/ • • w
respect o f the c rea tion  and du ra tion  o f the w o rld ; a re levan t passage in 
the Princ reads as fo llow s:
"Moreover, anyone who looks fo r  them at h is  le isu re  can fin d  in 
the d iv ine s c r ip tu re s  very many sayings o f th is  s o r t,  w hich a sse rt th a t 
the w o rld  both had a beginning and is  expecting an end. i f ,  however, 
the re  is  anyone who in th is  m a tte r would oppose e ith e r the a u th o rity  o r 
the c re d ib i l i ty  o f our s c r ip tu re , le t  us ask him  the question, w he ther he 
asse rts  th a t God can comprehend a ll th ings o r th a t he cannot? Now to  
say th a t he cannot is  c le a r ly  impious. I f ,  however, he should say, as he 
m ust, th a t God comprehends a ll th ings, i t  fo llo w s , fro m  th is  veru fa c t
th a t they can he comprehended, th a t they are understood to  have both a 
beoinnino and an end. For th a t w hich is  absolute lu  w ith o u t anu beainnino 
can in  no way be comprehended. However fa r  the understanding may 
extend, so fa r  is  the a b il i ty  to  comprehend w ithd ra w n  and removed 
endlessly, when there  is  held to  be no beginning."242
Hence the argument of the connexion between " in f in ite "  and 
"incom prehensib le" is  adduced bu Orioen in  o rder to  around h is
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fundamental v iew  discussed in chapter 1, namely th a t the w o rld  is  not 
beginningless; th a t is , in  o rde r to  ground a v iew  w hich is  exac tly  the 
opposite o f what Jus tin ian  and o the rs  have a ttr ib u te d  to  Origen. indeed 
the connexion between what is  " f in ite "  and w hat is  "com prehensib le" is  a 
S to ic  araument.w
R. S o rab jiz,u seems to be in doubt on w hether th is  is  tru e  o r not, 
as he saus th a t he does no t h im se lf fin d  such an araum ent in the S to ic  
lite ra tu re . I t  is  a good oppo rtun ity  here to  c lea r th is  doubt by saying 
tha t th is  argument is  a rtic u la te d  bu Cleomedes in arauina th a t the w o rldImJ W  W
i s  f i n i t e  ("SfjRov s k  x o u  u n o  (p u o s w g  auxov 6iou<sia9ai ... 6 e i  g a p  
K a i a K p a i s i v  xrjv (ptiaiv o u x i v o g  eaxiv. ... t u a x e  <puaiv e x w v  x r jv  o i o i K . o u a a v ,  
a u x o g  u e v  nenepaaxai a v a g K c u w g . ) 244
S orab ji adduces the c ita t io n  w hich R.T. W a llis  made in  o rde r to  
prove the S to ic  idea th a t only a f in ite  number o f s ta te s  is  knowabJe 245 
But th is  passage proves nothing o f the s o r t;  so S o rab ji is  rather- 
ju s t if ie d  in doubting as to  w hether o r not the S to ics  a c tu a lly  held such 
an idea, i t  seems th a t an old suggestion about th is  S to ic  v iew  was made 
by e a r lie r  scho la rs but the actual grounding o f th is  S to ic  v iew  was lost, 
i t  seems also th a t R.T. W a llis  was aware o f the suggestion about th is  
S to ic  v iew , but he did not know the source o f it .  A t any ra te  he adduces 
a passage which does not prove the po in t; fo r  a ll i t  says th a t the gods 
can know the in f in i te ly  re c u rr in g  events bu knowino the events o f one
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R. S o rab ji has doubts about i t .  We hope th a t the passage w hich we c ited  
a t th is  po in t w i l l  e lim in a te  th is  am b igu ity  as i t  c le a r ly  proves tha t in 
fa c t the S to ics held the idea th a t only a f in ite  number o f s ta te s  is  
knowabie.
The S to ics w ere bound to  connect the notions o f " f in ite "  and 
"com prehensib le” because on the one hand they held th a t the w o rld  is  
"adm in is te red  by a nature" and ye t th is  nature  (namely, th e ir  god) is  
immanent in  the w orld . As the re  w ere S to ic  a ff irm a tio n s  id e n tify in g  
th e ir  god w ith  the w o rld , the notion o f in f in ite  was puzzling them in  any 
case.
This was not a problem  to  Origen due to the fa c t th a t he held the 
notion o f God's rad ica l transcendence to  the w orld . Thus he could a f f i rm  
th a t God h im se lf was " in f in ite "  whereas the w o rld  was " f in ite " . Yet is  
was f in ite  not because God cannot understand what is  in fin ite , but 
because the w o rld  came in to  being fo r  a ce rta in  purpose, according to  
the d iv ine dispensation and i t  is  destined to  reach an "end", both in  the 
sense o f "goal" and "te rm in a tio n ", as we shall la te r  argue.
The argument fo r  the w o rld  to be f in ite  lie s  in  the percep tion  of 
the world its e lf (namely, on the ground th a t the w o rld  has a purpose to  
a tta in  to ) and not in  the perception  o f God w hatever. Thus, Origen's 
argum ent fo r  the w o rld  to  be f in ite  is  not based on i t s  
“co m pre hens ib ility " by God but on the fa c t th a t the w o rld  had a beginning 
and is  directed tow ards an end.
Hence R. S o rab ji is  not r ig h t in asse rting  th a t, a lthough he does 
not fin d  the argument in the S to ic  l ite ra tu re ,  th is  argum ent becomes 
e x p lic it  in  O rigen245
Oriaen as w e ll as the S to ics  a f f i rm  th a t the w o rld  is  f in ite ;  uet
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they take th is  v iew  departing  fro m  d if fe re n t prem ises and a im ing to  
d if fe re n t purposes, in the S to ic  thought, d iv ine co m p re h e n s ib ility  is  
m a in ly  m anifested as aufindSstu whereas in  Origen d iv ine
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co m prehe ns ib ility  is  m a in ly  perceived as npovota.
The S to ic  aupndSeta e x is ts  in  the w o rld  and i t  is  also 
o rig in a ted  in  the w o rld  since the re  is  no notion o f “ transcendence” in 
the S to ic  thought a t a l l  Thus the aui.ind9e.ia has to he fin ite  ju s t  
because the w o rld  is  f in ite ,  too.
By co n tra s t, Origen's v iew  is  th a t npovota a lthough m an ifested  />; 
the w o rld , is  o rig ina ted  beyond the w o rld , namely in  the d iv ine  being. So 
the re  is  no reason com pelling him  to  accept th a t the w o rld  is  f in ite  
because the npovoia is  f in ite . On the co n tra ry , because npovota is  not 
held to be fin ite , Origen nowhere postu la tes th a t d iv ine  
co m prehen s ib ility  is  f in ite . On the con tra ry . He e x p lic it ly  and in  ve ry  
s trong  te rm s  s tresses  th a t the d iv ine  npovota, namely the d iv ine  
com prehen s ib ility , is  in fin ite .
So the re  is  no log ica l connexion between the a ff irm a tio n  th a t the 
w o rld  is  f in ite  and the d iv ine  a b il i ty  to  comprehend w hatever, i f  Origen 
a f f irm s  th a t the w o rld  is  f in ite  he does so fo r  reasons com p le te ly  
d if fe re n t than the S to ics did, namely i t  is  because the course o f the 
w o rld  in tim e  is  not ju s t  a purposeless na tu ra l movement but the re  is  a 
fin a l goal to  be achieved th a t makes Origen to  s tre s s  th a t the w o rld  is  
f in ite .
T here fo re  i t  is  not the S to ic  argum ent, namely the d iv ine  a b il i ty  
to  "comprehend" the w o rld , which determ ines Origen's a f f irm a t io n  th a t 
the w o rld  is  f in ite . For the d iv ine  com prehensib iltu  in  i ts e lf  is  e x p lic it ly  
s ta ted  as " in f in ite "  and even more than that.
This is  why R. S o rab ji's  asse rtion , namely th a t Origen's a tt itu d e  
on the in f in i ty  o f the w o rld  is  based upon the argum ents o f the S to ics , is  
wrong. The S to ics postu la te  the w o rld  as fin ite  because they are 
preoccupied w ith  p reserv ing  the notion o f d iv ine  com pre h e n s ib ility . 
Origen takes fo r  granted th a t d iv ine  com p re h e n s ib ility  is  in fin ite  ye t he 
a f f irm s  th a t the w o rld  is  fin ite  because there is  an eschatoloaicai
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purpose which is  to  be fu l f i l le d  in  the course o f tim e. There fo re , and in 
the lig h t o f Origen’s s ta tem en ts  preserved in  Greek, the po in t of the 
La tin  rendering  o f the Pr/nc where the re  appears to  be a resemblance 
to  the S to ic  argument should be regarded as a s im p lis t ic  rendering  due 
to  Rufinus’ fa ilu re  to  grasp the intense eschato log ica l cha rac te r of 
Origen's though t247 A cco rd ing ly , i t  now becomes obvious how m isleading 
the Fragments which Koetschau inco rpo ra ted  in h is  ed itio n  o f the Princ 
are.
In the commMatt Origen b rings  the fo llo w in g  argum ent against the 
notion o f beginningless o f the w orld :
" I f  the w o rld  is  not consummated, but e x is ts  in f in ite ly ,  then God 
w i l l  not be such as to  'know everyth ing  before  i t  was made’,243 but he 
m igh t be supposed to  know only some o f them before  they w ere  made 
and, a fte r  them, he learned o the rs ; fo r  what is  in f in ite  is  by na ture  not 
confined in to  knowledge, as knowledge i t s e lf  by nature  imposes l im its  to 
w hat is  known."249 I t  is  in  th is  context th a t the v iew  o f Origen's, as 
expressed in  the Princ, th a t God has created everyth ing  "by number and 
measure" can be be co rrobo ra ted  fro m  h is w ork  in Greek; thus in  the 
commMatt he speaks of "the f in ite  number o f souls" ( s k  x o u  upiauevou 
tiuv ujuxwv apiSuou}2-'0
A painstaking study o f Origen's argument a t th is  po in t o f 
commMat/sh o w s  th a t he does not a c tu a lly  question God's com prehensib le 
a b il i ty ;  what he argues fo r  is  th a t the re  must be a before c rea tion . For 
unless such a before is  a llow ed prophecy makes no sense. God knows 
the w o rld  as f in ite  not ac tu a lly  because God is  unable to know w hat is  
in f in ite ,  but because God is  said to  know everuth ina  before is  was made.
*  w  w
i f  the w o rld  is  beqinniqless d iv ine foreknow ledae could make no sense,w  w
not because God canno tcomprehend what is  in f in ite ,  but s im p ly  because 
the notion of before loses any meaning whatsoever.
T here fo re  Orioen's notion th a t w hat is  in f in i te  i t  is
incom prhensib le  is  applied to  the w o rld  only. He is  qu ite  e x p lic it  is  
speaking about the “in f in ite  knowledge" o f God, as have seen. However, 
the w o rld  must be f in ite  by v ir tu e  o f the fa c t th a t i t  was known to  God 
before i t  came in to  existence. His deeper aim  is  to  argue th a t the w o rld  
is  a f in ite  c re a tu re , namely th a t i t  had a beginning and i t  w i l l  have an 
end. !n the fin a l analysis, th is  v iew  is  c lose ly  re la ted  to  h is  conception 
o f space-tim e, w hich is  perceived as aim ing tow ards  an end end not 
being the "extension" o f an endless and meaningless w o rld  movement. 
This is  why he e x p lic it ly  re je c ts  the notion o f an “ in f in ite "  (ansipckig) 
recu rrence  o f w orlds.231
Thus Origen holds th a t w hat is  not in f in ite  ( th a t is , what has a 
beginning and an end) i t  is  com prehensible, too. What fo llo w s  fro m  th is  
is  th a t what is  comprehensible it  is  not in fin ite ; ra th e r i t  has both a 
beginning and an end.
This is  exactly  Origen's conception about tim e. Regardless o f any 
o the r s ta tem ent o f Orioen about the "dura tion" o f the w o rld , i t  is  h is
w  -
opinion about the causative re la t io n  between in f in i te  and
incom prehensib le th a t renders h is  v iew  o f tim e  as a f in ite  re a lity .  I t  is  
the very view' o f Origen th a t i t  is  possib le to  acquire  a "con tem p la tion  o f 
both the past and the fu tu re  aeons"252 th a t ind ica tes h is co nv ic tion  th a t 
tim e  i t s e lf  is  com prehensible, th e re fo re  tim e  is  not in f in i te  and so has 
both a beginning and w il l  come to  an end.
Origen uses the p a rtic ip le  ^egovoxa (those made) to  ind ica te  what
is  a c rea tu re , as we have seen.253 I t  is  th e re fo re  c lea r th a t when he
speaks of ge^ovoxa (those made) he includes tim e  in them. So when he 
s ta tes  th a t "the contem pla tion  o f a ll made th ings (gegovoxuv) is  a f in ite  
one; i t  is  only the knowledge o f the holy T r in ity  th a t is  in f in ite "204 he 
a c tu a lly  means tha t contem pla tion o f tim e  is  f in ite ,  too.250
The very fa c t tha t tim e  i t s e lf  is  a c re a tu re  leads to  the
conclusion th a t tim e  is  not in f in ite ,  but i t  s tre tch e s  fro m  a beginning to
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an end; th is  is  why tim e  is  regarded as com prehensible and the notion 
of "contem plation" o f the whole tim e  is  used.
A lthough Origen's opinion on the fin ite n e ss  o f t im e  can be assumed 
fro m  the passages where he re fe rs  to the "contem plation  o f made th ings" 
(in  which tim e  is  considered to  be included) yet he does not fa i l  to  re fe r  
p a r t ic u la r ly  to  the “contem pla tion" o f a ll tim e.
in the selPs i t  is  s ta ted  th a t the te rm  "the kingdom of God" 
s ig n ifie s  "the contem pla tion o f the aeons made (ge^ovoxujv) and the aeons 
w hich w i l l  be made (^svrjoo jieviov)"206 in the same w ork  he quotes: “For 
the kingdom o f Lord is  the con tem pla tion  o f a ll the aeons, both o f those 
made and those which w i l l  be made; and i t  is  by th is  con tem pla tion  th a t 
enemies become friends."257 And fu r th e r : "con tem pla tion  o f those aeons 
made and those which w i l l  be made is  the inhe ritance  o f ra tio n a l
n a tu re ;"258
It  can th e re fo re  be assumed th a t, in Origen's v iew , tim e  is  f in ite ,  
namely i t  has a beginning and i t  w i l l  have an end. Th is is  why he can
speak o f " the order o f the entirety o f aeons" (nepf i.qc ev dnaa i x.olq
GiwaiSiaidEsiiJc)2' 9 o r "a ll the aeons" (ofioug xoug aiwvaq),250 as w e ll as 
o f “ the extension o f the whole time (xou S ia a if ju a io c  xov oP.ov 
Xpovov)"261
We would take th is  notion o f Origen fro m  the beginning as a datum 
stem m ing fro m  the fa c t th a t he regards tim e  proper as c lose ly  
connected to  the w o rld  its e lf .  The im p lied  notion (o r, fe e lin g ) o f
space-tim e th a t Origen appears to  hold as he speaks of “ tim e  extended 
alongside w ith  the s tru c tu re  o f th is  w o rld " may d ire c t ly  lead to  the 
conclusion th a t tim e  and "the s tru c tu re  o f th is  w o rld " (o r, space) "begin" 
toge the r and also come to an end together. Vet Origen does not fa i l  to  
m an ifes t h is v iew  on the question c le a r ly , namely th a t tim e  is  not 
in f in i te ly  long but i t  had a beginning and i t  w i l l  have an end; th is  is  why 
he also speaks o f “beginning and end and m iddle o f tim e s ", as in
V /1 s .7 /i7 -1 8  2b2
i t  is  qu ite  rem arkab le  th a t on the question of n o n - in f in ity  o f tim e  
Origen is  opposed to  a fundamental S to ic  doc trine , as the la t te r  held 
tim e  to  be in f in ite  in both d ire c tio n s , namely past and fu tu re . On th is  
question Origen's thought is  also opposed to  0. Cullmann's asse rtions , 
namely a 'w o rk  which c la im s to  expound the "pure” C h ris tia n  conception 
o f tim e  w ith o u t any "H e llen iza tion" o f it .
As a m a tte r o f fa c t, Cullmann holds tim e  to  be .a lso  in f in i te  in 
both d ire c tio n s , in th is  way standing not too fa r  away fro m  the S to ic  
and A r is to te lia n  conception o f i t .  For he is  c lea r in a ff irm in g  th a t tim e  
has an in f in ite  extension in  both d ire c tio n s , namely past and fu tu re .2^  
So he holds th a t tim e  is  not a c re a tu re ,264 i t  is  also in f in i te  and, 
th e re fo re , i t  is  an e te rna l companion o f God. This is  the way he th inks  
he has solved the problem  o f tim e  once and fo r  a ll,  so th a t "tim e  is  no 
problem  any m o re "265 i t  should be also stressed  th a t the tim e  o f the 
"present aeon" is  not regarded as som ething d if fe re n t th a t th is  tim e  in 
which God lives. S im ply, a t th is  period o f tim e  the re  is  not only God but 
also the w o rld  liv in g  in  the same tim e. That the essence o f th is  wau o f1—5 w
th ink ing  is  actual I u a P la ton ic  one, in  which the notion o f thew w J
"eve rla s ting  w o rld " has s im p ly  been su b s titu te d  by the notion of 
"eve rlas ting  tim e " has a lready been discussed in an e a rly  section  in th is  
chapter.
Nevertheless the notion o f in f in i te  is  involved not only in the 
conception o f what is  in f in i te ly  long, but also in the conception of 
in f in ite ly  short. I t  is  tru e  th a t the Greeks fa ile d  to  m aste r the ce n tra l 
concepts o f in f in ite s im a l ca lcu lus, namely the l im i t  and the process o f 
the convergence tow ards a l im it .266 The d ra m a tic  co n fro n ta tio n  o f Greek 
Mathem atics w ith  the problem s of co n tin u ity  and the in f in i te  seems in 
the ce lebra ted paradoxes o f Zeno o f Elea, in  the f i r s t  h a lf o f f i f t h  
cen tu ry  B.C. These paradoxes, re la te d  by A r is to t le ,267 propound, under
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the guise of argum ents, against the p o s s ib ility  o f m otion as some of the 
fundamental conceptions consider space as a continuum o f points, i t  was
only the S to ic  thought th a t made some rem arkab le  advances in  the
lo g is t ic s  o f the in f in ite  and they have an tic ipa ted  some o f the concepts 
fo rm ed in  modern M athem atics, beainnina w ith  the ca lcu lus and leadino
w  w  w
to  the fundamentals o f theo ry  o f  s e ts 268
The S to ics w ere considering the "now" as the l im i t  between past 
and fu tu re , as we have seen. Th is notion, i f  pushed a l i t t le ,  could eas ily  
lead to  the conclusion th a t th is  "now" does not e x is t a t a ll ( " i 6 5s vuv 
oRwg urjSsv e iv a i)259 What is  o f im portance to  our sub je c t here is  tha t 
the S to ics held a notion o f tim e  as in f in ite ly  d iv is ib le . This m ain ly 
stemmed fro m  th e ir  considering tim e  as a continuum 270 To S to ics , tim e  
is  riot only in f in ite  in both d ire c tio n s  (namely, tow ards past and fu tu re ) 
but they also regard  tim e  as a d m ittin g  of being in f in i te ly  d iv is ib le , 
tow ards a l im i t  which is  a "dura tion" reduced to  n il.
Origen does not hold the fo rm e r o f these S to ic  notions (namely, o f 
in f in i te  tim e ); ye t he appears to  hold the la t te r ,  th a t is  the d iv is ib i l i t y  
o f tim e  ad infinitum  .A s  a m a tte r o f fa c t, in  h is  thouaht i t  makes sense
*  w
to  speak o f an in f in ite ly  sh o rt tim e. What is  denoted by th is  is  a 
"dura tion" o f w hich both "beginning" and "end" v ir tu a lly  coincide. Origen 
applies th is  in f in ite ly  sh o rt du ra tion  m ain ly in  o rde r to  re fe r  to  acts  of 
God m anifested in to  the w orld .
In the commMatt Origen s ta tes  th a t the Logos, although acting  in 
tim e , does not a c tu a lly  need tim e  h im se lf in  o rder to  act in to  the w o rld ; 
thus " i f  one needs much tim e  in o rde r to  o ffe r  a ll h is  belongings to  the 
poor people, the Logos would not be hindered by tim e  in o rd e r to  make 
p e rfe c t the man who acts in th is  way"; th e re fo re  "the re  should be no 
h e s ita tio n  in  saying th a t th is  man becomes p e rfe c t a ll a t once 
(eu9s(i)c)!‘2/1
R e fe rring  to the Judgement, he accord ing ly  sta tes: "And no one
should th ink  th a t some kind of long tim e  (uaKpwv xiviov cuwvwv) w i l l  be 
needed fo r  everybody to  render an account about a ll h is  l i f e  here; fo r  
God, by h is w i l l ,  w i l l  a ll a t once (aSpoujg) make everybody re c o lle c t 
every th ing , good o r bad, he com m itted  during h is l i fe ;  and God, by h is 
ine ffa b le  power, w i l l  make everybody fee l what th a t was he did so tha t 
he w i l l  understand why he is  punished o r honoured. And one m igh t dare 
to  say th a t the ka iro s  o f the expected judgement does not need tim e  (6 
xrjg npooSoKiiJuevgg Kpiaswg Kcupog ou Sstxai xpsvwy); but as the 
re s u rre c tio n  is  said to  happen 'in  a moment, in the tw in k lin g  o f an 
eye'272 1 th ing  the Judgement w i l l  happen, to o "270
In the commMatt the same question is  discussed. I t  is  the re  qu ite  
c le a r ly  s ta ted  th a t no tim e  is  needed in  o rde r to  render an account o f a ll 
the years we lived  in th is  l i f e  (up wg XP°V0U noRRou Ssousva, (va 
auvapSq r p v  nsoi io jv oRujv xpdvwv xijg  svxau9a cjumc Rogog); and no one 
should be u n fa ith fu l to  the power of God to  make th ings happen w ith  such 
a ra p id ity  {m  xdxei xqg xou 8sou nspi xauxa Suvdyswg); fo r  God did not 
need tim e  to  make th is  c rea tion ; and i f  i t  is  said th a t th is  has been made 
in s ix  days one should be very ca re fu l in  understanding w hat is  the 
meaning o f the s ix  days,274 and Origen repeats th a t the Judgement w i l l  
happen in the same way as Paul says the re s u rre c tio n  w i l l  happen, 
appealing to  the same I C or.15,52270
S im ila r ly , in Fragment XXXV fro m  the "H om ilies on Jerem iah" he 
quotes Jer.28,8  saying th a t the consummation w i l l  happen a ll a t once 
(a9p6u)g)276
T here fo re , Origen holds th a t i t  is  possib le fo r  an ac tion  to  take 
place in tim e  and yet to  have no du ra tion ; fo r  he a sse rts  th a t the re  is  a 
tim e  which is  not "enduring tim e " (xpdvog SiapKijg),277 th is  means th a t 
Origen held a notion o f in f in i te ly  d iv is ib le  tim e , conceiving o f a 
"moment" as a " l im it "  between past and fu tu re ; a " l im it "  w ith o u t any 
tem pora l length, th a t is  to  say, an in f in i te ly  sho rt tim e , a tim e  w ith o u t
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dura tion  a t a ll.
Origen is  fu l ly  conscious of th is  conception. When he fu r th e r  
a ttem p ts  to  dep ic t fu r th e r  the content o f the Judgement he speaks of 
the "beginning" o f the Judgement, as he s ta tes  tha t i t  w i l l  "begin w ith  
those who owe the most debts". Vet he s ta tes  in parentheses, in the 
m iddle o f h is phrase: " ( th is  beginning) should be understood only as an 
in te lle c tu a l conception (snivoia Raypavoyevqv); fo r  we have not 
fo rg o tte n  what we said be fo re ” 278
Origen knows in  such a case makes no actual sense to  speak about 
"beainnina", as i f  i t  w ere somethina d istinau ished fro m  the re s t o f the
i j  u? '  w  w
'whole duration. For to  th is  "non -enduring -tim e" ca tego ries  lik e  
"beginning" or "end" o r even "dura tion" apply only ju s t  as in te lle c tu a l 
conceptions.
Thus the notion o f non-enduring tim e  is  applied to  the c re a tive  act 
o f God, to  the d iv ine  judgement as w e ll as to  the re su rre c tio n . There 
also o ther conceptions to  w hich th is  notion is  applied, too. In Fragment 
LXXXVlii fro m  h is commJohn Oriaen comments on John 12,27 thus:
"...about a ll these h is (sc. Jesus’) soul was sad and ernbarassed, yet 
not being dominated by embarassement, [ i t  was] but m om entary 
(aKapiaiwg); th is  is  what is  s ig n ifie d  by the w ord  "now" (vuv); fo r  as 
soon as i t  began i t  stopped (dua gap nu ap£aa9ai kq( snauaaxo) and 
p ra c tic a lly  (wg snog sins(v) i t  was a po in t o f tim e  (anusiov rjv xpovou). 
And you should see th a t he prays fo r  h is  b a ttle  against the powers 
fig h tin g  against him  to  take place not in du ra tion  o f tim e  ( ouk sv 
napaxdoei xpovou) but in a now (aRR‘ sv no vuv), w hich was enough fo r  
the soul o f Jesus to  conquer the power of the e v il."275
This is  how Origen expresses h is notion of "non-enduring" tim e. 
AH the tem pora l te rm s  used underline  the coincidence o f "beginning" and 
“end". He also rem ains cons is ten t w ith  h is conception o f tim e  as an 
"extension" and "continuum" by trq in q  to  p o rtra y  th is  non-endurinq tim e
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as a po in t o f a l in e ru~ For, in  Geometry, a “po in t" o f a lin e  is  postu la ted 
as having no length and having i t s  beginning and end co inc ided281 F ina lly ,
i t  should be noted th a t althouoh Qrioen holds the notion o f in f in ite lyW w w
sh o rt tim e , he rem ains cons is ten t w ith  h is  conception of tim e  as re a l; 
he has none o f the S to ic  re se rva tio n s  which tend to  re fuse  the re a li ty  of 
"now" as they consider i t  "crushed" to  e x tin c tio n  by both past and fu tu re . 
To Origen “now" (vuv) is  a fu l ly  rea l tim e , as a ll tim e  is. I t  is  in th is  
rea l "now'" th a t rea l tem pora l events occur; and those events are not 
only re a l, but they also are considered to  be o f tremendous im portance
w *  wJ
fo r  the e n tire  w orld .
The conclusion on the question is  th a t Origen re je c ts  the v iew  th a t 
tim e  is  in f in ite  in both i t s  d irec tion s . He d ire c t ly  re la te s  the notion of 
in f in i te  to  what is  incom prehensib le and cons tan tly  re fuses  to  apply to 
h is  w orld . However he holds a notion o f in f in ite ly  sh o rt tim e , a tim e  o f 
no dura tion  a t a ll;  in  th is  case he does not d ire c t ly  use the te rm  
" in f in ite ” ; yet he expresses h is notion o f an in f in ite  d iv is ib i l i t y  o f tim e  
leading to  th is  conceptual l im i t  by te rm s  such as “m om entary" 
(aKapicditig), "now" (vuv) o r as the opposite of what he c a lls  as "enduring 
tim e " (xpovog SiapKrjg). Thus, in  h is  conception of tim e , he re je c ts  the 
notion o f in f in ite  when i t  im p lies  a tim e  very long, a tim e  w ith o u t 
beginning or end; yet he holds the notion o f in f in ite  re fe r r in g  to  the ac 
infinitum  d iv is io n  of the continuum  o f tim e , in  the case o f a ve ry  sh o rt 
tim e , a tim e  of which beginning and end v ir tu a lly  coincide.
The notion o f r e ls t iv ity  in the perception o f tim e. Origen regards 
the w o rld  as being "in" tim e 282 o r “under" tim e.28,5 i t  is  h is conception o f 
tim e  as a c rea tu re  of God, as w e ll as the "broader" content he a ttr ib u te s  
to  the te rm  "w o rld ", th a t a llo w  him  to  consider the presence o f tim e  in 
the va rious ranks o f l i f e  in a more flex inbe  way. Thus he qoes as fa r  as
w  w
to  asse rt a notion o f r e la t iv i ty  in  the perception o f tim e  in  the va rious  
ranks o f life .
Oriaen not onlu holds the notion' o f God’s ra d ica l transcendence
w  w
w ith  respect to  tim e , he also im p lie s  a r e la t iv i ty  in  the perception  of 
tim e  i t s e l f  e ith e r by God o r fro m  the c re a tio n ’s po in t o f view. Thus, in 
h is  homJer, he enunciates th is  assertion :
"What is  l i t t l e  to man is  much to  another liv in g  being. For 
instance, what is  l i t t l e  to  a man is  big to  a child. So tim e  o f a human
life t im e , is  l i t t l e  compared to  the whole o f the present aeon which
com prises many years. So what is  l i t t l e  to  God is  much to  us and the 
whole aeon is  l i t t l e  to  God. When th e re fo re  i t  is  said; ‘Come, m y.people, 
en te r thou in to  thy chambers, and shut thy doors about thee; hide th y s e lf 
fo r  a l i t t l e  moment’284 th is  saying about a l i t t l e  moment should be 
regarded not as re fe r r in g  to  the re la t io n  to  those who are ordered to
w a lk  and en te r h is  chambers, but re fe r r in g  to  the re la t io n  to  Him who
o rde rs  th a t, to  whom is  l i t t l e  what to  the fo rm e r is  much."28'3
This is  a po in t on which O'rigen’s thought is  con tras ted  to  the 
S to ic  one. When they define tim e  as fundam enta lly being an "extension", 
they do not in troduce  any notion o f r e la t iv i ty  in the conception o f i t .  For 
to  them there  is  no notion  of transcendence. The w o rld  is  m a te r ia l and 
th e ir  god is  m a te ria l, too, and is  immanent in the w orld . So, in 
perce iv ing  tim e  as an "extension", they regard  th is  as a na tu ra l r e a li ty  
which has an ob je c tive  character. This is  why having once made the 
fundamental d e fin it io n  o f tim e  as an "extension", they go fu r th e r  and 
apply to  i t  the p ro pe rty  o f being "a measure and c r i te r io n  o f both 
fastness and s low ness"285
in co n tra s t, Origen m ain ta ins the notion o f God’s ra d ica l 
transcendence to  the w o rld ; and not only tha t, but he a lso holds a 
d if fe re n t,  namely a broader, conception o f the w orld . Hence he fo rm s  h is  
conception of tim e  according ly. He in troduces a notion o f r e la t iv i t y  as 
fa r  as the perception o f tim e  is  concerned e ith e r fro m  God o r fro m  the 
human point o f view. But he Goes as fa r  as to  apolu th is  no tion  o f
A s D
re la t iv e  experience o f tim e  re fe r r in g  to d if fe re n t ranks o f life , in the 
commMatt he states:
’’And you should see th a t we may regard  as day the whole o f the 
present aeon., which is  long w ith  respect to  us, but i t  is  sh o rt and 
cons is ting  ju s t  o f a few  years w ith  respect to  the l i f e  o f God and of 
C h ris t and o f the Holy S p ir it .  And something s im ila r  can be said about 
the blessed powers who have ascended in to  places w hich are h igher 
compared to those many e x is tin g  under the Holy T r in ity .  For the present 
aeon has the same re la tio n  to  th e ir  l i fe ,  as a day in human l i f e  in  
com parison w ith  the whole tim e  th a t a human being l iv e s "287
i t  is  out o f h is  conv ic tion  o f a r e la t iv i ty  in the percep tion  o f tim e  
th a t, in  deOr, i t  is  s ta ted  th a t ’’there  is  nothino w onderfu l in the fa c t 
tha t w ith  God the whole aeon is  reckoned as the extension o f one o f our 
days; and in my v iew , as even less.".2dS
Conclusion. The questions about tim e  in i t s e l f  w hich Origen 
discusses may seem qu ite  sim ple  in the f i r s t  place, ye t they are not 
s im ple  at a ll. For the question o f the re a li ty  o f tim e  was a h igh ly  
co n tro ve rs ia l one -and s t i l l  is. The argum ents fro m  the tim e  o f the 
E lea tic  ph ilosophers u n til the Sceptics w ere ra is in g  s trong  doubts as to 
w hether tim e  re a lly  ’’e x is ts ’’ in its e lf .  A r is to t le ’s sy llo g ism s  had 
con tribu ted  to  such a considera tion , also.288 To the S to ics , t im e  was iu s t
1 * mi
a “something" between being and non-being, as “ tim e  was one o f what 
they ca lled  inco rpo rea ls , which are despised by them as in a c tive  and not 
being and ex is tin g  only in  bare m ind"290 To Gnostics, on the o the r hand, 
tim e  has no fu l l  re a li ty 291 and th e ir  tendency is  to  negate and to  annul 
i t .  Time is  not a P la ton ic  "image" o f e te rn ity  o r even a P lo tin ia n  
“ im ita t io n "  o f i t ;  i t  is  a t best a c a ric a tu re  o f e te rn ity  end i t  is  so fa r  
removed fro m  i ts  model th a t, in the fin a l analys is, i t  is  regarded as a
■ • 292ne“
Even in our day there  are v iew s which s tro n q lu  deny the r e a li ty  o f
enjoyed much a tte n tio n  amongst those who study the problem  o f tim e. 
Althouah i t  has been aroued th a t the w ords expressing flo w  could be 
replaced by o the r tim e -w o rd s  not expressing f lo w 294 th is  v iew  has been 
re s is te d  by scho lars  such as R. Gale293 whereas o ther have conceded the 
re p a lc e a b ility  o f f lo w in g -w o rd s  in  c e rta in  re s tr ic te d  c o n te x ts295 On the 
o ther hand, the idea o f flo w in g  tim e  has been heavily  a ttacked by o ther 
scho la rs  such as D.C. W illiam s297 and D.H. H ell o r 298 Besides, in  Physics 
there  is  a recen t ve rs ion  o f the v iew  th a t tim e  m iah t e x is t, but w ith  a
•mJ *
low e r degree o f re a lity ;  th is  v iew  is  d if fe re n t fro m  w hat the S to ics  
m igh t be regarded to  hold, in  as much as i t  suggests th a t tim e  depends 
on a more fundamental and nontemporal r e a l i t y 299
In sho rt, the question o f the re a li ty  o f tim e  has rece ived a vast 
v a r ie ty  o f answers: Time is  re a l, tim e  is  unrea l, tim e  is  o f a 
q u a s i- re a lity  (a v iew  equally appealing to schools as r iv a l -even on the 
question o f t im e -  as the S to ics  and Epicureans),300 i t  is  o f lo w e r degree 
o f re a lity ;  tim e  in i t s e lf  may be rea l but a t leas t i t s  d iv is io ns  are in 
m ind; the whole o f tim e  is  present (a v iew  o f Appolodorus o f Seleucia, 
130 BC) o r the present corresponds to  the m inim um  pe rcep tib le  period 
(Poseidonius o f Apamea, 135-55 BC); tim e  comes along in  in d iv is ib le  
atom s,301 o r in  d iv is ib le  leaps;302 the re  is  a kind o f tim e  w hich does not 
f lo w  o r tim e  in  i t s e lf  flo w s  o r m oves303
These re fe rences are but an example o f the in tens ive  co n tro ve rsy  
w hich has raged fro m  a n tiq u ity  u n til to  our day. i t  is  against th is  
background304 th a t Origen's v iew s about tim e  in i t s e lf  should be seen. 
For i t  is  only thus th a t h is decis ive  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  a c e rta in  (namely, 
C h ris tia n ) v iew  o f tim e  can be re a lly  appreciated. A lthough he held a 
psychological v iew  of tim e , h is  main and fundamental conception o f i t  
was th a t tim e  is  an o b je c tive  e lem ent in  the make-up o f the w orld . He 
adm its  the A r is to te lia n  v iew  th a t human d iscourse can be but tensed-1^
but in Oriaen the re  is  nothing o f the A r is to te lia n  doubts about the
w  w
fu l l  re a li ty  of tim e  and p a r t ic u la r ly  o f the “now".
in modern thought the re  is  also much con trove rsy  as to  w hether 
universals (such as " tru th " , " ju s tic e " , etc.) are to  be regarded as 
tim e less  o r not. For example S. McCall denies the idee th a t tru th  is 
t im e le s s 305 On the co n tra ry , o the rs  such as V.V.O. Quine307 and H. 
Goodmann regard  tru th  as tim e less.303 On these questions Origen has 
also provided h is own answers long tim e  ago. His notions o f the 
"conceptions" o f the Son c le a r ly  dem onstrate h is  v iew s on questions 
which even today stand in  the cen te r o f con trove rsy  about tim e. Origen 
would have no h e s ita tio n  in  dec la ring  th a t tru th  is  not tim eless. For 
" tru th "  is  but a conception o f the Son and i t  is  among these conceptions 
w hich "became" toge the r w ith  t im e 309 Thus one can see th a t issues 
w hich are modern (and a ll the ind ica tion s  are th a t they w i l l  keen on 
being questions of con trove rsy ) have been addressed by Origen in te rm s  
o f h is theoloou. As fo r  h is  notion of re la t iv i tu  in the conceotion o f tim e ,
W  W  W  “ '
th is  is  a po in t where the "psychologica l" and the "o b je c tive ” v iew  o f tim e  
are c lose ly  co rre la ted . We have reasons to  believe th a t a fu r th e r  study 
of th is  p a r t ic u la r  top ic  could show th a t Origen’s conceotion o f tim e  is  
not only modern, but i t  has an tic ipa ted  the fu tu re  development o f the 
problem atique o f tim e  to  an exten t which should be tre a te d  in  a study o f 
i t s  own.
§2. Prolongation of time
As he does w ith  a ll p ivo ta l notions in  h is  thought, Origen grounds 
h is  notion o f p ro longation o f tim e  in  the S crip tu re . There are  tw o 
p a r t ic u la r  passages in which he deems th a t the o r ig in  as w e ll as the 
answer to  th is  question would be found.
The f i r s t  is  found in Heb.9,26: "For then he m ust o fte n  have
A id
end o f aeons he has appeared to  put away sin by the s a c r if ic e  of 
h im self.".
The second passage is  fro m  the Eph.2,7 which says: 'Tha t in the 
aeons to  come he m igh t show the exceeding riches  o f h is  grace in h is  
kindness tow ard  us through C h ris t Jesus.’' 310
What Origen wonders about is  how is  i t  possib le, on the one hand 
to  speak o f "end o f aeons" and, on the o the r, to  speak o f "aeons to  come". 
In deOr he s ta te s  th is  question thus: "...it has occurred many tim es  to 
me and ! wonder when ! compare tw o  aposto lic  expressions, namely how 
the re  is  an 'end o f aeons' in which 'once' 'in  o rder to  put away sin  Jesus 
'has appeared', i f  the re  are coming aeons..."311
This ju x ta p o s itio n  o f the tw o  s c r ip tu ra l passages is  the 
springboard o f Orioen's re fle c tio n s  on pro longation  o f tim e. A l i t t l e
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fu r th e r  in  the same w ork  tha t he s ta te s  h is own answer on the question: 
"...and in re f le c tin g  about th ings o f th is  kind, 1 th ink  th a t, i t  happens in 
the same wau as the end o f the year is  the la s t month, a f te r  w hich there  
comes the beginning o f another month; s im ila r i ly  th is  p resent aeon is  
the end of many aeons which com prise a year, as i t  w ere , a f te r  w hich 
some fu tu re  aeons w il l  come, the aeon to  come being th e ir  beginning; and* w w ; /
i t  is  in those aeons th a t God w il l  show 'the riches  o f h is  grace in h is
•u
kindness' “ 3l2
Besides, the conv ic tion  o f Origen th a t a l ife t im e  is  not s u ff ic ie n t 
a period fo r  a human being to  reach p e rfe c tio n  is  a fa c to r  fo r  h im  to 
employ the notion o f p ro longation o f tim e, in homJer he s ta te s  tha t 
anyone who passes away is  "going out" holding both "hay and reed" and 
"gold and s ilv e r  and a precious stone" in  h is  hands, th a t is , he "goes out" 
o f th is  l i f e  having com m itted  both s ins and good deeds. His Question is  
what is  going to  happen to th is  crea tu re . His answer is  th a t 
consummation, as p u rify in g  f i r e ,  destroues “hay and reed", th a t is  , what 
is  e v il; fo r  "in  the holy s c r ip tu re s  can be found th a t God is  s ta tin g  f i r s t
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what is  d im m er end then whet is  b e tte r".013 i t  is  out o f the need fo r  th is  
"then" to take place tha t the notion o f p ro longation o f tim e  is  employed. 
So i t  is  possib le to consider th a t the re  w i l l  be tim e  fo r  ra tio n a l 
c rea tu res  to  s tr iv e  fu r th e r  fo r  th e ir  re tu rn  to God314
in eniDlouino this exeoesis, Oricen feels that he has established a
w  w  w  /  u
way to  expla in the s c r ip tu ra l passages so th a t they do not seem 
co n tra d ic to ry . This exegesis a llow s  those tw o passages to  be regarded 
as cons is ten t, namely as expressing one unique conception o f tim e. 
Hence, he appeals som etim es to  one o f them and som etim es to  the 
o th e r315
This is  the s c r ip tu ra l basis o f Origen's notion o f p ro longation  o f 
tim e. His v iew  is  th a t the w o rld  had a beginning w hich co incides w ith  
the occurence o f the fa l l ,  which marked the beginning o f tim e. The 
movement of the w o rld  in tim e  th e re a fte r  takes place in periods, w hich 
are ca lled by the s c r ip tu ra l name "aeons”. Th is conception enables Origen 
to  preserve both the doc trine  o f the Church th a t the w o rld  had a 
beginning315 and h is personal v iew , namely th a t the whole o f tim e  
com prises periods o r "aeons".
i t  is  again in  S c rip tu re , namely in  Isaiah (Is. 65 ,22), th a t Origen 
seeks fo r  a u th o rity  fo r  h is v iew  th a t the re  w i l l  be a fu tu re  w orld : "For 
Isaiah teaches th a t there  w i l l  be another w o rld  a f te r  th is , when he says 
There  sha ll be a new ea rth , which i w i l l  cause to  endure in my s igh t, 
said the Lord” 31 '
A ccord ing ly , he appeals to  Solomon318 fo r  h is  v iew  th a t p rev ious 
w o rlds  have a lready existed: "And th a t the re  w ere o the r w o rld s  be fore  
th is  one Ecclesiastes shows when he says: ’What is  i t  th a t hath been? 
Even th a t which sha ll be. And what is  i t  tha t hath been c rea ted?  That 
ve ry  th ing which is  to  be created; and the re  is  nothing at a ll new under 
the sun. I f  one should speak and say ‘See, th is  is  new; i t  hath been 
a lready in the aqes which were before  us'."319
The conclusion drawn out o f th is , is  th a t “ ...clearly the end of th is  
w o rld  is  the beginning o f the w o rld  to  come."320
As the above-mentioned s c r ip tu ra l passages are deemed as 
p rov id ing  an a u th o rita t iv e  ground fo r  the notion o f prolonged space-tim e, 
the conclusion is  a r tic u la te d  according ly:
“By these tes tim o n ies  each p ro pos ition  is  proved at the seme tim e , 
namely, th a t the re  w ere ages in the past and th a t there  w i l l  be o thers  
he rea fte r. We m ust not suppose, however, th a t several w o rld s  ex is ted  at 
the same tim e , but tha t a f te r  th is  one another w i l l  e x is t in i t s  turn."321 
A t another po in t o f the same w ork  i t  is  also stated: "This w o rld , 
however, which is  i t s e lf  ca lled  an ‘age1,322 is  said to  be the end of many 
ages ... But a fte r  the present age, which is  said to  have been made fo r  
the consummation o f o ther ages, the re  w i l l  yet be fu r th e r  'ages to 
come'; fo r  we lea rn  th is  p la in ly  fro m  Paul h im se lf when he says, 'th a t in 
the ages to  come he m ight show the exceeding riche s  o f h is  grace in 
kindness tow ard  us '323 He did not say 'in  the age to  come'; nor ‘in tw o 
ages'; but 'in the ages to come', i th ink , th e re fo re , tha t the in d ica tion s  o f 
the s ta tem ent po in t to  many ages."324
Thus "the present aeon" is  ju s t  one in  the se rie s  o f aeons past and 
fu tu re ; th is  is  why Origen re fe rs  to  "this  w o rld  and aeon"323 by " th is "  
denoting th a t th is  aeon is  one o f the many in the se rie s ; and th is  is  why 
he speaks of "the fu tu re  aeon"326 as w e ll as o f "the fo rth co m ing  
aeons"327
As these view s are also found in  the w orks in Greek, we may 
adm it th a t these po in ts  in the Princ express Origen’s au then tic  thought. 
I t  should also be noticed th a t Orioen is  cons is ten t w ith  h is  fundamental 
v iew  o f tim e  as "extended alongside w ith "  the "s tru c tu re "  o f th is  w o rld ; 
fo r  the re  is  a lways a unique correspondence between w o rld  and tim e ; 
th is  means th a t in  every moment o f tim e  the re  is  only th is  s ing le3-^  
w orld . The m u ltitu de  of w o rld s  is  understood onlu in te rm s  of
succession and not o f s im ultaneous co-existence -a  case which is  
e x p lic it ly  excluded.
I t  is  in  the lig h t o f th is  analys is th a t the d is t in c t io n  between 
“ages" and "periods of tim e " should be understood; "...the Father and the 
Son and the Holy S p ir i t  m ust be understood as transcending a ll tim e  end 
a ll ages and a ll e te rn ity . ... The re s t o f th ings, however, w hich are 
exte rna l to  the T r in ity ,  m ust be measured by ages and periods of 
t im e ."329 The te rm  "age" is  used to  express the du ra tion  o f a cosm ic 
period, whereas the te rm  “periods o f tim e" is  used in d e fin ite ly  in  o rder 
to  express a period o f tim e  e ith e r longer o r sh o rte r than th a t o f an 
"aeon".
Thus the m otion o f the w o rld  in tim e  is  rea lized  through periods 
o f tim e  ca lled "aeons" o r "ages”; the whole o f tim e , th e re fo re , is  
consisted of conseauitive aeons and is  somethina "lonaer" than an ace. On 
th is  sub jec t Origen s ta te s  h is v iew  as fo llo w s :
" i f ,  however, the re  is  something g re a te r than the ages, -so  tha t 
among created beings we th ink  o f ages, but among those who exceed and 
surpass v is ib le  created beings, something s t i l l  g re a te r™  w hich w i l l  
perhaps e x is t at the 're s t itu t io n  o f a ll th ings031 when the un iverse 
reaches i t s  p e rfe c t end, then possib ly  tha t period in w hich the 
consummation o f a ll th ings w i l l  happen is  to  be understood as som ething 
more than an age. in regard to  th is  I am influenced by the a u th o rity  o f 
holy s c r ip tu re , which says, 'For an age and s t i l l  more'. Nov/ when i t  says 
's t i l l  more', undoubtedly i t  w ishes something more than an ace to  be 
understood."332
Thus Origen asse rts  th a t th is  e n tire  conception o f successive 
cosm ic periods sterns fro m  the questions ra ised  to  h im  by the 
ju x ta p o s itio n  o f s c r ip tu ra l passages. He also deems th a t the answer to 
h is questions is  also found in the S c rip tu re , namely in the E p is tles  to 
the Ephesians and Hebrews, Isaiah and Ecclesiastes. In o the r w ords, he
asse rts  th a t is  is  e n tire ly  in  the S c rip tu re  th a t both the o r ig in  and the 
so lu tion  o f these questions are to be found.
Nevertheless, he notion of successive w o rlds  and the emergence o f 
a w o rld  a f te r  the consummation o f the previous one, was one o f the main 
S to ic  doctrines. Tatian, fo r  example, s ta tes  th a t we should "leave aside" 
the a llega tions of "Zeno, who c la im s th a t the same people in  the same 
s itu a tio n s  w i l l  occur again, namely th a t Anytus and Meletus w i l l  accuse 
again, V o u ss ir is  w i l l  be again a fo re ig n -k i l le r  and Hercules w i l l  again 
com m it the deeds"333
indeed, a ll those who accused Origen fo r  h is concept o f successive 
w o rld s  have a ttem pted to  connect h is  v iew s w ith  the S to ic  c la im s. Thus 
in  the Princ, as edited by Koetschau and tra n s la te d  in English by G.W. 
But te r  w o rth , we fin d  the fo llo w in g  note: "in  Theophilus o f A lexandria 's  
Paschal le t te r ,  tra n s la ted  by Jerome in h is  Ed. 96, we also fin d  the 
fo llow ing : ’Nor does any man die over and over again, as Origen dared to 
w r ite ,  in  h is  des ire  to  es tab lish  the m ost im pious d o c trine  o f the S to ics  
by the a u th o rity  o f the d iv ine  s c r ip tu re s .’ "; and the note continues as 
fo llow s : "Rufinus has c a re fu lly  avoided g iv ing the v iew s th a t Origen 
re a lly  expressed’034 obviously im p ly ing  th a t these v iew s o f Origen m igh t 
o ffe r  ground to the above-mentioned accusations of Theophilus o f 
A lexandria.
i t  is  Origen h im se lf, however, who ne ithe r ignores nor does he t r y  
to conceal the fa c t th a t th is  notion o f successive w o rld s  seems to have 
some s im ila r i ty  to  th a t o f the Greeks;333 but he e x p lic it ly  s ta te s  h is 
opinion on the asse rtion  about the recu rrence  of id e n tica l w orlds : He 
regards th is  b e lie f as "lud icrous"335 and re fe rs  d ire c t ly  to  the v iew s of 
the S to ics on the subject. So, in Ce/s, he states:
"1 do not know why Celsus in w r it in g  against us thought i t  
p ro fita b le  to  th ro w  out an opinion which needs much p roo f, o r a t lea s t a 
p lausib le  argum ent, to  show as convincing ly as possib le th a t ’the period
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of m o rta l l i f e  is  s im ila r  fro m  beginning to  end, and i t  is  inev itab le  tha t 
according to the determ ined cycles tha same th ings a lways have 
happened, are now happening, and w il l  happen', i f  th is  is  tru e , free  w il l  
is  destroyed. For i f  ‘i t  is  ine v ita b le  th a t in the period o f m o rta l l i f e  
according to  the determ ined cycles the same th ings a lw ays have 
happened, are now happening and w il l  happen', i t  is  obviously inev itab le  
th a t Socrates w i l l  a lways be a philosopher end be accused of in troduc ing  
new d e itie s  and of co rru p tin g  the youth; Anytus and Meletus w i l l  a lways 
be accusing him , end the council o f the Areopagus w i l l  vote fo r  h is 
condemnation to  death by hemlock.337 Thus also i t  is  ine v ita b le  tha t 
according to  the predeterm ined cycles P ha la ris  w i l l  a lw ays be a ty ra n t, 
A lexander o f Pherae w i l l  com m it the same a tro c it ie s , and those 
condemned to the bu ll o f P ha la ris  w i l l  a lways groan ins ide it. i f  th is  is  
adm itted , i do not see how fre e  w i l l  can be preserved, and how any 
pra ise  o r blame can be reasonable. The re p ly  to  th is  assum ption of 
Celsus w i l l  be th a t i f  ‘the period o f m o rta l l i f e  is  s im ila r  fro m  the 
beginning to  end', and i f  ' i t  is  inev ita b le  th a t according to  the 
determ ined cycles the same th ings alw ays have happened, ere now 
happening and w i l l  happen’, then i t  is  inev itab le  th a t noses w i l l  a lw ays 
come out o f Egypt w ith  the people of the Jews; Jesus w i l l  again come to 
v is it  th is  l i f e  and w i l l  do the same th ings th a t he has done, not ju s t  once 
but an in f in ite  number o f tim e s  according to  the cycles. F u rthe rm ore , 
the same people w i l l  be C h ris tians  in the determ ined cycles, and again 
Celsus w i l l  w r ite  h is book, though he has w r it te n  i t  be fore  an in f in ite  
number o f tim es.
Celsus a f f irm s  th a t i t  is  only 'the period of m o rta l l i fe ' w hich 
'according to  the determ ined cycles' has o f necessity  a lw ays been, and is  
now, and w il l  be iden tica l. But m ost o f the S to ics say th a t th is  is  tru e  
not only of the period o f m o rta l l i fe ,  but also o f im m o rta l l i f e  and of 
those they reqard  as qods.33S For a f te r  the qeneral co n fla q ra tio n  o f the
universe, which has happened and w ill happen an in fin ite  number of 
times, the same order of ail things from beginning to end not only has 
happened but also w ill happen, in attempting to remedy the absurdities in 
some way the Stoics say in every cycle all men w ill be in some unknown 
way indistinguishable from those of form er cycles. To avoid supposing 
that Socrates w ill live again, they say it  w ill be someone 
indistinguishable from Socrates, who w ill m arry someone 
indistinguishable from Xanthippe, and w ill be accused by men 
indistinguishable from Anytus and fleletus. But i do not know how the 
world can always be the same, and one world not merely 
indistinguishable from one another, while the things in it  are not the 
same but are indistinguishable. However, the prim ary argument in reply  
to the words of Celsus and the Stoics w ill be discussed elsewhere at a 
more convenient tim e, since at the present moment it  is not relevant to 
our immediate object to give a further discussion here.”339
indeed, Origen returns to this question la te r, in order to argue 
against the Stoic doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds.
"The Stoics maintain that the universe periodically undergoes a 
conflagration and a fte r  that a restoration of order in which everything 
is indistinguishable from what happened in the previous restoration of 
the world. AH those of them who have respected the doctrine340 have 
said that there is a slight and very minute difference between one 
period and the events in the period before it. Now these men say that in 
the succeding period it  w ill be the same again: Socrates' w ill again be 
the son of Sophroniscus and be an Athenian, and Phaenarete w ill again 
m arry Sophroniscus and give b irth  to him. Therefore, although they do 
not use the word ‘resurrection' at least they have the idea when they 
sau that Socrates w ill rise aoain a fte r oricinatino from the seed ofW  W  «*/ w
Sophroniscus and w ill be formed in the womb of Paenarete, and after- 
being educated at Athens w ill become a philosopher; and something like
his previous philosophy w ill rise again and w ill s im ilarly  be 
indistinguishable from the one before. Moreover, Anytus and Meletus w ill 
rise again as Socrates' accusers, and the council of Areopagus w ill 
condemn him. And, what is. more ludicrus than this, Socrates w ill put on 
clothes which w ill be indistinguishable from those of the previous 
period, and w ill be be in poverty and in a city  called Athens which w ill 
be indistinguishable from that before. Phalaris w ill again be a tyrant, 
w ith a cruelty indistinguishable from that of the previous world, and 
w ill condemn men also indistinguishable from those before. But why need 
i enumerate the doctrine about these m atters held by the Stoic 
philosophers, even though Celsus does not laugh at it  but probably even 
respects it , since he thinks that 'Zeno was w iser than Jesus'."041
What those passages show is that Orioen is to ta lly  opposed to the
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Stoic doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds; and in the light of 
those passages we can accept those s im ilar passages in the Prime m 
expressing the authentic views of Origen. Thus the above-mentioned 
testimonies adduced of G. Butterworth042 which imply some kind of 
connexion of Origen's notion w ith the Stoic view on the subject, is 
unjustified and ungrounded; for even in the Prime Origen's views are 
stated w ith equal clarity:
"Moreover, as for those who maintain that worlds s im ila r to each 
other and in ail respects alike sometimes come into existence, 1 do not 
know what proofs they can bring in support of this theory. For i f  it  is 
said that there is to be a world s im ilar in all respects to the present 
world, then it  w ill happen that Adam and Eve w ill again do what they did 
before, there w ill be another flood, the same Moses w ill once more lead 
a people numbering six hundred thousand out of Egypt, Judas also w ill 
tw ice betray his Lord, Saul w ill a second time keep the clothes of those 
who are stoning Stephen, and we shall say that every deed which has 
been done in this life  must be done aoain. i do not think that this can be
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established by any reasoning, if  souls are actuated by freedom of choice 
and maintain the ir progress or the reverse in accordance w ith the power 
of their own free w ill. For souls are not driven on some revolving 
course which brings them into the same cycle again a fte r many ages, 
with the result that they do or desire this or that, but they direct the 
course of their deeds toward whatever end the freedom of their 
individual minds may aim at.
What these men say, however, is the same as if  one were to 
maintain that if  a bushel of corn were poured out on the ground it  could 
happen that on two occasions the grains would fa ll exactly the same 
positions, so that each single grain would lie  the second time next to 
that grain besides which it  was thrown at the f irs t , end the bushel 
would be scattered in the same order and w ith the same marks as 
form erly. Certainly this is an u tte rly  impossible thing to happen w ith  
the innumerable grains of a bushel, even if  they were to be poured out 
again and again for countless ages, it seems to me, then, impossible that 
the world could be restored again a second time w ith the same order and 
the same number of births, deaths and actions; but worlds may exist 
that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so that for 
certain clear causes the condition of one may be better, wh tie c n o t r * e $ 
for d ifferent causes may be worse, and another intermediate. What may 
be the number or measure of these worlds i confess i do not know;"040
it is interesting to note that Origen does not confine his c ritic ism  
of the opinion of recurrence of identical worlds only to the Stoics, but 
he extends his c ritic ism  to other Greeks as w ell, namely to "the 
Pythagoreans and Platonists",044 who "hold s im ilar mistaken opinions";040 
he even stated that "the learned men among Egyptians" hold s im ilar  
views.046
"Furthermore, thouoh the Puthaooreans and Platonists maintainJ W W w
that the whole is indestructible, uet theu fa ll into s im ilar absurdities.
For when in certain fixed cycles the stars adopt the same configurations 
and relationships to each other, they say that everything on earth is in 
the same position as it  was at the last time when that relationship f the 
stars in the universe was the same047 According, then, to this doctrine 
it  is inevitable that when a fte r a long period the stars come into the 
same relationship to one another which they had in the tim e of Socrates, 
Socrates w ill again be born of the same parents and suffer the same 
attcks, and w ill be accused by Anutus and Meletus, end be condemned by 
the council of the Areopagus. Moreover, are the learned men among the 
Egyptians who have s im ilar traditions respected and not laughed at by 
Celsus and his like?'."0 *"'
in the same work, namely in Cels, Origen does not only c ritic ize  
those who hold the doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds, but also 
does not fa il to articu late  his own opinion on the Question, in a passage 
which reads thus:
"As for us" we "sau that the universe is cared for by God in 
accordance w ith the conditions of the free w ill of each man, and that as 
fa r as possible it  is always being led on to be better, and we know that 
the nature of our free w ill is to admit various possibilities (fo r it 
cannot achieve the entirely unchangeable nature of God)"349
it is remarkable that H. Sasse regards that the aforementioned 
passage of Ecclesiastes necessarily implies the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence, namely "periods of the world in their in fin ite  succession"330 
Origen, however, regards this scriptural passage as implying only the 
succession of worlds, which is not in fin ite  -not only because time in 
its e lf is not in fin ite , but also because he clearly portrays the notion of 
the "end" of space-time, as we shall see in chapter 5.
The cause of consummation. This aeon w ill be consummated 
because there is "evil" in it; this is a conviction of Origen. Quoting 
M att.6,34 he states: “The blessed Paul says; ‘redeeming the tim e, because
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the days are ev il021 (and if  they are evil, then there is evil in them); 
ana Jacob Tew and evil have my days been'g^- and hoses in the Psalm 
'the. days of our years in these years'022 And everywhere in the 
scripture the days of this aeon are called as evil"224 Accordingly, 
quoting M att.6,34, he calls the present aeon allegorically as "present 
day" saying the "present day is one of being tormented and hard work end 
suffering hardship and pain"022 for his conviction is that "to the just 
this aeon is a winter",026 as he adds: "This entire aeon is a night, it  is 
darkness. Light is s till kept from you; you now see through a glass yet 
you w ill see the light in the future. Nevertheless this entire aeon is a 
night."027 Further in the same work, Origen reiterates: "This entire  aeon 
is a night. Light is kept from  you. What you now take as light, is just 
what you see i t  through a glass; 'And in thy light we shall see ligh t'023 
We shall see it  in the future. Vet this aeon is a night; and since it  is a 
night, there are many wars, many beasts going around.",059 for it  is evil 
that reigns during the present aeon; and re ferrin g  to the Satan he states  
that "the ru ler of this aeon is allegorically called as Caesar"253
Origen is quite explicit as to what is the real cause o f 
consummation: “Curse and lie  are the cause of consummation; therefore  
i f  they did not exist, neither anger nor consummation would exist, 
too."061 it is out of God's anger at the evil accumulated in the world  
that consummation takes place. Referring to Ez.5,i3  "Thus shall mine 
anger be accomplished" (kcu auvTsRsa9fjasxai o Suuog you) he comments 
thus: "This denotes that the anoer of God w ill come to an end in the same 
way that world w ill be consumed."062 Hence "We maintain that the cause 
of these events is the excessive torrent of evil which is purged by a 
flood or conflagration."060 And further; "When, therefore, He is said to 
be a consuming fire , we inquire-what is f i t  to be consumed by God; and 
we say that as f ire  God consumes evil and the actions resulting from  
i t " ° 64 So, "in this sense also 'rivers of fire ' are said to be 'before' God,
since ne makes me evil wmcn nas permeated the whole soul to
disappear."052
Thus Origen concludes: "Accordingly, we do not deny the rea lity  of 
the purifying f ire  and the destruction of the world to destroy evil and 
renew everything that ex is ts256 since we say that we have learnt these 
things from the prophets out of the sacred books.”257
Thus the arrangement of the next world stems from free morel 
action. Nevertheless this conception does not only re fe r to the
arrangement of the world, but also to the duration of a certain cosmic 
period, namely of an aeon, in his view, this period of tim e is not a
constant "natural" datum, it  is not pre-arranged by any natural law; but
it  is d irectly  related to moral action. This means that the duration of a 
cosmic period depends on the "evil" ( k o k i c O  accumulated in the world  
during a certain aeon.
in the commJohn i t  is stated that there is a "certain reason" 
behind the occurence of “cataclysm" (as in 6en.6,13 ff); and this reason 
is the purpose for the "seed of Cain" "to be extinguished", in order to 
ground this assertion Origen again appeals to the Scripture, namely to 
the Wisdom of Solomon,253 as well as to Deuteronomy, asserting that the 
destruction of Sodomah and Gomorah was "a work of the good God". 
Certain references in Psalms059 about destruction occured in Egypt are 
taken to imply the same notion270 For i t  is a conviction of Origen that 
"It is not in accord w ith God’s character not to stop the spread of evil 
and bring moral renewal."071
Hence the "destruction" of the world, 'which marks the end of an 
aeon and, thus, the duration of it , is not due to any natural determinism  
or any cosmic law. This duration is d irectly  determined by free  moral 
action of rational creatures. In the final analysis, this duration is 
determined by creaturelu freedom itse lf. This is a m ajor point which 
contrasts Oriqen’s thouqht from any paoan conception of cosmic periods
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"...does not Celsus appear ludicrous when he supposes that ‘evils 
could never either increase Os oecI edce 7  to r even i s trie natur e of tny 
universe is one and the same’, the origin of evils is not by any means 
always the same. Although the nature of some particular individual man 
is one and the same, things are not always the same where his mind, his 
reason, and actions are concerned. At one time he may not even ,have the 
capacitu for reason, while at another time his reason is v itia ted  bu evil,
w * . /
and this varies in its  extent e ither more or less; and sometimes he may 
have been converted to live virtuously and is making more or less 
progress, and at times reaches perfection and comes to v irtue  its e lf by 
more or less contemplation. So also even more may this be said of the 
universe, that, even if  it  remains one and the same genericaliy, yet the 
events which happen to the universe are not always the same nor of the
same kind. For there are not periods of productivity or of famine all the
time, nor always of heavy rain or drought. In this way neither are there 
determined periods of fe r t i l i ty  or famine in the life  of good souls; and 
the flood of bad souls increases or decreases. In fact, for those who 
want to have the most accurate knowledge of everything that they can, it  
is an unavoidable doctrine that evils do not always remain the same in 
number on account of the providence which either watches over earthly  
a ffa irs  or cleanses them by floods or conflagrations, and probably not 
only earthly things but also those of the whole world072 which is in need 
of purification whenever the evil in it  becomes extensive."300
This "whenever" clearly indicates the fundamental correlation that 
in Oriaen’s thouaht exists between free moral action and the duration of
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an aeon. Fie does not fa il to re jec t Gnostic as well as Neoplatonic views, 
according to which it  is m atter its e lf which is "evil". In his thought 
"evil" is closely related to freedom, in his view "ignorance of God is ... 
among the number of evils, while one of the greatest evils is not to
know the way to worship God and of piety towards him"0/4 end he 
clearly states that “in our view it  is not true that ’the m atter which 
dwells among m ortals’ is responsible for e v ils 0"2 Each person’s mind is 
responsible for the evil which exists in him, and this is whet evil is. 
Evils are the actions which result from it. In our view nothing else Is 
s tric tly  speaking evil."075
Hence, not only the notion of sucessive worlds and aeons, but also 
that of the "lim its" of the consecutive aeons realized by destructions of 
the world, are grounded on the Scripture. Nevertheless Oriqen does not 
ignore that this idea is found in Greeks, too. For the doctrine of cosmic 
destructions was held ever since Heracletus down to early Stoics and 
even by Stoics nearly contemporary to Origen, as Marcus Aurelius.
However, it  has been a constant concern of Origen to contrast his 
conception of successive worlds from that of the Greeks. Besides, he 
contends that this doctrine is not actually originated in the Greek 
thought. He claims that they have taken it  from the Hebrews, namely 
from Moses, yet they have "misunderstood"077 and fa ls ified  it  to such an 
extent that the whole conception is unacceptable to Origen. On this point 
he argues thus:
"The Greeks also have a doctrine that the earth is periodically  
purified by a flood or by fire , as Plato also says in one place as follows: 
’And then the gods flood the earth, purifying it  w ith waters, some in the 
mountains...’ 078 and so on.”°79 Accordingly, he re fers  to "the Theaetetus, 
where according to Plato Socrates says: 'But neither is it  possible for 
evils to be destroyed from men, nor for them to find a place among the 
gods'280 and so on."; and he further states that "the passage in the 
Tirnaeus which says 'And when the gods purify the earth'381 has shown 
that when the earth is cleansed by w ater it  has few er evils than it  had 
during the time before It was purified. And in agreement w ith  the 
opinion of Plato we maintain that at times evils ere less, on account of
Origen, therefore, knows the Greek views on the subject; yet he is 
insists that it  is the Hebrews where the idea has been taken from:
"...according to the opinion of some Greeks (probably borrowing 
from the very ancient nation of the Hebrews) the f ire  that is brought on 
the world is purifying, and it  is probable that it  is applied to each 
individual who needs judgement by f ire  together w ith healing. The f ire  
burns does not consume u tterly  those who have no m atter which needs to 
be destroyed by it , while it  burns and does u tte rly  consume those who 
have built 'wood, hay, or stubble'080 on the building (as it  is allegorically  
called) by their actions, words, and thoughts. The divine scriptures say 
that the Lord lik e  the f ire  of a sm elting-funiace and like a cleaner's 
herb'084 w ill v is it each individual who is in need, because they have been 
adulterated by the evil flood of m atter, as i t  were, which results from  
sin; and 1 say that they need fire  which, so to speak, refines those 
adulterated by 'copper', 'and tin, and lead'.005 Anyone who Is interested  
may learn these things from the prophet Ezekiel."385
it is because of Celsus' claim that the Christians "misunderstood 
what is said by the Greeks or barbarians about these m atters"037 that 
Origen insists that it  is the Greeks who have "misunderstood” and 
therefore fa ls ified  the original conception; for Celsus, "failed to give 
attention to the antiquity of Moses, who is related by certain  Greek 
w rite rs  to have lived in the time of inachus the son of Phoroneus. He is 
also admitted by Egyptians to be of great antiquity, and also by those 
who compiled Phoenician history. Anyone interested may read the two 
books of Flavius Josephus on the Antiquity of the Jews, that he may 
know how Moses was more ancient than those who said that at long 
intervals of time there are floods and conflagrations in the world.".088 
And at another point Orioen points out that "Moses is much e a rlie r  than
Homer and even than the invention of the Greek alphabet."089
it is therefore Origen's belief that it  is the Greeks who have 
"misunderstood" the idea of "destructions" of the world, which is 
originated in the scripture:
"...Moses and some of the prophets, being men of great antiquity, 
did not receive from others the idea of the world-conflagration. The 
truth Is rather, i f  we may pay regard to the m atter of the ir dates, that 
others misunderstood them and failed to reproduce accurately what they 
said, and invented the notion that identical occurences happen 
periodically, which are indistinauishable from one another in both theirw  *  v-/
essential and incidental characteristics. But we do not a ttrib u te  either 
the flood or the conflagration to any cycles and periodical conjunct ions 
of the stars."090
What all these show is the insistence of Origen on contrasting his 
notion of successive aeons from that of the Greeks and particu larly  of 
the Stoics.
However Origen does not hesitate to employ Stoic terminology on 
the subject; for the fact is that is was Marcus Aurelius who f irs t  used 
the term  "aeon” in this sense, namely it  is he who called each 
world-cycle its e lf as "aeon"391 Nevertheless Marcus used the same term  
to indicate a notion not held by Origen, namely that of in fin ite  tim e; for 
he speaks of in fin ite  time as proceeding from age to age.092 E arlier  
Stoics used simply the term  "infin ite time", it was Marcus Aurelius that 
used the term  "aeon" in order to indicate both the in fin ite  tim e of the 
universe as well as the time from  the beginning until the end of a 
certain cosmic cycieo9°
One may wonder why Origen is so insistent on contrasting his 
conception with that of the Greeks and why again and again he appeals to 
those scriptural passages which he deems as grounding this notion. The 
deeper motive of Origen here lies exactly in his aim to denote his
n i f f n r a n t  r r i n r a r i t i r s H  n f  t i r n o
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The question discussed shove is s crucial one. For the attitude to 
i t  implies two radically d ifferent conceptions of time. To the Stoics the 
opinion of identical recurrence of worlds entails some very significant 
consequences: 1. Human freedom is dismantled from its  actual content, 
to an extent that it  makes no sense at a ll.-94 2. Conflagration, as the 
"end" of a cosmic period, is a purely '‘natural" phenomenon. 3. The period 
of tim e in which a "period" is stretched is constant; among ea rlie r  
Greeks, Heracletus use to call this period as the "Great Year" (usgdnoe 
eviauiog). 4. The world its e lf, in its  motion in tim e, moves towards 
nowhere. This is what has made some to speak of "cyclic” tim e in Greek 
thought.
Origen is radically opposed to all those fundamental implications. 
The length of a cosmic period has not a definite length of time; 
consummation of a world has purely moral causes; and the world is 
directed towards an end. it is important to focus our attention on a 
phrase of P rinc : "For souls are not driven on some revolving course 
which brings them into the same'cycle again a fte r many ages, w ith the 
result that they do or desire this or that, but theu direct the course of
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the ir deeds toward whatever end the freedom of the ir individual minds 
rnau aim at.".4*95 This view clearlu denotes a conception of tim e
w 1 w
according to which the course of events is not a meaningless repetition  
but a meaningful striving and course towards a goal and an end.
it is then a fundamental conviction of Origen that what is "next" is 
directly  related to the freedom of rational beings; for they are not 
imprisoned in a depressive cosmic recurrence but it  is the ir freedom  
which actually determines the course of the world. This is why, in the 
deOr, he declares that he does not know how the next world w ill be 
arranged; (iw  ysflflovii usxd xauxa quk ot6’ onwg oiKOVounaousvou) 395
When, in Cels, Oriaen araues extensively aaainst the Stoic doctrine
of identical recurrence of worlds, his main argument is that such a 
conception actually abolishes freedom, if the Stoic doctrine is accepted 
”1 do not know how our freedom of w ill w ill be saved and how either 
praises or blames w ill be ju stified "397 For freedom is the fundamental 
constitutive element of moral action; and it  is an axiom that “if  you 
deprive virtue from willinoness, uou have also deprived virtue from its  
essence"393 in the comm John, too, the view that the future arrangement 
of the world is contingent is re iterated; "...and i do not know if  s im ilar 
things or even worse may happen in long recurring periods of tirne."o9y
Thus, Origen has not a simply natural conception of time. He also 
has a moral conception of it ,  as time acquires a deeper meaning being 
related to moral action and freedom, it is not a natural law but free  
moral action that w ill determine the length of an aeon.400 in the light of 
this view, time has a d ifferent meanina than that in the Greeks. For 
what they had endeavoured was to capture a scientific  ideal; to know the 
cosmic process as a whole, to render nature wholly transparent to 
understanding. Ail particulars were to be understood in term s of natural 
universal law. This "natural" conception of the meaning of being Into the 
world had a fundamental implication, in such an existential attitude man 
stands im partial in the natural process and what remains to him is "to 
know" that the cosmic process is not any kind of evolution towards any 
final goal, but just an endless repetition.
This is the fundamental notion that Origen rejects. To him there is 
a vision of a final end401 because there is a promise of that, in order to 
attain this end though there is a task to be accomplished; and this task 
w ill be carried out and the goal w ill be reached only through tim e and in 
tim e, as we shall argue la ter in this work.
What characterizes Origen's conception of tim e is that he neither 
denies responsibility nor does he accept any notion of u ltim ate  
tr iv ia lity . It is thus that Orioen establishes a break between
essential s im ila rity  to the Stoic one, however there is a difference  
which is fa r more profound: The Stoics regarded prolongation of time as 
an established natural law from which they simply cannot escape. Marcus 
Aurelius had already claimed that there is nothing to be gained by 
prolonging life 402 end Seneca argued that perfection does not require  
prolongation, as life  can be made perfect in a fin ite  tim e, even if  it  is 
short.403 To Origen, however, prolongation404 is needed because 
perfection has an actual spatio-temporal [s. chapter 4] content and 
prolonged life  does not mean repeated life , but it  means a process 
towards a g o a l. In fact, therefore, what constitutes the essential 
difference in the notion prolongation between the Stoics (and other 
Greeks, too, such as A ris to tle403 and Epicurus)405 and Origen is a 
radically d ifferent conception of time. We shall take the opportunity to 
elaborate on particu lar facets of this crucial point in due course in this 
work.
it is in the light of this view that Origen's conception of 
''consummation" (auvxeRsia) should be viewed. He speaks of "the 
destruction of the world, which our w ritings call as consummation" 
during which "changes in bodies occur according to ways that have been 
appointed" and “world is constituted of these bodies"407 The scriptural 
passages to which he alludes are not only the Matt. 13,39 end Heb. 9,26  
which H. Chadwick cites,403 but also the Matt. 13,40, Matt. 13,49, 
Matt.24,3 and Matt.28,20: On this, H. Chadwick points out that pagan 
w rite rs  do not use the term auvxeRsia in this sense.409 This is true; and 
i t  is exactly on this very fact that one should also see Origen's 
insistence on contrasting his own views w ith the pagan ones. The deeper 
difference of Origen's conception of consummation lies on his conception 
of "cosmos", namely in his perception of the world as mainly comprising
rational beings whereas the "natural" environment of these particular 
"worlds" is treated as a m atter of secondary importance. What is of 
significance is not any notion of "consummation" as destruction of the 
natural world itse lf. It is the "consummation" of rational creatures  
which is the subject of the main ( if  not exclusive) In terest in Origen’s 
thought. The very term  auvisRsia (consummation) is derived from the 
term  isnog (end) and i t  p rim arily  is perceived as the end of the 
existential status in a certain rank of life  and judgment of action during 
the time of being there. Thus, either conflagration or cataclysm are 
regarded mainly as the cause o f end o f a certain arrangement o f rational 
life  in various kinds o f bodies whereas the question of the existence of 
the world as a natural rea lity  is of not treated in much detail. This is 
the sense in which Origen’s conception of auvm lcia  should be regarded 
as d ifferent from the pagan one. A fte r a il, Origen was above all a 
theoiooian, and, aithouah he had a veru oood command of the Phusics of
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However, in arguing against Celsus he articulates, to a certain extent, 
his view of "consummation” in a natural sense:
"Next, because Celsus suspects or perhaps even himself 
understands the answer that could be made by those who reply to the 
question about those destroyed by the flood, he saus: If he does not 
destroy his own offsprings, 'where is he to banish them out of the world  
which he himself made?' We reply to this the He does not take those who 
suffered in the flood out of the world which consists of heaven and 
earth. He delivers them rather from the life  in the flesh and, at the 
same time as He takes them away from  these bodies he also takes them 
away from their being on earth, which in many place in the scriptures is 
usually called the world."410 Thus "those who suffer in the flood are not 
taken out of the world in an absolute sense", as the world is consisting 
of particular "worlds", which aithouah not seen are nevertheless
included into the world"411
What is perfectly clear in Origen's though is that "consummation" 
is an occurence affecting the entirety  of the world and not only the 
earth; this is why he a ffirm s that "we do not deny the re a lity  of 
purifying fire  and the destructuin og the world to destroy evil and 
renew the whole (xou navxoq) [w orld]412 Besides, it  is explic itly  stated 
that "floods and conflagrations" take place in order to purify “not only 
earthly things but the whole world" (ou xd sn( gng uovov aRRd kcu xd sv 
oBui xuj Koouiij) whenever evil in it  becomes extensive"413 Although in 
Origen's thought this a ffirm ation mainly pertains to rational creatures, 
it  nevertheless is very near to the Stoic one, at least in le tte r. This is 
why H. von Arnim has included an extensive part of this section of Celt 
in his edition of Stolcerum Veterum Fragments reckoning that at this 
point Origen is quoting Chryssipus views.414
it is obvious, therefore, that "consummation" is of in terest in as 
much as it  has to do w ith the destiny of rational creatures and not of 
the natural status of the world, as it  was with the pagan thinkers. 
Origen is certain ly fam ilia r w ith this kind of knowledge and deals w ith  
i t  only in case he is challenged to do so. This is what he does in the 
same work speaking his perception of consummation: He expounds his 
views of the "destruction of the world", of the "nature of bodies" and on 
the nature of "matter" on a natural basis, indeed he devotes a whole 
section415 to this discussion. But the end of this section is Quite 
indicative of the overall direction and aims of his thought. He feels that 
such a kind of discussion is entirely out of the purposes of his theology 
and outside the purpose of this particu lar work; so he ra th er briskly  
puts an end to this section by this statement:
"But we are not going to now discuss the nature of the world when 
we reply to the attacks of Celsus" (aRR’ ou xauxa vuv npoKsixai 
anavxioaiv r p v  node xdg xou KsRaou xaxn^opiag (puaioRoxsw)415
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indeed, this statement constitutes an expressive element of 
Origen's own existential presuppositions in articulating his thought and 
particu larly  his conception of time. This is why he deals w ith the 
question of consummation in a way d ifferent from that of the pagan 
philosophers. His aim is to stress the theological, not the natural, 
implications of this conception. And it  in the light of this aim of 
Origen’s that his notion of consummation (like his entire  conception.of 
tim e) should be understood.
The end of seen end judgement, it is from this d ifferent 
conception of time that Origen holds a d ifferent conception of the end of 
each cosmic cycle. This end is not just a moment in the continuous 
cosmic process but is is a moment of a special significance. For this end 
marks not only the consummation of the aeon but also the time when God 
iudoes rational beinos for their action durino the consummated aeon.
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This is also a point which contrasts Origen’s whole conception of 
cosmic periods to that of the Stoics, in his insistence in underlining this  
difference, he stresses this point and re fers  to God as follows:
"While remaining unchanged in essence, He comes down in his 
providence and care for human affa irs . We show that the divine 
scriptures also say that God is not subject to change in the words But 
thou a rt the same417 and !i change n o t418 But the gods of Epicurus, who 
are compounded of atoms and, in so fa r as they are compounded, are 
liable to disssolution, are at pains to throw off the atoms which may 
cause their distruction. Furthermore, the God of the Stoics in that He is 
corporeal, at one time when the conflagration occurs consists entire ly  
of mind, while at another tim e, when the new w orld-order comes, he 
becomes a part of it. Not even they have been able to perceive c learly  
the true conception of God’s nature, as being entire ly  Incorruptible, 
simple, uncompounded, and indivisible."419
Furthermore he states: "The oversioht and providence of God does
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permeate all things, but not like the sp irit of the Stoics. Providence 
does contain them as a containing substance, since it  is corporeal 
m atter which is contained, but as a divine power which has 
comprehended the things which are contained. According to the opinion of 
the Stoics, who maintain that the f irs t  principles are corporeal, and who 
on this account hold that everything is destructible and venture even to 
make the supreme God Himself destructible420 (unless this seemed to 
them to be u tte rly  outrageous), even the Logos of God that comes down 
to men and to the most insignificant things is nothing other than a 
m aterial sp irit. But in the view of us Christians, who try  to show that 
the rational soul is superior to any m aterial nature and is an invisible  
and incorporeal essence 421 the divine Logos is not m aterial. Through him 
ail things were made, and in order that all things may be made by the 
Logos, he extends not to men only but even to the things supposed to be 
insignificant which are controlled by nature. The Stoics may destroy 
everything in a conflagration if  they like. But we do not recognize that 
an incorporeal essence422 is subject to a conflagration, or that the soul 
of man or the hypostasis423 of angels, or thrones, or dominions, or 
principalities, or powers is dissolved into fire .'1.424
It is because of this conception that Origen regards the end of an 
aeon not just as a consummation but as a moment of tim e in which 
judgement takes place. This is why he says that “the f ire  that is brought 
on the world is purifying" and that "it is applied to each individual who 
needs iudaement bu fire  toaether w ith healino"423 Consummation in not
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just a natural occurence, but is closely connected to Judgement. This 
meaning of the end of an aeon is clearly  portrayed in Cels.
"But i f  there w ill be a certain fixed tim e when the world w ill be 
brought to the end which it  must necessarily have since it  had a 
beginning, then there w ill be a certain appointed end of the world and 
a fte r that a righteous iudaement of everyone426
in comm/lait Origen extensively re fers  to t he S i id of the aeon as 
the "end of things” "which is also called consummation of the aeon" and 
i t  is then that “the angels of God, who have been ordered to do so, w ill 
collect the malicious doctrines grown in the soul" and w ill discard them 
into the purifying f ire  and it  is then that judgement w ill take place42' it 
is then that “God who is above everything w ill be the just judge of 
everyone for everything made during his life " 428
The notion of the end of an aeon as judgement is based upon two 
fundamental conceptions:
F irst, God is incorporeal and rational creatures have in 
themselves an incorporeal element [see chapter 1] which is susceptible of 
change but not of destruction during a consummation. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the incorporeal element of a rational creature is in no way 
held to live as an independent "being". The dualism "corporeal- 
incorporeal" element of a rational creature is only conceptual, not 
actual; it  exists only in mind as an intellectual abstraction. This is why 
Origen comments on Matt. 10,28 ("fear him which is able to destroy both 
soul and body in hell") stating that what this passage teaches is that 
although "soul is incorporeal" it  w ill be not punished without a body"42  ^
Secondly, there is a uniform ity of nature of rational creatures. 
This notion stands beside that of continuity of time and a discontinuity 
of space as the whole world is held to comprise particu lar spaces 
to ta lly  separated from each other.
It is pointed out that "all rational beings are of one nature, and it 
is only on this ground that the justice of God in all his dealings w ith  
them can be defended, namely, when each contains w ithin himself the 
reasons why he has been placed in this or that rank of life".430 The same 
notion is found in passages preserved in Greek: "Thus the marvellous 
works done by God are as it  were the rain, while the d iffering  w ills  are
This notion, namely the uniform ity of nature of rational creatures, 
if  fundamental in Origen. For his perception of judgement as well as of 
the outcome of judgement, as rearrangement of bodies, are grounded on 
this notion. This is why he argues against those who consider higher and 
lower rational creatures as being of d ifferent nature:
'To those, however, who bring in diverse natures (Toig 5e xdc 
(puosic s ia a g o u a i)  ... we must answer as follows: if they reta in  the 
doctrine that the lost and the saved come 'from one lump'432 end that the 
Creator of the saved is also the Creator of the lost, and if  he who makes 
not only the spiritual but also the earthly is good (fo r this follows from  
their reasonings), it  is none the less possible for one w h o  has become at 
the present time a vessel of honour in consequence of certain form er 
righteous deeds and yet has not acted s im ilarly  here nor in a way 
befitting a vessel of honour, to become in another aeon a vessel of 
dishonour; just as on the other hand it  is possible for one who by reason 
of acts older that this life  has become here a vessel of dishonour to 
become, if  he amends his ways in the 'new creation’ 433 a 'vessel of 
honour sanctified and meet for the m aster’s use, prepared unto every 
good work’.’’430
it is the conception of the uniform ity of nature of rational beings 
that allows Origen to say that God is "God of the daemons as fa r as 
creation is concerned"433 meaning that God is not responsible for the ir  
being daemons, it  is their free w ill which is responsible for that;436 God 
is God of the daemons only in as much as they are regarded as creatures. 
In his comm John Origen re jects  any allegation that the "essence of the 
devil is d ifferent from the essence of the other rational beings"437 
arouino that "it is impossible to admit that the essence of the devil is 
different and that the devil is not susceptible of moral improvement"436 
At that point Qrioen develops his argument on the Question, statino that
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we cannot say that an eye which cannot see well is of d ifferent essence 
from an eye which can see well; and if  something happens to an ear and 
i t  cannot hear w ell, this is something accidental and does not introduce 
any diffenrece in its  essence of being an ear. Thus devil is responsible 
for his being evil and God "is in no way responsible for the evil". 
Therefore "it is the most absurd of all absurdities to blame him who 
substantified and created this being"439
it is then in accordance w ith his overall views that Origen deems 
that devil "became" devil and there was "when he was b!erne!ess 
(dui’juog)440 So he concludes that "one is son of devil not because of his 
make-up, nor is someone amongst men called son of God because has been 
created as such; and it  is clear that it  is possible that one who once 'was 
a son of devil may become a son of God."441 Indeed he makes extensive 
analyses in order to ground his views against those who hold that "there 
are some creatures who are son of devil due to the ir creation its e lf" 442 
Thus the notion of God's radical transcendence as well as his 
incorporeality allow Origen to articu late  his perception of God as a 
judge during the consummation. This is one of the reasons (though not 
the main one) that Origen stresses throughout his whole theology that 
God is both incorporeal (and thus, transcendent in respect to space) and 
timeless ( and thus, transcendent in respect to time).
The outcome of the judgement. Origen's conception of the outcome 
of judgement is based on his conviction that the entire world is m ateria l 
and to his conviction that "matter" (in the sense that he perceives 
"matter", namely as either "seen" or "not seen") is susceptible of any 
alteration by the w ill of God. So he holds that "it is possible for the 
m atter underlying ail qualities to possess varying qualities" (Suvaxov 
ausSstv notoxnxag xrjv unoKsiusvriv ndaaic notoxncnv urmv)443 and it  is 
"by nature subject to change, a lteration, and transform ation444 into 
anything the Creator desires and is capable of possessing enu Quality
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Hence Origen a ffirm s that "changes occur in the qualities of 
bodies" as "by God's w ill a quality of one kind is imposed upon this 
particu lar m atter, but afterw ards it  w ill have a Quality of another kind, 
one, le t us say, which is better and superior."445
in view of these passages preserved in Greek, we can corroborate 
some points in the Phnc as expressing the authentic views of Origen. 
Thus he states that “bodily nature admits of diverse and various 
changes, to such an extent that it  can undergo every kind of 
transformation";447 and that the nature of rational creatures is 
"changeable and convertible by the very condition of its  being created" 
and that "bodily nature" is "capable of changing at the Creator's w ill, by 
an alteration of qualities, into everything that circumstances might 
require.”448
This is the fundamental notion on which Origen grounds his 
conception of the outcome of a judgement, in his work selPs, he 
comments on Psalm 1,5 ("Therefore the impious shell not be resurrected  
in judgement") as follows:
"Judoement of the iust creatures is the transition from  the bodu
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of this life  to the angelic realms; end (judgement of) the impious beings 
is the transition from the body of this life  to dark and dim bodies. For 
the impious w ill be resurrected not in the forthcoming judgement, but in 
the second one.'449 This transition takes place because it  is possible for 
God to "alter" the "Quality" of m atter, since he "is the creator of i t " 43'3 
in Cels it  is stated that during "the destruction of the world,, 
which our w ritings call as consummation ... changes in bodies occur 
according to ways that have been appointed" and "the world is 
constituted of these bodies"451 in the light of this notion Origen 
affirm s that "we also know that there are 'both heavenly bodies and 
earthly bodies' “ and "as we believe in the resurrection of the dead, we
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a ffirm  that changes occur In the Qualities of bodies, since some of them 
which have been ’sown in corruption are raised in incorruption, and some 
sown in dishonour are raised in glory’, and some sown in weakness are 
raisea m power, and oooies sown natural are raises spiritual
Hence the outcome of judgement during the consummation of a 
world is a "transposition", a change of body, namely a transition of a 
rational being to another rank of life . Thus it  is possible for human 
beings to become angels;453 for those who are "resurrected” may become 
a “regime of angels"434 and in such a case their body w ill completely 
change and w ill become a body worthy of an angel, namely a body 
"aetheral and b rillian t like the nature of the light";433 for those angels 
who now are in the heaven were previously men who strived well having 
human bodies; and so did others before them 435 Thus he re fe rs  to those 
who, according to the ir m erits  (koto xrjv dgtav) enjoy (anoRauBdvovigc) 
"in the resurrection" (sv  in  a v a a x d a e t)  the ir now being in the most pure 
and translucent "spaces" (xwp(oic);43/ and he a ffirm s that it  is better to 
live a life  in "aetheral body" (sv ai9epuu aujuan) than to live a life  "in 
flesh and blood"438
Accordingly it  is stated that it  is possible for human beings to 
become superior to angels, i f  these la tte r  f a l l439 It is also possible that 
a fte r judgement human beings do not change rank of life , but remain  
"men saved in Christ"459 Finally, it  is possible that men w ill be 
"expelled" and "condemned to go to a place which is without any light at 
a ll" 451 At any rate those who are now human beings have been iudged in 
a previous judgement and have been found neither to have fallen too much 
nor to have commited such deeds as to become angels452
Thus Origen holds that any kind of transform ation and 
transposition is possible as an outcome of a judgement and he 
accordingly sets forth this idea of his in a more general way:
"It is, therefore, possible that one who is a seed of Abraham to
become also a ch ild  of his, by diligence; and it  is possible for one who is 
a child of Abraham to lose being his seed, because of negligence end 
unculiivation"433
In view of this he points out that "it is possible” that "the soul ... 
may either descend from the highest good to the lowest evil or to be 
restored from the lowest evil to the highest good"454 and "in the day of 
judgement" "the good w ill be separated from the evil and the righteous 
from the unrighteous and every individual soul w ill by the judgement of 
God be allotted to that place of which his m erits have rendered him 
w orthy"463 Subsequently to this, he holds that "during the consummation, 
those wicked on the earth w ill be shaked, while the saints, being 
mountains465 w ill be metathesized the metathesis of Enoch." (Ev xh 
ouvxsRsta of uev auapxojRof ovxsg xapaxSqoovxcu, of 5s dgioi, 6pm 
usxaxsSnaovxca xpv usxdSsaiv E v iM 467 So God is regarded as "creator
and wise and provident and judge", being "judge" as i t  seems of "the 
various bodies of rational creatures, and the various worlds" (5id xd 
6ia<popa atouaxa xcfiv RogiKtov kcu xoug noudfioug Kocmoug.453
In order to ground the notion of "various bodies" Origen appeals to 
Paul459 who a ffirm s that "God gives (5(5u30iv) to each a body as he 
pleased (KaSifig nSeRnasv)"470 stating that "as w ith seeds that are sown, 
so also w ith those who are sown, so to speak, in death, and who at the 
appropriate time out of the bodies that are sown take up 
( avaRapRavovnov) the body which is appointed by God for each one in 
accordance with his m erits."471
it is auite indicative of Qrioen's conception of successive aeons 
that he here uses this participle in the Present Tense, in order to imply 
that this "taking up" of a body is an occurence not happening only once 
but regularly at the end of each aeon. Paul’s expression didm iv  (gives) 
is also quite appropriate to Origen in articulating his own conception; 
for this is a form in Present Tense, which indicates an action regularly
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taking place. In contrast, the expression «a9(ugqSsngaev (as he pleased) 
is in the Past Tense, which indicates an action which once took place in
the oast; that is, God established this "eternal law"472 once because he
w illed  so and there is not anu timeless causalitu comoe 11 ino him to do
w  w  w
so, as we argue in §3 in this chapter.
Therefore, the result of the judgement is a rearrangement of 
rational beings in the particular ranks of life  which constitute the 
whole world. This w ill be the rank of life  in which a rational creature  
w ill live in the aeon to come; and at the end of the next aeon another 
consummation w ill take Diace and also another iudaement end another 
rearrangement of rational beings in the various ranks of life  w ill follow  
according to their merits.
in the light of this conception of Origen, it  is a serious mistake of 
R. Sorabji to allege that Origen entertained the hypothesis that only 
those who need correction w ill be reborn in successive worlds.4 '0 The 
main mistake made by many scholars is that they ignore that a 
fundamental element of Origen's thought is this: it is not the relation  
God-man that is studied, but the relation God-rational creatures, namely 
the relation of God to a world comprising many ranks of life 474 and 
different spaces, separated from each other in term s of in term s of 
quality and not of geometrical distance.
Thus the assertion that certain creatures "w ill not be reborn" 
does not make any sense at all. in fact, R. Sorabji im p lic itly  attributes a 
Platonic conception to Origen. This is entirely a mistake. For whet 
Origen holds is that once a rational creature has been created, it  w ill 
live throughout a ll tim e , namely it  w ill certain ly be present in ail the 
successive worlds in one rank of life  or another, according to his 
m erits. If R. Sorabji states "only those who need correction" in the 
sense of "to come into human life  again", it  is again a mistake. For a 
form erly human beino msu need correction and uet not to be reborn in
human rank of life , as it  may be found to deserve to be transposed to a 
lower rank of life.
in fact R. Sorabji's expression is but a Platonic notion (about a 
soul which assumes a m aterial body only i f  it  is to be punished) 
attributed to Origen, according to a usual habit of scholars to find it  as 
an easy way-out to render in Platonic or Neoplatonic term s what they 
take as Origen’s thought470 Yet Origen’s thought is too d ifferent from  
Platonism to be susceptible of being portrayed in Platonic terms which 
u tterly  garble what he really  held.
At any rate  Origen holds that the expected judgement at the end of 
the present aeon w ill, not be a "final judgement". Hence he speaks of a 
"second" judgement,476 implying this which w ill take place at the end of 
the next aeon. This is a fundamental conviction of Origen’s which can be 
traced in other points of his w ritings in Greek, in the homJer he re fe rs  
to "the f irs t resurrection" appealing to Rev.20,6 and he also speaks of 
"one of the later" resurrections4'7 and states; “Who is he who is saved in 
a la te r resurrection? it is he who needs to be baptized by fire."4/S in 
another Homily (namely, the Seventh) on Jeremiah he again implies the 
same notion; he speaks of "future punishments"479 and states that there  
are those for whom it  is only one "punishment" that occurs in the 
"consummation"450 while others suffer a "second", even a "third", 
nonetheless a "fourth" and even a seventh one481 as he holds that the 
passage in Lev. 26,21 (”i w ill bring seven times more plagues upon you") 
"denotes a certain m y s t e r y " . i n d e e d  his view is that iust as then 
"serve in a sanctuary which is only a copy and shadow of heavenly
/  q t
things"-^ so the people of Israel were punished for the ir sin as a copy 
and shadow of the real punishments; so all the punishments which have 
been w ritten  in the law and the prophets actually contain "a shadow of 
the real punishments"484
So a punishment for sins committed in a aeon mau occur not only
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grounded on the scriptural passage Matt. 12,32. Departing from that 
ooint, Origen affims:
"I understand that some are kept by their own sin not only in this
aeon but even in the aeon to come; they are those of whom the scrioture
says ’whosoever speaks against the Holy S p irit, it  shall not be forgiven 
neither in this aeon nor in the aeon to come‘;4S° and indeed not only in 
the next aeon but also in the aeons to come485 Thus he speaks of "those 
people whose sins are not foraiven not onlu in this aeon but also durincO  w  w
the whole aeon to come"48' in commMatt, however, Origen states that 
sin w ill not be not forgiven in the "aeons to come" indefin itely, but it  
w ill be kept only until the aeon to come. He comments on the Psalm 76, 
6 -8  ("Will the Lord cast off in the aeons?, Mo eig xouq atujvag anwasxai 
Kupiog;) and says: "Speaking w ith greater daring, the Lord w ill not cast 
off ‘in the aeons'; for it  is already quite much that he casts off in one 
aeon; but certainly he w ill cast off in a second aeon, in the case that the 
sin is of the kind which ‘is not be forgiven neither in this aeon nor in 
the aeon to come’."488
On this point one might notice an evolution in Origen’s view of this 
question, even though his fundamental conception of a prolonged time 
remains unchanged. Indeed, the above stated comments are from his la te r  
works, since the commMatt was w ritten  in Caesarea at a tim e between 
244  and 248 whereas this section of comm John was w ritte n  sometime
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In any case, Origen’s tim e is not terminated at the end of the 
present aeon; so he may speak of an "after" the consummation460 
denoting the continuation of tim e, a fte r the consummation and the 
judgement, in the aeon to come.
Thus the term  "end” may, in the f irs t  place, mean the end of the 
present aeon,491 clearly implying that this is not an absolute end of tim e
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its e lf but just a "moment" in the continuum of time. For each of the 
consecutive aeons is understood to be a part of the one continuum of 
time. This is why one should speak of "prolongation" of time. Time is 
continued throughout successive worlds and it  constitutes one rea lity  of 
the world. Recurrence of (non-identical) worlds is understood to occur 
in this continuum yet although the “worlds" are many, time is  one. The 
time of a next aeon is not, as it  were, "another" time, it is one and the 
same continuum which is extended alongside w ith the consecutive worlds 
which emerge one a fte r another. Thus an aeon is but a period of time  
which is understood to consist of these aeons. This is why Origen speaks 
of "the order of the entirety of aeons " (nspi xnc sv dnooi xotg auuai 
Siaxdysiugf 32 as well as of "the extension of the whole tim e (xou 
5iaaxqy.axog xov oRov xp6vov),49° and depicts his conception of time 
comprising aeons, yet being one and the same tim e , as follows:
"in fact, nothing has been or w ill be neglected by God, who at each 
season makes what he should be makina in a world of a lteration and 
change. And just as at d ifferent seasons of the year a farm er494 does 
different agricultural jobs upon the earth and its  crops, so God 
dispenses all the aeons as if  they were years, so to speak (oiovsi 
sviauxoug xivag, iv’ ouxwg ovoudatu, oikovousi oRoug xoug atwvag). in each 
one of them he does what is in its e lf reasonable for the universe, which 
is most clearly understood and accomplished by God alone since the truth  
is known to him."490
P. PI ass makes the suggestion that Origen holds a notion of "a 
higher time consisting of aeons"495 This mistake is relevant to the 
assertion by the same scholar that Origen holds a notion of a "sacred 
time", on which we have commented in chapter i. Subsequently he makes 
the serious mistake of affirm ing that beyond time there is a "changeless 
duration" which is something between God and time. This "duration" is 
said to be "changeless onlu while it  lasts". All these assertions are
entire ly  wrong. As we have discussed, in Origen there is the notion of 
time and that of timelessness in two rea lities  which are clearly  
distinguished from one another. What Plass has not grasped is the simple 
fact that Origen's conception of "aeons" depict his conception of 
prolongation of time -and nothing beyond that.
On the other hand J. Danielou is another scholar who hardly finds 
in Origen anything which is not Platonic or Gnostic view. Thus he alleges 
that "the to ta lity  of Time" in Origen's consisted of "the jubilee of 
aeonian years" and he thinks that in this, too, he has been "anticipated by 
the Gnostics.'497 We hardly need to comment on this entire ly  erroneous 
allegation. We only add that obviously J. Danielou (although says nothing 
about that) has misconstrued a passage in deOrA3B where an allegorical 
assessment of biblical temporal terms is provided.499
it is due to this conception of tim e that scriptural temporal terms 
like "years” or "days" are quite often interpreted by Origen as signifying 
"aeons", according to a perception of a prolonged historical process in
the continuum of tim eDU° This is why Orioen so often applies to te ■roc-
such as "today" or "yesterday" the exegesis that they may be figures 
which actually indicate "aeons". Thus, the term  "today" may mean the 
present aeon, whereas the term  "yesterday" may mean the past aeon301
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Thus Origen holds that in the consecutive aeons time is the same. 
This is an important element of his thought, especially because there  
are assertions that neither the Pythagoreans nor the Stoics had made an 
explicit part of the ir theory that time w ill be the same throughout 
successive aeons.502 indeed, takina into account the Greek idea of the
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Great Year, for example, it  would be argued that, once this period comes 
round and the heavenly bodies return to their original alignments, then 
time comes to an end and s tarts  again.
However there is a point which has to be made in contrast to R. 
Sorebii's assertions: This araument is sound only if  tim e is recerded es
ZDZ
a measure o r . number, namely In an A ristotelian sense. If time is
regarded as essentially being an extension, this argument is not sound
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period then certain ly it  w ill reach the number of years which comprise 
a cosmic period and then the counting w ill have to begin again, namely 
another time should begin. But i f  time in its  essence is regarded as an 
extension, there is nothino to suoaest that it  w ill begin ecain. This
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extension is simply in fin ite  -as the Stoics explicated. We think that this 
is a reason why the Stoics do not seem to have dealt w ith this Question. 
They simply did not need to do so.
Much discussion has been made about "cyclicity" in speaking of 
either "time" or "events"500 it has been quite popular among scholars to 
speak about "cyclic" time and "rectilinear” time -the form er regarded as 
a "Greek" conception of time. This notion of "cyclicity" enjoys much 
currency and use, perhaps because it  provides a sim plistic spatial figure  
of time. We, however, regard it  as most misleading for a proper 
comprehension of the problematique of time proper.
Even in Heracletus or in the Stoic thought, one could not speak of 
“cyclic" events. At most he would speak about "periodical" events, which 
re-cur in normal periods of an in fin ite , linear, continuum of time. As for 
Plato, hints of "cyclicity"004 have their counter points. As an example we 
adduce this: in the S ta te d  Plato seems to suggest that some day, in the 
in fin ite  future, the ideal State which he portrayed w ill m aterialize, it 
would be very reasonable to assert that the portrayal of an occurence 
lying in the in fin ite  future implies a linear conception of time.
There is only one hypothetical case, in which one might speak of 
"cyclical" time proper. That is an eclectic attitude, according to which 
the essence of time is to be a number (in an A risto telian  sense) and 
also to hold the Stoic notion of succesive periods of identical worlds. In 
that case, tim e had to s ta rt aoain , bu virtue of the fact that the number
w ill reach the amount of the years comprising the cosmic period and it 
w ill not be possible to increase further, but it  w ill have to s ta rt again, 
just because A ristotelian time is in fin ite  without any absolute beginning 
or end and therefore there is no absolute beginning of counting the 
number which is time. It is only in such a hypothetical case that one 
would speak of "cyclical" tim e, namely an in fin ite  series of counting 
until a certain number and then startina  countino aoain from the
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beginning. But such an eclectic view of tim e, If  ever any, never prevailed 
in the Greek thought.
Thus the very notion of repetition of events exactly implies a 
distinction  of events even if  they are structura lly  1 n d e 11 tics! from one 
cosmic period to another. Hence the notion of "cyclicity" alleged as a 
universal "Greek" conception of tim e is absurd. As for A ris to tle , he 
speaks of time as "something like as cycle"?06 It was a notorious 
mistake to take this phrase out of its  context and allege that A ris to tle  
suaaested that time is "cyclical", a mistake which clearly indicated that 
the text of the Phusics had not been read -anyway a mistake which we 
do not think is made by scholars nowadays3'07
in the best case, if  one wishes to stick to this notion of 
"cyclicity” (albeit there is no reason for this at a ll)303 one would speak 
of a sp ira l of space-time.
Thus it  is due to the very conception of tim e as an extension that 
the Stoics did not explicate the ir view that time is the seme 
throughout the successive aeons, although they did emphasize that time 
is a continuum which is not broken durino the destruction of a world 
whatsoever. This point supports our argument that the Stoic view of 
tim e is d ifferent from that of A ris to tle ’s. At any ra te , nevertheless, 
Orioen did enunciate his view that time is one and the same and "aeons"
w
are but parts of this one time.
It is remarkable that 0. Cullmsnn also holds a notion of successive
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aeons In what many people wish to regard as a Biblical view of time. He 
holds that the in fin ite  time is divided into three periods which are also 
called ‘"aeons” dCCOi ding to sc* iotUi a! term i no i oou a nd discerns a "oast 
aeon", which is the time before the creation306 Thus there is the 
"present aeon", which is the time from the creation onwards; and finally  
there is a tm rd aeon, wmcn is me aeon to come w,w me n rs t  aeon is 
beginningless and was term inated when creation was made. The present 
aeon had a beginning and w ill have an end which w ill mark the beginning 
of the endless aeon to come, in any case Cullmann is not absolutely 
positive as to how many aeons are indicated through the language of the 
New Testament. So, in order to feel more sure about his assertions he 
speaks of "three aeons at least
Origen has serious cause to employ the notion of prolongation of 
time (discussed also in the conclusion of this chapter). On the contrary, 
Cullmann does not say why (what claims to be biblical) time should be 
regarded as consisting of aeons. He just appeals to biblical passages 
where he finds the term  "aeon" or "aeons". Yet his assertion that the 
passage in Revelation 10,6 ("there should be time no longer") does not 
mean that time its e lf w ill be terminated but is just means "there w ill 
be no more delay'312 is but an extrapolation. Accordingly, that time did 
exist before creation is also an extrapolation, as it  is d irectly  grounded 
to the a rb itra ry  assertion that time is not a creature made bu 6od3l° 
Thus, according to Cullmann, God is regarded as being in tim e and 
this time is what creation (once came into existence) is in, too. V/het 
should be pointed out here is this: in an era when there is l i t t le  doubt 
that time in its e lf is inseparably connected to space, so that there is 
one rea lity  of space-time which is actually regarded, Cullmann a ffirm s  
that time in its e lf, namely tim e regarded "in its  essence ... is not 
connected with the creation" and time "in its  essence" is not something 
which " firs t appeared with the creation" as a “fallen down" s ta te 314 All
these ere postulated because of "the danger” of a "Platonic conception”, 
namely the danger to regard that divine being is "timeless"313 Indeed 
Cullmann is haunted by whet he regards as "danger” in Greek thought. We 
shall return to this point at the end of chapter 3 in order to discuss 
whether or not Cullmann actually avoids this "danger" and i f  it  is due to 
this obsession that he succumbs to an essentially Greek way of thinking 
as well as into a Greek conception of essential characteristics of time.-
In contrast to such a conception, Origen a ffirm s  the close and 
inseparable connexion of time to space and he depicts this connexion 
through a highly sophisticated terminology. It is due to this perception 
that in order to speak of “prolongation of time" it  has been necessary to 
speak of the notion of successive worlds, it is absolutely .impossible to 
speak of a prolonged tim e without speaking of the world connected with  
it. It is rather through speaking of the successive worlds in time that 
the notion of prolongation could be properly understood. If one alleges 
that it  is possible to speak of prolongation of time without also speaking 
of the world connected w ith it , i t  is as if  he regarded it  possible to
separate the one rea lity  of space-time and to speak of time while
neglecting space. This is why we should like to point out what is 
actually meant when one re fers  to the "shape" of tim e, so that some 
speak of "cyclical" tim e and others of "rectilinear" time or other 
affirm ations about the "shape" of time.
i
When a certain kind of line is drawn in order to portray tim e, this 
line does not actually portray time but it  indicates space in tim e . In 
fact, each point of the line is but a certain position of the world it. 
time; so the consecutive points which (conceptually) comprise this line, 
is a geometrical scheme which actually portray the world its  
consecutive positions into the continuum of time. Using Origen's highly
sophisticated terminology, we can say this: The "shape" of time is but
the conceptual succession of the "structure of the world" (namely of
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space) in its  consecutive positions of motion in  time. So prolonged time 
end its  meaning is studied through a simultaneous study of the positions 
of. the "structure of the world" in time. Time in its e lf  cannot be drawn 
whatsoever. It is only space which can be portrayed through some kind 
of picture, it is through the movement of the world in tim e, through the 
perception of the unstoppable succession of positions in time that the 
flux o f time is perceived and portrayed in a geometrical figure. Yet this 
figure actually portrays consecutive moments of the world (namely, 
space-time) - i t  does not potrau time Itse lf.
Thus it  is only through the notion of the inseparable connexion of 
space to time that such a geometrical figure can make sense as a 
portrayal of tim e, too . This is why Cullmann actually contradicts  
himself when he depicts time as a line. For once he does not accept the 
inseparable connexion of tim e proper to space, there is no logical 
argument for him to ground the view that this line portrays time.
It is due to Origen's fundamental perception of spsce-time as ah 
inseparable rea lity  that, in this section, the topic of prolongation of 
time has been discussed through his notion of successive worlds. For 
what the succession of worlds actually indicates is the flux of a 
prolonged time. One might assert that, in the previous analyses, the 
category of "time" would be substituted by a term  such as ’‘history"?15 
We shall not object to that. Yet what is "history" really? Is not it  a 
category which intrinsincly entails spatio-tem poral implications? Is not 
"history" just the perception of the status of the world's existence 
moment-after-rnoment in the flux of time? Hence, does not history its e lf  
imply the kind of time its e lf, in the final analysis? In fact, "history" is 
but an observation and portrayal of the flux of the world in time. 
History is par excellence the notion which indicates the fact that space 
and time in fact constitute one reality .
This is exactly what has eluded A ris to tle  as well as the Stoics
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full rea lity  of time proper. He regarded the present as extensionless, the 
past as not existing any more and the future as not existing yet. Thus 
there is nothing of time actually existing . The argumentation of 
A risto tle  (as well as the Zeno’s paradoxes) puzzled philosophers for a 
long time thereafter. At the time of the closure of the Neoplatonic
school in Athens, in 529 A.D., its  head Damascius was s t ill working on
them -and these philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, etc.) continued 
their studies even a fte r the closure of the school.
These arguments, however, are bound to be unresolved unless 
space-time is faced as one reality . The Stoic quite erroneously 
regarded as real what is present , namely what exists now . 
Accordingly, to A ris to tle  now does not actually exist, but i t  is only a 
potential re a lity  which exists only once a point in a line is singled out 
-otherw ise it  does not exist; (this is one of the notions through which 
A ris to tle  tried  to tackle with Zeno’s paradoxes).
Hence, according to the assertion that real is only what is 
present i t  would be argued that the rea lity  of the battle of Thermopylae 
should be challenged because it  is not a fact present . This kind of 
argument certainly would go too far. For what A ris to tle  did not do in 
treating time in the Physics is to consider time inseparably from  
space. In the final analysis his fundamental conception of tim e proper 
was an imagery of a line -and so it  has been treated for a long time.
Quite rightly, however, in late ninteenth century, H. Bergson 
asserted that if  we try  to conceive time as a static, geometrical line, we 
ere really  thinking of space 517 in fact A ris to tle  was reflecting on time  
purely in terms of space. The Stoics, too, regarded as reel (6v) only 
what actuallg exists and what potentialIg exists. To ,,weik,‘ actually  
(that is, at this very moment) is a d ifferent (namely “fu ller") kind of 
re a lity  from the possiblitu to walk, namely to be able to walk at any
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future moment or to have already walked. But the outstanding difference  
lies in the Stoic view of time as an “extension".
The natural objectivity of time as an element of the make-up of 
the world (and not merely as a "number" of motion) although established 
by the Stoics, was not exploited by them at ell. This view comes to the 
fore only w ith Origen. It was only w ith Origen that tim e is regarded 
both as an element of the creation existing in its e lf and yet closely 
connected.to  space so that no account of time may be given apart from  
the notion of space whatsoever. Origen did not trea t space instead ot 
tim e, namely sp a tia liz in g  time. But he did trea t space together with 
time. This is why the notion of with  is outstandingly present in the 
term  auunapsKXSivwv. This is the fundamental and crucial element which, 
in the sharp end, is absent from many ancient accounts of time and it  is 
only on this misleading grounds that his deductive arguments about the 
rea lity  of tim e  would stand.
in Origen’s view, time is a natural dimension of the world along 
side which the world exists. There is no question of ontological 
classification between time and motion -a  question which has been 
given so much discussion until our day310
Origen's world is always in motion, so to pose hypothetical 
questions of a possible "time without change'519 is a meaningless 
scholasticism in which (due to the purposes of his theology) he was not 
interested whatsoever. For in Origen motion has a crucial and defin ite  
purpose and space-time exists as long as motion is necessary. Time is 
regarded as objectively existing in its e lf as a dimension of the world. 
But there is no reason to pose the pointless Question of a possible 
nonexistence of motion. For motion not only is a concrete datum of the 
real world but it  also is necessary for the of space-time towards a 
final goal. Once God is regarded as omnipotens, time as a creature the 
nature of which is to be an "extension" and "dimension" of the world. At
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any rate  Oncers had no reason not face the problem whether time 
cannot exist without motion, because time proper is a rea lity  closely 
related but non-dependent on space, albeit co-existing w ith space. Once 
God is the creator of tim e, there is no reason not to assume that time 
without motion could not exist. But the actual point in Oripen's 
conception of space-time w ith respect to God is .th a t without motion 
time need not exist at all. For, as we shall discuss in the ensuing 
chapters, the very existence of time proper has a crucial in trinsic  
meaning, character and purpose, namely a raison d‘ etre. To try  to 
re flec t on a "time without change", or time without motion, constitutes  
an intellectual exercise which Origen did not need at all. To him it would 
simply be a meaningless question entirely out of the purposes of his 
theology, le t alone that "motion" is a permanent characteristic  of his 
"world", as we shall see in the next section. Throuoh the elaboration on 
the conception of tim e as essentially being an extension, the re a lity  of 
tim e is clearly affirm ed and so is its  close connexion to space and, 
subsequently, to motion.
This is why i t  is mainly in term s of observation of the movement 
of the world that the notion of proplongation of time has been discussed 
in this section.
A point which should be elucidated, however, is whether, In 
Origen’s thought, prolongation is a category which simply indicates the 
course in tim e or it  has further implications which eventually come to 
pertain to time itse lf. An account on this question w ill be given at the 
end of this chapter. For the same question w ill be raised w ith  respect to 
the notion of causality, which we are going to discuss next.
§3. T im e  and Causal itu
The kinds of motion. In spite of the fact that Oricen is mainly 
interested in the rational beings of the particu lar spaces of the world,
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rather than the spaces themselves, he does not fa il to re fe r to motion 
in general. In this section we shall discuss how he considers motion and 
particu larly  the causes of it.
Treatment of this question is supplied by Greek extracts of Prfnc 
as well as in o'eOr. A study of these points can show that Origen deals 
with the classification of motion in quite a systematic way. As we shall 
argue la te r in this chapter, the points where those analyses appear could 
in no way be considered as incidental. For in the Prfnc it  is "since the 
teaching of the church includes the doctrine of the righteous judgement 
of God" that Origen makes the analysis of "motion", in the beginning of 
Book ill, Chapter i ,  namely when he begins to extend his view of free  
w ill.520 it should be emphasized that the criterion  according to which 
Origen makes the classification of motion, is the cause of it. This 
crucial point has eluded J. Oulton and H. Chadwick.521 Thus Origen 
discerns motion in the following categories, according to the cause of it.
1. Motion which is caused from without;522 this is the motion of 
inanimate things, like “stones and pieces of wood, which are cut out of 
the quarry or have lost the power of growing", that is to say things 
which "are held together merely by their form "520 in the same category 
are also included those called "portable things"524 in general: that is, not 
the inanimate things as above, but also living things like "the bodies of 
living creatures as well as portable plants"525 What is in common in 
these motions is that all of them have their cause "outside" (s|w9ev)526 
them.
2. Motion due to "the flux of bodies" (inv  ouatv tu jv  awudiujv). 
Origen states that he does not include this kind "in the present 
discussion", namely in Prfnc 527 However, he re fe rs  to that in deOr 
stating that this motion applies to things which "are moved by virtue of 
the fact that all bodies are in a state of flux as they decay"; therefore  
"this motion which they have is inseparably connected w ith the ir state
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of decay."522
3. notion in which the cause exists in the moving body; they are
those moved "either by their own inherent nature or soul"522 These are
thinas havino the cause of motion "in themselves" Cev eauxotc)500 This 
kind of motion applies both to inanimate things and living creatures. 
Thus the following categories may be discerned in this case.
a. Motion of "metals, and f ire  and even springs of water" where it  
can be said that they "have the cause of their motion in themselves" (ev 
sauioie os sxetv xrjv au iav  xou k iv s io S g O ;551 as Origen states, "they have 
the cause of the ir motion" "with themselves" (sy sauiwv).552
b. Motion of "animates"503 or "living creatures";504 this is called
motion "from within themselves" (acT sauxwv).535 These "living
creatures" move "from within themselves when there arises w ithin them 
an image (<pavxaa(a) which calls forth  an impulse"; it  is because of "the 
imaginative nature setting the impulse in ordered motion". Thus Origen 
regards it  as a kind of "natural" motion, which is connected w ith the 
nature of a certain animal; for instance, “in the spider, an image of 
weaving a web arises and the impulse to weave it  follows"; this "impulse 
to weave" is connected to this animal because this is the natural manner 
of its  existence; the same happens w ith the "bee" in which, too, “an 
impulse to produce a honey-comb" arises. Or i gen's conviction, 
nevertheless, is that animals "beyond this imaginative nature ... possess 
nothing else"50'5
c. Motion of rational creatures. This is d ifferent from the motion 
of any other living creature. For the "rational animal ... has something 
more than the imaoinative nature, nameiu reason which iudoes theO  V w  w
impulses; some it  re jects , others i t  approves of, so that the creature  
may be guided in accordance with these la tte r  images."507 This is why 
Origen regards the motion of rational creatures as motion “by 
themselves" (Si‘ auxt(iv).5oU Thus "to decide to use what has happened
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either in this way or in that is the work of nothing else but the reason 
within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us 
towards the impusles that incite to what is good and seemly or else 
turns us aside to the reverse"552 So his view is that the possibi 1 ites of 
contemplating good and evil are inherent in the nature of reason; it  Is 
out of following these contemplations and choosing freely  whatever he 
wishes to choose that a rational creature is subject either to praise for 
choosina the aood or to blame for choosina the evil.w  W  w
it is Oriaen's view that external t hi nos do not lie  w ithin ourW w
power; but to use them in this way or the other, since we have received 
reason as a judge and investigator of the way in which we ought to deal 
with each of them, that is our task.540 it is out of these considerations 
of motion, that the notion of Judgement makes sense in Origen's thought. 
For what he mainly considers is motion stemming from the freedom of 
rational creatures and because of that no rational creature can escape 
personal responsibility. Thus he concludes as follows:
"To throw the blame for what so happens to us on external things 
and to free ourselves from censure, is like declaring that we are like  
stocks and stones, which are dragged among by agents that move them 
from without, is neither true nor reasonable, but is the argument of a 
man who desires to contradict the idea of free will."541
Free morel eciion os motion, if time is of importance in Oriaen’s 
world, it  is so because time is the "extension" where this "motion" takes 
place. For tim e, although fundamentally regarded as a natural element of 
the whole constitution of creation, is also regarded as the "extension" 
where the w ill of God and the w ill of rational creatures encounter each 
other. On the one hand it  is the unchangeable w ill of God which is 
manifested in certain times; and on the other, it  is the w ill of creatures  
which comes to a dialectical relation to the w ill of God, as they act by 
"motion" perceived as free moral action.
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We see, therefore, that Origen holds a "vertically" broader 
conception of the world (in the sense that there are ranks of life  above 
and under the human one); he also holds a "horizontally" broader 
conception ot time (in the sense that time is extended before as we 11 as 
a fte r this aeon). Accordingly, he holds a broader conception of "motion" 
considering this mainly as free moral action taking place in this broader 
space-time. Origen is not unaware that there are also other kinds of 
motion, as discussed In the previous pages; yet he is not Interested in 
them in the same way that he is not interested in the natural 
environment of the particular spaces comprising the world. Accordingly, 
although he knows that time is a natural rea lity , he considers mainly the 
theological and not the natural implications of this reality . This is why 
he deems that i t  is only this "motion" (namely, free moral action) on 
which both "horizontal" as well as "vertical" arrangement of space-time  
is dependent. For the continuum of time is arranged in consecutive aeons 
which have a duration d irectly  related to free moral action, as we saw 
in the previous section. It is only this kind of motion that Is taken into 
account at the time of judgement. Therefore this is the only kind of 
motion which not only determines the duration of an aeon, but also the 
arrangement of the next world (that is, the "vertical" arrangement of 
space-time).
This is why Origen does not confine his conception of tim e to the 
lim its  of the Stoic thought. He originally employs, to a certain extent, a 
Stoic terminology, yet the actual content he attributes to the terms is 
quite different. "Motion" does not so much apply to the "natural" one, 
rather pertains mainly to free moral action of rational creatures.
Origen does certain ly not ignore the connexion between tim e and 
heavenly bodies; he knows that time exists as long as heavenly bodies 
exist and vice v e rs a ."  inis is the meaning i f  the term 
ouunapSKisivousvog which he introduced on the subject; yet he nowhere
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asserts that time exists out of the movement of heavenly bodies; time 
co-exists w ith them yet being an independent element, as it  were, 
related to the “structure of this world". Nevertheless time is connected 
with motion, the term  " motion" meaning free moral action; for time is 
the means where this action can be realized. So time should exist 
because there is a motion to take place; it  seems though that Origen 
perceived this question is a revesre manner as well: Motion should exist 
since there is the extension of time for this to take place.
We have already see the critic ism  that Plotinus directed against 
the Stoics for the ir defining tim e in relation to motion; his argument 
was that the Stoics would actually be unable to say anything about time  
if  there in no motion at a l l540 Origen had no reason to deal w ith such a 
question; yet he provides a certain personal opinion about it ,  without 
naming the problem at all. His view is that " motion" is an always active  
faculty of rational creatures; and by " motion" he here means free moral 
action only, it is in this context that the following passage from the 
Princ should be understood:
"...no movement can take place in any body which does not possess 
life , nor can living beings exist at any time without movement."544 it is 
obvious that Oriaen here does not re fe r  to anu kind of movement; for it
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is himself who has extended his views about the various kinds of it. He 
therefore re fers  to free moral action; and he accordingly states that 
"...the holy angels and other heavenly powers ... are capable of feeling and 
of movement"; for "what" "is there in them" is "rational feeling and 
movement"545 Also, "it is certain that no living creature can be 
altogether inactive and immovable, but it  is eager for every kind of 
movement and for continual action and volition; and it  is clear, i think, 
that this nature resides in all living beings. Much more then must a 
rational being such as man be always engaged in some movement or 
activity."546 And aaain it  is stated that "...the w ills  freedom alwaus
that is the mind or soul, ever exist without some movement either good 
or evil."54'
Given the particular meaning which Origen attributes to 
"movement" (namely, free moral action m all the ranks of liteJ he, 
without naming the question of time at a ll, here provides an answer to 
any potential objection against his conception of time like that of 
Plotinus' against the Stoic definition of time. What does Origen actually 
mean when he makes those affirm ations? Taking into account that here 
"movement" means "free moral action", it  is moral inactiv ity  as well as 
moral neutrality of any action that actually Origen denies, in fact, this 
view can be corroborated by his works in Greek. In commJohn he states:
"... it  is clear that every man, endowed with reason, is e ither a son 
of God or a son of the devil; in other words, he commits sin or he does 
not commit sin, as there is nothing between committing sin and not 
committing sin (ouSsvog ovxoc usxaFu xou noieiv x r iv  a u a p x i a v  k c u  xrjv 
auapxiav up nois(v); and if  he commits sin, he comes from  the devil; 
while if  he does not commit sin he has been begotten by God."543
On this point Origen stands outside the Stoic tradition; for the 
Stoics held that actions are distinguished into three categories, namely 
the "good deeds" ( K a x o p S u j y a x a )  the "sins" ( a u a p x f j u a i a )  and the 
"neuters" (ouSexspa)549 Origen knew the Stoic notion of "indifferents" 
( a 6 i a < p o p a )  and re fers  to that in Cels?® He also uses the term  
K a x o p S w u a x a  himself551 There is one case though where he uses the 
term  "indifferent life , which is neither good nor bad; a sense in which 
the impious and animals are said to live"552 in fact this notion, namely 
that "to live" in its e lf is morally "indifferent" is a Stoic view.550
it is thus that Origen im plic itly  considers the c ritic ism  of 
Neoplatonists against the original Stoic definition of time which defined 
tim e as an extension of motion. As everything apart from God is in time
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there must be a kind of motion justifying, as it  were, the existence of 
time in ail the ranks of life. This is the perpetual free moral action and 
this is why of all the kinds of motion classified bu Origen, i t  is this one 
which is of major significance and attention is his entire thought.
T ria l of motion in tim e. Just as the Stoic term  of ''motion" is 
mainly attributed the meaning discussed above, so the term  "extension" 
has not so much the "natural" meaning which it  has in Stoic thought, but 
means mainly the “extension" where tr ia l of free moral action takes 
place.
in homJerOrigen states: ” He says 'since out youth until today [we 
committed sin] and we did not obey the voice of Lord our God'; [he says] 
we committed sin until the present time. Then, once they return they say 
'we committed sin and we did not obey' as a beginning of return. For we 
did not obey right as soon as we want to obey; for s till there is need of 
time; like wounds need time in order to be healed, so of the return [time  
is needed] in order to return to God completely and clearly.’ -54
The use of terms such as " returned (emaxpstpavxeq)", " beginning 
(apxpv)”, "for s t ill there is need of time (kqi gap ext xp^vou 5sQ", “fo r 
the return (xrjg sntaxpogfjg)" indicates that, in Origen’s view, tim e is not 
simply an "extension", but i t  is the "extension" for free moral action to 
take place.
Yet it  is a ground for tr ia l;  and this tr ia l is actually a challenge 
to freedom; the outcome of this tr ia l is the manner in which freedom  
reacts to devil's acts who also acts w ithin tim e, as Origen states:
"The devil has been committing sins for so long a tim e (xoaouxiu 
Xpovw), since the creation and the Kaxapoflf) of the world, yet he suffers  
neither fire  nor whip; for he does not m erit those punishments which 
come from God."555
It is time its e lf which, being the fie ld  of this t r ia l, fin a lly  shows 
what the result is. in selEx Origen comments on Ex.31,1 (“And the Lord
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spake unto Moses saying") as follows:
"it was a good fo rty  days that the most wise God kept noses 
waiting before giving him the law, although it  was possible for him to 
give the Law in three days. But [he did so] that the time of noses5 
absence tries  the impiety which was hidden in the depth of the Jews5 
hearts"550
Thus tim e constitues the venue where free  moral action is 
exposed to tr ia l, it is the length of time which often tests the valid ity  
of a certain moral attitude, in Origen’s view, duration, length of tim e, 
constitutes a m ajor challenge to moral action.
But although length of time is a means for trying moral quality of 
action, it  does not in its e lf constitute an element of the essence of 
morality, it is not the length of tim e, in which a man is aware of the 
word of God that is of the main significance: what is i moor tent is thew /
moral action its e lf throughout time, it is in the light of this view that 
Origen in terprets the passage Matt. 19,30 ("many that are f irs t  shall be 
last; and the last shall be first."). What he comments on this passage is 
that those who accept the divine speech la te r than others "are not 
hindered by time" (tug ouk sunoSigovioc xou xpovou to ic  uaxspov 
niaxcuouaiv)557 meaning that the question is not how long one is a 
fa ith fu l but how he realizes Christian belief in action. He particu larly  
insists on this point dealing with it  extensively. He also appeals to 
Heb.5,12 ("For when because of the time (5id xov xpovov) you ought to be 
teachers”),553 averring that the duration of just knowing the divine law  
is not a sufficient pressuposition to be "first". For what is of prime 
significance is the duration of action accomplishing this teaching as a 
concrete action in time. This is why, in comm/'latt, Origen states:
"And it  is possible to those who want to extend their force and 
energy intensively on the work for less time within the vineyard to have 
carried out an eoual work to that of those who began working since
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dawn; for they did not get tired  as like those who began working since 
dawn."552
in the ensrrJoh he re fers  to the passage Job,2,9 ("A fter time 
enough had passed his w ife  said unto him") and comments: "See how 
malicious he is. When much time had pone by, it  is then that he attacks; 
for it  is then that power is most weakened. Weakness was due both, to 
the fact that he who suffered had become more weak because of the 
length of time and that his hope was more near to fading"."'- And 
further: "He was bent neither by the loss of money neither nor by the 
untimely death of his sons nor by the unspeakable torture of his body nor 
by so long a length of time."551
This is the point of view, from which time is considered as the 
extension for the tr ia l of free moral action of rational creatures. Time 
exists as an indispensable means of realizing freedom, being also where 
the divine oiKovoyfa is manifested.
As it  happens with the terms "motion" and "extension" it  should be 
expected that where the Stoics consider time also as a "measure of 
fastness and slowness"552 in a purely natural sense, Origen would 
attribute  to this term  a quite d ifferent content according to his overall 
conception of time and motion; and indeed this is what he does.
The notions of "fastness" and "slowness”. in the context of 
conceiving time as a dimension of life , where a dialectical re lation  
between creatures and God takes place, Origen regards time as being 
also a "measure and ci ter ion of both fastness and slowness" as the 
Stoics used to define it  generally in addition to the ir fundamental view  
of time as an "extension of motion"555 Again we see that Origen 
form ally considers time in this Stoic way (which at this particu lar point 
is A ristotelian, too), yet in substance he endows this notion w ith  a 
to ta lly  d ifferent content; it  is not a natural content, but a moral one. In 
enarrJoh he comments: "And if  someone miaht ask whu the friends were
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so la te  ... One should know th a t the postponment o f a r r iv a l was some 
d iv ine oikonomia ... some d iv ine oikonomia took place fo r  the fr ie n d s  to 
be la te  and the disease to  be prolonged; so th a t the lu s t man w il l  be 
exercised fo r  more tim e  and w i l l  more ju s t if ia b ly  be ra ised  up by 
God"
A ccord ing ly , in  the Prime i t  is  stated: "...sometimes i t  does not
tu rn  out to the advantage of those who are healed th a t theu should be
healed qu ick ly  (xdxiov), i f ,  th a t is  they have fa lle n  of them selves in to
d if f ic u lt ie s  and are then eas ily  re leased fro m  the cond itions in to  which
they have fa lle n ; fo r  despising the ev il as being easy o f cure end tak ing
no precautions against fa llin g  in to  i t  they w i l l  fin d  them selves in i t  a
second tim e, in dealing w ith  such persons th e re fo re  the e te rna l God, the
pe rce ive r o f secre t th ings, who ‘knows a il th ings be fore  they come to
be’,555 in h is goodness re fra in s  fro m  sending them the qu icker help
(unspxOsxcu xrjv xaxuxepav npoc auxouc porjSsiav) and, i f  I may say so,
helps them by not helping them ... le s t having qu ick ly  (xdx iov) tu rned and
been healed by obta in ing fo rg iveness they should despise the wounds of
th e ir  w ickedness as being s lig h t and easy o f cure and should ve ry  qu ick ly
(xdxiov) fa i l  in to  i t  again. Perhaps, too, though they had paid the penalty
fo r  th e ir  fo rm e r sins which they com m itted  against v ir tu e  when they
abandoned i t ,  they had not yet fu l f i l le d  the approp ria te  tim e  (ouSsniu xov
npsnovxa xpovov SKnsnRrjptkeaav) ... and then a fte rw a rd s  (uoxsoov) to  be
ca lled to  a more enduring repentance, such as would p revent them fro m
qu ick ly  (xoxewg) fa llin g  again in to  the sins in to  w hich they had
prev ious ly  fa lle n  ..."; fo r  "God is  som etim es long and s low  (usRBst m i 
* *
ppaSuvsu in doing good to  men A t another po in t Origen expla ins 
the way in which God's "oikonomia" is  m anifested tow ards men. This te x t 
is  again fu l l  o f tem pora l ca tegories ind ica ting  the “ fa s te r"  (xdx iov) o r 
"s low er" (ppdStov) o r "not fa s te r"  (y fj xdxiov) o r "a f te r  a long tim e " 
(uoxsoov noRRtu voovw) th a t th is  "oikonom ia" is  m a n ifes te d 55*'
in conimtlatt Urigen po in ts  up tha t, fo rg iveness of sins cornes 
"e ith e r s low e r or t e s t e r e n d  at another po in t o f the same w ork he 
s ta tes  tha t "fo rg iveness o f sins reaches th ings and to those who 
com m itted  the s ins th is  fo rg iveness is  bestowed according to ju s tic e , 
e ith e r th is  fo rg iveness comes la te r  (ppdSiov) or sooner (xdxiov)".557
What we see th e re fo re  is  tha t fre e  m oral action  is  not only w ith in  
tim e , but i t  also is  in a sense judged according to  tim e. Thus tim e  is  a 
"c r ite r io n "  o f " both fastness and slowness";5 ' 2 but in Origen’s v iew  i t  is  
not so much regarded as measuring fastness o r slowness them selves, but 
as a means fo r  apprec ia ting  m oral action. T here fo re  Oriaerfs tim e  is  in 
p r in c ip le  an "extension" fo r  m oral action  to  be tr ie d  and i t  is  considered 
as a "measure arid c r ite r io n "  not so much m easuring quantity (o f tim e ) 
but measuring quality (o f fre e  m oral action). Time is  the "extension” 
where freedom  is  tr ie d ; fo r  i t  is  only w ith in  tim e  th a t c re a tu re 's  
freedom  can make sense.
Thus, d iv ine "oikonom ia" is  m anifested in tim e ; God h im se lf acts 
"qu ick ly  o r s low ly " as he re a lize s  h is  "oikonomia". Yet Origen adheres to 
h is v iew  o f God's tim e lessness s ta tin g  th a t although ra tio n a l beings need 
tim e  in o rde r to  re a lize  th e ir  freedom , God does not a c tu a lly  need tim e  
in o rder to m an ifes t h is "oikonomia". W ith respect to  th is  he s ta te s  in 
commMatt:
"...and no one should have any h e s ita tio n  in accepting the saying 
th a t i t  is  at once (suSswg) tha t he, who sold a il h is belongings and cave 
to the poor, becomes pe rfec t. I f  the belongings are given over much tim e  
and much tim e  is  needed to  give them to  the above-mentioned poor, the 
Logos is  by no means hindered by tim e  in  o rde r give (in  p ro p o rtio n  to the 
th ings given to  the poor) so tha t he who acted in  such a manner become 
pe rfec t. And i t  is  c lea r tha t he who c a rr ie d  out these deeds w i l l  have a 
treasu re  in the heavens, becoming heavenly h im se lf.571
So the Locos is  in the w o rld  ac ting  "ou ick lu" or "s lo w ly ", uet I I r J
action is  not a c tu a lly  sub jec t to  the confinem ents tha t .time i ts e lf  of 
necessity  imposes on tem poral ra tio n a l crea tures. So i t  is  in a way of 
h is own th a t Origen conceives the presence o f the Logos in tim e. God, 
even in his tem poral presence as Logos, dominates tim e  due to  h is being 
transcendent to  tim e  and c re a to r o f it .
There is  th e re fo re  a fu r th e r  fundamental d iffe re n ce  between 
Origen and the Stoics. The la t te r  held tha t "a ll beings are in tirn e “5/2 and 
so was th e ir  god, due to  h is being immanent in  the w orld . The god of the 
S to ics is  bound, as i t  w ere, w ith  tim e. In Qrigen’s v iew  "a ll beings are in 
tim e" means, as we have seen, th a t e ll created beings are in  tim e. It  is  
the notion o f transcendence o f God v is -a -v is  the w o rld  th a t a llo w s  him  
to consider the re la t io n  o f Logos to  tim e  in the way we discussed above. 
To Origen beings are "in" tim e 5 ' 5 o r "under" tim e ;574 ye t i t  is  h is  c lea r 
conception o f tim e  as created by God and i t  is  also h is conception o f the 
w o rld  in  a sense broader than the v is ib le  firm a m en t, th a t a llo w s  him  to 
regard  tim e  in a more f le x ib le  way. For he goes as fa r  as to  a f f i rm  a 
notion o f r e la t iv i ty  in the conception o f tim e.
Hence Origen is  in te re s ted  ne ithe r in the m otion o f inan im ate  
ob jec ts  nor in th a t o f anim als caused ju s t  by impulses. Besides he deems 
the movement o f heavenly bodies as “v a n i t y " ? A t  any ra te  I t  is  not 
nature  i ts e lf  which he is  preoccupied w ith . Nature is  but a 
"supplement"575 fo rm ing  the surroundings o f m oral action  -w h ich  is  the 
c ru c ia l m a tte r. He makes i t  p e r fe c tly  c lea r tha t the re  is  only one kind o f 
m otion which is  o f in te re s t to him , namely tha t o f ra tio n a l c re a tu re s , 
tha t is  to say, the kind o f m otion which is  cha rac te rized  by the 
co rre la te d  ca tegories of personal freedom  and re s p o n s ib ility .
When th e re fo re  Origen speaks o f tim e  as a means "through w hich 
the whole re tu rn s  to" God57' and when he avers th a t th is  "th rough" has a 
meaning of "serv ing  to"5/8 i t  is  obvious tha t he regards tim e  as 
something more than an extension and m ere ly  na tu ra l (th a t Is, m o ra lly
in d if fe r re n t)  dimension of l i fe ;  but, In addition , he regards tim e as the 
extension "se rv ing ” to  the re a liz a tio n  of fre e  m oral action. This is  the 
kind of "m otion" m ain ly re la ted  to  Origen’s tim e. For i t  is  freedom tha t 
th is  extension p r im a r ily  p e rta in s  to.
God end croeturoly freedom. The perception shows th a t each 
ind iv idua l ra tio n a l c re a tu re  fo llo w s  a personal d ire c tio n  which is  
determ ined by i ts  own fre e  action. In th is  course God is  regarded as 
to ta lly  im p a rtia l, i t  is  qu ite  s ig n if ic a n t tha t Origen's conv ic tion  on th is  
question is  so s trong  tha t he speaks o f “ the p r in c ip le  o f im p a r t ia l i ty  " o f 
God. What is  suggested by th a t is  th a t God by no means in te r fe re s  w ith  
the freedom  of ra tio n a l beings, i t  is  in the lig h t o f th is  conception th a t 
the fo llo w in g  passage fro m  the Princ should be understood:
"...All these, down to  the very leas t, God supervises by the power 
o f h is w isdom and d is tingu ishes by the c o n tro llin g  hand o f h is  judgem ent; 
and thus he has arranged the un iverse on the p r in c ip le  o f the m ost 
im p a rtia l re tr ib u t io n  {aequissima retributione uni versa disposuit ), 
according as each one deserves fo r  h is  m e r it  to  be assisted  or cared fo r. 
Herein is  d isplayed in i ts  completeness the p r in c ip le  o f im p a r t ia l i ty ,  
when the inequ a lity  o f c ircum stances preserves an equa lity  o f re w a rd  
iaequita tis) fo r  m e rit. But the grounds o f m e r it  in each ind iv idua l are 
known w ith  tru th  and clearness only to  God, toge the r w ith  h is 
on ly-begotten  Word and Wisdom and h is Holy S p ir it."542
This kind of re la tio n  of God to  tem poral fre e  action  o f ra tio n a l 
c re a tu res  is  a fundamental conv ic tion  of Origen, w hich can be id e n tif ie d  
in o ther po in ts o f h is w ork as w e ll: "...so also must we understand in 
regard to  the d iv ine providence, tha t he tre a ts  a il who descend in to  the 
s truoa les  of human l i f e  w ith  the m ost im p a rtia l care...";525 and furifier:w w •
"... tha t a il w i l l  take p a rt in the s tru g g le , but ind iv idua ls  w i l l  e ith e r  be 
matched against ind iv idua ls  o r a t any ra te  w i l l  f ig h t in such a way as 
sha ll be approved bu God, who is  the lu s t p res ident o f th is  contest."581
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As regards the function  of angels in re la t io n  to  men i t  is  po rtrayed  thus: 
"C e rta in ly  we must suppose tha t a il these du ties are not 
perfo rm ed by accident o r chance, nor because the angels w ere  n a tu ra lly  
created fo r  them, le s t in so doing we should charge the C rea to r w ith  
p a r t ia l i ty .  Rather must we believe tha t they w ere con fe rred  in 
accordance w ith  m e r it  and v ir tu e  and w ith  the a c t iv ity  and a b il i ty  of 
each ind iv idua l s p ir i t ,  by God who is  the m ost righ teous and im p a rtia l 
governor o f a ll things."522 Hence "God does not o f fe r  p o s s ib iiite s  to some 
beings so tha t they com m it sins nor does he o ffe r  p o s s ib ilit ie s  to o thers  
so th a t they c a rry  out good deeds."58'0
His conv ic tion  is  th a t God’s foreknow ledge in no way a ffe c ts  the 
freedom  of ra tio n a l beings?24 fo r ,  "although i t  may seem strange" 
occurrences happen "not because they are foreknow n, but they have been 
foreknow n ju s t because they w ere going to  happen."525 A cco rd ing ly  in 
selEz i t  is  stated: "So i t  is  upon our choice both to  hear and not o t hear 
as i f  God had no forknow ledge at a ll;  and our freedom  of w i l l  is  n e ithe r 
less i f  God has foreknow ledge nor more i f  God has no foreknow ledge."525 
This sub jec t also is  one of those given p a rtic u la r  emphasis is  Cels:
"Celsus th inks tha t i f  som ething has been p red ic ted  by some s o rt 
o f foreknow ledge, then i t  takes place because i t  was p red ic ted . But we 
do not g ran t th is . We say th a t the man who made the p re d ic tio n  was not. 
the cause o f the fu tu re  event, because he fo re to ld  tha t i t  would happen; 
but we hold th a t the fu tu re  event, which would have taken place even i f  
i t  had not been prophesied, co n s titu te s  the cause o f i ts  p re d ic tio n  by the 
one w ith  foreknowledge. And a ll th is  is  present in the foreknow ledge of 
the prophet; i f  i t  is  possible fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  event to  happen and 
possible fo r  i t  not to  happen, e ith e r o f these a lte rn a tiv e s  may come to  
pass. We do not m a in ta in  tha t the one who has foreknow ledge takes away 
the p o s s ib ility  o f an event happening o r not happening,5S/ saying 
something o f th is  so rt: This w i l l  assured ly happen, and i t  is  Im possib le
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fo r  I t  to  tu rn  out o therw ise . Th is holds good fo r  a ll knowledge about 
m a tte rs  co n tro lle d  by free  w i l l ,  w hether we are dealing w ith  the d iv ine 
s c r ip tu re s  or w ith  Greek s to rie s . And in  fa c t what is  ca lled  by log ic ians 
an id le  argum ent, which is  a sophism, would not even be regarded as 
fa lla c io u s  by Celsus (so mean is  h is  a b il ity ) ,  although by the standards 
of sound log ic  i t  is  a sophism."538
in the commGen the same argument is  adduced; "by no means is  he 
who has foreknow ledge the cause o f what has been foreknow n"5-2 and 
"the foreknow ledge o f God does not impose any necessity  upon those 
which have been fo reseen"590
In fa c t Origen has a c le a r perception o f what c o n s titu te s  God's 
action ( id  g ivousva) in  the w o r ld 591 Thus he arranges d iv ine  ac tion  in 
th ree  ca tegories, namely "out o f w i l l "  (kccicx pouRncuv) "out of 
benevolence" (k q t*  su S o k io v ) "out o f fo rg iv in g " ( k o to  ougx^pnoiv). These 
are the th ree  ways in which God acts in h is to ry . Obviously a ll the th ree  
o f them are re la ted  to d iv ine w ill. The f i r s t  ca tegory ( “out of w i l l " )  
ju s t  a lludes to  God's action  in to  the w o rld  not "in  response" but, as i t  
w ere , by h is own in it ia t iv e .
By co n tra s t to  d iv ine action  Origen d is tingu ishes  d iv ine
"foreknow ledge" (npogvwmv) which is  understood not to  be action . The 
way in which he a rtic u la te s  th is  d is t in c tio n  Is th a t d iv ine
"foreknow ledge" (npogvwaiv) should be understood as re la te d  to d iv ine  
" w i l l"  (pouRnuiv). Thus the category of "foreknow ledge" is  not re la te d  to  
any of the th ree  ca tegories of d iv ine action, indeed Origen makes the 
d is t in c t io n  between " w i l l"  and "foreknow ledge" of God more than once in  
h is work.592
i t  is , th e re fo re , obvious tha t Origen, throughout h is  e n tire
theology, m a in ta ins h is v iew  o f the freedom  o f ra tio n a l c re a tu re s
in s is tin g  th a t God's foreknow ledge bu no means in troduces any l im i ts  to 
th is  freedom.
The conception of cousoiity. N evertheless in Oriqen’s conception 
of tim e  there  is  a notion of causa lity . Let us then see how he perceives 
that.
F irs t,  Origen does not deny tha t there  is  a ca u sa lity  in the 
succession o f human actions, indeed, in the commGen i t  is  asserted tha t 
forknow ledge by God is  due to  the knowledge o f succession and evo lu tion  
o f actions according to  a causa lity :
“ in the beginning of c rea tion  God has estab lished the p r in c ip le  tha t 
nothing should happen w ith o u t a cause; so, bu h is m ind he goes along 
w hat is  going to  happen, seeing th a t i t  is  because th is  one happened, i t  is  
th a t one which fo llo w s ; and i f  th is  subsequently takes place, tha t one 
fo llo w s ; and once th is  happens, th a t one w il l  take place; and i t  is  in th is  
way th a t God has advanced u n til the end o f th ings, he knows w hat w i l l  
happen in the fu tu re , yet by no means being h im se lf a cause o f 
everyth ing  th a t w i l l  happen. I t  is  lik e  knowing beforehand th a t someone 
who, because o f h is ignorance dashes re ck le ss ly  on a s lip p e ry  road, w i l l  
s lip  down; yet he who knows i t  beforehand is  not the cause o f s lipp ing  
down."390
Natural causality. Thus Origen adm its  tha t the re  is  a “n a tu ra l” 
causa lity  and he also adm its th a t actions may fo llo w  a ca u sa lity  o f th is  
s o rt, known to God beforehand. He accord ing ly  adm its  tha t human beings 
are sub ject to th is  causa lity , i t  the same way tha t any o the r liv in g  being 
is ; fo r  example, to  be sub ject to  a c e rta in  ex te rna l im press ion  w hich 
gives r is e  to an images of one s o r t o r another, i t  is  not w ith in  the 
power of choice.59** Origen holds th a t in general ex te rna l n a tu ra l causes 
do not lie  w ith in  the power of man’s choice?93 in s im ple  w ords, th is  
kind of cau sa lity  means th is : A man is  fre e  as regards h is choice o f 
m oral action -y e t he is  also a p a rt o f the na tu ra l re a lity , i f  he is  on the 
f i f t h  f lo o r  of a bu ild ing  and jum ps out o f the w indow, he w i l l  fa l l  down 
and be harmed. His freedom  does not e n ta il tha t he is  “ fre e ” not to  be
2 f  6
sub ject to  the law  of g ra v ity . This is  the notion suggested bu te rm
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Causality in rational action. Another kind o f CSUS3li-tU P erta ins to 
what is  understood as a reasonably expected course o f events. This 
ca u sa lity  has not any d e te rm in is tic  character, i t  is  because Origen 
considers fre e d om ; as a fundamental fa c u lty  o f ra tio n a l beings, tha t he 
adm its  a contingency in  regard  to  the choices o f fre e  w il l :  "And i f  
someone says th a t the outcome may be th is  but i t  is  contingent tha t i t  
m igh t be a d if fe re n t one, we adm it th a t th is  is  true, what is  not 
contingent is  th a t God may be fa lse ; contingency applies only to  what is  
contingent on occu rring  and i t  is  possib le fo r  anyone to  th ink  tha t 
ce rta in  th ings may occur or may not occur."595 There fo re  "our freedom  
o f w i l l  is  in  no way a ffec ted  by the fa c t tha t God knows w hat is  going to 
be done by everyone"?9 '
There fo re  th is  causa lity  which Origen adm its  as e x is tin g  during 
an aeon does not stand beyond the freedom  of ra tio n a l beings; fo r  a ll 
p o s s ib ilit ie s  fo r  fre e  action  are open .
Existential causality. By co n tra s t, the re  is  another kind o f ca u sa lity  
which is  rea lized  at the end o f an aeon, namely d u rin g 39*  a judgement. 
This causa lity  appears to  stand beyond the freedom  o f ra tio n a l 
crea tu res.
The moment at which judgement w i l l  occur is  a re s u lt o f fre e  
m oral action of ra tio n a l c rea tu res ; fo r  th is  judgement takes place during 
the consummation, occuring "to  the e n tire  w o rld  w hich is  in need of
c ro  r)
p u r if ic a tio n  whenever the ev il in i t  becomes ex ten s ive "?35 ye t the re  are 
c e rta in  occurrences which are not under the co n tro l o f c re a tu re ly  
freedom.
F irs t,  th is  freedom , as m oral action , may acce le ra te  o r delay the 
occurrence of the end of an aeon, ye t the ve ry  moment th a t i t  occurs 
beloncs to God's choice alone. I t  is  beyond our knowledae when the end of
£? i
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Second, the very fa c t th a t a consummation takes place at the end 
o f an aeon.
T h ird , the fa c t th a t a judgement takes place a t the same tim e.
Fourth, the rank of l i fe ,  to  w hich a ra tio n a l being w i l l  be 
transposed in o rder to in the aeon fo llo w in g  the judgem ent
A ll these e lem ents c o n s titu te  a supreme ca u sa lity  w hich is  
v ir tu a lly  beyond the freedom  o f ra tio n a l beings. For they cannot a ve rt 
the "p u r if ic a tio n "  o f the w o rld ; they also cannot a ve rt the fa c t tha t 
judgement and rearrangem ent o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res  in the va rious ranks 
o f l i f e  takes place at tha t tim e. This causa lity  is  a datum in the 
make-up o f the whole w o rld  and i t  stem s fro m  the w i l l  o f God only. Th is 
is  as a datum as the very fa c t th a t th is  w o rld  e x is ts  as a Kaiaponfi. For* 
once the fa l l  occurred, the existence o f the w o rld  is  beyond the choice 
o f the w i l l  o f ra tio n a l beings; they can s tr iv e  fo r  the end to come bee 
chapter 53 but the re a liz a tio n  o f th is  expecta tion  depends, upon God’s 
judgement. This is  why Origen s ta tes  th a t "human w il l  is  not s u ff ic ie n t 
in  o rder to  reach the end'005 and "God arranges the th ings o f the w o rld  
in  the approp ria te  k a iro i and he alone knows the reasons of what occurs 
at these t1m es"°0-
Rational c re a tu res  cannot escape th is  supreme causa lity . T he ir
freedom  i ts e lf  is  the cause o f th is  cau sa lity , w h ile  th e ir  e x is te n tia l
s ta tus  (th a t is , the rank o f l i f e  in w hich they are placed) is  the effect. 
The w il l  o f ra tio n a l c rea tu res  is  e n tire ly  fre e  to act during an aeon and 
to  come to a d ia le c tica l re la t io n  to the w i l l  o f God. What cannot be 
escaped, however, is  th a t th is  w i l l  w i l l  be judged according to  God’s 
im p a rtia l righ teousness600 Hence, the ve ry  fa c t o f judgem ent, a lthough 
occu rring  in ce rta in  moments of the continuum o f tim e , a c tu a lly  a f f ec t s  
and determ ines the conception o f a ll tim e. This is  why Origen avers 
tha t th is  causa lity  " is  a doc trine  which should be regarded as an e te rn a l
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e n tire  make up o f creation .
This causa lity  i t s e lf  presupposes the existence o f tim e. For no 
re la t io n  between cause (as something before) and effect (as something 
a fte r ). could make sense in the absence of tim e. The e n tire  w o rld  is  
tem pora l and i t  is  only w ith in  tim e  tha t freedom  o f c re a tu res  can make 
sense. For freedom  presupposes the p o s s ib ility  o f (a t lea s t) a dilemma...
o f th ink ing  upon i t ,  o f decision and choice. A ll thesc c o  r 5 ; - 1 m t i o o  f 'p .n  r n s i /-•CJ! ) i i iU f - .
sense only as successions in  tim e. For a ra tio n a l c re a tu re  f irs t  faces a 
m u ltitu d e  o f p o s s ib ilit ie s , then considers them, then fo rm s  h is w i l l  and 
then chooses. Thus the notion o f possibility  o f a choice makes sense 
only as being before the choice i t s e l f 500
The notion of p re -existen t onuses. Holding th is  conception of 
tim e  and m otion, Origen goes ahead w ith  developing h is notion of 
"p re -e x is te n t causes". This is  exactly  what underlines the e x is te n tia l 
causa lity  as w e ll as h is conv ic tion  about freedom  o f w il l .
Beside a ll o ther reasons, the re  is  one p a r t ic u la r  one leading 
Origen to  a f f irm  a co n tin u ity  o f tim e  throughout the aeons: This is  
because in the “extension" o f tim e  a ca u sa lity  is  estab lished and th is
causa lity  is  extended in more than one aeon. The arrangem ent (o f the
ra tio n a l beings in the various ranks o f l i fe )  e x is tin g  in an aeon is  
d ire c t ly  re la ted  to  both the previous and the next aeon. For th is  present 
arrangem ent is  the effect o f the fre e  m oral action  which occurred  in 
the past aeon. A t the same tim e , the "movement" (th a t is  to  say, the 
m oral action) taking place during th is  aeon is  the cause fo r  the
arrangem ent in the aeon to come.
The co n tin u ity  of tim e  makes possib le fo r  th is  notion  to be 
established. Besides, the continuum o f tim e  is  not a ffe c ted  by the
occurrence of rearrangem ent o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res  in the va rious  ranks 
of l i fe ,  since tha t moment (the "moment" o f judgement) is  regarded as
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having no dura tion  at a ll. Thus there  is  not “break" o f the con tinua tion  of 
tim e  at the moment when a rearrangem ent of ra tio n a l beings in the 
ranks of l i fe  takes place. The notion o f th is  rearrangem ent taking place 
"in  the tw in k lin g  o f an eye lid", is  p a tic u la r ly  usefu l to Origen, as we 
have seen.
Hence the e x is te n tia l s ta tus  o f ra tio n a l beings during th is  aeon is  
the result o f p re -e x is te n t causes. Again, i t  is  a s c r ip tu ra l basis which 
is  sought fo r  th is  notion to be grounded:
" I t  fo llo w s , I th ink , tha t we must also ingu ire  what are the causes 
which lead the so u l' o f man to  be influenced at one tim e  bu good s p ir i ts  
and at another tim e  by bad. I suspect th a t i t  is  due to  c e rta in  causes 
which are o lder even than our b ir th  in th is  body, as John ind ica ted  by h is 
leaping and re jo ic in g  in h is m o the r’s womb when the voice o f Mary’s 
sa lu ta tio n  sounded in  the ears o f h is  m other E lisabeth, and as is  
declared by the prophet Jerem iah who, ’before  he was form ed in h is  
m other's b e lly ’ was known by God and ‘before  he came fo r th  fro m  the 
womb’ was sa n c tifie d  by him , and w h ile  yet a boy rece ived the g i f t  o f 
prophecy.505 On the o ther hand i t  is  c le a r ly  proved tha t some people are 
possessed r ig h t fro m  th e ir  e a r lie s t years, th a t is , are born w ith  an 
accompanying daemon, w h ile  o the rs  are declared by the tes tim ony o f 
h is to r ie s  to have been under supernatura l con tro l fro m  boyhood, and 
o thers  s t i l l  have fro m  th e ir  e a r lie s t years been in d w e lt bu a daemon 
whom they te rm  a Python,507 th a t is , a s p ir i t  o f ven triloqu ism .
"in  the face of these examples, those who m a in ta in  th a t eve ry th ing  
in th is  w o rld  is  governed by the providence o f God, a d o c trine  w hich is 
also p a rt o f our fa ith , can give no answer, as i t  seems to  me, w hich w i l l  
prove d iv ine providence to be fre e  fro m  a ll suspicion of in ju s tic e ; except 
to  say th a t the re  w ere ce rta in  p re -e x is te n t causes w hich led these 
souls, before  they w ere born in to  the body, to  co n tra c t some degree of 
g u ilt  in th e ir  se ns itive  or em otional nature, in consequence o f w hich
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div ine providence has judged them w o rth y  of enduring these su ffe rings . 
For the soul a lways possesses fre e  w i l l ,  both when in the body and when 
out o f the bod irUd and the w il l 's  freedom  always moves in the d ire c tio n  
e ith e r o f good o r e v il,  nor can the ra tio n a l sense, tha t is , the mind or 
soul, ever e x is t w ith o u t some movement e ith e r oood o r ev il, i t  is  
probable tha t these movements fu rn ish  grounds fo r  m e r it  even before 
the souls do anything in th is  w o r ld /s o  tha t in accordance w ith  such 
causes or m e r its  they are ordained by the d iv ine providence r ig h t fro m  
th e ir  b ir th , yes, and even before  i t ,  i f  i may so speak, to endure 
conditions e ith e r good o r ev il."509
in the same context, i t  is  s ta ted  th a t “...by reason o f h is  m e r its  in 
some previous l i f e  Jacob had deserved to  be loved by God to  such an 
extent as to  be w o rth y  of being p re fe rre d  to  h is brother...” 510 There are 
"o lder causes to  account fo r  the 'vessel o f honour' and the ‘vessel o f 
dishonour' so the "o lder reasons why Jacob was loved and Esau hated 
lie  w ith  Jacob before  he came in to  the body and w ith  Esau before  he 
entered Rebecca’s wom b"61!
Hence "...for antecedent causes a d if fe re n t p os ition  o f se rv ice  is  
prepared by the C rea tor fo r  each one in p ropo rtio n  to  the degree of h is 
m e r it ,  which depends on the fa c t th a t each, in  being crea ted  by God as a 
mind o r ra tio n a l s p ir i t ,  has persona lly  gained fo r  h im se lf, in accordance 
w ith  the movements o f h is m ind and the d ispo s ition  o f h is hea rt, a 
g re a te r o r less share of m e r it ,  and has rendered h im se lf lovable o r i t  
may be ha te fu l to God."512
The conclusion is  tha t "...each being, w hether o f heaven o r e a rth  o r 
below the ea rth , may be said to. possess w ith in  h im se lf the causes of 
d iv e rs ity  antecedent to h is b ir th  in the body. For a ll th ings w ere  crea ted  
by the Word of God and were set in  o rde r through the opera tion  o f h is 
righteousness; and in h is gracious compassion he provides fo r  a ll and 
exhorts  a ll to  be cured by w hatever rem edies they may, and in c ite s  them
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to  sa lva tion .'010
This causa lity  e x is tin g  in  Origen's conception o f tim e  underline 
the subs tan tia l sequence of the aeons in to  the continuous extension of 
tim e ; i t  also underlines tha t although in  p r in c ip le  tim e  is  perceived as 
an element of the make-up o f the w o rld , and th e re fo re  a natura/ 
e lem ent, i t  is  also deeply involved in metaphysical cons idera tions, since 
i t  is  the venue where God's w i l l  (and not only the c re a tu re ly  one) is  
rea lized. Thus, the notions of co n tin u ity  o f tim e , "v e r t ic a l"  d is co n tin u ity  
o f space and u n ifo rm ity  of nature  o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res , a ll toge the r
play a s ig n ific a n t ro le  in the exposition  o f the conception of th is
C ausa lity and i ts  deeper s ign ificance.
There are serious reasons fo r  Qrloen to  consider th is  ca u sa lity
W w
estab lished in tim e. We have a lready mentioned the f i r s t  reason, namely
tha t in th is  way freedom  (and, thus, fre e  m ora l ac tion ) becomes
m eaningful as i t  is  o rien ted  tow ards a goal.
The second reason is  tha t Orioen w ishes to  s tre s s  th a t God isw
im p a rtia l and righ teous in respect o f the action o f ra tio n a l crea tu res. 
These conceptions o f God are s ta ted  as "p rin c ip le s ", namely the
"p rin c ip le  o f im p a r t ia l ity '014 as w e ll as the "p r in c ip le  o f
righ teousness"513
The th ird  reason pe rta in s  to  Origen's aim  to  es tab lish  a C h ris tia n  
conception o f tim e  con tras ted  to  e ith e r the va rious Greek or the
Gnostic ones.
Thus, as regards the past aeon, th is  cau sa lity  explains the 
present e x is te n tia l s ta tu s  of ra tio n a l beings so th a t God's im p a r t ia l i ty  
and righteousness rem ain unquestioned. Regarding the next aeon, fre e  
m oral action  is  o rien ted  to  a goal and thus freedom  is  rendered
m eaningful by expecta tion  and hope. There is  fu tu re  end w hich a tt r ib u te s  
a deeper meaning to  freedom  and, th e re fo re , to  tim e. Th is is  why in 
Origen's theology te rm s lik e  prophecy, promise, hope, expectation.
fu lfilm entrealization  ere used. I f  there  were no o rie n ta tio n  tow erds 
the fu tu re  end no hope, then freedom  would be abso lu te ly  meaningless; 
subsequently tim e  would loose i ts  fundamental s ign ificance  end 
c ru c ia iity ;  i t  would ju s t be a "na tu ra l" element o f the w o rld , as It  was 
to the e a rly  S toics. In the Greek conception o f recu rrence  of iden tica l 
w orlds , fu tu re  has nothing to prom ise; m oral action  vanishes Into 
t r iv ia l i t y .  Th is was the deeper meaning o f Marcus A u re liu s ’ fru s tra tio n .
I t  is  out o f th is  conception o f tim e  tha t Origen regards judgement 
as a "ka iro s '615 in which prom ise, expectation and hope are fu lf i l le d . Yet 
i t  is  out o f the conv ic tion  o f God’s goodness tha t th is  judgement is 
regarded as not the " fin a l"  one nor is  the consummation regarded as the 
" fin a l"  end of the w orld . C rea tu re ly  freedom , expecta tion of an u lt im a te  
re a liz a tio n  o f . hope as w e ll as the b e lie f In God’s goodness lead a 
conception o f tim e  com pris ing  succeeding aeons. "Consummations" and 
"judgem ents" are the fixed  po in ts in which ca u sa lity  is  rea lized. Besides, 
the continuation  o f tim e  through these fixed  po in ts  has the meaning of 
g iv ing ra tio n a l beings one more chance fo r  im provem ent and sa lva tion , in 
th is  way co rrob o ra tin g  God's goodness.
Time as the extension of freedom. Thus tim e  is  not s im p ly  an 
element o f the na tu ra l w o rld , be i t  "seen" o r "not seen". It is  the 
extension where freedom  is  rea lized. In co n tra s t to the e a rly  S to ics  who 
did not re la te  the question o f tim e  to m o ra lity  (but they considered I t  as 
ju s t  a "na tu ra l" problem ), in  Origen th is  c o rre la tio n  is  apparent. In 
homLuc he quotes Luke, 1,80, commenting on i t  as fo llow s : " To grow ' 
has a tw o fo ld  meaning; i t  means to  grow  in body, where human freedom  
does not co llabo ra te ; and i t  means to  grow  s p ir itu a lly ,  where freedom  Is 
the cause o f grow th."51'
Time is  an "extension" and a "dimension o f l i fe "  w here i t  is  not 
s im p ly  the m o ra lly  co lou rless m otion of na tu ra l w o rld  tha t takes place, 
but i t  is  where freedom  is  m anifested and rea lize d  in a c ru c ia l way.
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R efe rrin g  to  the d isc ip les  asking Jesus who was the t r a i to r  fo re to ld  by 
him  him self.,518 Origen sta tes: "For they knew th a t, being humans, the 
choice of those s t i l l  in progress Is co nve rtib le  and th is  choice is 
susceptib le  o f w il l in g  the co n tra ry  to those w il l in g  before.'618 And In 
comm/iait, (quoting M a tt.7 ,9 -1 1): "why did he ca ll the d isc ip les  as 
w o rth le ss?  because eventhough they fo llow ed  fre e ly ; they s t i l l  had the 
changeab ility  o f human mind. And i t  is  only the son o f God who Is 
unchangeable both to  h is  d iv ine and human nature.'620 For " i t  is  only 
anim als which do not change fro m  a low e r gender to  a m ore noble one or 
vice versa; but, as fa r  as men are concerned, i t  is  a lw ays possib le to 
see people e ith e r ju s t o r e v il;  o r to  see them reaching v ir tu e  out o f ev il 
o r q u itt in g  im provem ent tow ards v ir tu e  and fa llin g  in to  e v il. '621 as 
"nothing in human nature is  perm anent"522
A ccord ing ly , when Origen in te rp re ts  the meaning o f apvp as 
"beginning" o f the "extension" o f tim e , he re la te s  i t  to  "movement" 
perce iv ing  th is  movement as m oral action.520
C erta in ly  the S to ics  held th a t i t  is  m oral ac tion  th a t is  o f u tm ost 
s ign ificance .524 Marcus A u re liu s  in co n tra s t to the e a rly  S to ics, 
c o rre la te s  m o ra lity  to  tim e , considering tim e  i ts e lf  as a m ora l question, 
as we have seen, is th is  a po in t o f a f f in i ty  o f Origen's conception of 
tim e  to a ce rta in  S to ic  one?
The answer is  no; fo r  the way Marcus re la te s  tim e  to  m o ra lity  is  
to ta lly  d if fe re n t ( i f  not exac tly  opposed to ) the way Origen does it .  To 
Marcus, tim e  is  the u ltim ae  impasse and responsib le  fo r  the 
"d is tru c tio n "  o f human action, especia lly  o f human m oral action. Marcus 
again and again pe rson ifie s  tim e, i t  seems a lm ost to  be the governor of 
the physical w o rld  and the source (o r d e s tro ye r) o f i t s  re a lity , i t  
sw a llow s up a ll a c tio n 525 So the fa c t th a t Marcus does not re fe r  to  the 
e a rly  S to ics cannot be co incidenta l. J. R is t accepts th a t i t  m ig h t. be 
co inc iden ta l, yet he acknowledges th a t i t  Is a s trange coincidence
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because the manner In which Marcus speaks of tim e, would not square 
easily with these defin itions525
How Origen relates time to m orality stands in contrast to the 
manner Marcus does it. For his stance towards time is to ta lly  different. 
To Marcus time i s .the ultim ate impasse; to Origen tim e is the means 
through which hope can be rea lized 627 As time is the field where 
rational creatures strive for their restoration, it  is regarded as the 
means to realize this goal and not as a destroyer of moral action. It is 
clear that the deeper pessimism of Marcus is due to the inherent 
incapability of Stoicism for transcendence. The desire for redemption is 
distinguishable in Marcus more than in any other Stoic -besides it  is a 
general symptom of his era. Origen met Stoicism at a tim e when this 
philosophy demonstrated symptoms of degeneration end impasse. His 
presuppositions, however, were d ifferent and so were the aims of his 
thought. This is why he has been able to employ Stoic notions and yet to 
transform  them so vigorously and radically that they eventually come in 
s trark  contrast to Stoic thought itse lf.
in fact, Origen uses Stoic categories attributing to them a content 
stemmina from his Christian faith. He reaards time as an indispensable
w  W
means towards the realization of hope; i t  is his conviction that rational 
beings are endowed with free w ill; he holds a broader conception of the 
world and a notion of Causality and Judgement establishing an in trins ic  
meaning on time itse lf. These ere serious reasons for him to employ the 
notion of prolongation of time.
So, although the notion its e lf sounds s im ilar to the Stoic one, in 
fact it  stems from not just d ifferent but stark opposite presuppositions 
and aims.
Existential causality is a guarantee that time is not a destroyer 
of moral action and that this action does not vanish into tr iv ia lity . Time 
not only does not depress Origen, but this tim e, the time of this aeon, is
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not enough to him -in  contrast to Marcus Aurelius who did not regard 
prolongation of time as necessary, as we have seen. This is why he 
Origen time as stretching throughout many aeons. It is his fa ith  to the 
Goodness of God that makes Orioen to hold that there is always time
W  w  ' w
available to rational creatures so that they act free ly  and return to God 
by both his help528 and their free moral action.
However, there is one point which should be c larified . In chapter 4 
we shall discuss brie fly  the sim plistic distinction drawn between Greek 
and Hebrew thought, which has been widely repeated (rather than each 
time pondered upon) by scholars. A facet of this distinction is to 
introduce the notion of quality o f timer*23 According to this distinction, 
in Greek thought the "quality" of past time is the same w ith that of 
present time and thus "time is homogeneous" 550 In fact, however, the 
notion of quality of time is meaningless. Time in its e lf has not Quality 
at all. It is a natural element of the make-up of the world end natural 
elements have no moral quality whatsoever. Time has also a 
metaphysical significance because it  is in time that the encounter of 
divine w ill and creaturely w ill takes place. But, in that case, the notion 
of quality applies to free moral action in time and not to time its e lf 
Regarding this “action", time can have in in trinsic  meaning -but no 
"quality". Certainly expressions about "quality of time" are being used, 
yet they make sense only once this distinction has been made. However, 
it  is inaccurate to speak of "Quality of time" in a s tr ic t theological of 
philosophical sense, when one ponders upon the problematique of time 
proper.
it would be useful to consider Origen's notion of ore-existing  
causes in view of the assertion that it  was a characteristic  of Greek 
thought to think causally, and consequently in terms of natural science, 
whereas Hebrew thought thinks fina lly  or ideologically This contention 
has been made by T. Boman, who states: "The one puts its e lf outside the
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events and looks backwards; the other puts its e lf into the events and 
thinks its e lf In to ' the psychic life  of the man involved and how they 
directed themselves forward in thought and w ill. The one concerns itse lf  
with the past, the other w ith the present ana future ,‘551 Likewise, 5. 
van Gronigen contends that the fundamental orientation of Greek thought 
was toward the past052 He contends that, for the Greek, the prevailing 
type of history was aetiological in which the inner dynamic or driving 
power in the historical process was sought in the oggaf which was 
understood not so much in the sense of "beginning" as In the sense of 
"causes" (a rn a i) 650
V/e shall not discuss these contentions in themselves because such 
a discussion is beyond our scope. We only say that we deem such 
distinctions to be over-sim plistic. Origen’s thought is a illustra tion  of 
how these distinctions cannot withstand any severe criticism :
Origen does establish an aei/o/og/ca/ character In the process in 
space-time. He also has no hesitation to speak about at vim and even 
omof -in  fact the la tte r  term  appears in the t it le  of the Princ, Despite 
this, however, his thought Is par excellence a teleologies! one (as we 
shall argue in chapter 3), he is entirely preoccupied w ith the future and 
not w ith the past. The very notion of Causality established in his 
conception of time constitutes a perception of the eschatologics, 
process in a way stressing creaturely freedom. Thus he can think both 
causalIg and teleologicallg To scholars such as Soman and van Gronigen, 
this affirm ation would seem contradictory. The study of Origen’s thought 
proves that it  is not contradictory; and it  further proves that the 
over-sim plistic  distinctions and contentions like the above-mentioned. In 
spite of their appealing formulation, are weak and indeed quite invalid in 
terms of philosophy of history.
At any rate , it  is exactly this perpetual movement in time that 
provides rational beings1 action with ail possibilities. These
287
possibilities can be realized, through the Causality existing in this 
conception of time. Thus Origen asserts that "the son of devil'' may 
become "son of God"; for "a son of devil is not a such by structure" but 
he has been what it  is because his own action554 What d ifferentia tes  
rational creatures is the result of their free action.
This is how Origen maintains his "natural" view of his world  
relating it  to metaphysical implications at the same time. Accordingly, 
he defines an “aeon" as "natural system, comprising various bodies end 
containing differences of reason which stem from the difference In 
knowledge of God."555
This definition explicates the view of "aeon" as a "natural" rea lity  
yet related to God. In the same definition the notion of causality is 
clearly suggested through the term  svsksv  (because of). The notion of 
perpetual movement, as moral action, means that existential causality 
existing in Origen’s conception of time is not a contingent one. This 
means that it  cannot be said that i f  a cause arises then the effect 
appears. The cause does exist all the time; for cause is free moral 
action its e lf, which in Origen’s world is perpetual.
So this causality, as fu lly existing in tim e, determines the 
conception of time its e lf and it  is a constitutive element of creation. 
But once it  was established God himself is Im partial. Thus, although the 
very existence of this causality is beyond creaturely freedom, yet both 
cause and effect are entirely dependent upon creaturely freedom. For 
both cause and result appear to be determined by free moral action. 
Accordingly, this causality is entirely existing in time as both cause and 
result stand in a temporal seouence.
With respect to this point, we endorse H. Chadwick's assertion  
that "Origen is quite clear that the expansion of C hristianity is not to be 
accounted for by any naturalistic  explanations.'655  although this would 
seem confusing to T. Boman who contends that "to think causally ’’
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necessarily means to think "in term s of natural science" 551
Nevertheless, here is another notion of causality, according io 
which it  is only the cause that stems from creature's w ill and from  
time; the effect (namely God's response in his dialectical re lation with  
creaturely freedom) stems entire ly  from God’s w ill and therefore, 
although manifested into the world, It  v irtua lly  has its  origin in 
timelessness. Such is the case of prayer; and in that case causality is 
not a relation fu lly  in tim e, but i t  is understood as a relation between 
time and timelessness.
Ceussliiy between time end timelessness. The question of the 
relation between God and man through prayer is, in Origen’s thought, 
directly  related to the question of free w ill, it is not Incidental that his 
analyses about motion, as discussed in the previous pages, are extended 
in his deOr. The challenge which Origen is up against is the question of 
whether it  makes any sense to pray at all.
Thus he deals with the views of those who deny the use of prayer, 
not because they deny the existence of God, but just because they place 
God over the universe and a ffirm  that there is a Providence503 Their 
argument is based on two particular points:
F irs t, they a ffirm  that "God knows all things before they be" 5o3 
and nothing which happens is known to him for the f irs t  tim e when It  
happens, as if  i t  were not known before this. This is a view of Or 1 gen's, 
too. Yet those who deny the use of prayer adduce the argument that "the 
heavenly Father knoweth what things" we "have need of before" we "ask 
him", as stated in Matt.,6 ,8 . Therefore, he who is the Father and Creator 
of the world, who "loveth all things that are and abhorreth none of the 
things which" he "hath made",540 should dispense what is for the 
well-being of each one without being prayed to. Just as the father does, 
who protects his babies and does not w ait upon their request, e ither 
because theu are unable to ask at a ll. or because throuoh innocence they
w * w
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often wish to receive things that are clean contrary to the ir p ro fit end 
advantage; and human beings are much further off from God than mere 
children are from the mind of the ir parents.
There is also a second argument; for those who deny the use of 
prayer aver that future is not only foreknown to God, but also 
predetermined by him and nothing comes to pass which has not been 
predetermined by him. For if  one were to pray that the sun should rise, 
he would be regarded as foolish fellow , for requesting that something 
should happen through his prayer, which would happen in any case 
without his prayer. Moreover, if  "the wicked are estranged from the 
womb"541 and the righteous man has been determined from his "mother's 
womb"542 and "the chi idem  being not yet born neither having done 
anything good or bad, that the purpose of God according to election might 
stand, not of works, but of him that caileth" 540 there is one conclusion 
to be reached: Since God is unchangeable and has predetermined 
everything that is, and abides in what he has pre-arranged, it  is obviouly 
inconsistent to pray with the idea of altering his plan by prayer or of 
entreating him as one who has not pre-arranged it  but awaits each one’s 
prayer. This would be to make prayer the reason why God arranges what 
is fittin g  for him who prays, and settles then what is deemed proper, as 
i f  it  had not already been foreseen by him.
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Thus there is a twofold argument against the necessity for 
praying. Origen stated it  through the same words w ith which the 
problem had been posed to him: "First; if  God knows the future  
beforehand, and it must come to pass, prayer is vain. Secondly; if  all 
things happen according to the w ill of God, and if  what is w illed by him 
is fixed, and nothing of what he w ills  can be changed, prayer is vain .'544
The question which Origen is up against here is not only the use of 
prayer. The very question is whether or not the dialectical re lation  
between God and creatures actually exists and makes sense; and further,
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whether a creature’s action may cause a responding action from God. in 
fact prayer is only a particu lar case of the question whether an action 
taking place in time and re ferred  to timelessness may cause a reaction  
from tirneiessness at a time subsequent to this temporal action. The 
very question, therefore, is .w hether Origen holds a notion of causality 
of this sort, namely a causality extended in both tim e and tirneiessness. 
And we shall assert that, indeed, Origen does hold such a notion.
His argument is again based on the freedom of w ill. He asserts 
that "from the creation '645  and "the foundation of ..the world"545 
everything has been known to God and therefore he has foreknowledge of 
what the choice of our free  w ill w ill be. He does not fa il to stress again 
that foreknowledge of God is not the cause of all future events or of 
future actions performed by us out of our free w ill and choice. God has 
arranged everything before hand in accordance w ith what he lias seen 
concernino each act of free w ill and what w ill be answered bu hisw _
providence.54^
Given this fundamental opinion, he articulates his view of the 
relation between God an man through prayer. Since each act of free w ill 
is known to God it  is reasonable to assume that he also knows what 
someone w ill pray for, his kind of disposition the nature of his fa ith  and 
what he desires to happen to him. it  is according to this knowledge that 
God disposes things somewhat as follows:
"i w ill hear this man who w ill pray prudently, for the very 
prayer's sake which he w ill prau; but this man i w ill not hear, e ither 
because he w ill be unworthy to be heard, or because he w ill pray for 
things which are neither profitable for hirn who prays, non proper for 
me to grant; and for this prayer (le t us say) of so-and-so i w ill not hear, 
him; but for that i w ill hear him .''543
Also, "i w ill grant this or that to this men who w ill pray, because 
it  is meet for me to do this for a man who w ill pray, blamelessly and
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w ill not prove careless in the m atter of. prayer; and when he shah pray 
for a certain time, i w ill bestow this or that upon him 'exceeding 
abundantly above1 what he ’asks fo r54y for it  is meet for me to overpass 
him in good deeds end to supply him with more than he has been able to 
ask fo r ."554
Thus Origen develops his argument by putting his own conception 
of the mind of God into words as if  spoken by God h im self55 '1 whet is of 
significance here is that he regards God as "responding” on a causative 
ground. Thus there are expressions like "because of the prayer itself"  
(ST auxrjv xfjv suxpv) 552 "because he is unworthy of being heard" (Sid xo 
avdyiov auxov sasaSai xou snaKouaSnasaScn) ,655 "because he has prayed 
these things for" (Sid 16  xauxa auxov su^aaSca) ,654 "because it  is meet 
for me to do this for a man who w ill pray blarnessly end w ill not prove 
careless in the m atter of prayer" 555 " for  i t  is meet for me to overpass 
him in good deeds" (moi $dp xovSs npsnei vtKdv sv xcng sunoiiaic) 555
What these expressions show is that the relation between man and 
God in prayer is conceived as a causative relation. The cause of this 
relation is the prayer its e lf and has its  source in time; the effect is 
God's response and it  obviously has it  source in God's tirneiessness.
Thus each of the two legs {cause-effect) of this causality lies in 
rea lities  d ifferent w ith respect to time. This causality, therefore, may 
be seen either from the point of view of time or that of tirneiessness. 
The f irs t  is quite simple; for this relation is realized in tim e, namely 
the result of prayer (whatever this result is, namely fu lfilm ent of the 
petion, or not)) is understood to come after the prayer. To see this 
relation from a timeless point of view is extremely d iffic u lt, i f  not 
impossible.
it has been asserted that Origen holds that God has answered all 
prayers before ail time or p re -e te rn a lly 657 Such an assertion, however, 
is actually a denial of the very fact that the dialectical re lation between
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God end men takes piece el the time of the preyer on. It should he 
objected nevertheless that this sentence makes sense only if  it  is seen 
from e temporal point of view; for from that of tirneiessness it does not 
make sense to distinguish between “before ail time" and “now", as those 
categories make sense only from a temporal point of view.
However, i f  one enquires into Origen's expressions carefully some 
conclusions may be drawn. Thus, what those expressions show is that 
what God holds before time is not the response its e lf but his 
knowledge o f the response. This means that God, regarded from our 
point of view, acts at the tim e of the prayer; the dialectical relation  
between God and him who pays is fu lly  real at that time; this Is why 
Origen portrays the state of prayer as follows: "...he whose mind Is set 
on prayer is in some sense profited merely by the settled condition 
involved in praying, when he has disposed humseif to approach God end 
speak in his presence as to one who watches over him and is present.'053  
As we saw, Origen adopts the method of putting his own conceptions of 
the mind of God into words as if  spoken by God himself. What is quite 
characteristic  in that case is that he presents God as speaking in Future 
tense; "i shall hear" (snaKouaoyai), "I shall not hear" (ouk s n a K O u a o u c u ) ,  
"he w ill be unworthy of being heard" (5id 16  avdEiov a u x o v  bo so dux x o u  
snaKoua9ijasa9aO, "i w ill grant this or that" (xdoe usv x iv g  n o m o u O ,  "I 
w ill bestow" (5wpqaouxa) b53
Certainly, it  is Origen himself who says that " whenever verbs 
are applied to timeless being one should not understand the tim ely  
implications of verbs in a s tric t sense", yet at the same point he states  
that Future tense indicates what "will exist in the future" 653 From a 
timeless point of view, there is no "future". Yet what Origen indicates 
here is that the action of God is actually realized In a dialectical 
relation to the prayer, at the time of prayer. This means that the 
response of God is regarded ss an action which takes place at that time.
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This becomes more clear from  the way Origen relates this action of God 
explic itly  relating It  to time. In the same work he presents God thinking 
as follows: "Moreover, to such an one, who w ill become such as this, I 
w ill send this m inistering anoei, to be his fe llow -w orker from this time
w w *
onward (and xouos apyousvov xou vpovou), and to continue w ith him until 
such a time (uexpt xouos).", while to another "who a fte r (usxd) 
embracing higher teaching is about to grow somewhat weaker and turn 
backwards to wordly things, from him I w ill remove (anoaxhaoj) this 
m ightier fe llo w -w o rker" 651 This is why Origen states that "he who ... 
prays w ill hear 'while' he is yet speaking', perceiving, by the power of 
him who 'hears in heaven'55-  the 'Here i am' having cast aside, before he 
prayed, all dissatisfaction concerning Providence."65'5
This means that God responds (that is, a c ts ) at the tim e of 
prayer. What exists before is his knowledge of this act, in the same 
sense that God has foreknowledge of everything that w ill happen in the 
world. Any notion of prior, therefore, does not pertain to God's act (or, 
response to the prayer) but to his knowledge of what w ill happen in the 
"train of future events" (xaxd xdv siouov xwv saoueviuv) 054 This 
knowledge of God has to do w ith his providence and the expessions 
presenting God as "electing" someone (as Paul, for example) are based on 
the fact that God is he "who knows the future events" end therefore  
"chooses" Paul before he knows what Paul, due to his free w ill, w ill do 
during his l i f e 555 Thus "God tries  people not because he does not know 
the outcome of their tr ia l but in order to give them the opportunity to 
do what they want because of their freedom of choice” 556 In view of 
that, "prophecy is a prediction of future events" yet an occurrence "took 
Diace not because it  was said" but "it was said because it  was coinc to 
take place"b5/
It is out of the manifestation of God in the world that "we all 
have some conception of God and form  some notions of whatever kind
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about him"; thus "we see his holiness as he creates, foresees, judges, 
chooses, forsakes, receives, turns away from, deems worthy of honour, 
punishes each one according to his deserts" 658 Through conceptions like 
these, creatures have an apprehension of God and come in a dialectical 
relation to him. In these categories "foreseeing" is Included as well; yet 
i t  is not understood as a kind of "action" of God in relation to creatures. 
This foreknowledge re fers  rather to God’s knowledge of the appropriate 
time (koiooc) which he w ill choose for his action. It is in a Greek extant 
from the Pnhcthat this perception is stated:
"For souls are, so to speak, Innumerable and their habits are 
innumerable and equally so are their movements, their purposes, their
inclinations and their impulses, of which there is only one perfect
superintendent, who has full knowledge both of the times (Kcupoug) and 
the appropriate aids and the paths and the ways, namely the God and 
ratner of the universe.
In Cels, however, he emphasizes that "since man is able to 
consider everything and to arrange everything in order, it  should be 
conceded that he is working together with providence (auvspgouvxa in  
npovota anoSsKisov), does works which are the product not m erely of the 
natural insticts w ith which he is endowed by the providence of God but 
also of his own independent thought, (m i ou uovnq inc  noovoiac Bsou 
sp^a ennsriouvia afifid kcu inc  sauiou ) " 5 /0
The notion of causality between time and tirneiessness Is
perceived not only in relation to the creaturely function of prayer nut it 
pertains to any aspect of the dialectical relation between God and
rational creatures, indeed Origen goes as fa r as to a ffirm  a sort of 
contingency in God’s action towards men. in homJer he portrays this 
contingency by commenting on the saying " / / th a t  nation, against whom I 
have pronounced, turn from their evil, then I w ill repent of the evil that 
I thought to do unto them. ... I f  i t  do evil in my sight, that it  obey not in
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my voice, then I w ill repent of the good, where I said I would benefit 
them" 5/1
Certainly Origen feels it  necessary to ‘’explain the notion of God’s 
repentance; for to repent seems to be a blemish and unworthy not only 
of God but even of a wise man" as the notion of repentance usually 
applies to what has been considered well. As God has a foreknowledge of 
future events he cannot be said that he has not considered things well 
and therefore he repents572 This is a Question to which he devotes 
extensive analyses concluding that these are figures of speech employed 
by God in his relation to men. It is like speaking to "babies" and thus he 
"pretends" not to know the future things^ '5 so that "self-determ ination  
is free '674 and cannot be put in question.5'0 Since, therefore, "God 
foreknows everything he neither becomes angry not does he repent" but 
"repentance" means God's "casting off a form er thing end metathesis 
(usid9saig) to another dispensation (oiKovoyta) of things".6 ' 0 Thus 
"repentance of God is said to be the metathesis (usid9smc;) of divine 
dispensation (oiKOVou(a) from one thing to another. For "the volatile  of 
human choice cannot be applied to God; it  is us and because of ourselves 
that provoke the changes of the divine dispensation by proving ourselves 
unworthy of the honour gifted by God". Thus when God says "I have 
repented for having ordained Saul as a king" instead of saying “I want to 
bestow the power of reigning to another one and suspending him from  
being powerful". It is as if  God said that "Saul made himself unworthy of 
being a king, so if  I had a nature susceptible of repenting I could repent 
about him. Then why he was ordained? Because at that time he was 
worthy. But, changing his mind he has become unworthy".
These deductive arguments are quite indicative of how strongly 
Origen feels about the dialectical relation between God and rational 
creatures. There is no need to challenge his arguments on a s tr ic tly  
logical basis; there is no need to ask why God made this choice since he
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foreknows that Saul would be unworthy, in the same sense that he 
"chooses” Paul by foreknowing what Paul would become by his own free  
w il l . - / /  In this syllogism the notion of "divine dispensation" Is Involved 
and it  is his conviction that it  is not "easy" for men to know "the 
reasons of dispensation" 6 ' 3 What is of importance in these affirm ations  
is that the w ill of God and the creaturely w ill encounter each other in 
space-time and Indeed they come to a dialectical relation. This means 
that the responsibility which of necessity accompanies creaturely  
freedom is perceived in the context of a causality established between 
the time of the world and divine tirneiessness.
Thus God has foreknowledge of the causative dialectical relations  
between him and the creatures; yet the causality its e lf  is realized at a 
certain time. We should, nevertheless, again emphasize that the 
distinction between foreknowledge of a causative re lation and a 
realization of it  makes sense regarded only from a temporal point of 
view; for in the final analysis it  is in terms of time that this 
dinstinction is based on.
From a timeless point of view, however, this distinction does not 
make actual sense exactly because of the absence of time. Indeed, in a 
causality where both time and tirneessness are Involved we cannot 
exoect the conventional temporal succession, as in a merely temporal 
causality. For example, in a temporal causality the cause is always prior 
to the result or, at most, simultaneous to it  (as in A ristotle 's  example 
of the eclipse). But in a causality of the sort we discuss here this is not 
necessarily implied. Thus, Origen regards the future event as the cause 
of God's foreknowledge of i t .673 This means that God's foreknowledge is 
the result of the fact that an event w ill take place and future  
occurrence of the event its e lf Is the cause of God's foreknowledge; that 
is, the cause is posterior to the result. However, the term  "future" 
applies only to a temporal point of view and this causality (where the
succession of cause and result Is reversed) is regarded from a temporal 
point of view. For God knows the future, but, due to his tirneiessness, 
the term  "succession" from a timeless point of view does not make any 
sense at ell; thus it  is a temporal point of view from which it is said
that God fore-knows the future; for he knows it , yet not as future .
if such a statement would seem strange and unconceivable a
hundred years ago, it  should not seem so in our day. For the twentieth  
century marks the radical change of a w orid-picture which (w ith
comparatively minor alterations) lasted two and a half thousand years. A 
vast number of works of modern scholars on time should be disposed for 
the simple reason that they insist treating the question on the premise 
that the universe is the Newtonian one. We understand that the Theory of 
R elativ ity  is not easily readable yet the fact is that for more than 
eighty years this theory is being constantly vindicated. Therefore  
Philosophy should again return to its  chapter i, and this chapter is the 
study of the w orid-picture according to the twentieth century 
perception. This is no the right place to develop this argument, so in 
returning to our particular point we say this: Even in our visible  
universe it  is now generally acepted that the notion of stniuttanefa 
does not make sense at all. Our “now" has not an objective correspondent 
"now" in a place some thousands light-years away. The arguments about 
prayer since antiquity are based upon this premise: it is taken for 
granted that God’s "now" is objectively the same w ith the earthly "now", 
in view of the fact that even in this visible space (not to mention other, 
non-Euciidean, spaces studied intensively, particu larly  during the last 
decade in connexion w ith the problem of Cosmology) there is no 
slmulataneity, the contention that God’s "now” is the seme w ith the 
earthly "now" is just ludicrous.
in view of that, R. Sorabji's assertion683 that Origen wavers on 
whether God's changeless w ill should be viewed as timeless or existing
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in advance does not actually represent Origen’s view of the w ill of God. 
R. Sorabii (appealing to a'eOr 5 -6 ) takes the view that Origen nlumps for 
the la tte r , namely that God’s w ill exists in advance. Yet this is not the 
case, indeed God's w ill exists tlm elessly and is manifested in time in 
dialectical relation to creaturely freedom. Thus, from a temporal (that 
is, h istorical) point of view, God's w ill, quite paradoxically, appears to 
be formed in time and indeed at the time when a certain creaturely act 
took place. This is why Origen speaks of God's "repentance".
On the other hand, if  God's w ill is regarded from a timeless point 
of view, then simply the notion of "in advance" makes no sense at all. 
Thus the case is not as simple as the distinction between what is 
"timeless" and what is "in advance". The actual distinction is over 
whether God's w ill is regarded from a temporal or an atemporal point of 
view, in the f irs t  case, God’s w ill exist neither in advance nor 
tlm elessly, but it  is perceived as formed at the time when a certain  
dialectical relation between God and creatures takes place. What exists 
tlm elessly is God's knowledge of events, not his w ill. But from an 
atemporal point of view, these distinctions simply do not make sense. 
Once, therefore, we (as temporal beings) regard God from a tem pers! 
point of view, his w ill does not exist in advance even ihougn his 
knowledge o f his wi/7 exists tlmelessly.
indeed Origen does not speak of foreknowledge but simply of 
"knowledge" of God w ith respect to the entirety  of time; thus he speaks 
the "richness of God's knowledge" of the things "oast and present and 
future" yet he contrasts it  w ith his "activity" in the world as Logos.531 
in respect of this, Origen actually did not face any dilemma of the sort 
that R. Sorabji describes.532 in deOr he speaks of what God knows and 
not what God wills. Everything related to the notion of "w ill” actually is 
the knowledge of his w ill at the time when a certain dialectical 
relation between God ans a man's w ill be realized. So the case is not
tha t everyth ing  is  determ ined in  advance, as R. S o rab ii rem arks. The 
case is  tha t everyth ing  is  known tim e le ss ly  and the " w i l l"  i ts e lf  is  
Involved only when an occurrence takes place. So Origen denies any 
notion o f change o f knowledge but he has no h e s ita tio n  in a ttr ib u t in g  to 
God a notion o f change o f w ill in  the context o f h is  d ia le c tic a l re la t io n  
to  crea tu res. This is  why i t  is  a case of causality between tim e  and 
tirneiessness.
in any event Origen does not hold th a t God has a "changeless clan 
fo r  a sequence o f events" as R .S orab  j i bS3 and P. PI ass584 and so many 
o the rs  assert. Such a v iew  would deny Origen's fundamental d o c trine  of 
c re a tu re ly  freedom , upon w hich h is e n tire  conception o f tim e  is  based.
R. S o rab ji asse rts  tha t God not only knows but also "Intends" the 
sequence of events. Yet Origen holds such an opinion only w ith  respect 
God's own actions, not to  the c re a tu re lu  ones o f which God has onlu
w w
knowledge but no in te n tio n  o f h is own. in s ta rk  co n tra s t to  S o ro b ji’s 
opinion there , Origen does hold th a t God th inks in to k e n -re fle x iv e  te rm s  
and th is  is  exac tly  what co n s titu te s  the c ru c ia litu  o f every moment o f
w  w  W
Origen’s conception o f tim e  as we argue in chapter 3 ,§ 4  This is  why he 
a ff irm s  tha t "even what seems to be com ple te ly  un im po rtan t is  ru led  by 
God's providence" (m i id  a x p r ja ia  vouiqoysva npovoia 8sou o io ik s i ig u 655 
And “Through him  a ll th ings w ere made, and in o rde r th a t a ll th ings may 
be made by the Logos, he extends not to  men only but even to the th ings
supposed to be in s ig n if ic a n t which are co n tro lle d  by n a tu re 685 A lso, "AH
these, down to the very least, God supervises by the power of h is  
w isdom and d is tingu ishes by the c o n tro llin g  hand o f h is ju d g e m e n t-3'  
The m istake o f R. S orab ii lie s  in the a sse rtion  th a t God estab lished 
c e rta in  general p rin c ip le s  in the w o rld  and th e re a fte r  he does not need 
to care about c rea tu res  in particular. The care o f God fo r  the world, is  
s ta ted  as ju s t a care fo r  the w o rld  as a whole. But th is  is  e xa c tly  the 
opposite of Origen's rea l views. This can be more c le a r ly  e luc idated
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fro m  th is  sta tem ent o f his: "But God cares not only fo r  the whole (i.ou 
oRou), as Celsus th inks , but he oar excellence (sEcaosxyc) takes 
p a rt ic u la r  care of every ra tio n a l c re a tu re  (usnsi ... navcor Roxikou)" -9-
But th is  ‘'providence” does not im p ly  h is “w i l l "  (xov pouFmv) but 
only h is “ foreknow ledge" (noogvwaiv) which is  d is t in c t fro m  the notion of 
h is  w i l l 589
Also, in co n tra s t to  S o ra b ji’s conclusion at the same po in t, Origen 
holds tha t God is  om niscient and has fu l l  knowledge of even the las t 
de ta il o f what happens in the w orld . What R. S o ra h ji’s a sse rts  here 
(though not ca te g o rica lly ) is  th a t a conclusion w hich m igh t be drawn 
fro m  the deOr is  tha t God does not need to  th ink  in to k e n -re fle x iv e  
te rm s and, th e re fo re , a s t r ic t  omniscience is  not needed (h is  i ta l ic s )  by 
God. What he im p lies  is  tha t e ll God did in  the w o rld  was to  es tab lish  
c e rta in  p rin c ip le s  and contingencies and he th e re a fte r does not need to 
know every de ta il o f what happens in the w orld . Thus he propounds a 
so lu tion  according to which a c o n d itio n a lity  could be in troduced  in to  
what God w ills :  "he w il ls  tha t i f  I pray then my p raye r w i l l  be 
answered" dS0 Such a v iew  is  abso lu te ly  beyond whet Origen holds as i t  
could d im in ish  the utm ost c ru c ia lity  o f fre e  m oral action  in tim e  and the 
im m ediate and continuous d ia le c tic a l re la t io n  between the d iv ine  and 
c re a tu re ly  freedom.
On the co n tra ry , Origen speaks of w  ns/ire^/spsc n jc noovofac 
namely the im m ediate care o f God fo r  even what seems to be of non 
im po rta n ce 591
in v iew  o f these sta tem ents o f Origen, when Puech p o rtra y s  the 
C h ris tia n  v iew  of tim e  a ff irm in g  th a t Providence is  conceived as in 
every instance "p a r t ic u la r"592 he a c tu a lly  echoes O rigen’s v iew , qu ite  
unconsciously though, as he im m ed ia te ly  a fte r  th a t po in t p resen ts Orioen 
as a re p rese n ta tive  o f a "Greek" a tt itu d e  even on th is  Denticular p o in t.590
A t any ra te  Origen regards God's knowledge as extended u n til the
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la s t de ta il o f what e x is ts  in  space-tim e. And he c e r ta in ly  a ttr ib u te s  to 
God a de ta iled  knowledge of a ll tim e , namely what is  "past end present 
and fu tu re " (A u ioq  gap uovoc ^ ivluoksi id  npwrjv kcu i d  s v s o iu j io  k o : i d  
usnnov ia ).594
The notion o f "repentance” is  one of those which oar excellence 
underline  the crucial and dramatical cha rac te r o f tim e , as we shall 
argue in the ensuing chapters.
in co n tra s t to  th is , however, C. Lew is s ta tes: "To God (though not 
to  me) I and the p rayer 1 made in 1945 w ere ju s t as much present at the 
c rea tion  o f the w o rld  as they are now and w il l  be a m ill io n  years hence. 
God's c re a tive  act is  tim e less  and tim e le s s ly  adapted to  the ‘fre e ’ 
e lem ents w ith in  it :  but th is  tim e less  adaption meets our consciousness 
as a sequence of p rayer end answ er."693
There are tw o  main m iscon s tru c tio n s  of Oripen's thought here: 
F irs t,  the c ru c ia l d is t in c tio n  between knowledge of God and wil l  of God 
has eluded Lewis. Secondly, the re la t io n  o f d iv ine w i l l  and human w il l  in 
tim e  is  not ju s t  a m a tte r o f "consciousness" e ith e r o f God or man. Origen 
is  e n tire ly  in d iffe re n t to  such a question. The question is  the d ia le c tic a l 
re la t io n  which is  underlined by the encounter of these tw o  w ills . God 
has a tim e less  knowledge of i t  but th is  encounter as a rea l historical 
occurrence cannot be sta ted  as “present" in God. For such an a sse rtion  
destroys the c ru c ie lity  o f tim e  and the fu ll re a li ty  o f the d ia le c tic a l 
re la t io n  between God and man.
in fa c t, on th is  question Origen's thought is  exa c tly  the opposite  o f 
a notion  about "a fixed  transcendent plan of h is to ry ” in a "tim e le ss  
P la ton ic  ove rw o rld " which provides "the basis fo r  a soph is tica ted  
typo log ica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f h is to ry " 593 This is  a w idespread m istaken 
a sse rtion  about Origen's thought, i f  he held such a v iew  he would never 
have a rtic u la te d  the notions o f " re c ru c if ix io n "  o f C h ris t in the fu tu re 597 
i f  the course of h is to ry  as such was "present" to  God, then C h ris t would
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not be reoarded as "su ffe rin a " end " re -c ru c if ie d ” because o f a c re a tu re ’s■— w
fa l lin g  again in to  the same sins, i f  h is to ry  is  “present" in C h ris t then
the re  is  no reason fo r  him  to  be regarded as "su ffe ring ". He would ra th e r
be regarded as in d if fe re n t ly  observing the course o f h is to ry , w hich is  
✓
"fixed " according to  a "transcendent plan". Th is is  what Origen v igo rous ly  
re je c ts , as we sha ll see in chapter 3. For what a c tu a lly  lie s  on the basis 
o f th is  re je c tio n  is  the dramatic character o f time and the c ru c ia lity  o f 
the encounter o f d iv ine  and c re a tu re ly  w i l l  in it .
The question is  not so s im ple  as to  make the s im p lis t ic  d is t in c t io n  
between what is  "present" in  God o r w hat happens s im u ltaneously  w ith  
respect to  both human and d iv ine  life ,  i f  the question o f w hat is  
"present" is  a rem ote  place o f the v is ib le  firm a m en t needs a lo t o f 
tre a tm e n t to  rece ive  a ( re la t iv e )  answer, the question o f what is  
"present" to  God is  fa r  more d if f ic u lt .  A t any ra te , such questions are no 
more susceptib le  o f s im p lis t ic  answers nowadays.
Regarding th is  re la t io n  fro m  a tem pora l po in t o f v iew , the re  is  a 
d is t in c t io n  w hich inbues Origen’s thought and a c tu a lly  e luc ida tes  h is 
conception o f th is  re la tio n : Knowledge by God is  im p l ic it ly  regarded as 
a ra th e r  passive s ta te , i t  is  a c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f God to  know everyth ing . 
The w ill o f God, however, im p lie s  a perception  of God being in  an active 
s ta te , namely in ac tive  d ia le c tica l re la t io n  w ith  c rea tu res. There is  no 
question th a t th is  d is t in c t io n  is  but a conceptual one ( i f  not aw kw ard) 
and th is  is  why Origen does not a r t ic u la te  i t  e x p lic it ly . A lthough 
somewhat rough, neverthe less, i t  helps as i t  provides human in te lle c t  
w ith  a p o rtra y a l o f the conceptual d is t in c t io n  between the knowledge o f 
God (even the knowledge o f h is w i l l  in i t s  d ia le c tic a l re la t io n  w ith  
c re a tu res ) and the w ill o f God in its e lf .
- i f  th is  conceptual d is t in c t io n  is  not made, then O rigen’s conception 
of th is  question is  bound to  be m isunderstood, as indeed i t  is. The basis 
fo r  a p o s itive  approach to  h is thought on th is  po in t is  a c tu a lly  the fa c t
th a t God Is perceived as really  involved in th is  01316011031 encounter of 
h is  w i l l  to  c re a tu re ly  w i l l  in tim e. In the f in a l analys is, the basis fo r  a 
comprehension o f Origen's thought is  h is  conception of the dramatic 
cha rac te r o f tim e , which w i l l  be discussed fu r th e r  on in th is  w ork. Ve 
must emphasize also tha t in Origen's thought i t  does not a c tu a lly  make 
sense to  speak of any "pa tte rn  o f h is to ry "  whatsoever. R. ha rkus has 
asserted tha t the re  can be no C h ris tia n  philosophy of his tory  in  the 
“pa tte rn -m ak ing " sense. There is  no C h ris tia n  p a tte rn  and indeed 
C h r is tia n ity  is  the very negation o f p a tte rn 593 i f  th is  a sse rtion  is  to be 
accepted, then i t  can be said th a t in Origen's thought th is  negation of 
"pa tte rn " is  estab lished in the s tron ges t possible te rm s.
C e rta in ly  the top ic  o f the re la t io n  between foreknow ledge and 
freedom  has been an outstanding question o f debate ever since a n tiq u ity  
and the b ib liog raphy on th is  is  tremendous. Our v iew  is  th a t in  o rde r to 
take the v iew  th a t d iv ine foreknow ledge (o r, tim e le ss  knowledge) 
co n s titu te s  a l im ita t io n  of c re a tu re ly  freedom  one has to  make a 
d ia le c tic a l jump. For the re  is  no log ica l span by w hich the knowledge 0 / 
future can be re la ted  to  the future itse lf. To p re d ic t one's ac tions  is  a 
phenomenon found even amongst human a ffa irs . Why o r how th is  
p re d ic tio n  should be held responsib le  o r a ffe c tin g  one's p red ic ted  
actions is  something which s im p ly  cannot be grounded on reason o r 
d ia le c tics . Thus the a llegation  th a t p re d ic tio n  ind ica tes  a l im i ta t io n  to 
freedom  is  but an a rb it ra ry  c o ro lla ry , reached only by a log ica l jump.
We th ink  th a t the d is t in c t io n  between "tim e le ss  knowledge" and 
"foreknow ledge" applied to the timeless God is  but an a r t i f ic ia l  one end 
makes no actual sense, i t  stem s fro m  a Newtonian w o r ld -v ie w  by 
scho lars who w i l l  not face the fa c t th a t th is  v iew  is  not va lid  any more. 
Thus Nelson P ike,599 J. R. Lucas/ 00 G. Isem inger,701 and R. S o ra b ji/u2 are 
among those who argue tha t /bwe-knowledge would r e s t r i c t . human 
freedom  whereas they concede th a t timeless knowledge w ould be in  a
sense regarded as not re s tr ic t in g  freedom. J. van Gerven asse rts  tha t 
God’s tim e less  knowledge would not r e s t r ic t  human freedom  was not yet 
even recognised by Augustine/ 00 but R. Sharpies argues tha t i t  was 
recognised by B oe th iu s /1*  On th is  Question the re  is  an enormous 
b ib liog raphy./Uo
in our v iew , however, the arguments developed have tw o 
fundamental weaknesses:
F irs t they are developed on the prem iss tha t the actual make-up of 
the w o rld  is  a Newtonian one. In fa c t they are a ll based on axioms such 
as "any moment o f tim e  is  the same in e ll places (P. Gassendi) and "every 
in d iv is ib le  moment o f du ra tion  is  everyw here" (Newton) / 05
Secondly, they are based on the a r t i f ic ia l  d is t in c t io n  (a ttr ib u te d  
to  God) between /b/ie-knowledge and tim e less  knowledge, in the fin a l 
analysis th is  d is t in c tio n  makes the a rb it ra ry  assum ption o f a ttr ib u t in g  
tim e  to  the timeless God. For th is  d is t in c tio n  can in no way make sense 
applied to God h im se lf, but i t  is  a re la t iv e  conception about God when he 
is  regarded from  a tem poral po in t o f view.
The conclusion is  th a t Origen holds a conception of ca u sa lity  
between tim e  and tirneiessness and grounds i t  upon the notion  of 
freedom  of ra tio n a l c rea tu res  and on the fa c t th a t th e ir  w i l l  comes to a 
d ia le c tica l re la t io n  to  the w i l l  o f God. Th is ca u sa lity  is  rea lize d  in tim e  
because i t  is  there  th a t the d iv ine  and c re a tu re ly  w i l l  encounter each 
o ther; but, as i t  stem s fro m  th is  d ia le c tic a l re la tio n , th is  ca u sa lity  is  
extended both in tim e  and tirneiessness.
Timeless ceusslity? By the so -ca lled  Fragment 19, Koetschau has 
embodied in h is ed ition  of the Princ a passage in Greek fro m  J u s tin ia n ’s 
ZihOr which reads as fo llow s:
"And i f  what has been sub jected to C h ris t shall in the end be 
subjected to God, then a il w i l l  lay aside th e ir  bodies; and I th ink  tha t 
there  w i l l  then be a d isso lu tion  of bod ily  nature in to  non-existence, to
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come in to  existence a second tim e  i f  ra tio n a l beings should again 
fa i t " 707
in accordance w ith  th is  passage, Jerome, in epAv, a ttr ib u te s  to 
Origen th is  view:
" i f  a ll sha ll be sub jected to  God, then a ll w i l l  lay aside th e ir  
bodies; and then the e n tire  un iverse o f bodily th incs  w i l l  be dissolved
f  w  w
in to  non-existence; but i f  necessity  should demand i t  a second tim e , i t  
would come in to  existence again in the event o f fa l l  o f ra tio n a l 
beings" / 03
Again, Koetschau has embodied in the same w ork  the so -ca lled  
Fragment 40, which is  another passage o f Jus tin ian 's  fro m  nhGn and 
reads thus: " i t  m ust needs be th a t the nature  of bodies is  not p r im a ry , 
but tha t i t  was created at in te rv a ls  on account o f c e rta in  fe l ls  tha t 
happened to ra tio n a l beings, who came to  need bodies; and again, tha t 
when th e ir  re s to ra tio n  is  p e r fe c tly  accomplished these bodies are 
dissolved in to  nothing, so th a t th is  is  ever happening." '-3
Koetschau has also inse rted  one more passage fro m  the same 
w r it in g  of Justin ian 's  where i t  is  s ta ted  th is  "when" ra tio n a l c re a tu res  
" r is e  again to  the s ta te  in  which they fo rm e r ly  w ere, com p le te ly  nu ttin g  
awau th e ir  e v il and th e ir  bodies. Then aoain a second or a th ird  or many
w  W  w
more tim es they are enveloped in d if fe re n t bodies fo r  punishment. For i t  
is  probable th a t d if fe re n t w o rld s  have ex is ted  and w il l  e x is t, some in 
the past and some in the fu tu re ." /'10
Such a llega tions have been accepted as expressing Origen's v iew s 
and such considera tions led to  the Anathemas decreed by the Second 
Council of Constant!nopole in  553. Koetschau has inco rpo ra ted  these 
Anathemas in the te x t o f the P rfnc . G. B u tte rw o rth , in h is tra n s la t io n  in 
English, notes th a t although these Anathemas "cannot be taken as l i te ra l  
e x tra c ts  fro m  the De Prfncfpffs, they express the teaching o f th is  w ork , 
doubtless fo r  the most pa rt in Origen's own w ords" / 11 It e xa c tly  a f te r
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the po in t where those Anathemas have been inco rpo ra ted  in the Princ 
tha t Koetschau has inse rted  the passage o f Jus tin ia n  ju s t mentioned 
above.
This being the way th a t Jus tin ian  was souainted w ith  Origen’s 
v iew s, i t  is  not s u rp ris in g  th a t th a t Council declared those Anathemas. 
For what Ju s tin ian  was considering as "Origen’s v iew s" is  a pro found ly 
d is to rte d  vers ion  o f h is au thentic  thought.
Jus tin ia n  regarded the c re a tion  o f "w o rlds " as tak ing  Place in a 
s o r t o f " in te rv a ls ” ( sk  51ari£iliudxtov3. This means th a t i t  should be 
tirne iessness, then tim e , then tirne iessness, then tim e  again and so on. 
The notion o f Origen’s about consecutive w orlds  is  d ire c t ly  connected to 
a notion of succession o f in c o rp o re a lity  -c o rp o re a lity  - in c o rp o re a lity  
-c o rp o re a lity  -  and so on " fo r  ever" Cast).712
What Jus tin ian  as w e ll as Jerome v ir tu a lly  a llege here is  tha t 
Origen was holding a notion o f tim e less  causa lity . For he a ttr ib u te s  to 
him  the opinion th a t God has a tim e le ss  w i l l  according to  which 
whenever a fa l l  takes place a m a te ria l w o rld  should appear.
What should be noted in the f i r s t  place is  th a t nowhere in h is 
w orks  in Greek Origen im p lie s  such a notion. What he c a lls  Koaponotk 
(actua l c rea tion  o f the w o r ld )710 is  one and unique event. We can find  
h is expression "the beginning of the actual c rea tion  o f the w o rld " (cove 
xfjc Koouonouag) 714 His e n tire  theology re fe rs  to the w o rld  fro m  tha t 
"beginning" u n til the "end o f th ings" / 10 Nowhere is  there  even the 
s lig h te s t im p lic a tio n  th a t th is  "c rea tion " is  a m a n ifes ta tio n  o f some kind 
o f "unchangeable w i l l "  o f God o r tha t i t  is  an occurrence w hich has taken 
place "before" th is  c rea tion  o r tha t i t  w i l l  happen again.
Our previous analyses on the re la t io n  o f God to w o rld  show tha t 
what Origen was holding was to ta lly  d if fe re n t fro m  what has been 
a ttr ib u te d  to  him  by the above-mentioned passages.
If i t  is  asserted tha t the fa l l  is  not a unicue event and tha t i t  is
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fo llo w e d  by e c re s t ion o f a w o rld , i t  fo llo w s  th a t 600 is  himseh 
involved in  a tim e less  causa lity . T he re fo re  “c rea ting " should be applied 
to God h im se lf as something compulsorily accompanying h is own being. 
Thus, in the fin a l analysis, c re a tion  is  not a product o f God's own 
freedom  but i t  is  a product o f the freedom  o f w hat, qu ite  fa lse ly , 
Jerome and Ju s tin ian  regarded as “ra tio n a l beings be fore  the fa ll" . There 
would be no notion more a lien  to  Origen’s au thentic  v iew s, than th a t one. 
For w hat we have seen in  chapter 1, is  th a t c re a tio n  is  a product o f 
God's fre e  w i l l  and benevolent decision. Origen many tim e s  s tresses  tha t 
the Wisdom o f God "w ille d ” and "wanted" to  es tab lish  a re la t io n  to  "the 
fu tu re  beings".
In th is  po in t we should re c a ll the analyses made in  chapter 1 
about the c ru c ia l s ign ificance  o f Past, tense used by Origen in the 
a r t ic u la t io n  o f h is  v iew s about the re la t io n  o f God’s fre e  w i l l  to  the 
w o rld  as a product o f th is  w il l .  The Past tense s ig n if ie s  tha t th is  
decision o f God was som ething w hich occurred once.
I f  Origen held a notion o f tim e le ss  ca u sa lity  he would have said 
th a t the Wisdom o f God "w il ls "  and "w ants" tha t i f  a fa l l  takes place 
then a c re a tion  should emerge. But he does nothing o f the so rt. On the 
co n tra ry , he c le a r ly  s ta te s  th a t God created by h is  own fre e  and 
benevolent decision. He does not say th a t the Wisdom God ’‘w il ls "  o r 
"w ants" the "estab lishm ent o f a re la t io n  to  the fu tu re  beings" but he 
says tha t she "w ille d " and "wanted" to do so.
What th is  a c tu a lly  means is  tha t God is  not a C rea to r by essence 
-a  fundamental notion of Origen’s thought ex tens ive ly  discussed In 
chapter i.  I f  there  was any kind o f "necessity" o r "tim e le ss  ca u sa lity " 
due to  w hich God should crea te  the w o rld , th is  could e n ta il a c e rta in  
established relation  between God and the w orld . Th is ve ry  "cau sa lity " 
would be the po in t a t which the being o f God and the being o f the w o rld  
are o f necessity re la ted  to each other. But th is ' is  exac tly  w hat Origen
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s tro n g ly  re je c ts  and th is  a tt itu d e  im m ed ia te ly  stem s fro m  h is notion of 
ra d ica l transcendence of God to  the w o rld  and the notion of the rad ica l 
h ia tus between the d iv ine  being and the existence o f the w orld .
That God "w ille d " to  c rea te  th is  w o rld  is  a unique product o f his 
freedom  -a  product which came in to  being out o f non-being. Although God 
rem ains ra d ic a lly  transcendent to  the w o rld , he “estab lished a c re a tive  
re la tio n "  w ith  I t  out o f h is  goodness and not out of any necessity  or 
causa lity .
Th is, in  the fin a l analysis, means tha t, hyp o th e tica lly , God would 
have never created the w orld . Although the w o rld  is  a "symptom" o f the 
fa i l,  he would have e ith e r acted in another way (c e rta in ly  unth inkable by 
human beings and c re a tu res) or even he m ight not have acted at a ll in 
any way. The meaning o f th is  hypothesis (and, subsequently, the meaning 
o f use of Past tense by Origen) is  th a t the re  is  not any tim e isess  
ca usa lity  -n o t even one estab lished by the w i l l  o f God. Origen re fe rs  to 
the decision of God using te rm s  c le a r ly  denoting th a t th is  c re a tion  is  an 
event stem m ing fro m  a God’s unique decision, not by any ca u sa lity  
whatsoever.
The question o f p ro b a b ility  o f some "next" c re a tion  is  indeed out 
o f Origen's main in te re s t as h is  thought is  e n tire ly  preoccupied w ith  
th is  c e rta in  w o rld  throughout tim e. But i f  one by a il means w ants to find  
some a llus ions o f Origen re la ted  to  th is  Question, then the conclusion 
should be tha t he believes tha t no o the r fa l l  w i l l  occur as we Drove In 
chapter 5, again through Origen's own words.
Thus the a llega tions of both Jus tin ian  and Jerome by w hich they 
a ttr ib u te  a notion of tim e less  ca usa lity  to  Orioen are not only fa lse  but
w  W  W
indeed Origen held exactly  the opposite o f what is  a ttr ib u te d  to him.
Hence the w o rld  was created by a unioue benevolent decis ion of 
God. He is  not a C rea to r because o f any ca u sa lity  com pelling  h im  to 
create. God created once because he out o f h is  goodness w ille d  to  do so.
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This is  why in Origen’s thought the d is t in c t io n  between the o f Goc 
Himself and God as Creator is  so v ita l,  The fundamental conv ic tion  o f 
Origen th a t the w o rld  was made out o f a fre e  benevolent and unique 
decision o f God plays an im po rta n t p a rt in tha t d is tin c tio n . Thus, to  say 
th a t God is  a c re a to r in  H im se lf is  a notion to ta lly  a lien  to  Origen’s 
au thentic  views.
Hence, due to  fundamental p resuppositions o f h is  theology.. Origen 
could have never applied to  God- anu tim e less  ca u sa lity  o f the kind 
discussed above; and, in fa c t, he did not. This is  the deeper meaning of 
the above-mentioned d is t in c tio n  in the conception of God.
When Ju s tin ian  and Jerome a ttr ib u te  to  Origen the no tion  tha t 
c o rp o re a lity  emerges and d isso lves in to  nothing in te rm it te n t ly ,  they do 
so because they also a ttr ib u te  to  h im  the notion o f a beginningless 
w orld . The fo rm e r a llega tion  is  a c tu a lly  subsequent to the la t te r .  For 
what they v ir tu a lly  im p ly  is  th a t the re  is  an "e te rn a l” w o r ld  of 
ind iv idua l end personal incorporea l souls, o r m inds, end th is  w o rld  may 
e x is t e ith e r in  a mode o f c o rp o re a lity  o r in co rp o re a lity . In any case, th is  
w o rld  is  thought to be w ith o u t beginning o r end. What changes is  the 
mode o f i t s  existence, not the existence i t s e lf  as an "e te rn a l" fa c t; and 
th is  mode o f existence (th a t is  e x is tin g  in e ith e r  co rporea l o r 
incorporea l fo rm ) depends on the m ora l s ta tu s  o f these inco rpo rea l 
ra tio n a l m inds, which are regarded w ith o u t beginning o r end.
But, as we have discussed in  chapter i ,  O rigen’s au then tic  v iew s 
are fa r  too a lien  fro m  those above, w hich are fa ls e ly  a ttr ib u te d  to him.
The conclusion o f th is  section  is  th a t Origen does not hold any 
notion o f tim e less  ca usa lity  n e ithe r does he regard  the c re a tio n  of the 
w o rld  as placed in a "causative scheme" o f in te rm it te n t appearance o r 
disappearance o f bodily  nature. To h im  the re  is  one c re a tio n  w hich came 
in to  being out o f non-being out o f one decision o f God and i t  s tr iv e s  
tow ards  an absolute end -as we sha ll see in  chapter 5.
C o n c lu s io n
'Origen employed the fundamental S to ic  perception  o f tim e  as an.
"extension" yet he tre a ted  i t  in a way appropria te  to h is  own thought.
The S to ics regarded tim e  as a pu re ly  na tu ra l elem ent end th e ir
a ff irm a tio n s  about i t  are exc lus ive ly  re la ted  to  tim e  as a c a rt of
na tu ra l re a lity . This way o f tre a tin g  tim e  was understandably 
consequent on both th e ir  lack o f any notion o f transcendence and th e ir  
m a te ria lism . Origen, however, did hold a notion o f transcendence; 
besides, the notion o f m a te r ia l ity  applies not only to the v is ib le  
firm a m en t but also to  o ther "w o rlds" which are m a te ria l ye t "not seen" 
due to  the q u a lity  of th e ir  m a tte r. He also held a notion o f in c o rp o re a lity  
applied to  the d iv ine being only. Not only the rea l existence o f th is  
in c o rp o re a lity  is  not put in  question but i t  is  regarded as a re a li ty  of 
apparently  h igher qua lity . A ll these presuppositions fundam enta lly 
dete rm ine h is conception of tim e.
Thus the ca tegories which co n s titu te  the S to ic  d e fin it io n  of tim e  
have in Origen's thought a qu ite  d if fe re n t actual content. Time is  indeed 
held to  be'a fundam enta lly na tu ra l re a lity . Yet there  are also s ig n ific a n t 
theo log ica l im p lica tio n s  re la ted  to  tim e  i t s e l f / 15
Whereas the S to ics spoke o f s im p ly  o f extension Origen c le a r ly  
defines the re la tio n  of th is  extension to space, by in troduc ing  the te rm  
atpnapsKTStviiiv which in fa c t p o rtra ys  the re a li ty  o f space-tim e. The 
S to ic  p red ica tion  of tim e  as napaKOflou9ouv the movement o f the w o rld  
is  d iscarded ju s t because i t  does not exactly  depict the re la t io n  o f tim e  
to  space and may be m isleading (as indeed i t  was fo r  some people) on the 
s t r ic t  re la tio n  of tim e  to space, namely as to  w hether tim e  is  "o lder" o r 
"younger" than space. The te rm ino logy  in troduced by Oriqen excludes the 
p o s s ib ility  o f such dilemmas.
A ccord ing ly , the re la tio n  o f th is  "extension" to the world has a
d if fe re n t meaning due to  Origen’s d if fe re n t conception of the "w o rld ”. 
T im e is  a re a li ty  accompanying the e n tire  w orld , i t  is  re la te d  not only 
to  what is  "v is ib le ” but also to  what is  "not seen". Thus, although both 
the S to ics and Origen f i rm ly  re la te  tim e  to  the w o rld , i t  is  obvious that 
Origen’s v iew  is  th a t tim e  applies to  a re a li ty  fa r  more “broad" than the 
S to ic  conception o f w hat is  the "w orld".
Origen a f f irm s  th a t everyth ing  in  the w o rld  is  in  tim e  yet i t  is  
only in  le t te r  th a t th is  expression appears to be the same to  th a t o f 
Zeno’s in  h is d e fin it io n  o f tim e. For the notion o f being in  th e  w o r ld  
and thus in  tim e  is  in  Origen’s thought fa r  too d if fe re n t fro m  the S to ic  
v iew s, due to  the d if fe re n t actual con ten t-app lied  to  the notion  o f the 
w o r ld .
In the same way, the category o f m ovem ent re la te d  to  tim e  has a 
d if fe re n t content in  Origen. A lthough na tu ra l m otion (w hich is  whet the 
S to ics  meant in  th e ir  d e fin it io n  o f tim e ) is  not neglected, th is  
p red ica tion  applied to  the conception of tim e  is  m a in ly  understood as 
fre e  m o ra l a c tio n  in  a ll the ranks o f l i f e  o f the w orld . And, whereas 
tim e  is  also regarded as a c r ite r io n  o f  fa s tn e s s  a n d  s lo w n e s s ! u  in 
Qrigen's thought th is  p red ica tion  is  m a in ly  applied to  the t r i a l  o f  fre e  
m o ra l a c tio n  in tim e.
Besides, Orioen records tim e  as a dimension. This te rm  b rinos  h is 
conception near to  P lo tinus ’ a ff irm a tio n s  about tim e  yet the re  is  no 
a f f in i ty  o f Origen’s conception o f tim e  to any P la ton ic  one. For tim e  is  
not any s o r t o f "moving image", i t  "was not a t re s t w ith  the e te rn ity  in 
rea l being" where " i t  .kept qu ie t" be fore  is  "moved" down to the w orld . 
Tim e came in to  being out o f non-being and i t  did in  no way e x is t before  
the c re a tio n  o f the w orld . In the P la ton ic  v iew , tim e  is  po rtra yed  as an 
"image" exac tly  because i t  is  perceived as es tab lish ing  a kind of a f f in it y  
between the w o rld  and the Beyond. On the co n tra ry , in Origen, tim e  not 
only does not es tab lish  any a f f in i ty  between d iv ine  l i f e  and the w o rld
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but fu rth e rm o re  i t  is  regarded as an element in  te rm s  o f w hich the 
rad ica l hiatus between God and the w o rld  is  portrayed. The conception 
of tim e  as dimension (both e tym o log ica lly  and e sse n tia lly ) a c tua lly  
stem s from  i ts  being regarded as an extension.
The S to ics did not regard tim e  as a dimension of l i f e  because they 
m ain ly considered the na tu ra l ch a rac te r o f cosm ic m otion and they did 
not have any eschato logica! ideas.
On the o the r hand, P lo tinus contem pts the notion of tim e  as 
"extension". He grounds h is argum ents on the d ia le c tic s  and the lack of 
e labora tion  o f the S to ic  d e fin itio n .
Our v iew , however, is  th a t the deeper a rgum enta tive  mood of 
P lo tinus a rises  ra th e r fro m  h is contem pt fo r  m a te r ia lis m  and from  the 
fa c t tha t the S to ics determ ine tim e  only in re la t io n  to  the v is ib le
w
m a te ria l w o rld  and th e ir  d e fin it io n  excludes any notion of 
transcendence, according to  th e ir  fundamental ph ilosophica l convictions. 
In challenging the S to ic  conception o f tim e  P lo tinus qu ite  r ig h t ly  deems 
tha t th is  Is a po in t fo r  em barrassing the S to ics by challenging th e ir
v iew  o f what is  "re a l" and, in  the fin a l analysis, challenging th e ir
m a te ria lism . In a way, he was not unsuccessful!.
Origen is  fa r  fro m  th is  kind of d ispute as he held both a notion of
m ateria lity  o f the e n tire  w o rld  and a notion o f the d iv ine 
transcendence. This Is why he can use both S to ic  and Mecpiatonic 
p red ica tions  and yet to  apply to  them a d if fe re n t actual content -a  
content b e f it t in g  h is own thought. Thus he form ed and estab lished a 
conception of tim e , as w e ll as a te rm in i logy fo r  i t ,  w hich has been 
employed by the Cappadocians (espec ia lly  Basil o f Caesarea) and vast 
number o f la te r  C h ris tian  w r ite rs .
In fa c t th is  conception of Origen is  what Augustine nicked up In 
o rde r to  fo rm  h is theory of tim e. In the lig h t o f our d iscussion here, we 
th ink  th a t Augustine’s o r ig in a lity  on the Question of tim e  has to  be
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thoroughly re-essessed. For what has been presented as h is own 
co n tr ib u tio n  to  a theory o f tim e  is  but a re p e tit io n  o f Oripen's o rig in a l 
perceptions as w e ll a rticu la tio n s . In regard to the po in ts on which ( fo r  
one reason or another) he has not been able to  fo llo w  Origen's rad ica l 
tra n s fo rm a tio n s  o f Neopl atonic notions, Augustine remained a mere 
echoer o f subs tan tia l aspects P lo tinus conception o f tim e.
A ccord ing ly , i t  is  fo r  h is own purposes tha t Origen emulous the 
notion o f pro longation  o f tim e. In co n tra s t to  pagan thought, m otion in 
space-tim e is  not ju s t  a na tu ra l occurrence but i t  is  a m eaningful free  
m oral action. There is  nothing o f the pessim ism  end despair of Marcus 
A u re liu s ’ in Origen’s thought. Time is  not a ''d e s tro ye r” but i t  is  exactly  
a re a lity  which is  a source o f consolation and hope in a w o rld  perceived 
as "being down" (Kaxapofifj).
The notions o f Judgement and C ausa lity estab lished in tim e  
underline a p a r t ic u la r  conception o f it.
in commGen the reason of " fa ith "  and "the advent o f C h r is t” and 
"the whole dispensation through the law  and the prophets and the to i ls  o f 
the apostles in  o rder to  es tab lish  the Churches o f God through C h ris t"  is  
grounded exac tly  on the fa c t tha t there  w i l l  be a "Judgement by God". As 
i t  is  pointed out the re , i f  Judgement is  not established in time then a ll 
those events have taken place “ in va in "/lS  and fa ith  is  fu t i le ,  too. But in 
th a t event Origen’s conception o f tim e  looses c ru c ia l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f 
i t  to  the extent tha t one has to speak of a to ta lly  d ifferent conception 
o f tim e  - i t  could not be Origen's conception o f it.
For one th ing, i t  is  the conv ic tion  about the " im p a r t ia l i ty "  and 
"rightousness" o f God - tw o  p red ica tions  o f God which are regarded as 
"p rinc ip les". For another th ing, freedom  co n s titu te s  an essentia l 
e x is te n tia l c h a ra c te r is tic  o f ra tio n a l crea tu res. Thus tim e  is  understood 
as a re a li ty  created by God fo r  freedom  to  make sense, as c re a tu re ly  
freedom  in absence o f tim e  can make no sense whatever. I t  is  a re a li ty
established in the world in order to “serve" rational beings, namely in 
order to render their freedom meaningful end their struggle for return  
to God hopeful.
So, although it  cannot be sustained that the notion of Judgement 
and Causality pertain to the essence of tim e, it  can be affinned that 
they constitute fundamental characteristics of a particu lar conception 
of time. This means that if  Judgement and Causality are disregarded or 
abolished, then what remains is another conception of tim e, which 
indeed would be very close to a Greek one. This is why Origen 
consciously contrasts his own ideas to the Greek ones, especially at 
points where misunderstandings are possible.
in fact this conception of tim e provides the basis on which Origen 
establishes his considerations about the process of the world and they 
plau a crucial role in portraying certain functions in time which 
attribute  to it  a particular and unique character. This is the subject 
which we shall examine next.
Chapter 5: _The character of Timfi
§1. Human being throughout an aeon.
Follow ing fro m  the conceptions o f judgement and causa lity , a 
ra tio n a l c rea tu re  rem ains in a ce rta in  rank o f l i f e  fo r  as long as one 
aeon a t least. Changes o f e x is te n tia l s ta tus  take place only a f te r  a 
judgement which occurs a t the end of an aeon. W hether in the 
subsequent aeon one w il l  continue to  liv e  in  the same rank o f l i f e  o r i t  
w i l l  be transposed to  another one, th is  is  something determ ined only 
a fte r  a judgement. Thus, any tra n s it io n  fro m  one rank o f l i f e  to  another 
is  im possib le  a t any o the r moment during an aeon apart fro m  th a t 
w hich m arks the end o f it .
Th is conception, however, ra ise s  ce rta in  questions w ith  respect 
to the e x is te n tia l s ta tus  o f a human being throughout an aeon.
Origen applies the te rm  "soul" Cgjuxrj) only to  the human rank of 
l i f e 1 and regards soul as ju s t  a "p a rt o f the ra tio n a l essence".2 In 
doing so, he is  fu l ly  conscious o f the questions ra ised  by th is  view . He 
a rtic u la te s  those questions in a passage o f the comm John w hich reads 
as fo llow s :
“Before anything else, we should a t another po in t enquire  more 
d ilig e n tly  and to  a la rg e r exten t the questiom about the essence o f soul, 
the beginning of i t s  co n s titu tio n  and i ts  en te ring  in to  the e a rth ly  body; 
and about the d is tr ib u tio n  o f the l i f e  o f each one o f them and about i t s  
d ischarge fro m  here and i f  is  i t  contingent fo r  soul to en te r a body fo r  
a second tim e , e ith e r during the same aeon and the same w o rld  o r not 
and e ith e r in  the same body o r not; and i f  [soul en te rs ] in  the same body 
[we should enquire] w hether i t  is  a sub ject rem ain ing the same and i t  
ju s t  changes i t s  q ua lity  o r i t  w i l l  be the same both as a su b je c t and in 
q u a lity ; and [we should inqu ire ] w hether [soul] w i l l  a lways use the same
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body or i t  w i l l  change it .  Among these questions., a main one which 
should be enquired of is: what is  tra n sm ig ra tio n  (psT.svaujpdT.iiJoig) in 
i ts e lf  and what is  the d iffe re n ce  between i t  and embodiment 
(svaiopdm iaig), and w hether a consequence of holding tra n sm ig ra tio n  is  
to hold th a t the w o rld  is  in co rru p tib le . Among these i t  is  also 
necessary to  expound the opinions o f those who hold th a t i t  is  according 
to  the s c r ip tu re s  tha t soul is  sown toge ther w ith  body and what 
fo llo w s  fro m  that. Arid., in one w ord, the doc trine  about soul needs a 
p a rtic u la r  tre a tis e  because i t  is  a doc trine  g rea t and d if f ic u lt  to  
in te rp re t3 as i t  needs to  be selected and com piled fro m  passages here 
and there  in  the s c r ip tu re s .’4
Origen and the doctrine o f transm igration . To re je c t the 
doc trine  o f tra n sm ig ra tio n  is  among the fundamental conv ic tions of 
Origen and he exp lica tes h is opinion in commrlatt where he comments 
on Matt. 17,10-13 as fo llow s:
"A t th a t po in t I th ink  th a t by Elias i t  is  not E lias ’ soul w hich is  
meant; [I th ink  th is ] in  o rder not to  fa l l  in  the doc trine  of 
tra n sm ig ra tio n  which is  a lien to  the church and i t  is  ne ithe r given by 
the apostles nor does i t  appear anywhere in the s c r ip tu re s ;’’5 in the 
same w ork  he speaks o f "the fa lse  doc trine  o f tra n s m ig ra tio n ’0 
whereas in another w ork he a ff irm s  tha t the "do c trin e  o f 
tra n sm ig ra tio n " is  "re je c te d  as fa lse ’’.7
In Cels he re fe rs  to  those who "have su ffe red  harm  caused by 
the fo o lish  doc trine  of re - in ca rn a tio n , taught by the physic ians who 
degrade the ra tio n a l c rea tu re  som etim es to  an e n tire ly  ir ra t io n a l 
anim al, som etim es to  th a t which is  capable of pe rcep tion ."8 He also 
re fe rs  to  the Jews, the Egyptians and the Pythagoreans who hold “ the 
m yth about the sou l’s re -in ca rn a tio n "8 and s ta tes  th a t "we do not hold 
the doc trine  of tra n sm ig ra tio n  o f the soul and i ts  fa l l  even to  
ir ra t io n a l animals.".10 Thus, on th is  sub jec t, Origen is  not only opposed
to  the Greeks “who in troduce  the notion of tra n s m ig ra tio n ",11 but also 
to  the Jews "who held the doc trine  o f tra n sm ig ra tio n  to  be tru e  and 
h e re d ita ry  arid not a lien  to  th e ir  m ys tica l teaching."12
Origen’s a t t i tu te  tow ards the question of tra n sm ig ra tio n  of soul 
is  one more po in t on which h is thought is  con trasted  to  the P la ton ic 
perceptions. For the P la to n is ts  held tha t soul is  a “being" liv in g  in 
i t s e l f  as an incorporea l hypostasis and i t  may be "im prisoned" in  a body 
o r to  be out o f any body at any tim e. This means th a t a soul would "go 
out" o f a human body a fte r  a man’s death and to "en te r" in to  another 
body at any tim e  a fte r  th a t death. This means tha t during a period of 
tim e  determ ined by Origen as "one aeon" a P la to n is t could a sse rt th a t a 
soul may en te r in to  another body fo r  a second tim e  a fte r  a man’s death.
Origen, however, is  opposed to the P la ton ic  d u a lis tic  
conception of "soul-body" since he does not regard  soul as an 
incorporea l being liv in g  in i t s e lf  apart fro m  a body. Besides, he holds 
th a t a ra tio n a l c re a tu re  may change a rank of l i f e  only a t the end o f an 
aeon a fte r  d iv ine judgement. This is  the ground on which argues against 
any notion o f sou l’s en te ring  in to  another body during the same aeon. On 
th is  sub ject he deploys a se ries  of deductive argum ents which may be 
rendered thus:
I f  one supposes th a t, in  the period fro m  the beginning o f th is  
w o rld  u n til the consummation, a soul would en te r a body fo r  a seconc 
tim e , then there  is  no reason not to  assume th a t a soul may, in the 
same period, en ter a body fo r  a th ird  tim e  and even more. In fa c t th is  
is  held by those who believe th a t re-em bodim ent is  the way by w hich 
soul is  punished fo r  i ts  sins and th is  is  how i t  may be p u rif ie d .13 But i f  
th is  process goes on, then i t  should be assumed th a t soul w i l l  a lw ays 
be incarnated because of i t s  fo rm e r sin. T here fo re  the re  w i l l  be no 
consummation of the w o rld  during which "the heaven and the e a rth  w i l l  
pass away.".14 Nevertheless, someone would say th a t soul a w i l l  be
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re -in ca rn a te d  u n til i t  be p u r if ie d  and a fte r  an "so to  speak, in f in ite  
number o f years"15 i t  w i l l  need no fu r th e r  re -in ca rn a tio n , i t  would also 
be sustained th a t, in  th is  way, one soul a fte r  another w i l l  be p u rif ie d ; 
and, since the number o f souls is  f in i te 15 there  w i l l  be a tim e  th a t no 
soul w ill,  need inca rna tion  and, subsequently, the m a te ria l w o rld  w i l l  be 
destroyed because there  w i l l  be no soul in need of incarna tion . But, as 
Origen po in ts out, th is  is  c o n tra ry  to  what the Holy S c rip tu re  say. For 
i t  is  said there  th a t, a t the tim e  o f consummation, the re  w i l l  be p lenty 
o f s inners in  the w o rld , as Jesus h im se lf said "Nevertheless when the 
Son o f man cometh, shall he fin d  fa ith  on the earth?".17
So Origen to  develops h is argum ents on the question on the 
basis o f tw o  prem ises. F irs t,  the re  w i l l  be a tim e  at which the w o rld  
w i l l  be consummated. Secondly, a t th a t moment the re  w i l l  be p len ty  o f 
s inners in the w orld .
The p o s s ib ilit ie s  which he considers then are the fo llow ing :
1. Consummation o f the w o rld  w i l l  be fo llow ed  by punishment. 
In th a t case there  are tw o like lihoods, namely e ith e r punishement //; 
another body o r punishment out o f any body a t a ll. Considering th is , 
Origen challenges the po ten tia l proponents o f th is  v iew  to  expla in  what 
the "causes" and the "d iffe ren ce s" in th is  conception o f punishment 
are.18 Nevertheless th is  is  a pure ly  hypothetica l case employed by 
Origen ju s t  fo r  the completeness o f h is d ia le c tica l exposition. This is  
why he does npot e laborate on the expressions "in  another body" o r "out 
o f any body". The case is  not ac tu a lly  re la ted  to  the Greeks (to  whom 
Origen re fe rs  la te r  on; s. infra)-. The c lass ica l P la ton ic  percep tion  of 
tra n sm ig ra tio n  is  c e rta in ly  out; fo r  to P la to n is ts  the re  is  no notion o f 
consummation of the w o rld ; they regard  the w o rld  as e ve rla s tin g  and 
m etempsychosis takes place a t any tim e , namely i t  is  not re la te d  to  any 
"consummation" o f the w orld . On the o ther hand, the S to ics held the 
doc trine  o f recurrence ; but they held the successive w o rld s  to  be
iden tica l. A t any ra te , in S to ic  thought the re  is  no notion o f re tr ib u t io n  
of sins.
2. There w i l l  be no punishement at a ll,  since a ll s inners are 
supposed to  be p u r if ie d  "at once" (aSpouq) at the very moment of
consummation.1^
3. The th ird  is  in  fa c t Origen’s own v iew  o f how ju s t ic e  about 
p e rp e tra tio n  o f sins is  done: He a ff irm s  tha t there  m igh t be a way of 
punishment according to  which c rea tu res  w i l l  liv e  in bodies and yet 
outside th is  l i fe ,  according to  th e ir  m e rits .20 i t  is  obvious th a t he 
alludes to h is conception of e x is te n tia l causa lity  in a prolonged tim e.
His conclusion is  th a t "to  those who can see" each one o f the 
above-mentioned p o s s ib ilit ie s  of re tr ib u t io n  " is  re fu ta t iv e  of 
tra n sm ig ra tio n " (eKaaxov 5s xouxwv ... avaxpenxiKov saxi xfjg 
psxevawpaxLOoeiijg); and " re tr ib u tio n  o f s ins w il l  not take place in the 
fo rm  o f tra n sm ig ra tio n " (eoxcu 5e fj xiuv ajuapxrjfidxfijv s ia n p a F ig  ouk ev 
jjexevawpaxiLiasO21
The above s ta ted  arguments are d ire c ted  against those who 
accept th a t the re  w i l l  be a "consummation" o f the w orld . Vet the re  are 
"the Greeks who postu la te  the doc trine  o f tra n sm ig ra tio n  o f souls and 
hold th a t the w o rld  w i l l  not be destroyed, fo llo w in g  fro m  th e ir  
hypothesis.” 22
I t  is  s ig n ific a n t tha t the argum ents o f Origen against the 
doc trine  o f tra n sm ig ra tio n  are la rg e ly  based on h is fundamental v iew  
o f the beginninglessness of the w o rld  and h is a tt itu d e  tow ards  the 
notion o f the In fin ite . It is  then w o rth  w h ile  to  consider th is  
argum entation, since in the f in a l analysis, i t  ind ica tes  Origen's 
conception o f tim e  in a way which we are going to discuss la te r  on.
He re je c ts  the Greek asse rtions  about non-consum m ation o f the 
w o rld  on the ground of h is C h ris tia n  a tt itu d e  tha t the existence o f the 
w o rld  has a c e rta in  meaning as i t  comes to  a d ia le c tic a l re la t io n  to
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God. More p a r t ic u la r ly , i t  is  Origen’s v iew  of tim e  as the means where 
God's w i l l  and c re a tu re ly  w i l l  encounter each o the r th a t prove the 
w o rld  as f in ite , i f  the w o rld  were in f in ite  the re  would be no 
foreknow ledge; and th is , not because (as i t  has fa ls e ly  been a ttr ib u te d  
to  Origen) God cannot comprehend w hatever is  in f in ite ,  but because in 
th a t case "foreknow ledge’’ s im p ly  does not make any sense, i f  the w o rld  
is  in f in ite  in te rm s  o f dura tion ,25 any notion o f before makes no sense 
a t a ll. This is  why one could not speak o f fo re -knowledge; and i f  there  
is  no foreknow ledge i t  fo llo w s  th a t n e ithe r prophecy can make sense, 
exac tly  because the notion o f end o f the w o rld  would make no sense 
e ith e r.24
Thus, there  are tw o notions d ire c t ly  involved w ith  Origen’s 
conception o f tim e  on the grounds o f which he re je c ts  the do c trine  of 
transm ig ra tio n :
F irs t,  the f in ite  dura tion  o f the w o rld , in  te rm  o f both 
beginning and end.
Second, tim e  is  not a m o ra lly  in d iffe re n t continuum  in which 
action  takes place w ith o u t any meaning o r s ign ificance ; but i t  is  where 
action  has a purpose, i t  is  d irec ted  tow ards an end w hich means tha t 
fre e  m oral action  is  meaningful 1 exac tly  due to  i ts  being judged in the 
lig h t o f i t s  eschato log ica l perspective.
The d istinction between soul and s p ir it . Nevertheless Origen 
has a passage o f Luke before him , namely the Luke, 1 ,16-17, w hich says: 
"And many of the ch ild ren  of Israe l sha ll he tu rn  to  the Lord th e ir  God. 
And he shall go before him in the s p ir i t  and power of E lia s "25 in o rder 
to  explain th is  passage, he d is tingu ishes between "sou l” on the one hand, 
and " s p ir i t  and power" on the other. So he comments on the above- 
mentioned passage of Luke s ta ting :
"And note th a t he did not say in  soul o f Helias so th a t a 
doc trine  of re -in ca rn a tio n  would be grounded, but in the s p irit anc
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power o f He//os.
Accord ing ly , in  h is  homLuc he sta tes: "For John was not E lias 
in a c tu a lity , as those who hold the doc trine  o f tra n s m ig ra tio n  say, 
a lleg ing th a t the soul of E lias came in John. For he does not say ‘in the 
soul of E lias ’ -because i t  was not a tra n s m ig ra tio n - but he says 'in the 
s p ir i t  and power o f E lias.’27 For there  was s p ir i t  and power upon E lias, 
th a t is  a s p ir itu a l g i f t  as i t  happened to each one o f the prophets. This 
s p ir i t ,  which was in  E lias, was bestowed upon John."28
i t  is  again on the S c rip tu re  th a t Origen grounds th is  
d in s tin c tio n  as he sta tes: " I t  is  c lea r th a t the S c rip tu re  knows a 
d ife rence  of s p ir i t  fro m  soul" and he adduces passages such as the ! 
Thess.5,2329 and Qan.3,8630 which "denote the d iffe re n ce  between s p ir i t  
and soul.'01
In comm John he quotes John 1,21 ("And they asked him , What 
then? A r t  thou E lias? And he sa ith , I am not") saying th a t th is  passage 
" w il l  be used by those who believe in tra n sm ig ra tio n  and [hold] th a t 
soul is  clothed in d if fe re n t bodies having no mem ory a t a ll o f the 
previous lives";32 but a man who th inks according to  the r ig h t doc trines  
o f the Church should re je c t such an in te rp re ta tio n  because i t  is  not 
said about the soul o f E lias but about the s p ir i t  and pow erj30 fo r  i t  is  
possible to  prove fro m  numerous passages in the S c rip tu re  th a t the 
s p ir i t  is  something d if fe re n t fro m  the soul."34 T he re fo re , "the re  is
i
nothing absurd in saying th a t John has come in the s p ir i t  and power o f 
E lia s ."35 Hence "John is  said to  be Elias not because o f h is  soul, but 
because of h is s p ir i t  and power; and there  is  nothing c o n tra ry  to  the 
teaching of the Church i f  i t  is  said th a t they (sc. the s p ir i t  and pow er) 
fo rm e r ly  w ere in E lias and then were bestowed on John; fo r  " s p ir i ts "  
"of prophets are subjected to  prophets",36 but souls o f prophets are not 
subjected to  prophets; and also "the s p ir i t  o f E lias is  re s tin g  in 
E lissaeo"37 p a r t ic u la r ly  emphasizing th a t what was in Elissaeo was the
" s p ir i t "  and "not the soul" of E lia s08
Origen goes fu r th e r  w ith  h is  d is t in c tio n  between soul and s p ir i t  
by juxtaposing various passages of the S c rip tu re  re fe r r in g  e ith e r to  the 
soul or the s p ir it .  His conclusion is  th a t soul is  a "means" ( jjsoov) 
which is  susceptib le  o f e ith e r v ir tu e  or e v il whereas s p ir i t  o f man is  
not susceptib le  of anything bad39 He fu rth e rm o re  asse rts  th a t " i t  is  
possible th a t many s p ir i ts  e x is t w ith in  a man., not only w orse but also 
b e tte r  ones’4'-1 and regards as c lea r th a t the s p ir i t  o f 6od e x is tin g  
w ith in  a man is  d if fe re n t fro m  the s p ir i t  o f man h im s e lf41 So, having 
adduced various passages fro m  the S c rip tu re , he concludes th a t i t  is  
possible to  hold th a t more than one b e tte r s p ir i ts  e x is t w ith in  a man42 
and also many "powers" may e x is t w ith in  one man43
The way in  which Origen makes the d is t in c tio n  between "soul" 
and " s p ir i t  and power" is  not e n tire ly  a sys tem a tic  one. We can however 
com pile h is v iew s fro m  various po in ts  of h is  theology when he re fe rs  
to th is  sub jec t, as i t  is  m ain ly the above-mentioned passage in  Luke 
1,17, where he o rig in a te s  h is enquiry on the question. To h im  i t  is  
enough th a t he can re je c t the notion of tra n sm ig ra tio n  by p rov id ing  an 
exegesis e n tire ly  based on the S crip tu re . According to  the h is  m ys tica l 
doc trine  of the fa l l ,  the o r ig in  o f soul is  in  the d iv ine  re a lity . As we 
shall discuss in chapter 5, th is  re a li ty  is  also sou l’s f in a l destina tion . 
As, th e re fo re , the o rig in  as w e ll as the destina tion  o f soul are re la te d  
to  the m ys tica l do c trine  of the fa l l ,  i t  should be not s u rp ris in g  th a t 
Origen avoids developing h is v iew s on the sub ject s ys te m a tica lly . He 
does not, neverthe less, fa i l  to  exp lica te  the co n tra s t o f h is  d o c tr in e  to  
tha t o f P lato as he did w ith  o the r non-C hris tian  th inkers . Thus he ju s t  
re je c ts  tra n sm ig ra tio n  and a ll he says about h is  own v iew s is  th a t they 
com prise “a d if fe re n t and more sublim e v iew " than th a t o f P lato:
“ i f  he (sc. Celsus) had understood what fo llo w s  upon a soul when 
i t  w i l l  be in the e te rna l l i f e  (11 a«oflou9ei i i j  ifjuxij ev aiwvCuj sa o p ivq
cwfj) and w hat is  the r ig h t v iew  of i t s  essence and o r ig in , he would not 
have r id icu le d  in th is  way the idea of an im m o rta l (aS dva iov) en tering  
a m o rta l body, not according to P lato 's tra n sm ig ra tio n  but according to  
a d if fe re n t a more sublim e view."44
Thus Origen's v iew  is  th a t a human soul does not en ter another 
body during the same aeon. The question, th e re fo re , ra ised  by th is  
a ff irm a tio n  is: what happens to  the soul a fte r  the death o f a man and 
u n til the consummation of the aeon?
, Human being throughout an aeon. The answer w hich Origen 
provides is  cons is ten t w ith  h is  fundamental v iew  th a t c o rp o re a lity  is  a 
un iversa l c h a ra c te r is tic  of c rea tu res , regard less of the rank of l i f e  in 
the w orld . Indeed, h is asse rtion  is  th a t, a fte r  death, the soul uses a 
body which has the same "fo rm " to  th a t during the life t im e , in the Ret 
we fin d  h is v iew  th a t "before  the re s u rre c tio n " and a fte r  i ts  
"separation" fro m  the body "soul makes use of body"45 which is  "o f the 
same shape to  the th ick  and e a rth ly  body"; fo r  whenever “ the re  is  a 
n a rra tio n  o f appearance o f one of the dead, he has been seen in  a shape 
w hich is  the same to  th a t which he had when he was in  f le s h "46 
A ccord ing ly , when i t  said th a t "Samuel was appearing, th a t is , he was 
v is ib le , i t  e n ta ils  th a t he was clothed w ith  a body"47
Thus Origen holds th a t, a fte r  death, the soul has also a human 
body which is  consisted of a m a tte r o f another qua lity .
This very a ff irm a tio n , namely th a t a fte r  death the soul is  in 
the body, provides Origen w ith  one more argument against 
tran sm ig ra tio n . He subsequntly argues th a t " i t  is  not possib le" fo r  
E lias ’ soul to  be in John’s body “because one soul cannot func tion  in to  
tw o  bodies a t the same tim e";48 fo r  "once [E lias] was ascended toge the r 
w ith  a body, how th is  soul which had a body was transposed to  another 
body?'.49 This is  why " i t  was not the ascended E lias who had come 
having changed body [and] named as John"50
What Origen re a ff irm s  is  not only th a t a fte r  death human beings 
are "a live "51 but also h is v iew s about co rp o re a lity , as discussed in 
chapter 1. Throughout an aeon a human being has a human body and 
what is  d if fe re n t fro m  the e a rth ly  l i f e  is  the q u a lity  o f th is  human 
body, in Origen’s v iew  th is  should not be regarded as strange; fo r  a 
human body changes not only a fte r  death but is  a c tu a lly  changes every 
day; " th is  is  why not m is taken ly  body has been named as a r iv e r " 52 
Thus " i t  is  necessary fo r  a soul, ex is tin g  in  spa tia l places, to  use 
bodies which are approp ria te  to  those places. And i f  i t  w ere  necessary 
fo r  us to  liv e  w ith in  sea as sea -crea tu res  we would have a body 
s im ila r  to th a t o f fishes , so when we are lik e ly  to  in h e r it  the kingdom 
of heaven and being in  d if fe re n t places, i t  is  necessary th a t we use 
bodies which are s p ir itu a l,  the fo rm e r shape, neverthe less not being 
extinguished even though the tra n s fo rm a tio n  becomes tow ards  a more 
g lo rious  fo rm ; th is  is  what Jesus’ body was lik e  (as w e ll as th a t o f 
Moses' and H ellas’), namely, during the m etam orphosis i t  was not 
d if fe re n t fro m  what i t  (sc. Jesus' body) no rm a lly  was (wonsp rjv t o  
I tjctou siSoq ... oux sxepov ev if )  p s ia p o p fitio s i, nap’ o rjv).”53 What is  
suggested here is  th a t the body of Jesus, during h is m etam orphosis, 
was trans fo rm ed  in to  a “more g lo rious  fo rm "; however, i t  was the same 
body somehow trans fo rm ed  - i t  was not another body. This rem ark  
applies also to  the bodies of Moses and E lias, who w ere present during 
the event o f the m etam orphosis o f Jesus.
The very s ig n ific a n t conclusion, which Origen a rtic u la te s  a f te r  
th is  analysis, is  th a t the re  is  no question o f d ispu ting  the personal 
id e n tity  of a human being because o f h is  changing q u a lity  o f body during 
an aeon.54
This is  a v iew  according to  which he can answer any question 
about the s ta tus  o f a human being throughout an e n tire  aeon. For, as a 
l ife t im e  is  too sh o rt a period o f tim e  compared to the du ra tion  of an
aeon, one would ask the question not only o f the s ta tus  of a human being 
a fte r h is death, but also about th is  s ta tus  before b ir th . Indeed, Origen 
provides an answer to such a question in Cels:
"...we know th a t when a soul, which is  in  i t s  nature  incorporea l 
and in v is ib le , is  in any m a te ria l place, i t  re qu ires  a body su ited  to  the 
nature of th a t environm ent, in the f i r s t  place, i t  bears th is  body a fte r  
i t  has put o f f  the fo rm e r body which was necessary at f i r s t  but which 
is  now superfluous in i ts  second state. In the second place, i t  puts a 
body on top o f th a t w hich i t  possessed fo rm e r ly , because i t  needs a 
b e tte r garm ent fo r  the pu re r, e the rea l, and heavenly regions. When i t  
came to  be born in to  th is  w o rld , i t  put o f f  the a f te rb ir th ,  w hich was 
useful fo r  i t s  fo rm a tio n  in the womb o f the m other so long as i t  was 
w ith in  i t ;  and underneath th a t i t  put on what was necessary fo r  one 
th a t was about to  liv e  on earth. Then again, since the re  is  an e a rth ly  
house of the tabernacle , which is  somehow necessary to the 
tabernacle ,55 the B ib le says th a t the e a rth ly  house of the tabernacle  is  
being d issolved, and th a t the tabernacle  puts on 'a house not made w ith  
hands, e te rna l in  the heavens’. The men o f God say th a t 'th a t w hich is  
c o rru p tib le  shall put on in c o r ru p t ib i l i ty ’, which is  d if fe re n t fro m  tha t 
which is  in c o rru p tib le , and th a t 'th a t which is  m o rta l sha ll put on 
im m o r ta lity ’,55 which is  not the same as th a t which is  im m orta l."57
This is  how Origen p o rtra ys  human being in  body throughout an 
aeon. It  is  the very fa c t th a t a ra tio n a l c rea tu re  is  an inseparable 
corporea l e n tity  liv in g  in a w o rld  which is  m a te ria l, which e n ta ils  
th a t the soul should always be understoood as being in a body.
E. de Faye58 has taken the v iew  th a t the sta tem ents in  La tin58 
according to which i t  is  only the T r in ity  who live s  w ith o u t a body are 
but in te rp o la tio n s  o f Rufinus. in the lig h t o f the discussion here, th is  
asse rtion  is  not co rre c t. Origen had strong  as w e ll as c le a r v iew s of 
co rp o re a lity . This is  why he argues against those who m igh t asse rt
th a t i t  is  possib le fo r  a soul a fte r  death to  be punished w ith o u t being 
in  a body50 Furtherm ore , Origen’s comment on the passage o f Matthew 
"but ra th e r fe a r him  who is  able to  destroy both soul and body in h e ll"51 
is  qu ite  in d ica tive  of h is fundamental view's o f co rp o re a lity . He takes 
the v iew  th a t what th is  passage o f Matthew suggests is  th a t "the 
incorporea l soul is  not punished w ith o u t a body" (o n  a o w u a x o r  fj qjuxrj, 
Koa o n  d v s u  a w y a i o c  ou K o R d g s i a O 5 2  in any event, “soul is  in  need o f a 
body fo r  i t s  spa tia l transpos itio ns" ( o w p a io c ,  Seexai 5 i d  id c ;  x o n iK d c ;  
j i e x a p d a s i g ) 53
On th is  question, H. Crouzel is  r ig h t in w ith d ra w in g  an e a r lie r  
v iew  of h is a ff irm in g  th a t the soul live s  in  a body in  the tim e  between 
human death and what he ca lls  " re s u rre c tio n "54 There are tw o  th ings, 
however, th a t have eluded h is analyses in  th a t work. F irs t ,  O rigen’s 
perception about co rp o re a lity  pe rta in s  not only to  th a t period  o f tim e  
but also to  the tim e  before the b ir th  o f a man. Secondly, a human being 
does not ac tu a lly  change body a fte r  death55 A human being a c tu a lly  has 
two bodies and the v is ib le  one is  po rtrayed  as being "under" the unseen 
human body. I t  is  only during the fo rm a tio n  of a human being in to  the 
"womb of the m other so long as i t  was w ith in  i t "  th a t he does not w ear 
th is  not seen (and yet human) body.55
It  would be in te re s tin g  (ye t beyond our scope here) to  d iscuss 
how modern physics has made progress tow ards de tecting  (and indeed 
photographing) what Origen regarded as a body under w hich the v is ib le  
human body is. We only note th is : Modern research has shown th a t the 
"brigh tness" o f human body is  p a r t ic u la r ly  high when a human being is  
in  c e rta in  e x is te n tia l s ta tes  (praying, fo r  example, is  one o f these 
sta tes). I t  is  not w ith o u t s ign ificance  tha t Origen, more th a t seventeen 
cen tu ries  ago, a rtic u la te d  the a ff irm a tio n  th a t "the prophets ... because 
of the touch, so to  speak, of the Holy S p ir i t  upon th e ir  souls ... became 
more c le a r-s ig h te d  in th e ir  m ind and brighter not only in  th e ir  soul
but also in the ir body (sgivovxo kql xrjv ixtuvfjV Raunpoxspoi aRRd kqi xo 
auipa)67
What is  s ig n ific a n t, however, is  not so much how Origen depicts 
the s ta te  of bodily  nature. A fte r  a ll one m ight a llege th a t th is  cannot 
be detected a t a ll and re je c t a ll asse rtions  about the opposite. But what 
is  m ost s ig n ific a n t is  th a t Origen postu la tes th a t soul a lw ays has a 
body, namely th a t soul must a lways have a body. And th is  "m ust” 
d ire c t ly  stem s fro m  h is conception o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res  (and here, 
man) as an inseparable e n tity . So, what should be seen beyond these 
a ff irm a tio n s  o f Origen is  a c e rta in  mode o f perception o f c re a tu re ly  
l i fe ,  which is  in s ta rk  co n tra s t to  the P la ton ic  perception.
This way of th ink ing  has pro foundly in fluenced the research  of 
modern science. A g rea t number of the sub-a tom ic p a r tic le s  o f m a tte r  
have been f i r s t  v isua lized  and la te r  v e rif ie d . Physical theory  postu la ted 
tha t they must e x is t, according to  fundamental th e o re tic a l 
assumptions. In fa c t many of them were la te r  a c tu a lly  detected. Even 
today, the "quarks" are hypothetical p a rtic le s  w hich are assumed to  
e x is t due to  th e o re tica l presuppositions.
There fo re , what Oriyen's a ff irm a tio n s  (about soul a lw ays being 
in  a body) dem onstrate is  h is deeper conception o f human being as an 
inseparable e n tity  and h is thorough re je c tio n  of any P la ton ic  notion 
about souls c o n s titu tin g  liv in g  persons and capable o f liv in g  w ith o u t 
any body a t a ll.
Origen is  c lea r in s ta tin g  th is  fundamental e x is te n tia l connexion 
between "being in the w orld " and "having a body". In the passage above, 
the p a r t ic ip le  " x u ^ v o u a a "  (being in) is  a causative one, as i t  ind ica tes  
the cause why soul needs a body -and th is  cause is  th a t soul is  "in  
every corporea l p lace"58 A l i t t l e  fu r th e r  he h igh lig h ts  th is  connexion 
again, s ta tin g  th a t "we need a body fo r  various purposes because we 
are in a m a te ria l place and indeed a body which is  o f the same na tu re
SZti
as the nature of the corporeal place and we put on the tabernacle 
because we are in need o f a body"69
Origen, th e re fo re , is  absolu te ly  fa ith fu l to  h is v iew  discussed 
in chapter 1, namely tha t " l i fe "  in  the w o rld  is  understood as l i fe  o f an 
inseparable e n tity  o f incorporea l and corporea l nature  and by no means 
the incorporea l could be considered as liv in g  in i t s e lf  w ith o u t any body 
a t a ll. Besides, i t  is  h is  very v iew  of the whole w o rld  as m a te ria l, 
where "co rp o re a lity "  ac tu a lly  means "s p a tia lity " , tha t makes him  say 
th a t "a soul ... is  in need o f a body fo r  i t s  spa tia l t ra n s it io n s "70
As fo r  the place in which human beings liv e  a fte r  death and 
“before the consummation o f the aeon",71 there  is  an answer, too. In Res 
the re  is  a comment on the parable of the r ic h  and Lazarus72 s ta tin g  
th a t Lazarus was re s tin g  “ in the bosom o f Abraham",76 by th is  meaning 
"to  be toge ther w ith  C h r is t"74 In Cels Origen provides a more de ta iled  
v iew  on where human soul e x is ts  a fte r  death u n til the consummation 
o f an aeon:
"Moreover, not only C hris tian s  and Jews, but a lso many o ther 
Greeks and barbarians have believed th a t the human soul live s  and 
e x is ts  a fte r  separation fro m  the body, and show th is  by the d o c trine  
tha t the pure soul, which is  not weighed down by the leaden w e igh ts  o f 
ev il 75 is  ca rr ie d  on high to  the regions o f the pu re r and e therea l 
bodies, fo rsak ing  the gross bodies on ea rth  and the p o llu tion s  a ttach ing  
to  them; whereas the bad soul, th a t is  dragged down to  e a rth  by i ts  
sins and has not even the power to  make a recovery, is  c a rr ie d  here and 
roams about, in  some cases at tombs where also ap pa ritions  of shadowy 
souls have been seen,75 in o ther cases s im p ly  round about the earth ."77
This is  the sense in which Origen s ta tes  th a t "A fte r  death the 
soul does not e x is t in th is  l i f e " 78 The way in which he a r t ic u la te s  how 
man e x is ts  a fte r  death denotes h is  tw o  notions about w hat w i l l  happen 
th e re a fte r. U n til the end o f 'th e  aeon, human being takes h is  "award"
ozy
according to  h is m e r its  and h is e x is te n tia l s ta tus  is  s t i l l  a human one 
in a body of a q u a lity  th a t he deserves to be u n til judgement. However, 
i t  is  only a t the tim e  o f judgement, th a t a man "co lle c ts  the harvest", 
th a t is  another e x is te n tia l s ta tus  in  the aeon to  come -  i f  he is  found 
to  deserve a tra n sp os itio n  at a ll.
Origen depicts extens ive ly  these tw o ca tegories o f "aw ard" and 
"co lle c tio n  of the harvest" in commJohn 13 He obviously does so in 
o rder to re ite ra te  h is fundamental v iew  th a t "human beings" m a in ta in  
th is  rank o f l i f e  "u n til the consummation o f the aeon"80
During th is  period of tim e , a human being "saved in C h ris t"  (of 
sv Xpiaxw ow^opsvoi) are not supe rio r to  "angels", due to  the ve ry  fa c t 
th a t they are s t i l l  human beings.81 Those who "are now m e rc ifu l"  (01 
vuv sReijpovsg) w i l l  become "angels" in "the aeon to  come"8-  and i t  is  
then th a t they may be sent a "angels" to  help human beings to  a tta in  to  
e te rna l l i f e 8vi
I t  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  no tew orthy  th a t Origen s ta tes  th a t to  be lieve 
th a t th is  "a lte ra tio n " (fis iapoR ij)84 may take place "be fore  the 
consummation o f the aeon" (npo xfjg ouvxsRsiag xou aituvog)85 is  an 
opinion held by those who "have not grasped the meaning of the 
s c r ip tu re  and long fo r  fo r  im possib le  th in g s "85 For w ha tever the 
"award" fro m  God w il l  be, th is  w i l l  be given in the "aeon to  come" (sv 
6s xw peRRovn <cawvi> ij napa xou Kupiou 5i.avopfj)87
Nevertheless, the re  is  a fu r th e r  question w hich should be ra ised  
w ith  respect to  Origen's v iew s of "m otion" in  tim e , as discussed in 
chapter 2. He holds th a t movement o f ra tio n a l beings in tim e , m a in ly  
regarded as fre e  m oral action, is  perpetual as "the re  is  noth ing 
between to  com m it sin and not to  com m it s in "88 The question, 
th e re fo re , is  what happens to  th is  movement in the in te r im , namely 
between death and consummation of an aeon.
Origen is  conscious o f th is  question which d ire c t ly  stem s fro m
his fundamental p rem ises -and he does face it .  Thus, in commNatt he 
comments on the parable as in M att.20,1-16: " I f  the soul has been sown 
toge ther w ith  the body, how did they rem ain id le  during the whole 
day?"89 His exegesis is  tha t the expression "out o f the vineyard", where 
the w o rke rs  w ere before  they w ere "h ired", " is  the place o f the souls 
before  th is  body"90 whereas "v ineyard" is  not only th is  l i f e  but also the 
place where the souls w i l l  be a f te r  death; " fo r  the souls w hich are out 
of the body do not stand id le " as "Samuel was 'working by prophecying 
being out o f the body, and Jerem iah was praying 'fo r  h is  people'."91 He 
holds th a t we should w ork  in the vineyard 'w hether present o r 
absent',92 " fo r  no one w i l l  be sent in the v ineyard (according to  the 
parable) in  o rder not to  w o rk "93 A ccord ing ly , in deOr he s ta tes  that 
"in  a place of p rayer", among those standing w ith  the fa ith fu l,  there  are 
those "who have fa lle n  asleep before  us"; "And i f  Paul w h ile  s t i l l  
clothed w ith  a body held th a t i t  cooperated w ith  h is s p ir i t  in  C orin th  94 
we m ust not give up the b e lie f th a t so also the blessed ones who have 
departed come in  the s p ir i t  more qu ick ly  than he who is  in  the body to 
the assem blies o f the Church."95
There fo re , Origen regards those who have departed fro m  th is  
l i f e  as being in  a s o r t of a c t iv ity  u n til the consummation of the aeon. 
Consequent on h is convic tion  th a t a liv in g  being is  an inseparable whole, 
he holds th a t the “whole" which is  said to  be " s p ir i t ,  soul, body, w i l l  be 
judged" a t the tim e  of "the presence" o f C hris t.95
Conclusion. Origen provides answers to the questions ra ised  by 
h is conception of tim e  so th a t he rem ains fa ith fu l 1 to  h is  fundamental 
conception of i t .  He dec is ive ly  re je c ts  the doc trine  o f tra n s m ig ra tio n , 
held by the Greeks, Jews and Egyptians and he upholds h is  v iew s, as a 
C h ris tian , so tha t basic po in ts o f h is conception o f tim e  are re ite ra te d  
and re in fo rced . He re a ff irm s  h is v iew s on co rp o re a lity , h is  opinion th a t 
the w o rld  had a beginning and is  d ire c ted  tow ards an end and th is
d ire c tio n  has an purposefu l cha rac te r underlined by the judgem ent at 
the end of an aeon. He also re ite ra te s  tha t a liv in g  ra tio n a l c re a tu re  (in  
th is  case: human beings) is  a "whole", namely an inseparable e n tity  
having s p ir i t ,  soul and also having alw ays a body, although the q u a lity  
o f m a tte r which co n s titu te s  th is  body changes. F ina lly , Origen 
re ite ra te s  h is conception of c re a tu re ly  movement as s ig n ify in g  m a in ly 
fre e  m oral action ; he regards human beings a fte r  death as e x is tin g  in 
bodies and being in a c t iv ity  and he o ffe rs  prophecy and p raye r as 
examples of such a c tiv ity . Those examples are qu ite  c h a ra c te r is t ic , as 
they p a r t ic u la r ly  underline th a t movement in  Origen’s space-tim e  is  not 
a purposeless one, but i t  is  o rien ted  tow ards an end; in th is  way the 
eschato log ica l cha rac te r o f action  o f human beings in  tim e  is  id e n tifie d .
§2. Time and the incarnation of Christ.
The perpetusl advent o f the Logos. Follow ing  fro m  h is 
conception o f the re la tio n  o f the Logos to  the w o rld , Origen regards the 
presence and func tion  o f the Logos in the whole o f tim e , "not only the 
fu tu re  ... but also in  the past."97 This means th a t the "advent" o f the 
Logos in  the w o rld  takes place as long as i t  e x is ts , fro m  i ts  beginning 
to  i t s  end. On th is  sub jec t Origen sta tes:
"According to  the na rra ted  presence o f our Lord Jesus C h ris t an 
advent o f h is has taken place, which was co rp o re a lly  u n ive rsa l93 and 
shone there  upon the w o rld , when ‘the Logos was made flesh , and d w e lt 
among us'99 For 'he was the tru e  lig h t, which lig h te th  every man th a t 
cometh in to  the w orld . He was in the w o rld , and the w o rld  was made by 
him , and the w o rld  knew him  not. He came unto h is own, and h is  own 
received him  not.’100 One should know, neverthe less, th a t the Logos was 
also coming to each of the sa in ts  before  (h is  inca rna tio n ), though not in 
a corporeal fo rm ; and he is  s t i l l  coming to  us even a f te r  h is  v is ib le  
advent".101
in the comm John i t  is  accord ing ly stated: “Before the corporeal 
advent o f Jesus the sa in ts  had something more than the o the r fa ith fu l,  
as they had comprehended the m ys te rie s  of d iv in ity ; fo r  i t  was the 
Logos of God who had taught them before  he became flesh  ( fo r  he was 
a lways w ork ing , being im ita to r  o f h is fa th e r, about whom he says ‘My 
fa th e r is  h ith e rto  w o rk ing ’;102 and those sa in ts  “w ere in s tru c te d  by 
C h ris t before he became fle s h ” , C h ris t “who was begotten before  the 
L u c ife r" .10'1, So "the re  is  not when" the Logos was not “present in the 
l i fe ,  e ith e r a fte r  the h is to r ic a l era o f Jesus o r before  it.".104
in the Fragment XiX o f the same w ork, Origen comments on 
John 1,29 ("Behold the Lamb of God, which bears and takes away the sin  
of the w o rld ").a s  fo llo w s : " i t  has been w e ll said ‘he who bears and 
takes away the sin ' not >he who bore and took< or >he who w i l l  bear and 
take awayc For he pe rpe tua lly  c a rr ie s  out the bearing and tak ing  away 
the sin o f those who seek re fuge to  him. Hence we hold th a t he bore and 
took away and bears and takes and w il l  bear and take as 'to  bear and 
take' is  applied to  each tim e."105
A ccord ing ly , in  Cels, Origen sta tes: "God in  h is goodness comes 
down to men not sp a tia lly  but in h is providence and the son o f God was 
not only w ith  h is d isc ip les  at th a t p a r t ic u la r  tim e , but also he is  w ith  
them always (asQ, in fu lf i lm e n t o f h is prom ise *Lo, 1 am w ith  you a ll 
the days u n til the end of the aeon'."106 A lso "the Logos is  estab lished as 
the Logos of God and Jesus is  proved to  be son o f God both be fore  and 
a fte r  h is incarnation. But i a f f i rm  tha t even a fte r  h is inca rna tion  he is  
a lways found to  be m ost d iv ine in ch a rac te r by people who have very 
sharp eyes in th e ir  soul, and to  have t ru ly  descended to us fro m  God, 
and not to  have owed his o r ig in  o r development to  human sagac ity  but 
to  God’s m an ifes ta tion ; fo r  i t  was he who by varied  w isdom  and va rious 
m irac le s  estab lished Judaism in the f i r s t  place, and la te r  
C h r is tia n ity ."107 So God wants "to  enable us to  become fa m ilia r  w ith
him  through C h ris t and the perpetual advent o f the Logos".103
Thus Origen holds the doc trine  o f the "s p ir itu a l advent" of the 
Logos109 as a pe rpre tua l m an ifes ta tio n  o f God in the w orld . There fo re , 
the te rm  "presence" o f ' t h e  Logos may suggest e ith e r h is "s p ir itu a l 
advent" before the inca rna tion  o r the corporeal presence o f C h ris t in 
the w o rld  o r h is  presence th e re a fte r or even "the prom inent and 
g lo rious" presence o f C h ris t expected in  the consummation o f the 
w o rld .110
This v iew  is  the background fo r  an exegesis o f a passage in 
Luke 2,6 ("the days w ere accomplished th a t she should be delivered"):
"To many people i t  would seem superfluous to  say ‘[Now 
E lisabeth ’s] fu l l  tim e  came th a t she should be de live red ; and she 
brought fo r th  a son'. For who is  th a t woman who can b ring  fo r th  a son 
unless the tim e  o f incubation is  com plete? ... And one should know th is , 
namely th a t in the case o f John i t  has been w r it te n  ‘E lisabeth ’s fu l l  
tim e  came th a t she should be de live red ’,111 whereas o f Mary [ i t  has 
been w r it te n ] ’the days w ere accom plished’.112 For [the expressions] 
'the days w ere accomplished' and ‘fu l l  tim e  came' are not a ll the same, 
as tim e  has also n igh ts, but in  the case o f Jesus the re  are no n igh ts  but 
only days to  be accomplished th a t he be brought fo r th ."113
What Origen im p lies  here is  th a t the actual presence of C h ris t 
did not take place "a fte r"  a tim e  elapsed, but, a t a c e rta in  h is to r ic a l 
moment, th is  presence was m anifested in  tim e  in a corporea l fo rm . For 
what came was "he who was destined to  b ring  peace in  the w o rld , he 
who estab lishes a contact between heavens and earth ".114 The 
inca rna tion  of C h ris t " is  a genesis not as a road fro m  non-being in to  
being" but i t  is  “a road fro m  'being in the fo rm  of God'115 to undertake 
the 'fo rm  o f a servant'."116
Nevertheless, Origen deems the do c trine  of inca rn a tio n  a 
m ys tica l one117 and as a “m ys te ry ” in i t s e l f ,118 which c o n s titu te s  a
m a n ifes ta tion  of the love o f God tow ards crea tu res.119 He also s ta tes  
th a t inca rna tion  took place so th a t ''man who had gone away" be 
saved120 and in o rder to  make men "fr ie n d s" o f God.121 So the 
inca rna tion  was not "in  va in";122 fo r  i t  is  through th is  event tha t the 
transcendent God became "approachable" to  men,120 since, departing 
fro m  hum anity which C h ris t assumed at th a t tim e , one may become a 
man o f God.124
The ch a rac te r o f inca rna tion  as a h is to r ic a l event is  c le a r ly  
pointed out.125 Origen is  p a r t ic u la r ly  scrupulous in enunciating th a t the 
inca rna tion  was a rea l event and not a "seemina" one126 and so was the 
passion o f Jesus.127 The te rm  “death" applied to  C h ris t is  re fe rre d  to 
h is human hypostasis,128 because C h ris t did not stop being God during 
the tim e  of h is  incarna tion .129
Origen p o rtra ys  the reason of inca rna tion  as w e ll as the 
re la tio n  of h is d iv in ity  to  h is  soul.100 It  is  very  s ig n if ic a n t tha t, even 
in re fe r r in g  to  C h ris t, Origen rem ains consis ten t w ith  h is fundamental 
v iew  of human nature  as a "whole" and not something compound in a 
P la ton ic , o r o ther, sense. Althouah he s ta tes  tha t n e ith e r the bodu nor9 • U w
the soul o f C h ris t w ere God,131 yet he regards them as being "one" w ith  
the Logos of God during the inca rna tion .102 I t  is  again in  the 
above-mentioned passage fro m  commMatt th a t he regards the soul and 
body of Jesus as being "one" w ith  the Logos o f God, so th a t "a ll th is  is  
one whole".100
Origen's v iew  is  th a t the advent o f C h ris t is  being continued 
even a fte r  h is incarna tion  and re su rre c tio n . Thus, "as before  h is  v is ib le  
and corporea l incarna tion  he had descended to  the p e rfe c t, so [he does] 
a fte r  h is  procla im ed presence".104 He holds a notion of the Logos as one 
who "re tu rned  fro m  inca rna tion  to  what 'he was in the beginning w ith  
God‘" ,1°5 and who th e re a fte r " is  being served not o f men nor by men"105 
but he "goes to  the souls which have prepared therneselves to  rece ive
Thus C h ris t was incarnated according to  the d iv ine  dispensation 
and yet he continues to  be present; fo r  "everyth ing  passes away, but 
those (sc. the commandments) do not. And ne ithe r does the Logos; fo r  i f  
he " fa lls  in to  the ground", he fa lls  w il l in g ly  in o rde r "to  b ring  fo r th  
much f r u i t " .1
Origen fu l ly  a f f irm s  the h is to r ic a l re a lity  o f the inca rna tion  of 
C h ris t in the person o f Jesus. Nevertheless he does not hold th a t th is  
inca rna tion  took place so th a t the presence o f the Logos become more 
"concre te", as i t  w ere, and th e re fo re  in  a sense "com pelling" men to  
adm it i t .  On the co n tra ry , h is  v iew  is  th a t the inca rna tion  took place in 
o rder to  provide an o r ie n ta tio n  of freedom  tow ards sa lva tion  -and yet 
leaving th is  freedom  com ple te ly in ta c t.139 This is  why he regards the 
te rm  "gospel" (e u a ^e flio v ) as pe rta in ing  only to  the New and not to  the 
Old Testament. As he expla ins, the w ord o f C h ris t is  to  men an 
eua^eR iov only "once they accept those which are announced",140 tha t 
is , only i f  th is  w ord is  accepted by human freedom.
Origen would have never asserted tha t the inca rna tion  took 
place so th a t C h ris t appears in a s o r t o f more "concre te" re a li ty ,  so 
th a t men are fo rced to  believe. The presuppositions req u ire d  to accept 
the Logos o f God are the same w hether he is  incarnated or not. These 
presuppositions co n s titu te  a process o f personal p repa ra tion  through 
fre e  m oral action.141 i f  these presuppositions do not e x is t, then a man 
cannot apprehend the Logos, even i f  he sees him  incarnated  in tim e. On 
th is  Origen states:
"In o rder to  see sensible th ings, there  is  nothing ac ting  but a 
healthy eye which, once d irec ted  tow ards a po in t, sees, w he ther i t  
wants to  see o r not. But d iv ine th ings are not o f such a na tu re  as, a t 
present, they cannot be seen w ith o u t th e ir  own action". Not only God 
h im se lf, but even an "angel, as long as he does not want to  be seen, he
is  not seen although present. ... This is  how th ings should be 
apprehended in the case o f C hris t". One should not th ink  tha t "a ll those 
who saw w ere seeing C hris t. They saw the body of C h ris t, but they 
w ere not seeing C h ris t as C h ris t is  in h im se lf. For he was seen only by 
those 'who deserved to  see h is magnitude. This was also prom ised by 
the s c r ip tu re  which says " fo r  he is  found by those who do not put him 
to  the te s t and he appears to  those who are not u n fa ith fu l to  him".142
So, “although Jesus was one, he had many aspects; and he did 
not appear u n ifo rm ly  to  a ll those who saw' h im ";140 "not even w ith  the 
apostles them selves and the d isc ip les  was he a lways present o r a lways 
apparent, because they were unable to  rece ive  pe rpe tua lly  h is  d iv in ity . 
A fte r  he had accomplished the w ork  o f h is  inca rna tion , h is d iv in ity  was 
more b r il l ia n t . " 144 "A ccord ing ly , the s c r ip tu re , in which a ll is  done by 
d iv ine appointm ent, recorded th a t before  h is passion Jesus appeared 
qu ite  genera lly  to  the crow ds, although even th is  he did not do a ll the 
tim e ; but th a t a fte r  h is passion he no longer appeared in the same way, 
but w ith  d e libe ra te  care measured out to  each ind iv idua l th a t which 
was r ig h t. Just as i t  is  recorded th a t God appeared to  Abraham o r to 
one of the sa in ts ,145 and th a t h is appearance was not unbroken but only 
a t in te rv a ls , and ju s t  as he did not appear to  a ll,  so also i th ink  tha t 
the son o f God appeared in much the same way to  the apostles as God 
appeared to the sa in ts  in the Old Testam ent."145
C hris t "was sent in to  the w o rld  not only to  become known, but 
also to  conceal h im se lf. For h is whole nature  was not known even to  the 
people who knew him , but some p a rt o f him  escaped them; and to  some 
he was e n tire lu  unknown."147 And Oriqen re ite ra te s  h is v iew  la te r  inw? w
the same w ork s ta tin g  th a t C h ris t's  "human c h a ra c te r is ts  w ere v is ib le  
to  a ll,  w h ile  the d iv ine c h a ra c te r is tic s  could not be seen by a ll" .148
There fo re , w hether during the incarnated presence o r in the 
perpetual incorporea l advent, the in te rn a l p resuppositions o f man to
to  each ind iv idua l man rem ains; i t  is  up to the human being to  prepare 
h im se lf p ro pe rly  and apprehend th is  fac t, i t  is  according to  th is  
perception th a t Origen sta tes: “And we should know th a t the advent o f 
Logos occurs to  those who enjoy the most o f blessing. For what is  my 
personal bene fit i f  the Logos has come to the w o rld  but i do not have 
him ? and, by co n tra s t, even i f  we suppose th a t the advent o f Logos had 
not ye t taken place and i would become as the prophets became, then I 
have the Logos.”149
Origen considers the d oc trine  o f the Church to  be th a t the 
inca rna tion  of C h ris t was the "fu lfilm ent o f the promise" w hich had 
been announced by the prophets.150 On the question as to  why the advent 
became corporea l, although i t  would be possible to  continue being 
incorporea l (since the presuppositions o f “seeing" him  are e xa c tly  the 
same) Origen provides answers as s ta ted  above. C h ris t was incarnated  
because i t  was prom ised by God. i t  was an act o f God's providence fo r  
the sake o f the e n tire  w orld . Nevertheless the ve ry  fa c t th a t 
inca rna tion  took place and the tim e  at which th is  happened are in  God's 
choice, according to  h is providence. I t  is  not possib le to  men to  know 
the very reasons o f God's action  nor can men know why these actions 
take place at th a t sp e c ific  tim e. This is  a fundamental v iew  o f Origen 
and i t  is  subsequent to  h is v iew  o f God's rad ica l transcendence.151
The consummation o f aeons. In Qriqen's view' the h is to r ic a l 
moment o f Incarnation  m arks a c e rta in  fixed  po in t in the continuum  of 
the whole tim e. Th is "po in t" is  one of prom inent s ign ificance , exceeding 
even the s ign ificance  of those po in ts  which m ark the “consum m ation" 
and "end" o f an aeon.
The ground fo r  holding a p a r t ic u la r  v iew  about the s ig n ifica n ce  
o f the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  to  be found, as Origen deems, in  the 
S c rip tu re , namely in  Paul. I t  is  the passage fro m  Heb. 9 ,26 "but now'
o o d
once in  the end o f the aeons hath he appeared to  put away sin  by the 
s a c r if ic e  o f h im se lf" as w e ll the passage fro m  I Cor. 10,11 “and they 
are w r it te n  fo r  our adm onition, upon whom the ends o f the aeons have 
come". What Origen concludes fro m  these tw o  passages is  th a t there  
are some o ther fixed  po in ts  in  the continuum o f tim e , apart fro m  those 
which m ark the end o f each aeon; these are the po in ts  which m ark the 
“end o f aeons", tha t is  the end o f a period o f tim e  which com prises a 
number of aeons -a  number which Origen does not de term ine and 
im p lies  th a t he does not know.152
In the commMatth he s ta tes  th a t as a t the end o f an aeon
“c e rta in  occurrences"150 happen (d e s tru c tio n  of the w o rld ,
consummation, judgement, rearrangem ent o f ra tio n a l c re a tu res  in the 
various ranks o f l i fe ) ,  so a t the “end" o f a set o f aeons the event o f
incarnation  took place. Origen is  rem arkab ly  cautious in the
a rtic u la t io n  o f h is v iew s on th is  sub ject. In co n tra s t to  the end o f an 
aeon which is  constan tly  marked by the same essentia l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
(consummation, judgem ent, re -a rrangem ent o f ra tio n a l beings in the 
ranks of l i fe ) ,  the "end o f aeons" is  not marked by occurrences w hich 
are supposed to  be a lways o f the same nature. I t  is  on th is  ground tha t 
he regards the inca rna tion  of C h ris t as an event w hich m arks the “end" 
of an undeterm ined number of aeons and the "beginning" o f a next se ries  
o f aeons o f an undeterm ined number, too. In the deOr he a r t ic u la te s  
th is  v iew  thus:
"I th ink  tha t, as the la s t month is  the end o f the year, a f te r  
which the beginning of another month ensues, so i t  may be th a t, since 
several ages com plete as i t  were a year o f ages, the present age is  ‘the 
end', a fte r  which ce rta in  ’ages to  come’ w i l l  ensue, o f w hich the age to  
come is  the beginning, and in these coming ages God w i l l  ’show the 
riches  o f h is grace in kindness’; when the g re a tes t s inne r, who has 
spoken i l l  o f the Holy S p ir i t154 and is  under the power o f s in  throughout
jo y
the present age, w i l l ,  I know not how ( o u k  o ( 5 a  ontoc o iK o v o u n a o p s v o u ) ,  
undergo tre a tm e n t fro m  beginning to  end in the ensuing age tha t is  to 
come."155
The uniqueness o f the incarnstion of C hrist. A question ra ised 
by Origen's conception o f tim e  is  th is : Since tim e  is  understood to 
cons is t o f aeons marked by consummations o f the world., how is  i t  
possible fo r  ra tio n a l c re a tu res  to  know the w ord o f God in an aeon 
h e re a fte r?  Does such a conception o f tim e  e n ta il th a t C h ris t should 
again be incarnated in o rder to  reveal the w ord of God to  the w o rld ?
Origen's answer to  th is  question is  negative. The advent of 
C h ris t does not mean tha t he "changed place" but ju s t  tha t "he became 
v is ib le  whereas he fo rm e r ly  was not. Being in v is ib le , due to  h is being 
image of the in v is ib le  God, he assumed the fo rm  o f a se rvan t; thus the 
Logos became flesh  and thus v is ib le , so tha t, through h is  appearance, he 
m igh t in s tru c t us to  see h is  g lo ry  through h is v is ib le  appearance".15b i t  
is  due to  h is doc trine  of the perpetual re la tio n  o f the in v is ib le  Logos to 
the w o rld  th a t Origen has no d if f ic u lty  in a ff irm in g  the uniqueness o f 
h is  appearance in to  the w o rld  in  an incarnated form .
Thus i t  was not only through h is v is ib le  presence th a t the Logos 
communicated w ith  the w o rld  and revealed the w ord o f God. He is  
pe rpe tua lly  acting as a m ed ia to r between c rea tu res  and God. The 
inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  a "m yste ry" and " i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to  know the 
m ys te ry  of inca rna tion  in a ll i t s  p a rtic u la rs " .157 Nevertheless th is  
“m ys te ry  ... has been prepared" by the providence of God even "be fore  
the foundation of the w o rld " and the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  lik e  "bread 
which descended fro m  heavens and gave l i f e  to  the w o rld ".153 This 
means th a t C h ris t was incarnated not because there  was no o the r way 
fo r  the Logos to  reveal the tru th  to  the w o rld , but because God h im se lf 
appointed th is  way fo r  h is own m an ifes ta tio n  in to  the w orld . I t  is  not 
possib le to  know why God acted in th is  way. I t  was an act out o f h is
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Providence and men cannot know the reasons of providence.159
This is  the context in  w hich Origen regards the c ru c if ix io n  of 
C h ris t as a "s a c r if ic e "  which took place “once".150 He d ire c t ly  appeals 
to  Paul and quotes the passage fro m  Rom.6,10 “For in  tha t he died, he 
died unto s in  once;"161 and rem ains fa ith fu l to  the dnof as in Heb.9,26.
i t  is  thus, namely as a m an ifes ta tio n  o f the d iv ine  otKovoyia 
"prepared before  the foundation o f the w o rld ", th a t Origen underlines 
the uniqueness o f the inca rna tion  o f C hris t. He s ta te s  th a t the “genesis 
o f Jesus C h ris t"152 is  as unique an event as the "genesis o f men"150 and 
the "genesis of heavens and earth ".154
The inca rna tion  is  a h is to r ic a l occurrence w hich is
unprecedented since c rea tion  came in to  being. Th is is  why Jesus is  
s ta ted  as he who "came out o f God"165 whereas “before  th a t he did not 
w i l l  to  go out o f the fa th e r".155 In v iew  o f th is , Origen re fe rs  to God 
who "made one special descent in  orded to convert those whom the
d iv ine s c r ip tu re  m y s tic a lly  ca lls  ‘the lo s t sheep o f the house o f
Is ra e l1, 157 which had s trayed  down fro m  the mountains".1 ba
Furtherm ore , the inca rna tion  took place not just, once, but also 
once and fo r a l l . This means th a t th is  event is  unique not only w ith  
respect to  the past but also to  the future. Origen a sse rts  th a t the 
saying in Revelation th a t “he was clothed w ith  a ves tu re  dipped in 
blood" (Rev. 19,13) denotes the blood of the incarnated  Logos; and he 
adds th a t even i f  we in some fu tu re  tim e  ascend to  the h iahest rank o f 
l i fe ,  we shall never fo rg e t the entrance o f the Logos in to  a body lik e  
th a t o f ours.159 Thus the uniqueness of the inca rna tion  is  regarded w ith  
respect to  the eschato log ica l perspectives, as po rtrayed  in  Johns
Revelation.
The event o f inca rna tion  is  regarded as one c e rta in  po in t in the 
whole s tre tc h  o f tim e , between the beginning and the end of the w orld , 
i t  is  a unique event havinq a decis ive  eshato loq ica l purpose.170 So th is
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is  a unique “ka iros" (a notion discussed la te r  in  th is  chapter) in the 
whole o ikovou io : of God about the w orld :
" i t  is  not su rp ris in g  th a t the re  have been prophets who in 
ce rta in  Generations on account o f th e ir  more ac tive  and zealous l i fe  
surpassed o ther prophets in  th e ir  reception  of the d iv ine  in sp ira tio n , 
some o f whom w ere th e ir  con tem poraries w h ile  o the rs  lived  earlier- 
arid la te r  than they. So also i t  is  not s u rp ris in g  th a t i t  has happened at 
a c e rta in  tim e  (Kaipog) th a t some special person has v is ite d  the human 
race, who was p re -em inen t beyond those who lived  be fore  o r even a fte r  
him. The explanation o f th is  has something ra th e r  m ys te rious  and 
profound about i t ,  the understanding o f which is  qu ite  beyond the 
capacity  o f the common people. To explain these m a tte rs , and to  re p ly  
to  Celsus’ question about C h r is t’s advent ’is i t  only now a fte r  such a 
long age th a t God has remembered to  honour171 the human race? Did he 
not care be fo re? ’ i t  is  necessary to  touch on the sub jec t o f d iv is io ns , 
and to  explain why ’when the m ost High divided the nations as he 
sca tte re d  the sons o f Adam, he set the boundaries o f the nations 
according to  the number o f the angels o f God; and the Lord's p o rtio n  
was Jacob h is people, Israe l the lo t o f h is  in h e rita n ce ’.1/2 And i t  w i l l  
be necessary in each case to  give the reason fo r  the b ir th  o f a man in to  
a p a r t ic u la r  region as the sub jec t o f the one who has been assigned tha t 
reg ion, and how is  i t  reasonable th a t ’the Lord ’s p o rtio n  was Jacob h is 
people, Israe l the lo t o f h is inheritance '. We must exp la in  why fo rm e r ly  
‘the Lord's po rtion  was Jacob h is people, Is rae l the lo t o f h is  
inhe ritance ', whereas concerning the la te r  d ispensation the Father said 
to  the Saviour, ’Ask of me and I w i l l  give thee the heathen fo r  th ine  
inhe ritance , and the bounds of the ea rth  fo r  thy possession.’ (Ps.2,8). 
For the re  are log ica l and consis ten t reasons fo r  the d if fe re n t ways in 
which providence cares fo r  human souls which cannot be expressed or 
explained in de ta il.
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Accord ing ly , oven i f  Celsus w i l l  not adm it i t ,  a fte r  many 
prophets who were re fo rm e rs  of the old Is rae l, Christ came as 
reform er o f the whole world P * He did not need to  punish men by the 
method of the e a r lie r  d ispensation, w ith  whips and bonds and to rtu re s . 
For when 'the sower went fo r th  to  sow ',174 h is teaching was enough to 
sow the word everywhere. But i f  there  w i l l  be a c e rta in  fixed  tim e  
when the w o rld  w i l l  be brought to  the end which i t  m ust necessa rily  
have since i t  had a beginning, and i f  i t  is  tru e  th a t, a f te r  th a t, a 
righ teous judgement o f a ll,1/D then anyone who co n s tru c ts  a C h ris tia n  
philosophy w il l  need to  argue the t ru th  o f h is doc trines  w ith  p roo fs  o f 
a ll kinds, taken both fro m  the d iv ine s c r ip tu re s  and fro m  ra tio n a l 
arguments.".176 So the answer o f Origen to  the argum ent o f Celsus is  
tha t God "has a lways cared fo r  the re fo rm a tio n  o f the ra tio n a l beings 
and given to  them o p po rtu n ities  o f v ir tu e "  and "the re  is  no tim e  when 
God did not want to  ju s t i f y  the l i f e  o f men".1/7
On the same question Origen s ta tes  fu r th e r  in  the same 'work:
"We observed e a r lie r  th a t i t  was not as i f  God had rise n  up 
fro m  long slum ber when he sent Jesus to  the human race; although now, 
fo r  reasonable causes, he has accomplished the d ispensation o f h is  
inca rn a tio n ,178 he has a lways (aeO been doing good to  mankind. For 
nothing good has happened among men w ith o u t the d iv ine  Logos who has 
v is ite d  the souls o f those who are able, even i f  but fo r  a sh o rt tim e , to 
rece ive  these operations of the d iv ine Logos. M oreover, though the 
advent o f Jesus was apparently  in  one co rner, i t  was qu ite  reasonable; 
since i t  was necessary th a t the one prophesised should v is it  those who 
had le a rn t th a t there  was one God, and who were reading h is  prophets 
and learn ing  of the C h ris t they preached, and tha t he should come at the 
proper tim e  (ev Kaipw) when the doc trine  would be poured fo r th  fro m  
one co rner a ll over the w orld .".179 This because "the d iv ine  s c r ip tu re s , 
which understand the sleepless nature  o f God, teach us th a t God
Kaipouc;), as reason demands".180
So Origen holds th a t the inca rna tion  of the Logos, the "day" of 
Jesus [as in John,8,56], m arks the fu lf i lm e n t of the d iv ine  prom ise, 
which was announced by the prophets, as the incarnated Logos was the 
same one who had descended to  the prophets.181
in Ce/s, when he a ttacks  the doc trine  of recu rrence  o f iden tica l 
w o rlds  and ca lls  i t  as " lud ic rous"18^  one o f the argum ents he adduces 
against th is  doc trine  is  tha t th is  would e n ta il the the inca rna tion  of 
C h ris t would be considered as having happened a lready in the past or
th a t i t  w i l l  happen again in  the fu tu re  fo r  an in f in ite  number of
tim es.180
It  is  c lea r, th e re fo re , th a t Origen s tro n g ly  holds tha t the 
inca rna tion  o f C h ris t took place not ju s t  "once" but also once and fo r  
a ll.
Hence, E. Noll and is  w rong in a lleg ing tha t Origen "cannot 
answ er"184 the question o f w hether o r not the inca rna tion  of C h ris t 
was a unique event. For Origen did answer th is  question and indeed in 
the most s trong  and c lea r term s.
In v iew  o f th is , we asse rt tha t the a llega tion  o f Jerom e, as 
s ta ted  in the fo llo w in g  passage, is  to ta lly  groundless; fo r  he says: "your 
Origen a llow s  h irnse lf to asse rt th a t C h ris t has o ften  su ffe re d  and w i l l  
o ften  s u ffe r , on the ground th a t what was bene fic ia l once w i l l  be 
bene fic ia l a lways".185
What e x is ts  in the Prfnc w ith  respect to  th is  question is  a te x t 
in  the Second Book, which is  extan t only in the La tin  rendering  and
reads as fo llow s:
“This w o rld , however, which in  i t s e lf  is  ca lled  an ‘age’ (Wis. 
13,9) is  said to  be the end of many ages. Now the holy apostle  teaches 
th a t C h ris t did not s u ffe r  in  the aqe th a t was before  th is , nor uet in
the age before th a t; and I do not know w hether i t  is  in mu power to 
enumerate a ll the previous ages in which he did not su ffe r. I w i l l ,  
however, quote the s ta tem ents o f Paul fro m  which I have a rr iv e d  at 
th is  po in t o f knowledge. He says: 'But now once at the consummation of 
the ages has he been m anifested to  put away sin by the s a c r if ic e  of 
h im s e lf  (Heb.9,26). He says th a t C h ris t has become a 's a c r if ic e ' once,
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and th a t 'a t the consummation o f the ages he has been m anifested to put 
away sin ' “.185
Even i f  one asse rts  th a t th is  passage does not render the 
au thentic  v iew s o f Origen exactly  s t i l l  the re  is  nothing in i t  which 
would en ta il th a t Origen holds th a t incarna tion  w i l l  be repeated. On the 
co n tra ry , as he does in  h is w orks  preserved in Greek, he again quotes 
the c ru c ia l passage o f Paul fro m  Heb.9,26, where the s f  dna§ o f the 
inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  s ta ted .187 This p e rs is te n t recourse  o f Origen to 
a passage of Paul's, which is  p ivo ta l fo r  the sub jec t discussed, re f le c ts  
h is au thentic  v iew s as found in the passages in Greek, w here he 
e x p lic it ly  a f f irm s  the uniqueness o f the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t.188
What Origen holds is  tha t a t the "consummation o f aeons" which 
occurred during the present aeon, God "w ille d "189 “ to  reveal h im s le f"  
and as a "measure o f re ve la tio n "190 he "w ille d  to send a d iv ine  teacher 
to  mankind".191 I t  is  exactly  in the passage above fro m  frLuc tha t 
Origen looks very conscious o f the meaning o f the Past tense, as he 
e x p lic it ly  comments on i t  and a ll h is  expressions about the " w i l l"  and 
"act" o f God tow ards inca rna tion  are in  the Past tense, w hich denotes 
an action  which once took place in the past.
Taking Origen's scrupulous trea tem en t of language in to  account, 
we should note th a t the expression awuai.onoirj9fivai 9sRfjaac (he who 
willed  to  assume a body)192 denotes h is v iew  o f the uniqueness o f 
incarna tion, as both the te rm s are in  the Past tense denoting an ac tion  
th a t took place once in the past. I f  Oriqen held tha t th is  event had taken
place more than once in  the past (th a t is , i f  he held th a t incarna tion  
takes place in each “consummation of aeons") he would use those verbs 
in im p e rfe c t tense, which denotes an enduring action  in the past; o r he 
would use Present tense, in  o rder to  ind ica te  an assumed "pe riod ica l" 
o r “repeated" inca rna tion  of the Logos. For example, in Cels, he alludes 
to  h is  notion th a t "assumina" a "bodu" "in  accordance w ith  one's m e rits "W- -w)
is  an occurrence w hich takes place cons tan tly  a t the consummation of 
an aeon; and i t  is  c e rta in ly  not accidenta l th a t here he uses the verbs 
in the Present tense (5i5ujoiv, avaRapBavovxujv) in o rder to denote tha t 
th is  is  something always happening at the end of an aeon,190 whereas, 
in  the same sentence, he s ta tes  tha t God “w ille d "  th is  occurrence to be 
no rm a lly  estab lished, using Past tense in o rde r to  im p ly  tha t th is  
"e te rna l law "194 was established once God willed  so.
Speaking of the incarna tion , however, Origen uses h is  language 
in  a way c le a rly  denoting th a t th is  event took place "once" (dnap .
In re p ly  to  Celsus' a llega tions, Origen argues: “Or are you 
a llow ed to give a defence o f the fa c t th a t God is  not a lw ays (ufj asQ 
appearing to  the Hebrew race, w h ile  we are not granted the same r ig h t 
in  the case of Jesus? For he once (dnctp both rose again and convinced 
h is d isc ip les  about h is re s u rre c tio n , and convinced them to such an 
extent th a t they show to  a ll men by th e ir  su ffe r in g s  th a t they are 
looking fo r  e te rna l l i f e  and fo r  the re s u rre c tio n  w hich has been 
exem plified  (uno5s5sigpevnv) before  them in w ord and deed, and tha t 
they deride a ll the troub les  o f l i fe . “19D
A ccord ing ly , in  commJohn, Origen speaks o f C h ris t saying th a t 
"he o ffe re d  the unique (a n a p  s a c r if ic e  by o ffe r in g  h im se lf, not only 
fo r  the sake o f man but fo r  the sake o f a ll ra tio n a l c re a tu res  (oux unsp 
avSpwntuv uovov aflfia kqx navxog fiogucou x-nv dnaE 9ua(av 
npoasvsx9eiaav sauxov npoasvegKiuv)”. He argues th a t " i t  could be 
absurd" ( k c u  gap dxonov) to c la im  th a t i t  was only fo r  the human sins
th a t C h ris t "tasted  death", as in  Heb. 2,9. For in  th a t b ib lic a l passage i t  
is  s ta ted tha t C h ris t "tasted  death unep navxog", namely " fo r  the sake 
of everyone", which means tha t he tasted  death not only fo r  the sake of 
human beings. The conclusion fro m  th is  argum entation is  tha t Jesus 
“died not only fo r  the sake of men, but also fo r  the sake o f the re s t o f 
ra tio n a l c rea tu res  (ou uovov unep avSpiiinuiv ansSavsv, a ft fid kql unep tujv 
Romwv RogiKwv).".195
in the Fragment 38 i o f the "Commentary on M atthew" (quoting 
M att.3,2), i t  is  s ta ted  th a t the "kingdom" [o f heaven] ind ica tes  the 
“presence" o f C h ris t, both the " fo rm e r" and the " la s t"  one.l9 /
C e rta in ly  i t  is  not co inc identa l th a t Origen m ore than once 
appeals to the passage where Paul enunciates the uniqueness of 
incarna tion ; and i t  is  also not co incidenta l tha t although he speaks o f 
"years" and “consummations" "o f aeons" he nowhere makes the s lig h te s t 
h in t of a po ten tia l past o r fu tu re  inca rna tion  of the Logos. On the 
co n tra ry , he s tresses  the uniqueness o f the event. R e fe rrin g  to  the end 
o f an aeon, he ca lls  the occurrences of th a t tim e  as "e te rna l law " (s. 
supra) and p o rtra ys  the meaning o f consummation, the causes o f i t  as 
w e ll as the content and the outcome o f judgem ent; he does so in a 
de ta iled  way and he ca lls  them also as "heavenly and s p ir itu a l law s" 
which e x is t “ fo r  sa lva tion" and " fo r  the se rv ice  to  God".'75-''
Juxtaposing th is  concreteness o f Origen on the question o f the 
consummation o f an aeon to the way he expresses h is v iew s on the 
"consummation of aeons", we asse rt tha t the d iffe re n ce  is  not 
inc identa l. He emphasizes the uniqueness o f Incarnation  and as fo r  the 
o ther "consummations" "o f aeons" he ju s t  says th a t "som ething should be 
done"199 but i t  is  only God “who knows the tim es o f revea ling  and the 
measures o f re v e la tio n "200
Thus, although Origen holds a notion o f a prolonged tim e  
cornpris inq consecutive aeons and does not a ltoqe the r exclude the
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9f:1p o s s ib ility  fo r  recu rrence  o f one event o r another-LI he is  c le a r ly  
a ff irm in g  tha t the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  a unique event throughout 
the whole of tim e ; and the uniqueness of th is  event has granted tim e  a 
ce rta in  meaning in both d irections., namely past and fu tu re , i t  is , 
th e re fo re , o f p a r t ic u la r  s ign ificance  to enquire in the meaning which 
tim e  acquires out o f the inca rna tion  o f C hris t.
Incarnation and Time. Origen, w ith  h is c h a ra c te r is t ic  acu ity , 
makes a percep tive  rem ark  on the meaning of the te rm  suo^geffiov 
(gospel). Since the te rm  sua^sR iov  has the meaning o f an 
'.'announcement of th ings" which gladden those who hear them "once they 
accept what is  announced"20-  then one would say th a t th is  d e fin it io n  
applies to  the Old Testam ent as w e ll; and uet the te rm  sua^eR iov  is  
not applied th e re 203 Origen's concern fo r  log ic  and p rec is io n  appears 
here once more, as he does not hes ita te  to  challenge h is own 
sta tem ents in  o rde r to  around them in the m ost so lid  wau.W
The answer th a t he provides to th is  question is  based exac tly  
on the event o f the inca rna tion  o f the Logos.
" it . would seem to  someone reasonable to  ob jec t to  the f i r s t  
te rm  (sc. the te rm  sua^eR iov) because these w r it in g s  w hich are not 
named as gospels can be included in the same d e fin it io n ; fo r  the law  
and the prophe tic  w ords are believed to  conta in announcement o f th ings 
which reasonably gladden those who hear them because o f the b e n e fit to  
them once they accept what is  announced. To th is  i t  would be answered 
tha t, before the [v is ib le ] advent of C h ris t, the law  and the prophets did 
not have them selves what was being prom ised, because he had not come 
yet in  o rder to  e luc idate  the m ys te ries ; but once the sav iour came and 
w ille d  to  present the euangelion as a corporea l one, made eve ry th ing  
lik e  an s u a ^s n io v 204 ... by taking away the ve il which was on the law  
and the prophets, proved the d iv in ity  o f a ll o f them, as he apparen tly  
rea lized , to  those who wanted to  become d isc ip les  of h is  w isdom , w hat
happening in fig u re , yet i t  was w r it te n * 0*3 fo r  u s ,  to  whom the end of 
the aeons has a rrived . For everyone to whom C h ris t has come, does not 
w orsh ip  God e ith e r in  Jerusalem  o r in the mountain o f the Sam aritans; 
but lea rn ing  th a t ‘God is  s p i r i t ’ [and] adoring him  ‘in s p ir i t  and in 
t r u th ’207 w orsh ip  the fa th e r and c re a to r o f everyth ing  not in f ig u re  any 
more (ouksii). Thus, none o f the old w r it in g s  be fore  the gospel was 
euaggeRiov; fo r  i t  (sc. the gospel) became sua^eR iov because o f the 
advent o f C hris t. And the su a ^e n io v , which is  a new' tes tam en t, once 
took us aw'ay fro m  the a n tiq u ity  (naRaioxTjxog) o f th a t le t te r ,  bestowed 
the lig h t o f knowledge to  a ll the w r it in g s  and illu m in a te d  them by the 
newness o f the s p ir i t ,  w hich never becomes old; th is  newness of the 
s p ir i t  applies to  the new testam ent. For i t  was necessary par 
excellence (syaipexujq) to  ca ll as suax^emov th is  w hich rea/izec 
( n o t r j i t K o v )  what in  the Old Testam ent was regarded as gladdening 
news (exPnv ^  n o iq i iK o v  xou m l ev xfj n a f i a i d  5 i a 9 f j K n  v o u ig o u s v o u  
euaggeRiou euaggsRiov s y a ip e i . t i ig  KaReia9ai ’euaggsRiov* ‘V'2ua
Thus the pre-announcements in  the Old Testam ent, about the 
fu tu re  advent o f C h ris t, c e rta in ly  w ere gladdening news. However, the 
te rm  sucr^eRiov applies only to  what conta ins the realization  o f those 
prom ises and announcements -and th is  is  the New' Testament.
In respect o f th is , the s c r ip tu re  o f the law  and the prophets 
was incom plete (nenRqpupevT] ouk rjv) in  the sense th a t he who said 
"Think not th a t I am come to destroy  the law , o r the prophets: I am not 
come to destroy, but to  com plete (ouunRqpojaaO"209 was not p resent in 
tha t sc rip tu re .210
The passage above show's how Origen comprehends the meaning 
which the inca rna tion  o f the  Logos Gave to  t im e  before  th a t event.
Incarnation  "made c lea r" the “m ys te ries " o f Old Testam ent, where there 
was a "prom ise" but i t  was expressed in a secre t way, as a fa c t 
p e rta in ing  to  fu tu re  tim e. Those w r it in g s  though cannot be named as 
s u a ^s fk o v ; fo r  there  was not “what was prom ised" in i t s e l f  ( th a t is  
C h ris t) as he appears "being corporea l" in the New Testament. This 
"presence" took away the ve il fro m  the w ords o f the law  and prophets 
and proved those w ords to  be re a lly  insp ired  by God. i t  was th e re fo re  
the "prom ise" in  i ts e lf ,  s e c re tly  expressed in the Old Testam ent, tha t 
became corporeal. This is  why the te rm  euaggerkov applies "par 
excellence" (s^atpsxwg) to  what "re a lize s " (notnitKov) the message of 
the Old Testament.
So h is to ry  before th is  event is  proven to  have had an 
eschato loa ica i cha rac te r, as i t  was o rien ta ted  tow ards  the advent o f 
C h ris t; the evo lu tion  o f h is to ry  was d irec ted  by the promise given by 
God and, subsequently, the expectation and hope fo r  th is  event to 
occur, once i t  had been prophesed Those ca tegories  in i ta l ic s  
co n s titu te  fundamental c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f Origen’s conception of tim e  
in respect o f the inca rna tion  o f the Logos. Thus in Cel he s ta tes:
"But are you not moved by the commendations of the supreme 
God and h is holy angels, u tte re d  through prophets not a f te r  Jesus’ l i f e  
but before he came to  liv e  among men, so th a t you adm ire  both the 
prophets who received d iv ine in s p ira tio n  and the one whom they 
pre-announced ? i t  so happened th a t h is  advent to th is  l i f e  was 
procla im ed many years beforehand by several men in such a way tha t 
the whole Jew ish race was hanging on the expectation o f h im  whom 
they hoped would come."211
This is  the sense, in which Origen regards John the B a p tis t and 
h is preaching as an "end" and Jesus C h ris t as a "beginn ing"212 This 
"beginning" though, apart fro m  i ts  tem pora l sense, has also a 
q u a lita tiv e  one, meaning the en lig tenm ent and renewal o f tim e
bbl)
th e re a fte r  210
This is  why Origen, in the beginning of h is exegesis on the 
Psalms, adopts those d e fin it io n s  of the te rm  “end" ( ib Roc) th a t b e tte r 
f i t  h is theology and express h is thought in the most e ffe c tiv e  way. Thus 
he appeals to  A r is to t le  to  define “end” (xeFiog) as what " is  the cause of 
the o the rs  not being in i t s e l f  the re s u lt o f anything “ ; o r "end" is  th a t 
"because o f which the o the rs  e x is t, in  i t s e lf  e x is tin g  not because of 
them"; o r "end" is  tha t " fo r  which every th ings is  done, and do th is  not 
everyth ing  else". A ccord ing ly , he appeals to  H erophilus, according to 
whom "end is  a p red ica te  because of which we do eve ry th ing  else, and 
do i t  i t s e lf  not because o f anything else; and goal is  the respec tive  
[p red ica te ] to  th is , in the same sense th a t tru e  happiness (suSaiuovi'a) 
is  [respective ] to  be t ru ly  happy; and th is  [sc. goal] is  the u lt im a te  o f 
choices."214
Thus the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t as a "beginning" is  understood in 
both a tem poral as w e ll a q u a lita tiv e  sense, in se/Ps th is  v iew  is  
expressed in a s ing le  passage, as C h ris t is  s ta ted  as he who “has 
a lte re d  h im se lf by undertaking the fo rm  of a se rvant, because o f whom 
we began to  liv e  according to  the New Testament and are p reparing  
ourselves to  beoin the te rm in a tio n  of the fio u re s  and the beoinnina o f\ j  •_> «_• w
the tru th  i ts e lf  " 215
Origen quotes the passage o f John 2,19 "Destroy th is  tem ple, 
and in th ree  days I w i l l  ra ise  i t  up" and, w ith  h is usual scrupulousness, 
he makes a very acute rem ark upon that:
"For i t  is  not w r it te n  ‘Destroy th is  tem ple and in the th ird  day i 
w i l l  ra ise  i t  up’, but ‘in  th ree  days". For the tem ple * * *  is  ra ised  in the 
f i r s t  and the second day a fte r  i t s  d es tru c tion  and h is ra is in g  up is  
completed in  th ree  days in a ll. Th is is  why re s u rre c tio n  has taken place 
and there  w i l l  be re su rre c tio n , even though we are buried w ith  C h ris t 
we also are re su rre c te d  together w ith  him."215
DO I
What th is  passage shows is  th a t tim e  acquires a new meaning 
after the inca rna tion  o f the Logos.
Free m oral action  is  re in fo rce d  by the hope end expectation of 
re s u rre c tio n , which has t r u ly  and v iv id ly  been rea lize d  in h is to ry  by 
C h ris t h im se lf. The h is to r ic a l event o f inca rna tion  gave a c lea r meaning 
to  future tim e  as w e ll as to  the wau in which the w alk tow ards th is  
goal w i l l  be rea lized, in comm John Origen states:
"W ell, according to  a c e rta in  exegesis, both the tem ple and the
body o f C h ris t seem to  me to  be a fig u re  o f the church; she is  the
‘temple*, a s p ir itu a l house, 'a holy priesthood'217 due to the fa c t tha t 
she is  b u ilt  by liv in g  stones and founded 'Upon the foundation of the 
apostles and prophets, Jesus C h ris t h im se lf being the ch ie f co rner 
stone'.218 And by the saying ‘Now you are the body o f C h ris t, and 
members in p a rtic u la r ',219 even though the harmony o f the tem ple 
seems to  be e ith e r d issolved o r a ll the bones o f C h ris t [seem to be] 
sca tte red ,220 as i t  is  w r it te n  in the Psalm 21, in persecutions and 
so rro w s  due to p lo ts  by those who f ig h t against the u n ity  o f the 
tem ple; ye t the tem ple w i l l  be ra ised  up and the body w i l l  be 
re su rre c te d  on a day which w i l l  be the th ird  a fte r  the day th a t e v il 
was against i t  and [a fte r ] the ensuing day o f the consum m ation; fo r
the re  w i l l  be a th ird  [day] in the new heaven and the new e a rth  221 when
those bones, the whole house o f is rae l 222 w il l  be re su rre c te d  as death 
w i l l  be defeated222 on the grea t [day] o f the Lord. Thus the re s u rre c tio n  
of C h ris t, which took place a fte r  h is passion on the cross, con ta ins a 
m yste ry  of the re s u rre c tio n  o f the whole body of C hris t. And as tha t 
sensible body has been c ru c if ie d  and buried and a fte r  th a t i t  has been 
ra ised  up, so the whole body of C h ris t [cons titu te d ] o f sa in ts  has been 
'c ru c if ie d  w ith '224 him  and is  not a live  at the moment; fo r  each one, 
like  Paul, g lo rie s  fo r  nothing else but 'in the cross o f our Lord Jesus 
C h ris t',225 through whom he has been c ru c if ie d  to  the w o rld  and the
w o rld  to  him. So he has not only been c ru c if ie d  toge the r w ith  C h ris t 
and c ru c if ie d  to  the w o rld , but he is  also, buried toge ther w ith  C h ris t; 
fo r ,  he says ‘we are buried w ith  h im ‘/ ^ u and Paul lik e  being in a kind of 
b e tro tha l to re s u rre c tio n  makes the rem ark ‘We have been re su rre c te d  
w ith  him',227 fo r  he w alks in  a renewal o f l i fe ,  in  the same way as 
during the hoped fo r  blessed and p e rfe c t re s u rre c tio n , although he has
not been re su rre c te d  yet. The re fo re , although he is  now e ith e r
c ru c if ie d  and a fte r  th a t buried o r now buried and re su rre c te d  fro m  the 
[death o f] the cross, the re  w i l l  be a tim e  when he w il l  be re su rre c te d
due to  the very fa c t tha t he is  now buried ."228
Thus "w a lk ing" in  tim e  is  advancing tow ards the "hoped" fo r  
re s u rre c tio n ; and tim e  acquired th is  meanina a fte r  the inca rn a tion  of* 3 w
C hris t. !t is  because o f th is  meaning th a t Origen regards the Church as 
the place fo r  progressing tow ards sa lva tion  and also considers the 
"tem ple"229 as w e ll as the "body" o f C h ris t as “p re fig u ra tio n s " o f the 
Church.220 This is  also why201 he in te rp re ts  the co n s tru c tion  of the 
tem ple o f Solomon as pe rta in in g  to  the Church: “We sha ll t r y  to  apply 
everyth ing  which the re  is  re fe rre d  to  the tem ple, to  the Church” 222
Throughout the theology of Origen there  are many po in ts  w hich 
show tha t he regards the Church as being the "place" fo r  sa lva tion .202
As the meaning o f "sa lva tion" is  the " re tu rn  to God", th is  re tu rn  
has been rea lized  in h is to ry , as "re su rre c tio n ". This is  a m a tte r though, 
which is  regarded as a “g rea t m yste ry"224 and “hard to  speculate" on. 
Such an opinion is  not unexpected, since the re s u rre c tio n  is  c lose ly  
re la ted  to  the conception of the fa l l,  namely, re s u rre c tio n  c o n s titu te s  
the "re s to ra tio n " fro m  the fa lle n  s ta te 202
This is  why, very c h a ra c te r is t ic a lly  and w ith  h is  usual 
s c ru tin y , Origen ca lls  the re s u rre c tio n  o f Jesus C h ris t as the 
"exem plified" (unoSs&sigusvrjv)205 one. His “death and re s u rre c tio n "  have 
a lready estab lished a "p re fig u ra tio n " (npoiunojaiv)237 of the
re s u rre c tio n  the e n tire ty  o f the w o rld , as those who fo llo w  him  in "his 
death" w i l l  also be like  him "in  the re s u rre c tio n " (xfjv usxd to adppaxov 
avanauaiv xou awxrjpog fiuluv Koxd xfjv avanauoiv auxou sunoiouvxog xoc 
auuuopcpoic xou Savdxou auxou gsxcvnuevoic kq( 5 id xouxo koi ih g  
avaaxaaeu)g jrJu
The rea l meaning which fu tu re  tim e  acquired a f te r  the 
inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  estab lished by the fa c t th a t "he staged the 
re s u rre c tio n  of the dead through h is own re s u rre c t io n "259 This was a 
h is to r ic a l event which established the v a lid ity  o f the prom ise o f C h ris t 
to  h is  d isc ip les  th a t they w i l l  be re su rre c ted , to o 240 i t  is  also in the 
Fragment 553 of the Commentary on Matthew th a t he again a f f irm s  tha t 
the death and re s u rre c tio n  o f C h ris t was also a f ig u re  o f the 
re s u rre c tio n  o f a l l 241
In v iew  o f these a ff irm a tio n s , the re  is  no doubt th a t the 
passage re fe r r in g  to  “re s u rre c tio n , the fig u re  o f 'w h ic h  was shown in 
our Lord and Saviour",242 although extan t only in La tin , does express 
Origen’s au thentic  views.
So Origen regards inca rna tion  as a “m yste ry" w hich was in the 
providence o f God "before the foundation of the w o rld "; th is  was 
rea lized  in the proper tim e  appointed by God h im se lf, a t a moment 
which m arks the consummation o f a number o f aeons. Th is ve ry  event 
aave tim e  a new rneanino, as c re a tu res  in tim e  are th e re a fte r  recarded 
as being in a kind of "b e tro tha l"  (ev appapwvi) to the re a li ty  o f the 
"end"240 This means th a t, in  a deeper sense, future became present. 
For in  the person o f Jesus the fin a l end was fu lly  re a lize d ; the 
re s u rre c tio n  of Jesus was a f i r s t  fulfilm ent o f the promise o f God, 
given through Jesus, about the f in a l re s u rre c tio n  o f the e n tire  w orld .
The fu tu re  became present not only fo r  the re s u rre c te d  Jesus 
h im se lf, but also fo r  everyone who believes in God through C hris t. Th is 
is  whu Oriqen re fe rs  th a t Paul "became in a kind of b e tro th a l to
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re s u rre c tio n " and he w alks as i f  he were a lready re su rre c te d , although 
he is  not re su rre c te d  yet. in the selPs Origen speaks o f tim e  a fte r  the 
re s u rre c tio n  of C h ris t in  a re a lly  trium phan t manner, not because of 
what h is to ry  w ill be but because o f what h is to ry  a lready became:
“What th a t day w i l l  be lik e , on which re c o n c ilia tio n  of God to  
men took place, and a la s tin g  w ar was suspended, and the ea rth  was 
proved to  be heaven, and the unw orthy men o f the ea rth  appeared 
w o rth y  o f the kingdom, and the beginning o f our nature  was elevated 
above the heavens (unspdvtu xwv oupavwv), and paradise opened and we. 
rece ived back our ancient fa the rland , and the curse was extinguished 
and sin  was fo rg iven?  He c e r ta in ly  created a ll the days, yet he made 
th a t one par excellence (s^aipexujg); fo r  i t  was on th a t day tha t he 
rea lized  the supreme m ys te ries  b e f it t in g  him. Hence le t us re jo ic e  and 
be overjoyed on tha t day, en joying a double jo y  and fe a s t; one, because 
we w ere emancipated fro m  the c a p tiv ity  of the d ev il; and a second, 
because we are elevated to the kinodom o f heavens."244
The cause fo r  th is  jo y  is  th a t “he who is  going to  b ring  peace in 
the w o rld  has a rr ive d , namely he who estab lishes a lin k  between heaven 
and ea rth  tra n s fo rm s  ea rth  in to  heaven through the preaching o f the 
gospe l"245
Origen's v iew  th a t "the fo rm e r c a rry  in  them selves fig u re s  of 
the la t te r "245 means th a t Incarnation  illu m in a te d  the sayings in Old 
Testam ent 247 i t  is  according to  th is  v iew  th a t he defines prophecy as 
" fo re te ll in g  of fu tu re  th ings; and when they are accomplished then the 
saying reaches i ts  end"248 The passion and re s u rre c tio n  o f C h ris t is  a 
"p re fig u ra tio n " of what w i l l  happen to  the “body" o f the Church. "For 
C h ris t is  the 'head o f the church', so tha t C h ris t and church are one 
body"249
in fa c t, the advent o f C h ris t as a promise2d0 o f God, m arks the 
fu lf i lm e n t, the "answer o f him  who is  expected to  those who expect
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?n '!hirn,,.^_ ‘ Because w hat came was he who “would es tab lish  peace in  the 
future and reconc ile  heavens to  the ea rth  and transform earth itself 
into heaven through h is preaching."2d2 Thus th is  h is to r ic a l event 
estab lishes a springboard fo r  the fu tu re  process of h is to ry . How Origen 
regards th is  "beginning" is  s ta ted  in a passage in Cels:
“Both Jesus h im se lf and h is d isc ip les  did not want people who 
came to them to  believe only in h is d iv ine nature  and m ira c le s , as 
though he did not share in human nature  and had not assumed the human 
flesh  which lu s ts  ’against the s p i r i t ’; 200 but as a re s u lt o f th e ir  faith 
they also saw the power th a t descended in to  human nature  end human 
l im ita t io n s , and which assumed a human body, combined w ith  the d iv ine 
c h a ra c te r is tic s , to bring salvation to believers . For C h ris tia n s  see 
tha t, w ith  Jesus, human and d iv ine nature  began to  be woven toge the r, 
so tha t, by fe llo w sh ip  w ith  d iv in ity , human nature  might become 
d iv ine, not onlu in Jesus, but also in a il those who believe and oo on to
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undertake the l i f e  which Jesus taught, the life  which leads everyone 
who live s  according to  Jesus’ commandments to  fr ie n dsh ip  w ith  God and 
fe llo w sh ip  w ith  Jesus.”204
The expressions in  i ta l ic s  ind ica te  the cha rac te r o f tim e  
assumed a fte r  the inca rna tion  o f C hris t. He was incarnated- so th a t 
those who have "exercised th e ir  freedom  tow ards accepting” the w ord  
of the prophets w i l l  h e re a fte r "be given the paterna l in h e rita n c e "200 
The inca rna tion  o f C h ris t m arks the moment o f h is to ry  at w hich "we 
began to  liv e  according to the New Testam ent" w hich means th a t we 
"are preparing  ourselves to begin the termination o f the figures anc 
the beginning o f the truth its e lf " 2o5 i t  is  Origen's v iew  th a t once the 
inca rna tion  of the Logos took place, we know the meaning of movement 
in tim e  th e re a fte r ; we also learned th a t the re s u rre c tio n  was an 
"exem p lified " p re fig u ra tio n  o f the re s u rre c tio n  o f the e n tire  "body" o f 
C h r is t257 at the end.
This Is how Origen p o rtra ys  the fa c t tha t an expected
eschato log ica l re a li ty  has begun to be realized and in a sense i t  is  
a lready present in h is to ry . In v iew  of th is , when Gregory o f Nyssa2da 
suggests tha t the rea l cosm ic and h is to r ic a l s ign ificance  of the 
sa lva tion  lie s  in the fa c t o f C h r is ts  tru e  inca rna tion , he a c tua lly  
echoes the v iew s expressed by Origen.
Thus, the inca rna tion  and re s u rre c tio n  was something w ith  a 
tw o fo ld  meaning in  respect o f the d ire c tio n  in tim e. F irs t,  i t  was an 
event by which God h im se lf showed the road to  sa lvation. Secondly,
th is  fin a l end was presented in to  h is to ry  not as a p rophetic
speculation, but as a concrete  h is to r ic a l event, i t  is  exac tly  th is
h is to r ic a l event which staged the end in the present as a concrete 
h is to r ic a l re a li ty  and i t  subsequently enables a ll men to  experience, 
through fa ith , th is  future a t the present tim e.
i t  is  out o f th is  realization and promise th a t the w ord of the 
incarnated Logos is  ca lled as euaggefliov. Explaining the etym ology o f 
the te rm 259 Origen po in ts  out th a t what is  announced is  "the saving 
advent o f Jesus C hris t". So "to those who want to accept i t "  and "to  him  
who believes", th is  eu a^e n io v  "teaches the advent o f the good fa th e r 
in  the son". Thus "the good" which is  "promised by these books, is  what 
co n s titu te s  our expectation" 25°
Hence the inca rna tion  of the Logos has o rie n ta te d  tim e  tow ards  
the end as he realized th is  end and i t s  actual content and promisee 
th is  to  those who would fo llo w  the road suggested. The re s u rre c tio n  o f 
Jesus o rien ta te d  action  in tim e , namely i t  illu m in a te d  and "exem p lified " 
i t s  u lt im a te  perspectives; thus hope and expectation became more 
intense, since the promise given bu Jesus was a lready realized in  h is 
person as an “example" "both in w ord and deed" o f what w ill happen at 
the end261
Hence, “movement" (th a t is , fre e  m oral ac tion ) in  O rigen’s tim e
fundam enta lly  h is  conception o f tim e. Movement is  regarded v is -a -v is  a 
goal -"th e  hoped blessed and p e rfe c t re s u rre c t io n "252 The path tow ards 
th is  goal c e rta in ly  presupposes the proper m oral action ; ye t God can 
re in fo rc e  th is  action  through h is grace, which is  perpetual in tim e  
since perpetual is  the presence o f the Logos even "a f te r  h is declared 
presence"260 Thus, tim e  is  coloured by “ incessant grace" and "perpetua l 
hope" and accord ing ly , in  the se/leK Origen re fe rs  to “ the incessancy of 
grace and the constancy o f hope" ( to  SiqvsKeg rng  vdpuog kcu to  
audpavxov ip c  sRniSog)254 Time has now a new o rie n ta tio n  tow ards  a 
goal which was both prom ised and "exem plified"255 in h is to ry . Now' the 
d ia le c tic a l re la tio n  between God and ra tio n a l c re a tu res  is  more c le a r ly  
underlined by God's grace and c rea tu res ' hope. This is  why Origen 
reqards a pious man to be actina  "in  th is  aeon, uet he s tr iv e s  lookinc
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fo rw a rd  to  the aeon to  come"256 A fte r  the inca rna tion  "we who have
been fa m ilia r  w ith  C h ris t expect (npooSoKiuusv) to  rece ive  our 
rew ard " 257 since now there  are "God's re c ip ro ca l promises w hich are 
being expected" ( kcu xqjv eRiFofisvnjv apoipaiwv enaggeRiwv xou Gsou).258 
T here fo re  C h ris t o ffe rs  a consolation “ through the hopes o f the future '‘ 
(xcug eRmoi xou ueRRovxogj259 and man's course in  h is to ry  is  
enlightened and d ire c ted  by fa ith  To such a conception of fa ith  Origen 
devotes extensive analyses270 in o rder to  p o rtra y  the intense 
eschato log ica l cha rac te r tha t movement in  tim e  has acquired once God 
m anifested h im se lf in h is to ry  through Jesus and hope and expectation 
w ere established in tim e.
Follow ing the a lle g o rica l , exegesis o f the "in  th ree  days"271
Origen considers th a t, in sp ite  o f the fa c t tha t "the p resent aeon is  
n igh t"272 arid a period of “d is tre s s  and hardship and s u ffe r in g  and 
pain"273 and "to the ju s t  th is  aeon is  a w in te r " 274 i t  is  neverthe less the 
inca rna tion  of the Loqos tha t granted tim e  an o r ie n ta tio n  tow ards  the
fu tu re  and made th is  tim e  m eaningful by es tab lish ing  a hope which 
en lightens the meaning o f tim e  u n til the very end o f it .
In the sefPs Origen quotes Psalm 36,7 ( " f re t  not th yse lf 
because of him  who prospere th  in  h is way, because' o f the man who 
b ringe th  w icked devices to  pass.") as fo llow s:
"He says not to  im ita te  a p ro sp e rity  made o f w ickedness; nor 
le t yo u rse lf be provoked tow ards e v il, even i f  you see someone ev il 
p rospering ; fo r  you should th ink  th a t th is  aeon belongs to  those who 
have no o the r hope. Let them be happy in  th is  aeon and le t them have 
what theu reaard as ooods. We thouah look fo rw a rd  to  another aeon ofw  w : w  w
l i f e ;  and our hope is  in  th a t aeon onwards, i t  is  not possib le  to  have the 
goods both in  th is  aeon and in  th a t aeon; fo r  i f  someone have in  th is  
aeon, there  he w i l l  hear, w h ile  being punished: Thou in thy l i fe t im e  
d ids t rece ive  thy good th ings ’."2 ' 3
Accord ing ly , he comments on Ps.36,8 ( " f re t  not youse lf in any 
w ise  to  do e v il"  (Mfj napagfjRou ujaxe novnpsueaSat) thus:
"Do not keep your a tte n tio n  upon th e ir  p ro s p e rity ; but w a it fo r  
the end and you sha ll see th e ir  d e s tru c tio n "275
in the same w ork , the exegesis o f P s .6 i,6  is  th is : "He says, 1 do 
see many e v ils  a ff l ic te d  by them; but i am looking tow ards God and i t  is  
h im se lf tha t i have as expectation and hope; th is  is  why i w iths ta nd  
those 'which occur to  me now "27'
This hope, which o rie n ta te s  Origen's thought tow ards  the 
fu tu re , a rises  fro m  the Gospel, namely fro m  the inca rna tion  of the 
Logos, regarded as an event which rendered tim e  m eaningfu l, as i t  
enlightened the d ire c tio n  of the e n tire  w o rld  tow ards a future  f in a l 
goal.
Thus, in Origen's v iew , the Incarnation  is  a unique event w hich 
en lightens tim e  before  i t .  By th e ir  fu lf i lm e n t,  the prophecies not only 
acquired meaning, but also the “p rom ise" appeared co rp o re a lly  in the
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the w o rld  and what w i l l  happen at the end was re a lized  in  h is to ry . So 
incarna tion , as a h is to r ic a l event, gave a meaning to both pest and 
fu tu re  tim e.
The e ie rn s ! gospel, i t  is  out o f th is  assessment tha t Origen 
considers the gospel as conta in ing !,a fig u re  and a shadow of heavenly 
th in gs" 278 This a ff irm a tio n  is  qu ite  a s ig n ific a n t e lem ent, w hich helps 
comprehend Origen’s conception o f the inca rna tion  o f the Logos w ith  
respect to  tim e  as w e ll as h is  conception of tim e  in  general.
in seJLev he s ta tes  th a t the S c rip tu re  is  a whole com pris ing  a 
"body", namely the le t te r  o f the n a rra tio n , a "soul" o f th is  "body" and 
the " s p ir i t "  which is  "according to  fig u re s  and a shadow o f heavenly 
th ings" 279
The prophecies in the Old Testam ent determ ined a d ire c tio n  in 
tim e  tow ards the coming o f Messiah; the inca rna tion  o f the Logos shows 
the d ire c tio n  tow ards the fin a l end, th a t is  the re su rre c tio n . I t  is  ve ry  
in te re s tin g  to  note Origen’s a llego ry  o f the S c rip tu re  as com pris ing  
( lik e  a human being) a body, soul and s p ir i t ;  and i t  was understood as 
"body" by those before Incarnation , i t  is  understood as "soul" th e re a fte r  
and as “s p ir i t "  by those who w i l l  in h e r it  the e te rna l life .
Thus, the gospel conta ins a f ig u ra t iv e  d e sc rip tio n  of the 
eschato log ica l re a li ty  -and i t  is  in  v iew  o f th is  th a t Origen understands 
what John in the Revelation (14 ,6 ) ca lls  as "e te rna l gospel". The 
re la tio n  of the gospel to the “e te rn a l" one is  s im ila r  to  the re la t io n  of 
the "m ys te ries " o f the Old Testam ent to  what has been revealed through 
the New Testam ent280
Consequent on th is  notion, Origen makes the “conceptual" ( i f )  
snivo(a)281 d is t in c t io n  between "sensib le  gospel" and " in te ll ig ib le  and 
s p ir itu a l aospeV'.Therefore "a ll the s tru o a le  is  to  t ru  to  reach the depth
w  w  w  w
of the evangelic mind and to  enquire in to  the n a ke d -o f-fig u re s  t ru th  
( i f jv  ev auioj gupvrjv xuniiiv a flfj9e iav), w hich e x is ts  in i t .” 282
X-n Q
I t  is  qu ite  c h a ra c te r is tic  of the eschato log ica l ch a rac te r of 
Origen’s -thought tha t he is  preoccupied w ith  p o rtra y in g  the meaning and 
c ru c ia iity  o f future tim e. To him  Incarnation has illu m in a te d  the 
meaning o f  h is to ry  u n til the end o f tim e  i ts e lf ;  in seJEze he s ta te s  tha t 
the "end" as “apokatastasis" co n s titu te s  the fin a l r e a li ty  w hich has 
a lready been in tim a te d  through "prophecy" 280
By co n tra s t, Origen does not seem p a r t ic u la r ly  in te re s te d  in 
dealing much w ith  the whole o f tim e  before  inca rna tio n ; he m ain ly 
deals w ith  the tim e  ever since the pronunciation o f the prophecies in 
the Old Testament. I t  should be noted neverthe less th a t Origen seems to 
deem tha t the tim e  of the Old Testam ent is  extended in a period o f tim e  
com pris ing  more than one aeon. When he grounds h is notion o f "aeons" 
on the Old Testam ent, he s ta te s  the flood  o f Noah284 as w e ll as the 
de s tru c tion  of Sodom as n a rra tio n s  which ind ica te  "consum m ations" o f 
the w orld . This means th a t the n a rra tio n  in the Old Testam ent re la te s  
not only to  events o f the c u rre n t aeon, but a t least to  events o f tw o  
previous aeons -one o f which was consummated by flood  and the o the r 
bu con flaa ra tion .
A question which would be posed in re la t io n  to  tim e  in  the Old 
Testam ent is  w hether o r not th is  tim e  is  extended to  the past u n til the 
begining of tim e  its e lf .  Such a question could be in v ite d  by po in ts  o f the 
Princ such as "God did not begin to  w ork  fo r  the f i r s t  tim e  when he 
made th is  v is ib le  w o r ld " 285 However, in chapter 1 we have a lready 
argued th a t Origen regards the n a rra tio n  in Genesis as p e rta in in g  to  the 
veru beainninq of the c re a tive  act o f God. Thus the "days" o f
are s ta ted  as ind ica ting  no tim e .285 Besides, i t  is  to  passages in 
Genesis th a t Origen appeals in o rder to  ground h is no tion  o f 
p ro v id e n tia l and actual c rea tion , as we-have seen.287
As regards the Incarnation, the re  ere po in ts  w here Origen 
deems tha t i t  is  the tim e  fro m  the prophecies onwards th a t has been
i llu m in a te d  by th a t event.-88 In another passage he. a f f irm s  tha t "the 
ju s t"  and the "prophets" lived  in a length of tim e  which Is extended in 
s ix  aeons before the inca rna tion  o f C h r is t;289 yet i t  would be asserted 
th a t th is  a ff irm a tio n  o f.O rig e n  is  rooted ra th e r in  purposes of h is 
a lle g o rica l exegesis; fo r  he re la te s  th is  v iew  to  an exegesis o f 
"sabbatism " (th a t is  the re s t on the seventh day) as meaning " re s t and 
te rm in a tio n  of com m iting  sin".29u Elsewhere he s ta te s  tha t the 
“e cc le s ia s tica l s ta te " "emerged" "at the tim e" o f Abraham *-"
A ccord ing ly , in  deOn Origen sta tes: "There fore  he who sees 
these th inas and perceives in  h is  m ind a week o f eoes so th a t he rnau■—/ 1 W
contem plate a holy sabbath r e s t 292 and a month o f ages, th a t he may 
see the holy new moon o f God, and a year o f ages, tha t he may 
understand the feas ts  o f the year, when 'a ll the males' m ust appear 
before  'the Lord God‘29° and the years p roportioned  to  so la rge  a 
number of aaes, th a t he may comprehend the holy seventh year, and the
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seven weeks of ages, th a t he may sing the pra ises of h im  who has la id  
down law s so g re a t."*3*7
This exegesis, however, although com ple te ly  cons is ten t w ith  
Origen’s conception of tim e , should be regarded ra th e r  as one adopted 
fo r  the sake o f in te rp re ta tio n , since Origen h im se lf, in the same w ork , 
makes a general rem ark upon tem pora l te rm s  found here and the re  in 
the S crip tu re :
"And we have to  consider i f  the words w r it te n  o f feas ts  o r 
solemn asernblies th a t take place accordina to 'days' o r 'months' o r
w
'seasons' o r ‘years '290 are to  be re fe rre d  to  aeons. For i f  'the la w ’ has 
a 'shadow o f the th ings to come'295 i t  must needs be th a t the many 
sabbaths are a 'shadow' o f so many days and th a t the new moons come 
round in in te rv a ls  o f tim e , beino the re s u lt o f some moon o r o the r w ith  
a ce rta in  sun. Now i f  the ' f i r s t  month' and the 'ten th ' day ’u n til the 
fou rteen th ' and the feas t of unleavened bread fro m  'the fo u rte e n th  u n til
the one and tw e n tie th ‘s 7 conta in ‘a shadow o f th ings to  come* 80 ‘who 
is  w ise '289 and so great ‘a fr ie n d ’ tow ard  God°00 as to perceive the 
‘f i r s t ’ o f many months, and the 'ten th  day' o f i t ,  and so fo r th ?  What 
ought i to  say of the feas t o f the 'seven weeks'001 and o f 'the seventh 
month'0'02 (o f which the new moon is  a day 'o f trum pe ts ', but 'on the 
ten th  a day of atonem ent'000 -th in g s  known to  God alone who has la id  
down law s concerning them? And who has so entered in to  'the mind of 
C h r is t '0-14 th a t he can understand the seven years o f the freedom  o f the 
Hebrew servants and 'the re lease ' o f debts and the r e l ie f  fro m  til la g e  
o f the Holy Land?o0° And there  is  also what is  ca lled the Jub ile  over 
and above the feas t o f seven years ,085 but what is  c le a r ly  o r what are 
the tru e  law s to  be fu lf i le d  in i t  no one can even so much as imagine, 
save he who has contem plated the Father's w i l l  concerning h is 
ordinances in a ll the aeons in accordance w ith  iiis  iriscr utaDiS
judgem ents and h is unsearhable ways'.. .o fTOU/
Origen deals s im ila r ly 003 w ith  the same question in comrntlali. 
He avers th a t i t  is  hard to  understand the deeper meaning o f these 
tem pora l ca tegories, saying th a t he who would a ttem p t to  in te rp re t 
them " w i l l  fa l l  in to  an abuss o f conceptions" exo la in ina fu r th e r  th a t he
w  * s w
uses the name o f “abyss because o f the depth o f the d o c tr in e s ” ind ica ted  
by those tem poral ca te g o rie s009
Hence Origen regards the n a rra tio n  in Genesis as pe rta in in g  to 
the yery beginning o f crea tion . We draw  th is  v iew  m a in ly  fro m  h is 
asse rtions  tha t the "days" in  Genesis do not express any tim e  but a 
process of thought010 and ju s t  an "o rd e r”,011 as w e ll as fro m  h is 
re fe rences to  h is w ork  "Commentary on Genesis" (w hich is  lo s t)  when 
he re fe rs  to  the the very beginning o f c re a tio n 012 In the P rinc^^ m 
also re fe rs  to  th a t lo s t w ork and the whole context a t th a t po in t 
c le a r ly  ind ica tes  th a t the d iscussion is  about the ve ry  beginning o f the 
creation. In Cels, too, appeals to  h is  w ork  “On Genesis" and g ives a b r ie f
found in the S ixteenth  of the "H om ilies on Jerem iah" where he s ta tes  
tha t the only n a rra tio n  about the c rea tion  of the w o rld  is  tha t which 
has been w r it te n  "by the Holy S p ir i t ";010 at th a t po in t Origen also uses 
the te rm  Koafjonoti'a which is  c h a ra c te r is tic  and ind ica tive  o f the 
moment which m arks the very beginning of the actual c re a tion , as we 
discuss in chapter 5. F urtherm ore , in  Cels, he re fe rs  to the "d iv ine  
word" u tte re d  through Moses about the "beginning o f the w o rld " (ev 
a p x f j  xou  k o o u o u ) 015 F ina lly , in  the Fragment 383 o f the "Commentary 
on M atthew" i t  is  s ta ted  th a t the “s ix " days o f Genesis p e rta in  to  the 
c re a tive  act o f God017
In any case, Origen takes p a r t ic u la r  care to  p o rtra y  h is 
convic tion  th a t Incarnation en lightens future tim e  u n til i t s  end, w hich 
means th a t h is thought is  preoccupied w ith  the eschato log ica l 
perspectives o f the w o rld -w h ich  underlines the fa c t th a t O rigen’s 
thought is  par excellence an eschato log ica l one.
In v iew  of the discussion above one m ight wonder what was 
ac tu a lly  new in what 0. Cuilmann said about the meaning o f tim e  a f te r  
the inca rna tion  o f C hris t. Leaving aside h is asse rtions  about a 
" re c t il in e a r"  tim e , which have been reasonably challenged 018 and w hich 
ac tua lly  cannot w iths tand  a c r i t ic is m  pe rta in ing  to  the na ture  o f tim e  
proper, our v iew  is  tha t 0. Cuilmann has said nothing tha t Origen did 
not ac tu a lly  say about the meaning w hich tim e  acquired a f te r  the 
inca rna tion  o f C hris t. On the c o n tra ry  Culimann's v iew s have been 
c r it ic iz e d  as c rea ting  "serious, indeed insurm ountable, obstacles to a 
rea l doc trine  o f inca rna tion " 319
i t  is  th e re fo re  qu ite  in d ica tive  o f how l i t t l e  O rigen’s thought 
has been understood th a t Cuilmann d ire c ts  a severe c r i t ic is m  against 
Origen, namely regard ing  him as a kind o f Gnostic. His argum ents, 
however, can be challenged on th e ir  own grounds as i t  is  he h im se lf020
who s ta tes  the c r i te r ia  fo r  regard ing  a though as a Gnostic one. Those 
c r i te r ia  are held to be these:
1. R ejection o f the Old Testament and i ts  ro le  in  the h is to ry  of 
sa lvation.
2. Docetism  -th e  theory of the im ag inary s u ffe r in g  of Jesus.
3. R e jection  of the eschato log ica l expecta tion in  te rm s  of tim e  
and adoption o f a m etaphysical d is t in c tio n  between th is  w o rld  and a 
tim e less  Beyond.
That Origen a ttr ib u te s  a p rom inent and c ru c ia l ro le  to  the Old 
Testam ent needs no fu r th e r  discussion. Besides he qu ite  o ften  argues 
against the Gnostics who do not recognize th a t the God o f the Old 
Testament is  the same God of the New Testam ent and so they “s o li t  the 
d iv in ity " 021
On the question o f Docetism  he e x p lic it ly  re je c ts  the opinion 
which impugns the re a li ty  o f su ffe r in g  and death o f Jesus; and he does 
so using the very  te rm  EoKqatg^22 obviously rebuking the Gnostics. 
Furtherm ore  he does a f f i rm  th a t the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t was an event 
of fu l l  h is to r ic a l re a li ty 020 and h is death, as a man, was fu l ly  re a l, 
to o 324
As fa r  as the eschatological expectation is  concerned th is  has 
a lready been discussed to  a c e rta in  exten t and i t  w i l l  be a m a io r to p ic  
throughout th is  w ork , as Origen’s thought is  above a ll eshato log ica l.
0. Cuilmann re fe rs  to  irenaeus s ta tin g  th a t the re  is f a r n  h  i M U i  U  t U
another theologian who grasped the meaning o f sa lva tion  and tha t the 
h is to r ic a l w ork of C h ris t is  a cen tra l po in t in a line  w hich leads fro m  
the Ola Testament to  the second advent o f C hris t, in any case, Origen 
(as w e ll as Clement) is  s ta ted  as a kind o f co u n te r-p o in t o f irenaeus 
and in  fa c t they are postu la ted as standing ve ry  near to  G nosticism .
in view  of the fa c ts  proving Origen's a tt itu d e  tow ards  
Gnosticim 320 i t  is  ex trem e ly  u n fa ir  th a t 0. Cuilmann a tta cks  Orioen as
he im p lic it ly  regards him  a kind of G nostic0*0 For, according to the 
c r i te r ia  adopted by Cullman h im se lf, i t  can be said tha t I t  could be fa r  
too hard to  fin d  another theologian who perceived the e n tire  course of 
the w o rld  through the cen tra l and c ru c ia l h is to r ic a l event o f the 
inca rna tion  o f C hris t. Not only the en lightenm ent of tim e  both before 
and a fte r  the inca rna tion , but also the dramatic ch a rac te r o f tim e  
i ts e lf  (s. in fra ) have been estab lished due to the very event o f the 
inca rna tion  of C hris t. Amongst h is numerous re fe rences to  the decis ive 
eschato log ica l purpose o f the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t (some o f them 
a lready quoted),'we ju s t  quote th is  which is  ind ica tive  o f how e x p lic it ly  
Origen a ffirm e d  th a t the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t is  the h is to r ic a l event 
which has d ire c t eschato log ica l consequences tow ards the goal o f 
sa lvation:
"When you hear th a t salvation is  fro m  the Jews, you should 
understand these w ords p e rta in  to  Him who said them. For i t  was He 
who was the expectation o f the n a tio n s027 he who was made of the 
seed of David according to  the fle s h " ° 28
in a sm all passage Origen a ff irm s  the co n tin u ity  fro m  the Old 
to  the New Testam ent as he im p lic it ly  appeals to  both o f them (namely 
in Gen. 49 ,10  and Rom. 1,3); he underlines the meaning of tim e  before 
the inca rna tion  o f C h ris t through the te rm  expectation; h e  denotes 
the meaning of tim e  th e re a fte r  through the te rm  salvation
I t  would be ex trem e ly  hard indeed fo r  0. Cuilmann, end fo r  
anyone else, to fin d  a theologian who could express so many profound 
theo log ica l conceptions through so few  words.
L ikew ise, E. de Faye°29 a ttr ib u te s  a Gnostic in fluence on Origen 
on the question o f the inca rna tion  o f C hris t. The only d iffe re nce  fro m  0. 
Cuilmann is  th a t Faye does i t  qu ite  e x p lic it ly  and seems to have no 
doubt about h is assertions. In chapter 1, however, we have a lready 
shown tha t Faue grounded h is a llega tions o f Gnostic in fluence  upon
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Ungen on entirely rmstSKen assumptions and profound 
miscomprehensions of his thought. It is no surprising, therefore, that 
he makes one more erroneous assertion out of the mistaken premises 
on which his entire work is grounded.
A m a jo r fa c to r  causing Origen’s thought to be erroneously 
re la ted  to  G nostic ism  is  th a t Origen is  regarded a p rio ri as a 
P la ton is t. i t  has been said th a t Gnosis is  the outcome o f a n 'ex tre m e  
H e llen iza tion  o f C h r is t ia n ity 000 Hence the alleged re la t io n  o f Origen to 
G nostic ism  is  an inference ra th e r than an outcome o f an actual study 
of h is  own works. Once he was postu la ted as a "P la to n is t’’ and a 
C h ris tia n , scho la rs lik e  E. de Faye found i t  qu ite  reasonable to  postu la te  
Origen as a "Gnostic", too. Origen’s own w ords, however, show tha t such 
an asse rtion  is  a wrong conclusion drawn out o f erroneus 
presuppositions. For they took fo r  granted th a t in  Origen would be found 
a "H e llen iz ing" C h r is tia n ity  (sfiRqvicwv Xpianaviauog), e 
ch a ra c te riza tio n  applied even to  fian ichae isrn001 What has eluded those 
scho la rs, however, is  th a t Origen e x p lic it ly  and many tim es rebukes 
ilanichaeans by name, and th a t throughout h is  w ork  the re  are numerous 
sta tem ents against p a r t ic u la r  Gnostic assertions.
Hence, the s trong  eschato log ica l concern in h is thought Origen 
takes p a rt ic u la r  care in expressing h is v iew  o f the "e te rna l gospel", as 
discussed above. And in v iew  o f th is  d iscussion we can now take in to  
account the c r it ic is m  on th is  sub ject d irec ted  against Origen by 
Jerome:
"And when he (sc. Origen) has said th a t the ’e te rna l gospel’ o f 
the Apocalypse of John, tha t is  the gospel w hich e x is ts  in the heavens 
is  as fa r  su perio r to our gospel as the preaching of C h ris t is  to  the 
r i te s  o f the old law , he goes to the extrem e length o f in fe r r in g  (w hat 
is  im pious even to  have thought o f) tha t C h ris t w i l l  also s u ffe r  in  the 
a ir  and in the rea lm s above fo r  the sa lva tion  o f the daemons. And
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although he does not ac tu a lly  say so, yet i t  m ust be understood as a 
log ica l consequence, th a t as God was made man fo r  the sake of men, to 
set them fre e , so also fo r  the sa lva tion  o f the daemons he w i l l  be made 
what they are, fo r  whose lib e ra tio n  he is  then to  come. And in case i t  
should be supposed th a t we are pu ttin g  our own in te rp re ta t io n  upon h is 
s ta tem ents, we w il l  give h is ve ry  words: ‘For lu s t as he fu l f i l le d  the 
shadow of the law  through the shadow o f the gospel, so because a ll lew  
is  a copy and shadow o f the heavenly r i te s ,  we m ust c a re fu lly  inqu ire  
w hether we ought not to  regard  even the heavenly law  and the r i te s  o f 
the h igher w orsh ip  not as possessing completeness, but as standing in 
need o f the t ru th  o f tha t gospel which in the Apocalypse o f John is  
ca lled  the "e te rna l gospel", in com parison, th a t is , w ith  th is  gospel of 
ours, which is  tem poral and was preached in a w o rld  and an age th a t 
are destined to  pass away'. " oo2
In o rder to  discuss these rem arks p ro pe rly , one should examine 
what is  s ta ted  in the Phnc, on th is  subject. I t  is  s ta ted  th a t "as in th is  
earth  the law  was a kind o f schoolm aster to those who by i t  w ere  
appointed to  be led to  C h ris t005 and to  be in s tru c te d  and tra in e d  in 
o rde r th a t a fte r  th e ir  tra in in g  in the law  they m ight be able w ith  
g re a te r fa c i l i t y  to  rece ive  the more p e rfe c t precepts o f C h r is t, so also 
th a t o ther ea rth , when i t  rece ives a il the sa in ts , f i r s t  imbues and 
educates them in the precepts o f the tru e  and e te rna l law  in o rd e r th a t 
they may w ith  g re a te r fa c i l i t y  accept the precepts o f heaven w hich are 
p e rfe c t and to  which nothing can ever be added. And in heaven w i l l  t ru ly  
e x is t what is  ca lled the ‘e te rna l gospel’ and the testam ent th a t is  
a lw ays new, which can never grow  o ld 0054
in the same w ork i t  is  also stated:
"We m ust also see, however, w hether the s c r ip tu re s  may not 
perhaps ind ica te  th is  fu r th e r  tru th , tha t ju s t  as the le g is la t io n  is  
presented w ith  g re a te r clearness and d is tin c tne ss  in  Deuteronomy than
In those books which w ere w r it te n  at f i r s t ,  so also we may gather 
fro m  tha t coming of the Saviour which he fu l f i l le d  in  h u m ility , when he 
‘took upon him  the fo rm  of a se rva n t’,°°D an ind ica tion  o f the ‘more 
splendid and g lo rious  second coming in the g lo ry  o f h is Fa ther',000 at 
which coming, when in  the kingdom o f heaven a ll the sa in ts  sha ll liv e  by 
the law s o f the 'e te rna l gospel’,00/ the fig u re  of Deuteronomy w i l l  be 
fu l f i l le d ;  and ju s t  as by h is present coming he has fu l f i l le d  tha t law  
which has a 'shadow o f the good th ings to come'008 so also by tha t 
g lo rious  coming the shadow o f h is f i r s t  coming w i l l  be fu l f i le d  and 
brought to  pe rfec tion . For the prophet has spoken o f th is  thus: The 
breath  o f our countenance is  C h ris t the Lord, o f whom we said tha t 
under h is shadow we sha ll liv e  among the na tions ',009 th a t is  a t the 
tim e  when he sha ll duly tra n s fe r  a ll the sa in ts  fro m  the tem pora l to  
the e te rna l gospel, to  use a phrase by John in the Apocalypse,where he 
speaks o f the ‘e te rna l gosper."040
What becomes obvious fro m  these pasages as w e ll our previous 
d iscussion in th is  section, is  th a t Jerome's a llega tions  about Origen's 
thought are qu ite  a rb it ra ry .
F irs t,  Origen f i rm ly  holds tha t the passion o f C h ris t was a 
unique event and took place fo r  the sa lva tion  o f a ll ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  
and not only o f human beings.
indeed Origen rem ains cons tan tly  cons is ten t in  h is  v iew  of the 
w o rld  com pris ing  various ranks o f l i f e  as he a sse rts  th a t the 
inca rna tion  of C h ris t and h is s a c r if ic e  has taken place not only fo r  the 
sake o f human beings but also fo r  the sake o f a ll ra tio n a l c rea tu res.
in comm John hes ita tes  th a t C h ris t "died not only fo r  the sake 
o f men but also fo r  the sake o f the re s t o f ra tio n a l beings";041 fo r  i t  is  
Paul who s ta te s  th a t C h ris t "tas ted  death fo r  the sake o f everyone 
(nov 16c) " 042 “ i t  would, th e re fo re , be absurd to say th a t he tas ted  death 
only fo r  the human sins and not fo r  the sake o f anyone else being in  s in .
M oreover, the passion of Jesus was a benevolent act o f God not 
only fo r  the sake o f human beings who lived  th e re a fte r , but also those 
who had a lready d ied044 Origen again appeals to  Paul in o rde r to  ground 
th is  v iew ; i t  is  the passage in Col. 1,20 which says th a t C h ris t "made 
peace through the blood of h is  cross both to those on ea rth  and to  those 
in the heavens", " i t  is  he who went in to  the low est p a rts  o f the ea rth042 
and he also went above a ll heavens, preparing  the road w hich leads to 
above a ll heavens, tha t is  out o f c o rp o re a lity ."345
Thus Jesus came in o rde r to  "make p e rfe c t ... every ra tio n a l 
c re a tu re  and not only man" 047
The conclusion a t th is  po in t is , th e re fo re , th a t out o f the unique 
inca rna tion  and passion o f C h ris t a il ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  have 
bene fitted  no less than human beings did. T here fo re , the inca rna tio n  is  
a unique event not only fo r  hum anity, but also fo r  the e n tire  w orld . 
This is  how Origen a ff irm s  the once and fo r a ll occurrence o f the 
inca rna tion  rem ain ing cons is ten t w ith  h is fundamental conception of 
the world, as discussed in chapter 1.
One can see th e re fo re  th a t Jerome's a llega tions  th a t Origen 
a ffirm e d  a fu tu re  inca rna tion  o f C h ris t in  o rder to save c re a tu re s  o f 
o the r ranks of l i f e  is  e n tire ly  ungrounded and has noth ing to  do w ith  
Origen's rea l views.
As fa r  as the notion o f "e te rna l gospel" is  concerned, i t  should 
be noted tha t th is  notion very v iv id ly  underlines the eschato log ica l 
cha rac te r o f Origen's thought. What Jerome s ta te s  on th is  is  not very 
fa r  fro m  what Origen re a lly  held, as we can see i t  fro m  h is passages in 
Greek. What Orioen believes is  th is : God m anifested h im se lf in the fo rm  
o f a man, so tha t he would be comprehended by crea tu res. He showed 
h is w isdom to men in the fo rm  o f human w ords, fo r  the same reason. 
Th is is  why Orioen believes th a t "now, even i f  we become able to  see
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God by our mind and heart, we do not see him  ‘as he re a lly  is ’ but as he 
m an ifes ts  h im se lf tow ards us according to h is d ispensa tion "048 Thus, 
as the death o f Jesus does not mean th a t C h ris t passed awau, so the 
d e s tru c tion  of the w o rld  does not en ta il tha t the gospel, w hich C h ris t 
preached to  the entire w o rld , w i l l  pass away. C h ris t re tu rned  to  “what 
ne was oerore tne inca rna tion  w and in tne gospel tne re  is  a “ tru th "  
which is  "beuond the f ic u re s "000w
Origen’s conception of " in te llig ib le  and s p ir itu a l gospel'001 
stands in accordance w ith  h is  notion o f pro longation  o f tim e. He 
a ff irm s  th a t "the church ... has been founded in  the name of C h ris t u n til 
the consummation o f the aeon".002.We know, neverthe less, tha t a f te r  the 
"consummation" tim e  w il l  continue. The question w hich then a rise s  is  
how sa lva tion  w i l l  be possib le a fte r  the consummation o f the w orld . 
Origen provides h is answer on th is  question on the one hand by h is 
notion of the perpetual in te ll ig ib le  advent o f the Logos, and on the o the r 
hand by p rov id ing  a lle g o rica l exegeses the te rm  "church".
The in te ll ig ib le  advent o f the Logos does not p e rta in  only to  the 
v is ib le  w o rld , but to  the e n tire  w o rld ; also i t  does not p e rta in  only to  
the present aeon, but to  the whole o f the tim e.000 Thus Origen can hold 
th a t the saving in te rve n tio n  o f Logos in to  the w o rld  w i l l  continue a f te r  
the consummation. To a hypothetica l question “how fu tu re  genera tions 
w i l l  know the. re ve la tio n  given to  the w o rld  by the unique inca rn a tio n  of 
the Logos?" Origen's qu ite  sim ple  answer is  to a f f i rm  tha t " i t  is  God 
alone who knows the measures of h is  s e lf- re v e la tio n  in to  the w o r ld "004
Holding trie v iew  tha t the church is  the place fo r  the sa lva tion  
and th a t th is  church w i l l  la s t u n til the consummation o f th is  aeon, 
Origen adopts a fu r th e r  a llego ry  o f the te rm  "church", asse rting  th a t 
"each ra tio n a l being is  a holy place by no means in fe r io r  to  the church; 
fo r  ra tio n a l nature  is  made so th a t i t  mau comprehend the a lo ru  o f
This is  v ir tu a lly  the th ird  ’’deduction" (avagw$f?)025 th a t Origen 
makes fro m  the te rm  "church".
The f i r s t  answer o f Origen is  th a t the w o rld  i t s e l f  Is a product 
o f God’s goodness, so th a t ra tio n a l beings w i l l  s tr iv e  Tor th e ir  
sa lva tion , tha t is , th e ir  re tu rn  to  God by th e ir  fre e  m ora l action.0'2 '  
Thus th is  is  the "place" where ra tio n a l beinqs w i l l  s tr iv e  fo r  th e ir  
sa lvation , in respect o f th is , "any place of the w o rld  is  a p a rt o f the 
whole, since the e n tire  w o rld  is  a tem ple o f God" and thus a C h ris tia n  
can pray standing "in  any p lace"028 Hence the “ fa rm " (s ta ted  in the 
parable in  Matt. 13, 3 6 -4 3 ) “would be said to  be the e n tire  w o rld  and not 
only the church o f God"0’28
The second deduction is  th a t, before  inca rna tion , the "holy 
place" o f God is  the tem ple o f Solomon (and, subsequently, the law  o f 
the Old Testament*-"-), whereas a fte r  incarna tion  "holy place" o f God 
and "place" fo r  sa lva tion  is  the Church061 According to  th is  exegesis, 
the te rm  "w o rld " may be applied to  the chu rch062
The th ird  deduction is  to  deem th a t “holy place" o f God is  "each 
ra tio n a l being"; spec ify ing  th is  to man, he c a lls  i t  "sou l"050 In the lig h t 
o f th is  exegesis "a man alone" (uovoq 6 dvSpajnog) can be said to  be "the 
e n tire  w o rld " (6 Koouog 6rtoc)°54
indeed, the th ird  deduction which Origen makes fo r  the content 
o f the te rm  “church" stands very  close to  the f i r s t  one; fo r  n e ith e r is  
tim e  te rm ina ted  at the end o f the aeon nor does the w o rld  com prise  
"souls" only ( th a t is , human beings) and C h ris t was incarna ted  fo r  the 
sake o f a ll ra tio n a l beings and not only o f men.
One would wonder why Origen fee ls  i t  necessary to  make the 
th ird  deduction above, namely to aver th a t every ra tio n a l being is  a 
"holy place" o f God. The answer to  th is  question lie s  in  O rigen’s 
conception of consummation as d es tru c tion  o f the w orld .
In the continuum of tim e  the re  are those fixe d  p o in ts  w hich
determ ine the l im its  o f each p a rt ic u la r  aeon; those po in ts  mark the 
consummation of an aeon and th e ir  du ra tion  is  in f in ite ly  short. So 
consummation m arks no "break" o f the co n tin u ity  o f tim e , as th is  is  a 
moment o f no actual duration. Nevertheless, a t th a t in f in ite ly  sho rt 
tim e  a re -a rrangem en t o f the w o rld  takes place; i t  could th e re fo re  be 
asserted th a t, fo r  a moment, the "world", as an o rde r o f ra tio n a l beings 
in the va rious ranks of l i fe ,  loses i ts  actual meaning and content; fo r , 
a t tha t "moment", ra tio n a l beings are "transposed" fro m  one rank o f l i f e  
to another, according to th e ir  m e rits . Notions lik e  those, however, are 
to ta lly  beyond Origen's thought.
i t  is  through the th ird  deduction th a t the re la t io n  between God 
and the w o rld  is  m aintained, in  sp ite  o f the fa c t th a t the arrangem ent 
o f the w o rld  is  d isso lu ted  at the momeny o f judgement. A lthough, at the 
in f in ite ly  sho rt tim e  o f consummation, the “w o rld " is  destroyed, what 
rem ains is  the ra tio n a l being in i t s e lf  which is  not "destroyed" at the 
consummation, in Origen i t  makes sense to  say th a t "the w o rld  is  
destroyed", meaning the d isso lu tion  o f i t s  o rde r; but in  no case does i t  
make sense to  say th a t a ra tio n a l nature  is  d es troyed002 A t tha t very  
moment o f consummation (conceived th e o re tic a lly , o f course, as I t  has 
no dura tion  at a il) ,  although the w o r ld  is  supposed to  have been 
"destroyed", the co n tin u ity  o f space-tim e is  rea lized  in the ve ry  
existence o f the ind iv idua l ra tio n a l c re a tu re , standing be fore  the ju s t 
judgement o f God. The w o rld  may be destroyed; what however rem ains 
in d e s tru c tib le  throughout a ll the time is  the personal identity  o f a 
ra tio n a l crea tu re .
There fo re , i t  is  the conception of co n tin u ity  o f tim e  as w e ll as 
th a t o f the personal id e n tity  o f ra tio n a l c rea tu res  th a t can be traced  in 
the basis of Origen's th ird  deduction o f the te rm  "church” .
The " in te llig ib le  c ru c ifix io n "  o f C hrist. The notion  o f 
“inte llia ib le advent" o f the Loqos Is re la ted  to  the notion o f " in te ll io ib le
c ru c if ix io n "  of C h ris t e ith e r before  o r a fte r  h is  co rporea l oner*5 This 
is  a notion which has su ffe re d  serious m isunderstandings. P. Koetschau 
quotes v iew s of Jus tin ian 00' on the question of the inca rna tion  o f the 
Logos, which are a ttr ib u te d  to Origen. The passage reads as fo llow s:
"But i f  we w ish  to continue our enqu iries as fa r  as the passion 
o f the Lord our Saviour, although i t  is  a bold and venturesom e th ing to  ■ 
seek fo r  h is  passion in the heaven, neverthe less, i f  the re  are ‘s p ir itu a l 
hosts of w ickedness1 in the heavenly places and i f  we are  not ashamed 
to confess th a t the Lord was c ru c if ie d  in o rder to  destroy  those whom 
he destroyed through -his passion, why should we fe a r to  suspect tha t 
something s im ila r  to  th is  may happen in the rea lm s above, in  o rde r tha t 
the inhab itan ts  o f a ll places may be saved by h is passion? " 35S
i t  is  out o f tw o fundamental notions of Origen's theology tha t 
v iew s as th a t above are a ttr ib u te d  to  him:
F irs t,  h is  conception of the w o rld  com pris ing  many ranks of 
l i fe ,  some of them h igher and o the rs  low e r than the human one.
Secondly, i t  is  the notion o f Origen o f " in te llig ib le  c ru c if ix io n "  
as w e ll th a t such o "c ru c ifix io n "  may e ith e r have taken place be fo re  o r 
i t  may take place a fte r  the corporea l one.
As fa r  as the f i r s t  no tion is  concerned we note th a t Orioenw
would have never asserted th a t another c ru c if ix io n  could take place fo r  
the sa lva tion  of the c rea tu res  o f a h igher rank o f l i fe ,  as a lleged in the 
above- mentioned passage. The reason is  s im p ly  tha t Orioen f i r m ly  
be lieves tha t the inca rna tion  and passion o f the Logos took place fo r  
the sake not only o f human beings but also o f a il ra tio n a l c re a tu re s , as 
we have seen.
As regards the " in te llig ib le  c ru c if ix io n " , i t  should be enquired 
how Origen perceives the content of th is  notion, in the commJohn he 
c le a r ly  s ta tes  h is perception o f th is  “c ru c if ix io n ".
“And you should know th a t the re  was no tim e  when a man.
figuratively said as living according to Jesus, did not exist in this life , 
either before or a fte r the historical era of Jesus. Accordinolu, i think
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ot him who was once enlightened and has tasted the heavenly g ift and 
was partaker of the Holy S p irit and has tasted the good word of God 
and of powers of the aeon to come; if  he fa lls  away he renews himself 
again to repentance, pre-crucifying or re -crucifing  the son of God and 
putting him to an open shame, either before the historical advent of our 
saviour or even a fte r i t ° 55 For he who commits sin now, a fte r the 
enlightenment and the rest of God's benefactions to him, he
re -c ru c ifies  the son of God by his sins themselves to which he fe ll 
back, even though he carries out nothing of the commonly said corporeal 
act of crucifixion of the son of God; and the same thing was happening 
before as anyone who committed sins a fte r he had heard the divine 
words, he was pre-crucifuina the son of God. And one mioht accept
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what allegedly has been said by the saviour and is stated in the Acts of 
Paul; 'I am about to be crucified from above (dvuiSsv ueRRui
QiaupouaSaO’; ss he [sc. who accepts that this phrase has been said by 
Jesus] admits that the [saying of Jesus] ‘I am about to be crucified  
from above1 pertains to the time a fte r the advent, s im ilarly , before the 
advent, when the same causes arise [he should admit] the saying 'even 
then i am about to be crucified'. For why, as he 'from above' is about to 
be crucified, he was not so before? And you should perceive that the 
ssauino] 'i have been crucified toaether w ith Christ070 is said not onlu 
by the saints a fte r his presence, but also by the form er ones, so that 
we do not say that the saints a fte r the presence have any difference  
from hoses and the patriarchs. And the 'i live; yet not i, but Christ 
liveth in m e°71 should be regarded as said not only by those a fte r  the
presence but also by those before it. And i attend to the [saying] '! am
the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; God is 
not the God of the dead, but of the living1 which is said bu the saviour
and [I think that], out of this [saying], Abraham and Isaac and Jacob are 
living, since they also, once buried together with Christ, rose together 
with him*72 yet certainly not at [the time of] the corporeal burial of 
Jesus or the corporeal resurrection of his.’* 73
Hence, what Origen means by this particu lar conception of 
"crucifixion" does not pertain to any corporeal passion, but i i  denotes 
Christ's regret and suffering in seeing rational creatures, who have 
made a progress towards him, fa ll back. Their "falling beck" constitutes 
the actual meaning of this “crucifixion".
Origen's reference to the alleged saying of Jesus "I am about to 
be crucified from above", as well as his statements about 
"recrucifixion" in general, are obviously the source of Jerome's 
allegations that "Origen allows himself to assert that Christ has often 
suffered and w ill often su ffer"074
But the analysis above shows how Origen perceives this 
“passion" "from above" and what is the actual content he attribu tes to 
this conception. What "died" was the man Jesus Christ and his corporeal 
presence, suffering and death took place once and for all. it is only in 
that case that "death" can be applied in a s tr ic tly  lite ra l sense; for 
"Logos in himself is not susceptible of death, but it  was human nature 
to which i t  occured";0/D as, therefore, "human nature", that is 
"corporeality" of the Logos was assumed once and for a ll, it  follows  
that “death" in a lite ra l sense is but a unique event. Thus Jerome's 
above-mentioned allegations are to ta lly  misleading and in no way 
express Origen's authentic view on the subject.
it should be added that a conception of "passion" of Christ lies  
also in the persecution and suffering of a real C h ris tian °/5 For what 
happens to the church is understood to happen to Christ him self, as 
"Christ is the 'head of the Church*/7 so that Christ and church ere one 
body"*78 This is the sense in which Christ is regarded as having been
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"crucified1 in the pest and as to be so in the future.
in Ce/s Origen clearly explains how he perceives the "passion" 
of Christ throughout time:
"It might well cause amazement among those w ith moderate 
intellectual powers that a man who was accused and charged falsely did 
not defend himself and prove himself not guilty of any of these charges, 
although he could have done so by expatiating on the fine quality of his 
life  and showing that his m iracles were done by God, to give the judge 
an opportunity of giving his case a more favourable judgement. This he 
did not do, but despised and noblu ignored his accusers. That the judge 
would have released Jesus without hesitation i f  he had made any 
defence is clear from what is w ritten  about him where he said: “Which 
of the two do you wish me to release to you, Bar abbas or Jesus who is 
called Christ?' and, as the scripture goes on to say: ‘For he knew that 
out of malice they had delivered him '079 Now Jesus is always Cast) 
being falsely accused, and there is never a time when he is not being 
accused so long as there is evil among men. Fie is s till silent in face of 
this and does not answer w ith his voice; but he makes his defence in 
the lives of his genuine disciples, for their lives cry out the real facts  
and defeat all false charges, refuting and overthrowing the slanders 
and> accusations."0- 0
if one were to follow the falsifying logic of Justinian and 
Jerome one would subsequently assert that Origen holds a notion of an 
“etern ity  of passion". For in the passage above, he says that "Jesus is 
always falsely accused"; and at another point Origen quotes John 1,29 , 
saying that Christ "is always bearing and taking away the sin of those 
seeking refuge to him" noting that it  happened in the past, is happening 
now and w ill happen in future.331 Accordingly, in homJer, Origen quotes 
Jer.15,10 ("Woe is me, my mother, that thou hast borne me a man 
standing before judges and a man of contention to the whole earth")
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explaining I t  as follows:
"if you see the m artyrs being everywhere judged for my sake 
and in each particu lar church standing before judges, you w ill see in 
what way Jesus Christ is judged in the person of each m artyr; for it  is 
himself who is judged in the person of those who u tte r the truth. And 
this w ill convince you, so that you consider that it  is not you who are 
in prison when you are in prison, but it  is him; it  is not you who are 
hungry, it  is not you who are hungry but it  is him; [and] it  is not you 
who is th irs ty , but it  is h im .... Thus when a Christian is iudoed fuet not
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for something else, not for his own sins, but just because he is a 
Christian) it  is Christ himself who is actually judged. Therefore Christ 
is judged throughout the earth; and whenever a Christian is judged, it  is 
Christ himself who is judged; [and] not only before the o ffic ia l courts, 
but where a Christian is slandered by someone, it  is also then that 
Christ himself is unfairly judged. ... everywhere Christ is suffering  
actions taken against him and judged.... There are two things that Jesus 
suffers amonost men; either he is condemned bu those unfaithful or he
W 7 W
is put in doubt by the double-minded, if you put on 'the image of the 
heavenly’ and live aside 'the image of the earthly',032 then you are not 
the earth which condemns him, and neither are you the earth in which 
he is condemned nor are you the earth which puts him in doubt.'*30 Thus 
in a Christian who is "fu lfilled  w ith grie f and is tormented and 
condemned by the unjust" it  is Christ himself who is actually "suffering  
the tria l"  (SiKagousvog) 034
in the the same work, Origen gives a most vivid portrayal of 
this "passion" of Christ:
"This lord himself, my Jesus Christ says: ‘i gave my back to the 
whips, and my cheeks to slaps, i hid not my face from the shame of 
spitting.'o3°  Those who abide w ith the le tte r  understand that these 
re fe r only to that time when Pilate whipped him and when the Jews
to the whips'. Go into the Jewish synagoges and see Jesus being 
whipped by the blasphemies of their tongues. See the pagans being 
gathered and conspiring against the Christians and how they regard 
Jesus and [you w ill see that] he ‘gives his back to the whips1. Perceive 
the deeper meaning of the Logos of God being abused, reviled, hated by 
the unfaithful. See that he 'gave his cheeks to slaps’ and once he tought 
that i f  one ‘shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other 
also' he did so himself. So many people are slapping him in the face and 
whipping him, but he is silent and he does not speak. For he has been 
narrated as not speaking during his being whipped. And until now Jesus 
did not hide his face from the same of spitting. For who of those 
disparaging the teaching [of his] does not even unto now spit, as it  
were, Christ who is tolerating this?’* 85
Furthermore, in commJohti Origen quotes John,8 ,49  (“and ye do 
dishonour me") stating tht this "has not been said only to those people, 
but to those who always (aeC) dishonour him, by their acts aqainst the 
right word of God, and dishonour him by deeds unjust to Christ, who is 
justice and, by acts out of feebleness and weakness, dishonour the 
power of 6od;°b7 for ‘Christ is the power of God‘oSS And to anyone who 
has contempt for wisdom would be said ‘and ye do dishonour me1 
(John,8 ,49) as Christ himself is wisdom, too."089
in Origen’s view Christ himself "laments and mourns for our 
sins’* 90 and when we are praying he “prays w ith us to the fa ther, being 
a m ediator"091
The previous analyses as to what Origen means by "body” of 
Christ should be recalled here in order to make this point clear, it is 
the whole world, in the f irs t  place, and, a fte r the incarnation, it  is the 
Church, that are meant by the term  “body" of Christ. The corporeal 
passion of the Logos was both a historical event and a fioure of the
ongoing “passion" of his “body'1, which is realized either in each act 
against his word or in a relapse of a rational creature which form erly  
was just. S im ilarly , the resurrection was both a historical event and a 
figure of the "resurrection" of his entire "body" which is now suffering  
the "passion".
The conclusion on this question is that the opinions of both 
Justinian and Jerome, concerning Origen’s view of "passion" of Christ, 
are misleading and attributes to Origen views which he did not actually 
hold. For Origen’s view of “in tellig ib le  crucifixion" and "always" 
suffering of Christ has a meaning which in no way puts the unioeuness 
of the incarnation in question, if  Christ was to suffer in "the realms 
above" as i t  has been alleged (on the basis of Origen’s quotation of the 
passage "i am about to be crucified from above" -ignoring his comments 
on it) , it  is obvious that Christ would have to assume a body again, 
because corporeality exists in all ranks of life . But this idea is to ta lly  
alien to Origen’s authentic views, as he cosistently rea ffirm s  the so’ 
dnat of the incarnation of Christ and holds that this intervention of 
God into space-time took place once and for all and if was the entirety  
of the world that benefit ted from that unique corporeal presence of 
Christ in the world.
Conclusion. The conclusion of this analysis is that when Origen 
speaks of "eternal gospel" he neither implies any repetition of the 
corporeal passion of Christ nor does he imply that the gospel preached 
by Jesus is, in a sense, "incomplete". Far for the contrary. Origen does 
a ffirm  the uniqueness of the incarnation of the Logos; and he considers 
that the word of Christ w ill "always" act into the world as it  is 
"perfect". Quoting Matt.24,35 ("Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my 
words shell not pass away") he provides the very core of his conception 
of the gospel preached by Jesus Christ w ith respect to time:
"For the words of the saviour always w ill carry out what is
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befitting them, because they are perfect and not susceptible of 
becoming better as if  what they are now would pass away. But 'heaven 
and earth w ill pass away, but his words w ill remain' because they are 
words said by him through whom everything was made; * * *  for the 
reason of what has been made does not pass away, even though those 
made pass away."092
in expProv i t  is also affirm ed that "The heaven and the earth  
w ill pass away ... yet the words of our Saviour Jesus Christ w ill not 
pass away"090
Therefore Jerome quite falsely and misleadingly attributes to 
Origen assertions such as that "the gospel" is regarded "as not 
possessing completeness" as it  "was preached in a world and an age 
that are destined to pass away"094 For it  is Origen himself who uses a 
superb term  as a predication of the gospel, affirm ing that "the gospel 
is a5id5oxov", the term  a S id o a jfO Y  meaning "without successor" or 
"perpetual" in the sense of "perfect";090 and this, as Christ is a "heaven 
who neither passes away nor can he be destroyed"095
As the term  "logos" in Greek means both "word" and "reason", 
Origen articulates his above-mentioned view considering that both the 
word of Jesus and the reasons of creation w iir"a lw ays"  exist. The 
passage above is a crucial one, because it  clearly portrays Origen's 
view of the meaning of time a fte r the incarnation of Christ as well as 
the eschatological implications of this event. What is there said is that 
the words of Jesus exist in order to help rational beings to abolish the 
reasons (that is, the fa ll) because of which creation came into being. 
Furthermore, those words of Christ are not a circum stantial event in 
the whole continuum of time, but, once they were pronounced to the 
world, they w ill exist for as long as the reasons for the existence of 
the world exist. Thus the eschatological perspectives of Incarnation are 
clearly indicated, as incarnation is regarded as a unique h istorical
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event, the signigicance of which pertains to the en tire ty  of the 
world; an event which established a meaning for time thereafter until 
the end of the world.
What the analysis of Incarnation w ith respect to time shows is 
that Origen considers movement in time as always directed not merely 
forward but forward w ith a fin a l purpose to be fu lfille d  because It has 
been promised, in this movement forward, future is related to oast 
regarded as a result of free moral action. So future is regarded not 
only as unknown but also as essentially unformed, as it  depends on free  
morel action. Future is known to God alone. God, in his timelessness, 
does not remain inactive with respect to creation but he Intervenes 
Into space-time and acts within it. Such an action is the bestowal of 
his foreknowledge on the prophets and its  subsequent proclamation to 
human beings. These prophecies, nevertheless, are completely 
enlightened only when what has been foretold is realized in space-time. 
Usually the realization of prophecies constitutes an intervention of God 
into the world. The main characteristic  of these acts of God Is that 
they stand in dialectical relation to creaturely free moral action they 
take place at certain moments of tim e, which are known to God only, 
too. These moments are called "kairoi". Thus the direction of the world  
in time is decisively determined and enlightened by the categories of 
“prophecy" end "kairos". How these notions affect the character of tim e  
is what we are ooino to examine next.
§  3. T he  c o n c e p t  o f  p ro p h e c y
In Origen’s view it  is the eschatological direction of tim e as 
well as the fact that time is not in fin ite  in both directions (that is, in 
past and future) that allows prophecy to have an actual meaning. Time 
had a beginning and w ill have an end; this fin ite  "extension" is marked 
by fixed points which determine the lim its  of aeons and thus one can
speak of a "relative beginning" or "end", that is the beginning or end of 
an eeon.°bV This non -in fin ity  of time makes it  comprehensible and it is 
because of non-infinity that a conceptual "before time" would make 
some sense, if  taken ,loosely of course, meaning timelessness in the 
status of uncreated time.
Origen considers the meaning of prophecy in close connexion to 
his conception of the beginninglessness of the world and of the 
direction of the world towards an end. If the world were beginning!ess 
then it  could make no sense to say that there is God “who knows 
everything before it  came into being";09-  for, in that case it  could be 
meaningless to speak of any "before", as time would be regarded as 
having no beginning; if ,  therefore, there is no "beginning", then there is 
nor God's fore  -knowledge of the world as a whole, exactly because 
there is no "before". On the other hand, if  there were no end of tim e, 
prophecy about any "end" would make no sense either. This is why 
Origen directly  relates the non-infinity of space-time w ith the notion 
of prophecy. Accordingly, in commM&tt, he states:
"if the world is not consummated but it exists ad Infinitum , 
then there is no God 'who knows everything before it  came into being,' 
But he p artia lly  w ill know each individual thing 'before it  comes into 
being' or some of them and then again [he w ill know] others; for things 
in fin ite  are not containable into knowledge, which by nature contains 
what is fin ite. From that follows that [in such a case] neither prophecy 
of anything is possible, since everything would be infinite."/--^
In the light of this view of Origen, R. Sorabii makes a serious 
historical mistake when he attributes to Phiioponous whet is actually  
Origen's views. His assertion reads thus:
"Up to 529, Christians adopted a defensive position. They sought 
only to rebut the arguments that the universe cannot have a beginning. 
In 529, however, in Alexandria, Philoponus moved on the attack: he
sought to show that the universe must have had a beginning. The most 
striking and influential of his arguments had to do w ith the concent of 
In fin ity ."400
This view of Sorabji is erroneous. For it  was Origen who long 
before had established the view that the cosmos must have had a 
beginning. And it  was Origen who explicated that "What creates is older 
than what is created" (Fidv gap io  noiouv npsapuxsoov xou 
nsnoiTiusvou)401 and "what proceeds from a cause must necessarily have 
a beginning"*0-  It Is also Origen who challenges "those who hold that 
the world is not created" stating that "they cannot speak of any 
beginning of the world" (wg ouk s a x tv  ouv io(c axsvniov ugiaiausvom  
io v  Koauov apvriv auxou stns(v).40° And, re ferrin g  to the actual 
creation, i t  is him who speaks of “a certain fixed time when the world  
w ill be brought to the end which it  must necessarily have since it  had a 
beginning“4°4
As to what prophecy is in its e lf, Origen regards it  as a function 
in time; yet he also takes into consideration the divine inspiration of 
prophecy and, subsequently, the causality between timelessness and 
tim e, as discussed in chapter 2. Hence, he defines prophecy as follows:
"Prophecy is a prediction of future occurrences; this saying is 
accomplished when what has been foretold comes to pass, it did not 
come to pass because it  was foretold; for this kind of thing is not 
prophecy; but it  was told because it  was to come to pass; and this is 
prophecy."403
By the passage above Origen not only provides the definition of 
prophecy in itse lf; he also' defines the causative relation between 
prophetic announcement of an event and the realization of it. Out of his 
conviction about creaturely freedom, he regards the future  
accomplishment of prophecy as a cause whereas prophecy is regarded 
as a result , although temporally preceding the event itse lf. Thus,
584
prophecy is ’‘f i r s t” end yet it  is e result; realization of propnecy is 
“second” and yet it  is a cause. Thus, we have a ■ causality in time the 
parts of which are regarded in a reversed order. Indeed, it  is in this 
way that Origen holds the relation between “f ir s t” and "second” in the 
eschatoiogical evolution in time; and this conception is portrayed by 
Origen’s statement that "Those form er bear in themselves an image of 
those la tte r1' (Tw v  g a p  Ssuteptuv s i k o v q  sspsi id  n p a m a ) 405
Much discussion has been made about Origen’s “allegorical 
method" which led R. Hanson40/ and H. Koch40*  to the u tte rly  misleading 
conclusion that Origen actually has no eschatoiogical ideas. On this we 
discuss in chapters 4 and 5. Here it  Is worth Quoting an opinion of J. 
Danielou:
"People are continually talking about his (sc. Oripen’s) love of 
allegory and comparing it  w ith Clement’s. How far is that true? I think 
i have shown - i t  is in fact one of the conclusions that emerge most 
plainly from the book- that Origen had the greatest respect for the 
traditional typology; he followed the rest of the Church in seeing 
figures of the m ysteries of Christ’s life  in certain texts of the Old 
Testament. His work thus contain a whole theology of history which 
shows him to great advantage as an.exponent of biblical theology."40"
We endorse this statement, even though we cannot do the same 
with the author’s ensuing assertions about Gnostic influence on Origen 
on this point. S im ilar views have been taken by H. de lubac4;U and h. 
H arm 11 The statement of Origen which we adduce here is, we think, one 
of the most clear proofs that the dramatic relation between Present 
and Future plays a predominant role in his thought.
This means that it  is future which enlightens end gives a reel 
meaning to past. This is why Origen employs those definitions of "end" 
( is Rqc) from A risto tle  and Herophilus which express his own 
theological conception of "end"41-  it was the incarnation of the Logos.
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that enlightened the tim e of Old Testament and its  perspectives, which 
previously were hidden in “m ysteries”4 *0 Accordingly, it  w ill be the 
second advent of Christ that w ill reveal all the truth  which is at 
present hidden behing the words of the gospel; that is, he w ill show the 
"eternal gospel" in its e lf, without articulating it  in rites.
This view of Origen, namely that it  is the future which finally  
enlightens past, can be traced throughout his whole theology, in Ce/s he 
states that " the end showed up the wonders of the Egyptians to have 
been produced by trickery , while those of hoses were divine"414 Also, 
in the same work: “For if  the end, which was that a whole nation owed 
its  origin to the wonders of hoses, shows the indubitable fact that it  
was God who caused the m iracles of hoses, why should not this
*  w
argument be even more in the case of Jesus, since he did a greater 
work than that of hoses?"4’10
it is out of the view of the crucial and revealing meaning of the 
future that prophecy acquires a significant place in Origen’s work.
The question which arises here, however, is this: in discussing 
the notion of causality we said that it  is in causality between tim e and 
timelessness that cause and effect are regarded in a re vers order. How 
then is it  possible to consider the same thing happening In a causality  
in time -namely in the relation between pre-announcement of an event 
end re a liz a t io n it?. The answer to this question lies in the fact that 
this causality, although manifested in time, is actually a causality  
between time and timelessness. For prophecy is uttered by a prophet 
yet it  is God himself who speaks through the prophet and what is said 
is coming from God's foreknowledge of everything.
Thus, prophecy as a result, is a c tu lly  originated in timelesness 
even though it  is manifested in time. Sow as fa r as causality is 
concerned, prophecy is a case of causality between timelessness end 
time as discussed in chapter 2.
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With respect to this, in Cels, Origen states: T h e  proclamation 
of future events Is the characteristic  of divinity, since they ere not 
foretold by a natural human facu lty ./15 and from the consequent events 
we draw the conclusion that it  was a divine sp irit which proclaimed 
these things1/ 1 ' For “prophecies ... are not inventions, but ... a divine 
sp irit dwelling in the pure souls of the prophets, who underwent any 
trouble for the sake of virtue, impelled them to prophesy some things 
for their contemporaries and others for posterity, and above ail to 
prophesy concerning ‘a certain saviour who would come to dwell among 
mankind"1.418 "By his logos 6od is always correcting those who listen to 
what he says. In each generation his logos descends into holy souls end 
makes them friends of 6od and prophets”419
it is then God who speaks through prophecy.420 Those who u tte r  
the words are just “servants of the truth" and they are the "prophets 
and the apostles"421 The reason for God acting so is to help the 
creatures in their striving for the ir salvation. "God comprehended all 
things by his foreknowledge, and seeing that there were these two 
extremes, w illed to te ll them about these things through the prophets, 
in order that those who understood their words might be made lovers 
of what is better and be their guard against the opposite."422
Prophecy then is not just a prediction of future events; but it  is 
a sort of enligtening the perspectives of moral action in time; it  is an 
act underlining the eschatoiogical direction in time and helping towards 
the realization of the end. This is why Origen holds that to be able just 
to predict future is not enough for someone to be regarded as a 
prophet; for prophecy is not just a prediction, but it  is an action of the 
Holy S pirit w ith crucial eschatoiogical implications. On this subject he 
states:
"if one prophesies, he is not a prophet; but i f  he is a prophet, he 
prophesies. For Veiaam prophesies because he is a mantis.420 Thus one
1 S'not a doctor just because he carried out an act of healing; or one is 
not a bricklayer just because he carried out an act of building."42'7
The deeper conception of prophecy in Origen can be traced in 
this passage. He does not deny that there are others who also predicted 
what was going to happen yet they cannot be considered as prophets; 
their prediction was nothing but a product of sorcery420 in the basis of 
Origen's conception of prophecy there is his view of tim e as the means 
where the dialectical relation between God and world takes place. 
Prophecy constitutes a manifestation of the benevolent intervention of 
God into the world; through this act, God enlightens the perspective 
towards salvation, without affecting human freedom at a ll; this is why 
prophecy has always appeared not as a determ inistic prediction, which 
would be oppressing human freedom, but as “mysteries" which were 
accepted not only by logic but also by faith.426 "For the law and the 
prophecies are believed to be words containing announcement of things 
which reasonably rejo ice those who hear them because of the benefit 
they receive once they accept whet is announced."427
Prophecy, as crucially related to the eschatoiogical expectation, 
makes no sense in the Greek conception of time. The "prediction" there, 
given by a mantis as an oracle, has usually to do w ith a short-te rm  
expectation; the reasons for asking an oracle were usually practical 
and at the interests of a man or a small group of people. It is an action 
without long term  perspectives and certain ly there is no context of any 
eschatoiogical expectation; it  does not pertain to the en tire ty  of human 
existence and certainly not to the entirety  of humanity. This is why, in 
the various Greek schools of thought, biblical prophecy has no Place and 
it  is there almost unthinkable as quite incompatible w ith  that 
conception of time. For there is no eschatoiogical expectation perceived 
in terms of a real future realization in space-time. Thus biblical 
prophecy is to ta lly  d ifferent form Greek oracles, due to its  origin, to
its  function and to its  perspectives.
Regarding the difference in origin, Origen clearly states this 
contrast of biblical prophecy from Greek oracles:
"From this ground, by collecting evidence from  the sacred 
scriptures, we prove that the prophets among the Jews, being 
illuminated by the divine sp irit in so fa r as it  was beneficial to them 
as they prophesied, were the f irs t  to enjoy the visitation of the 
superior s p irit to them." By contrast, "if the Pythian priestess is out of 
her senses and has not control of her faculties when she prophesies, 
what sort of s p irit must we think it  which poured darkness upon her 
mind and rational thinking? its character must be like that of the race 
of daemons which many Christians drive out of people who suffer from  
them, without any curious magical a rt or sorcerer's device, but w ith  
prayer alone and very simple adjurations and formulas such as the 
simplest person could use"428
V/hat "the Greeks take to be divine inspiration" coming from  
"the Pythian Appolo" is just "the daemons" who "perform the petitions  
of those who bring requests to them more because of the sacrifices  
they offer than because of their virtuous actions". And the seme 
happens with him "who rules from stormy Dodone"422 end the “oracle at 
Clares" and "another at Branchidae and another at the shrine of Zeus 
Ammon, or at any place on earth where there are oracles" all them are 
not "gods" but they are "daemons".
Origen generally holds that the gods of the pagans are 
daemons408 Certainly to him any prediction based on astrology is 
equally rejected as oracles or predictions out of "dreams"; all these 
are "impious predictions” committed by “fa lse- prophets" because 
"there is neither augury in Jacob nor oracle in Israel'401 but what is 
there is "divine foreknowledge"402
In contrast to the "false-prophets" of the pagans, "of the Jewish
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prophets some were wise before they received the g ift of proohecy and 
divine inspiration, while others became wise a fte r they had been 
illuminated in mind by the actual g ift of prophecy itse lf. They were 
chosen by providence to be entrusted w ith the divine S p irit and with  
the utterances that he inspired on account of the quality of their lives, 
which was of unexampled courage and freedom.'400
Also “from many passages we might gather the exceptional 
qualities of the prophets -th e ir  freedom, their courage, the ir 
watchfulness"404
As regards the function of prophecy, we have already noted 
that it  in no way oppresses freedom; for it  is uttered as a "mystery"400 
accepted only by fa ith  -th a t is, an act of freedom. Prophecy 
illum inates the perspectives of moral action without affecting freedom  
at all. Thus, in homJer, Origen stresses the contingency in the 
relation between God and men in the pronunciation of prophecy:
" i f  we repent, captivity w ill not go on and God w ill bestow 
mercy upon us. ... i f  we commit sin, we shall be in captivity in the 
future ... For there is a useful knowledge out of the prophetic w ritings, 
that God, because of his love for men, admonishes them so that they 
w ill not suffer captivity."400
The same sort of contingency in God's action towards men Is 
pointed out in the Eighteenth of these Homilies:
" i f  that nation, against whom i have pronounced, turn from  
their evil, then i w ill repent of the evil that i thought to do unto them. 
... i f  i t  do evil in mu sight, that it  obey not in my voice, then i w ill 
repent of the good, where i said I would benefit them"407 it is by such 
scriptural passages that Origen articulates his conviction about the 
freedom of men in their relation to God even a fte r the utterance of a 
prophecy.
This is the existential environment in which the perspectives
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of prophecy are realized. It does not establish any determination but it  
is rather a kind of "beacon" in time illumuneting the road to salvation 
and yet not coercing its  acceptance by men. This salvation w ill be 
achieved only with the consent of creaturely freedom, namely fa ith  and 
proper action. For "it in in our choice to hear and not to hear, as if God 
had no foreknowledge; neither our freedom of w ill is less because of 
God's foreknowledge nor i t  would be more if  God had no 
foreknowledge”403 This is why, ''promise'1 and "prophecy" make sense 
only regarded in the context of a time of freedom, a time directed  
towards an "end" -both in the sense of "goal" and "termination".
When Origen opposes the doctrines of astrology, it  is on the 
grounds of freedom that he does so. in commGen he states that if  the 
stars are to be regarded as "acting" upon human things then human 
freedom is abolished; and from  that follows that there can be neither 
praise nor blame; therefore, one would not speak of judgement by God 
nor of course of the outcome of it , re ferring  either to those who w ill 
enjoy the award for the ir good deeds or those who w ill be punished for 
their sins. And if  this is so, then "the fa ith  is fu tile  end the advent of 
Christ is fu tile  as accomplishing nothing and so is the dispensation 
(oiKovouta) through the law and the prophets, and the to il of the 
apostles in order to found churches of God through Christ [was fu tile , 
too]."403 Ail these hypothetical considerations are strongly rejected  
exactly because "human things are not coerced by necessity"440
The main point suggested in the above-mentioned deductive 
argument of Origen's is that once freedom is abolished, then the whole 
conception o f time is abolished, too. For, in that event, free moral 
action looses its  actual content; subsequently, judgement ceases to 
make sense and thus time looses its  eschatoiogical perspectives. It is 
very remarkable that these eschatoiogical perspectives of tim e are 
expressed as an otKovopfa manifested in the succession of "the law",
the "prophets" and the "advent of Christ" and the "toils of the apostles" 
in order to establish churches. V/hat Origen denotes by the statement 
"if the stars exercise some kind of action upon us, then our prayer is 
fu t i le " /4'1 is exactly the crucia lity  of the dialectical re lation between 
God end rational creatures in time.
The notion of abolition of freedom coincides w ith the notion of 
"vanity"; and "vanity" is mainly portrayed by cyclic movement, 
especially that of the stars. This conception of Origen that “cyclicity" 
means "vanity" and “vanity" actually means "absence of freedom" exists  
also in his deeper conception of time, in articulating his view of 
prophecy, he expresses it  in a way that is in accordance w ith his 
overall conception of time, as he explicity dissociates the notion of 
prophecy from any implication of either "vanity" or oppression of 
freedom.
it is in this context that time in Origen is the means where the 
dialectical relation between God and rational creatures takes place.
in chapter 2 we argued that the notion of movement is mainly 
perceived as free moral action. Prophecy, as an act of God in tim e, 
actually constitutes God's "movement" in his dialectical re lation with  
human action, indeed, Origen avers that prophecy constitutes a 
movement on behalf of God through the utterances of a prophet.
Quoting Deuteronomy 1,3 ("noses spake unto the children of 
Israel, according unto all that the Lord had given him in commandment 
unto them") he states that it  is said so "because God was revealing his 
power and the prophet was using his tongue in order to articu la te  what 
had been declared. For movement is ceiled the prophetic voice its e lf , in 
as much as it  articulates what has been said by God"442
Hence prophecy, although not affecting freedom, underlines the 
meaning of time as the "extension" for the return to Goo. Therefore it  
orients time according to a perception like this: providence - prophecy
392
-  promise - expectation -  realization - fa ith  -  hope -  waiting - 
fulfilment.
in this process, “prophecy" is exactly the notion which suggests 
the immediate correlation of divine tirnelessness to time. For
"providence" is actually atemporsl whereas the rest of these categories 
are manifested in time. Prophecy in indeed both in time (due to the 
temporal being of the prophet him self) and out of tim e -as a 
"contemplation"440 and "insight"444 and "communion w ith divine 
nature"440
Particu larly , in the scheme above, fa ith  is the existential
condition which allows future to be experienced at the present.440 Hope 
is through which unrealization is related to fa ith 44/ and the 
expectation out of this hope has been decisively strengthened a fte r the 
realization of the incarnation and the "exemplified" resurrection, as it  
was fu lfille d  in the person of Jesus Christ. Hence this hope is a most
strong drive for free moral action443 When Origen re fe rs  to "him who
subjected them in hope"449 means that "subjection" is due to to 
unrealization; but it  is through hope end fa ith  that unrealization ere 
regarded as unrealization as ye t.
This orientation of tim e towards the eschatoiogical expectation 
is mainly established through prophecy, in the scheme above, if  
"prophecy" is taken away then God remains unapproachable in his 
radical transcendence whereas "promise -  fa ith  -  hone -  expectation -  
waiting -  fulfilm ent" loose the ir actual content and meaning as there 
would be no prophecy to illum inate the direction in time.
Prophecy creates hope; and this means that the objective 
tranform stion of unrealization into realization w ill take place when the 
"fulness of time" comes. As it  happens with the bestowal of prophecy 
its e lf, so the time when realization of hope w ill occur is in God's 
choice; for this realization constitutes one of the times, at which God
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sets into history. These "moments’* are called "kairoi". As Or 1 pen’s 
conception of "kairos" is d irectly  related to the character of tim e, this 
is the subject which we shall enquiry next.
§4. The concept of ksiros.
The concept of ksiros makes sense in Origen’s thought by virtue  
of the fact that time had a beginning, and "through time" the world is 
directed to an end. This renders the direction of time a crucial one, 
because what is moving in time is not a morally ind ifferent existence 
of the world, but an entirety  of rational creatures whose w ill comes to 
a dialectical relation to that of God. The conception of tim e as an 
"extension" of free moral action means that this action is related to 
the w ill of God, positively or. negatively, as "there is nothing between 
committing sin end not committing sin"4D° it is exactly the notion of 
kairos which underlines the significance of time as a means where this 
dialectical relation takes place.
The notion of kairos is quite often used in Origen’s work to 
express significant facets of his theology and particu larly  of his 
conception of time, in the f irs t  place, in Origen’s thought "kairos" 
denotes a quality of tim e, namely a time when an event of outstanding 
significance happens, it has been asserted that "kairos", as a moment in 
tim e, pertains to God's action only421 We shell enouire to what extent 
Origen perceives this notion in such a way.
The concept of "kairos" is closely related to that of ’’proDhecy" 
at least in two ways: F irst, kairos' is a moment of time when a 
prophecy was pronounced. Secondly, kairos is a time when a proDhecy 
was realized.
The keiroi of God's action, it is a fundamental conviction of 
Origen that it  is beyond the comprehensive capacity of rational beings 
to know “how" and "when’452 God is going to intervene into the world.
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This depends on his choice only and he alone knows the "oooortunes 
times" for his action.
in Princ, God is the "oerfect superintendent, who has full 
knowledge both of the times (Kaipouq) and the appropriate aids and the 
paths and the ways" of his action422 in commNatt, he states that "it is 
only for the master and his divine knowledge to know the kairos of each 
man [that is] when the time o f fru its  is  near (as in Matt.21 ,33 ,43) and 
when it  is fa r" 424 and this, because "the causes" of what is done "lie 
entirely in the sphere of providence, and it  is not easy for men to come 
upon their explanation."422
Even Jerome acknowledges the belief of Origen about angels 
performing "duties" “at the various times which are known to God the 
A rtificer."455 also Jerome attributes to Origen the opinion on the 
existence of "others" who "in their various places and tim es, which the 
A rtif ic e r  alone knows, undertake the governance of the world. These we 
believe be the angels"42/
This notion is also found in commSen and it  is worth while to 
compare the passage in Greek to the way Jerome renders the thought of 
Origen. For Jerome's allegation that "angels ... undertake the governance 
of the world" is not entirely exact, since whet Origen rea lly  holds is 
that these beings serve God's w ill and they are "functioning spirits"  
being "sent in order to minister":
“For the holy angels, the functioning sp irits  who are sent in 
order to m in is te r423 receive, as it  is natural, orders which are 
w ritten  according to the law of God, in the appropriate order, end when 
they should end as they should carry out the better things; for it  would 
be absurd to assert that they come at random and not according to a 
fixed order ... Thus they read the book of God, so that they carry outw * W
this task neither at random nor by chance; and so they perform  what it  
is appropriate to them"429
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Thus, the angels do not "undertake the governance of the worlch, 
as Jerome fa ls e ly , a lleges about Origan's thought, but they are lust, 
“m in is te r in g " 6od!s w i l l ,  rece iv ing  o rders  fro m  him. i t  is  in te re s tin g  to 
note tha t Origen regards th is  perform ance of angels as tak ing niece 7 / 
tim e , according to  h is ove ra ll v iew  tha t the e n tire ty  of the w o rld  is  in 
time.
The heavenly bodies and th e ir  pos itions c o n s titu te  a "book of 
6od" which "can w e ll be read by the angels and d iv ine powers" who "act 
by, as i t  w ere, rece iv ing  orders". This is  the exegesis o f the passage in 
Genesis, 1,14 " le t the illu m in a to rs  be fo r  s igns"450
A ccord ing ly , in the commJohn, Origen asse rts  th a t the "angels 
... at the ordered ka iros  ... begin to  c a rry  out the d ispensation 
concerning each in d iv id u a l"  man.451. This means th a t the in te ra c tio n  
between ra tio n a l beings in the w o rld  is  conceived in the con text of the 
whole w o rld  being tem poral. The angels act in  tim e  and they "begin" to 
c a rry  out th e ir  c e rta in  du ties at the approp ria te  tim e  w hich is  
ind icated by the pos itions of the s ta rs  in th is  v is ib le  firm am en t. Thus, 
angels do not ac tu a lly  "undertake the governance o f the w o rld ", as
Jerome suggests about Origen's thought, but they are iu s t beings of
o ther ranks o f l i f e  and th e ir  o ff ic e  is  understood in the con text o f the 
in te ra c tio n  between the c re a tu res  o f the various ranks of l i f e  in tim e , 
be they h igher o r low e r than the human ranks o f life .452
Hence, the "k a iro i"  o f God's action  in the w o rld  ere "unknown" to 
m e n /00 Nevertheless "there  is  nothing which has been o r w i l l  be 
neglected by God, who makes what should be made in a w o rld  of
a lte ra tio n  and change"; fo r  “God cares fo r  whole ages as i f  they w ere
years, so to  speak, in each of them, he does what is  reasonable fo r  the 
un iverse, which is  most c le a r ly  understood and accom plished by God 
alone since the tru th  is  known to h im ."454 God is  lik e  an " a r t i f ic e r "  who 
"knows the d ispos ition  of everyone" and i t  is  "only him " who may give
"what is  necessary and when he should do so to each one”.45'0
i t  is  rem arkab le  tha t Origen dep icts the connection o f ka iros  in 
the context o f the d ia le c tica l re la t io n  between Goo and men by the 
a ff irm a tio n  th a t God in te rvenes in the w o rld  ” waiting fo r  the 
approp ria te  p repa ra tion  to  take p lace” in the w o rld , so tha t th is  
in te rve n tio n  w i l l  be e ffe c t iv e ly  b ene ficen t450 This is  the tim e  which 
Origen ca lls  as "ka iros  o f re v e la tio n ” (sv Kaipui anoKafiuujsujg)45/
In v iew  o f th is  conception of kairos, i t  is  a ffr im e d  tha t Moses 
and the prophets did not a t th e ir  tim e  see whet the apostles sew curing  
the advent o f Jesus, not because they (sc. noses and the 'p rophe ts ) w ere 
" in fe r io r "  to  the apostles, but because they were "expecting the fu lness 
of tim e" (dRR‘ wg nspiuevovisg to  nnfspajua xou xpovou) at w hich "should 
be revealed" fexpnv ... anoKaRus9fsvai) what was fa r  too su p e rio r to 
anything which had been p rev ious ly  said o r w r i t te n 453
In Origen's v iew , God, who "knows the k a iro i" ,453 in te rvenes in 
h is to ry  at h is appointed opportune tim es; fo r  he "dispenses the th ings 
o f the w o rld  in k a iro i" 4/Q
Prophecy co n s titu te s  an outstanding way of God's in te rve n tio n
in to  tim e ; th is  is  why Origen s ta tes  th a t God "sent ... prophets at
ce rta in  k a i r o i " f n  th is  was an act o f h is " w i l l"  as he "by h is
foreknow ledge" knew th a t hum anity was s tr iv in g  under an in te ra c tio n  
between "tw o  extrem es", namely good and ev il. 4/2 Even in a prophet's 
l ife t im e  there  were some moments at w hich he was "more 
c le a r-s ig h te d " under the illu m in a tio n  o f the Holy S p ir it .  473 Those 
p a r t ic u la r  moments in a prophets l ife t im e  would be ce lled  bu Origen as 
"opportune tim es of the opportune tim es" (kouooi Kcapuiv),4 ''4 by th is  
ind ica ting  the p a rtic u la r  moments o f com m unication w ith  God, lik e  the 
approp ria te  moments of prayer.
What is  s ig n ific a n t is  th a t those opportune tim e s  are
understood as moments in the process o f the eschato iog ica l process o f
the w o rld ; In sending the prophets, God's elm  is  nothing less then to 
help peoDie tow ards th e ir  re tu rn  to  him. “when the opportune tim e 
comes, God sends th is  prophet ... so tha t those who w i l l  unaerstand 
the p rophe tic  w ords w i l l  re p e n t" / /D Thus the ere o f the prophets was 
the “ka iro s  o f fru its " .4 ' 0 According t o .another a llego ry  o f Oripen's, 
e ith e r  Moses o r the prophets could be regarded as "those who 
sowed"4"  whereas "those who reap" are those "who accepted C h ris t and 
beheld h is  a lo r u " / /S
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The Incarnation  m arks a m a jo r ka iros. In homJer the re  is  a 
passage which ind ica tes the d ire c tio n  o f the tem pora l process fro m  one 
"opportune tim e" to  another:
"God chose the fa th e rs  (sc. o f the Jews), he gave a prom ise to 
them, he took the people of the fa th e rs ' generation out o f Egypt, he was 
m e rc ifu l to them when they com m itted  s ins, educated them as a fa th e r, 
sent prophets to  them at opportune tim es, educated them end turned 
them back fro m  sins. He has been pa tien t w ith  them alw ays sending the 
healers u n til the a rch -hea le r comes, the prophet who was d if fe re n t 
fro m  the prophets, the healer who was d if fe re n t fro m  those who 
healed. Once he came they betrayed and k ille d  him  ... Look how much of 
oiKovouta [the re  is ] fo r  the sa lva tion  o f the na tions."4 ' 5
Thus God's action  in the w o rld  fro m  "ka iros" to  "ka iros" is  
m anifested to  help tow ards sa lvation. While consummation of an aeon is  
a ce rta in  kind o f ka iros ,480 the ka iros  of incarna tion  marked the end of 
a number of aeons481 being the " la s t k a iro s "482 and he also quotes the 
passage fro m  II Thess.2,1-12, where Paul says th a t "the dau of C h ris t 
is  a t hand" as he was revealed "in  h is k a iro s "480
in o rder to  denote the s ign ificance  o f ce rta in  moments in  tim e , 
Origen also employs the te rm  "m ost approp ria te  tim e " (sn iipG siog 
Katpog). I t  is  by th is  te rm  tha t he speaks o f the passion o f C h r is t484 
The tim e  of "judgem ent" also m arks a "ka iros" o f th is  o a r ic u le r kind.
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since "a t the most approp ria te  tim e" ra tio n a l c re a tu res  "take up the 
bodu which is  appointed by God fo r  everyone in accordance w ith  h is 
m e r its ."480
The notion of ksiros in men's ection. It  is  s ig n ific a n t tha t 
Origen applies the notion of “most opportune tim e" (sntTh&stog koiooc) 
not only to  God's but also to  man's a c tio n 480 He s tresses  th is  notion 
espec ia lly  in  re la t io n  to  prayer:
"One o f these im possib le  th ings, having regard  to  our weakness, 
is , I believe, to  give a c le a r, exact and approp ria te  account o f the whole 
m a tte r o f p rayer, and what tim es are more opportune than o the rs  (noioi 
Koiooi noiujv Kaipyv) fo r  p ra y e r48'
Quoting. John 13,36 ("W hither i go, thou canst not fo llo w  me 
now; but thou sha lt fo llo w  me a fte rw a rd s ") Origen accord ing ly  sta tes: 
"You should understand th a t the seme th ing w i l l  be said to each 
one which has been given to  the hands o f the son by the fa th e r; yet [ i t  
w i l l  be said] according to  a ju s t  p roportion . Thus to  each one w il l  be 
said 'thou sha lt fo llo w  me a fte rw a rd s ' but they w i l l  not a ll fo llo w  at 
the same tim e ; fo r ,  in  the expression 'thou sh a ll fo llo w  me 
a fte rw a rd s ', the w ord ’a fte rw a rd s ' is  s ta ted  as pe rta in in g  not to  the 
seme opportune tim e  (Kaipog) fo r  those who w il l  fo llo w  h im ."480
In commfiatt he c le a r ly  re fe rs  to  the stages o f a man's 
e x is te n tia l evo lu tion  tow ards h is  re tu rn  to God in te rm s  o f "ka iros":
” ‘For a ll there  is  a tim e  and a ka iros  fo r  every th ing under the 
heaven',48 and there  is  some 'ka iro s  to gather the precious stones 
to g e th e r',430 when i t  su its  to  go away end se ll a ll one's belongings in 
o rd e r to buy tha t precious stone. For he who is  destined to  be w ise  
must a t f i r s t  be introduced to  the elem ents and fu r th e r  be educated by 
the e lem ents and rem ain a iono tim e  studuina them; yet he should not
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rem ain in the elem ents because he honoured them in the beginning, but 
he should go ahead 'to the p e rfe c tio n 431 being g ra te fu l fo r  the
in tro d u c tio n  as having been usefu l to him  at the e a r lie r  stages. Thus, I t  
is  the w ords of the lew  and the prophets tha t should be understood as 
e lem entary education when they are compared to the deeper 
understanding of the gospel as w e ll as to  every m e n ta lity  which 
p e rta ins  to  w orks o r w ords about Jesus C h ris t."450
Thus the concept o f ka iros  p e rta ins  not only to  c e rta in  moments 
o f God's action  in to  the w o rld  but also to tim es o f man's ac tion  in 
respect to h is s tr iv in g  fo r  s a lv a tio n 450
Toe notion of ksiros snd the chsrscter of Tims. In Oripen’s 
thought, i t  is  o f g rea t s ign ificance  not m ere ly  what is  done but also 
when i t  is  done. The enquiry in to  th is  "when" ( th a t is , the deeper 
s ign ificance  of “ka iro s") is  to  Origen so im p o rta n t th a t he considers i t  
as a m a tte r o f high p r io r ity .  Thus he re fe rs  to  the Logos s ta tin g  tha t 
what should be enouired is  "o f what nature  he is  and in what manner he 
is  son o f God and what are the causes of h is descending to  the leve l of 
human flesh  and com ple te ly  assuming hum anity and w hai is  h is a c t iv ity  
and tow ards whom and when i t  is  exerc ised."454
The ka iro s  at which a w ord is  pronounced is  a c o n s titu tiv e  
elem ent o f the t ru th  o f it .  A w ord is  "w e ll pronounced" and, th e re fo re , 
a w ord o f " tru th " , only when i t  is  pronounced at the approp ria te  tim e, i f  
i t  is  not pronounced at the approp ria te  tim e , then th is  "un tim e ly" (ou5s 
sv Koioiii) p ronuncia tion  is  not s u ff ic ie n t to  produce beneficent re su lts . 
In tha t case th is  w ord as pronounced "not w e ll" , tha t is  as not helping 
tow ards the eschato iog ica l perspectives o f a man.
Quoting Job,27,2, Origen sta tes: "The devil assumed power.upon 
Job and a ff l ic te d  him  n ight and day, fo rm e r ly  through those who w ere 
out of him , la te r  through h is body i t s e lf  and a fte r  through h is  own 
friends. So, when (sc.the dev il) t r ie d  th is  through h is (sc. Job's) w ife  
and Job was not defeated, the devil brought th ree  fr ie n d s , not being 
enemies nor holding m a lic ious do c trines , but [holding] w ords w hich
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w ere w ords of t ru th  but they w ere pronounced not wen anti not at the 
opportune tim e, (ou mMq 5s, ou5s ev kgiow nposispouevou?;)"492
Thus tim e  co n s titu te s  a c ru c ia l element w hich d ire c t ly  a ffe c ts  
the q u a lity  of m o ra l. action. Origen emphasizes th is  conception as he 
quotes dob 31 ,40-32 ,1  ( “And Job stopped pronouncing words. So these 
th ree  men ceased to  answer Job. For he was righ teous in th e ir  eyes."):
" i t  is  not m ere ly  said th a t he stopped. For h is  hea rt, w hich was 
understanding the d iv ine  th ings, did not stop. For he knew tha t the re  is  
an opportune tim e  (Kcapog) fo r  everyth ing  under the heaven, a ka iros  of 
being s ile n t and a ka iro s  o f speaking. When, th e re fo re , i t  was the ka iros  
fo r  him  to  answer to the th ree  [fr ie n d s ], he was speaking; when, a f te r  
he had stopped them up, i t  was ka iros  [ fo r  him  to  go s ile n t], he went 
s ile n t. And i th ink  th a t the [expression] ‘Job stopped' is  said as a kind 
o f p ra ise ."492
Thus, the re  is  an essentia l re la t io n  between fre e  m ora l action
and ka iros. This is  why Origen holds tha t to take in to  account the
'
ka iros  at which preaching o f ce rta in  d iv ine m ys te rie s  m ust be 
pronounced is  an essentia l p re re q u is ite  fo r  th is  preaching; fo r  such a 
job is  a "dangerous" and "p reca rious” one as one "who hears them" m igh t 
be "harmed" i f  he hears those w ords at an un tim e ly  moment. So "he who 
is  a s tew ard  of the m ys te ries  o f Goer97 ... should take in to  account the 
ka iro s  at which he adduces those doc trines , so th a t he does not harm  
him  who hear".49a
Hence any action  is  considered as a r ig h t one, judged not only 
according to  i ts  content but also according to the tim e  at w hich i t  
takes place. This is  why Origen regards as "be a u tifu l"  (as said by Isaiah 
and s ta ted  in Rom. 10,15) w hat "has been done in the appro p ria te  
k a iro s "499
In the analysis above i t  is  m a in ly  fro m  a po in t o f v iew  of place 
th a t an action  has been examined and i t  has been susta ined tha t tim e  is
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a c o n s titu tiv e  elem ent o f the Quality o f an action  w hich takes place. 
This means tha t what is  m ain ly regarded is  the content o f an action  in 
i ts e lf  and whet is  re q u is ite  is  the proper tim e  fo r i ts  re a liza tio n . 
Nevertheless, Origen holds a v iew  of ka iros  regard ing  the cha rac te r of 
an action  (w hich is  in e v ita b ly  a spa tio -tem p o ra l occurrence) m ain ly 
fro m  a po in t o f v iew  of time.
I t  is  not only an action  which requ ires  the proper tim e  fo r  i ts  
approp ria te  re a liz a tio n ; but i t  is  also each tim e  tha t re o u ire s  the 
proper action , which is  the approp ria te  way o f ac ting  fo r  tha t 
p a r t ic u la r  moment o f tim e. The conv ic tion  about human freedom  as w e ll
as the p a r t ic u la r  c ru c ia litu . o f each ka iros , lead Origen to th is
perception:
Each p a r t ic u la r  ka iros  re q u ire s  the action  w hich is  approp ria te  
to  i t ,  in v iew  o f the eschato iog ica l purpose o f sa lvation. Hence i t  is  not 
im possib le  tha t tw o  d if fe re n t k a iro i may re q u ire  actions w hich, in 
them selves, would be opposite to each other.
This v iew  can be found in commJohn opining on the Question of 
"when one should contem pt the dancers o f duina".2U°
■ W W w
"We say tha t ne ithe r should we always avoid the dancers nor
alw ays run to  meet them; to someone who is  w ise  in C h ris t, i t  is
necessary to  te s t what the ka iro s  is  which demands h im  to  go away and 
what [the ka iro s ] is  o f w il l in g n e s s ,to  f ig h t,  w ith o u t going away ana, 
much m ore, w ith o u t f l ig h t " 501
The same v iew  is  expressed in Cels:
"Jesus taught h is  d isc ip les  not to  be rash, saying to  them: ' i f  
they persecute you in th is  c ity  flee  to another; and i f  they persecute 
you in th a t, flee  again to another.002 And he gave them an example of 
h is teaching by h is tra n q u il l i fe ;  he was ca re fu l not to meet dangers 
unnecessarily  o r at the wrong tim e  o r fo r  no good reason.'022 A t 
another po in t, th is  opinion is  again exp lica ted  through the no tion  of
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kairos:
“But he saw tha t i t  is  ve ry  d if f ic u lt  to  e rad ica te  fro m  a soul 
doc trines  w ith  which he was a lm ost born end was brought up u n til he 
reached man's esta te , end w hich persuade those who accept them tha t 
they are d iv ine and tha t to  ove rth row  them is  impious. He perceived 
tha t is  is  herd to  prove th a t they are 'dung' end ‘loss ’^  compared w ith  
the pre-em inence o f the knowledge th a t is  according to C h ris t, tha t is  
the tru th , so tha t those who heard would have been convinced. He 
th e re fo re  put i t  o f f  u n til a more su itab le  tim e  (sCg snunSsmxsoov 
kcuoov) a fte r  h is  passion and re su rre c tio n . Moreover, i t  was re a lly  the 
wrong moment (dK a ipog ) to b ring  help to  people as ye t unable to  accent 
i t ,  because possib ly i t  m igh t have destroyed the im press ion  of Jesus 
which they had a lready gained, th a t he was C h ris t and son o f the liv in g  
6odGjD
Hence every moment o f tim e  demands a ce rta in  kind o f action, 
which is  approp ria te  to tha t p a r t ic u la r  moment. I f  the time Is not 
“opportune" (sukcuoov), then even the best o f th ings ere unnecessary and 
even ha rm fu l, because th a t c e rta in  tim e  req u ire s  the kind of action  
b e f it t in g  th is  ka iros. For example, a t the tim e  of Jesus, “ the opportune 
tim e  of the law  and the prophets" had "passed away"; i ts  "hour'0 -5 was 
"past" end, th e re fo re , " i t  is  not the ka iros  fo r  th a t any m o re "~ C/
This conception o f "ka iros" in  Origen shows tha t tim e  is  not a 
m o ra lly  co lou rless continuum in which fre e  m oral action  takes Place; 
but each p a rt ic u la r  moment is , in  a p a r t ic u la r  way, re la te d  to  th is  
action. So, the time o f an action is  a c o n s titu tiv e  element o f the 
quality o f the action its e lf .
cr r\r";
I t  is  upon the judgement o f a "w ise  man in  C h ris t"—- to judge 
each tim e  what is  the action  tha t a p a r t ic u la r  moment re q u ire s ; tha t 
is , to  d iscern  whet is  the p a r t ic u la r  re la t io n  of th a t ka iro s  to moral 
action  and how the so te rio io g ica i pe rspectives of man can be served in
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the best wan.
This ve ry  po in t d ire c t ly  stem s fro m  Origen's fundamental 
conv ic tion  about freedom  o f ra tio n a l beings. The in te rve n tio n  of God in 
tim e  in the various k a iro i is  m a in ly  regarded as a re s u lt o f the 
freedom  o f c rea tures. This re s u lt may be e ith e r a consummation o f the 
w o rld  because o f excessive extent o f ev il in the w o rld  o r a response to 
God to  a p ra y e r3^  o r the sending o f a prophet to  announce c e rta in  
th ings and to educate people o r any o the r action  caused by c rea tu res ' 
action. I t  is  th e re fo re  in the conception o f ka iros , too, tha t Orloen's 
conception o f tim e , as the means where the freedom  o f God and th a t of 
c re a tu res  come to  a d ia le c tic a l re la t io n , can be traced  as w e ll as 
grounded.
In seJJud Origen expresses h is opinion th a t God's action  in 
tim e  takes place at the approp ria te  ka iro s  according to the choice of 
h is  freedom  and yet in  re la t io n  to  human action; and i t  is  in  v iew  of 
th is  opinion th a t he quotes and in te rp re ts  the passage in Ps.74,3 "when 
I deem tha t the approp ria te  tim e  (tccupov) has come, then I w i l l  judge 
good deeds"?10 A ccord ing ly , a ra tio n a l c re a tu re  "b rings its  f r u i t "  at i ts  
"app ropria te  tim e" (Kcapoc), by "ka iro s  of g iv ing [ f r u i ts ]  meaning the 
b e tte r m oral q u a lity "  o f the c re a tu re ? 11
Thus, Or i gen's conception o f ka iros  underlines the 
eschato iog ica l d ire c tio n  of the w o rld  in tim e, in th is  tim e  the re  are 
"k a iro i"  o f a m a jo r o r less m a jo r s ign ificance , incarna tion  is  a m a jo r 
ka iros  and i t  occurred at a moment m ark ing the consum m ation of a 
number o f aeons. The appearances o f the prophets also m ark va rious 
"k a iro i”. The apokatastasis which m arks the "end o f the prophecy" is  
also a "ka iros", w h ile  the " re s u rre c tio n " o f an ind iv idua l ra tio n a l 
c rea tu re  also m arks a "ka iro s ” of h is  own l i f e  in t im e ? 12
in commNatt Origen provides an exegesis o f M att.2 0 ,1 -16 , 
s ta tin g  tha t the "hours" o f the day in the parable are respec tive  to  the
various "kairoi" of biblical history, namely to Noah, Abraham, Moses, 
Jesus C hrist?*0 the consummation of the aeon?'- the outcome of the 
judgement?10 end, finally , the "kingdom of God“° Ib
Beyond those "points" In tim e, nevertheless, Ohoen’s time is 
fu ll of dots which mark the process of the return to God. Not only is an 
action "right" only once it  takes place in the appropriate time and 
"wrong" and "harmful” (even if  “good" in its  content regarded in its e lf) 
i f  it  takes place in a non-appropriate time. But also each moment 
demands an action appropriate to it. Origen’s opinion is that the 
perspectives of moral action pertain to future time which is of 
enormous length, such as "a week of aeons" and "month of aeons" and 
"year of aeons"01' Thus the perspectives of moral action re fe r to a 
future very long time, of which even "the smallest portion of an hour" 
actually means a period re lative ly  long time. It is in respect of this 
perspectives that everyone should now and “here” do “everything, In 
order that a fte r his preparation here he may be found worthy to attain  
to the ‘daily’ (cniouoiog) bread in the day that is ceiled Today’, end 
receive i t  ’day by day’, it  now being clear from the foregoing what the 
‘day by'day’ is"?18
So it  is not only action which seeks the right time to take 
Place, it is also time which seeks to be "filled full" by the right action.
This slight distinction indicates exactly the spatio-tem poral 
conception of re a lity  by Origen. There ere two elements which 
constitute the very existence of an occurrence. F irs t, it  is Place; this 
is why it  is said that an event takes place 019 Secondly, it  Is tim e . An 
event becomes "reality" when the "fullness of time"020 comes. It is 
therefore both space and time that concur and constitute the re a lity , 
the h isto ric ity , of an event.
What is usually done is to observe space and to look for the 
“coming" (or "fullness") of time. Origen did not neglect this, as we saw.
But what he further does is to observe each moment of time end-to 
look forward to the occurrence of the right event In it. if  this does not 
happen then the occurrences which happen before "the fulness of time" 
are "powerless” to serve the desirable purpose?-1
This is a crucial point which is underlined by Oripen's 
conception of kairos. Since the goal of "movement" (that is, moral 
action) in time has no other purpose than salvation, each moment of 
time is actually a kairos which has to be "filled fu ll” by the appropriate 
action, that is the action which serves the eschatoiogical perspectives 
of a rational being. Thus, besides the question of space's "fulness of 
time", in Origen there is also the question of time's "fulness of space", 
in the sense that a certain and appropriate action should take piece at 
each moment as "there is nothino between comrnittino sin and notw
committing sin"022 "Fulness of space" means that each forthcoming 
moment in the continuum of time should be “filled  full" by that action 
which serves the ultim ate eschatoiogical purpose, namely the return  to 
God.
Hypothetically speaking, if  each moment of time were "filled" by 
the appropriate action, then there would be no need for prolongation of 
time. Salvation does not take place at the end of one aeon only, just 
because this does not happen. Either a "right" action does not take place 
at all or it  takes place at the wrong time -a  case which v irtu a lly  has 
the same effects as an action wrong in itse lf.
Thus Origen’s time is not just a "line" which comes forth  by 
“connecting" the "points" of the various "kairoi" of God's action in the 
world, as Cullmann holds about tim e020 On this subject, quite 
reasonable critic ism  has been exercised. J. Marsh, for example, argues 
that "It was, of course, possible in ancient Israel to join the kainv 
that had then occurred; it  is possible in modern, as in ancient 
Christianity: but we have no temporal line when we have made our
connexions, it results In serious confusion to use this ’line' of time as 
an argument to support a doctrine of etern ity  as an endless tim e"024 
This is a very reasonable objection. Cullmann could never be able to 
prove that the "line" between two "kairoi", the line which joins these 
two points, is time in itse lf. Certainly It is not the only contradiction  
in Cullmenn’s thought; we discuss other points of it  further on in this 
work.
Our discussion of Origen's conception of kairos here shows that 
there can be no objection of this kind in Origen's conception of time. 
For in his view a ll the moments of time are "kairoi" in a sense. 
Certainly there is a classification of the significance of the various 
kairoi in tim e and Origen is clear in expressing this view. Beyond that, 
however, it  is the crucialitu  of the dialectical relation between God end 
creatures that renders each moment of time as a crucial kairos 
demanding a certain action. This is exactly what constitutes the 
dramatic character of time.
When H. Puech says that "the world and its  destiny stand in a 
direct relation to the w ill of God"020 he saus nothinc more that what
w w
Origen said. When he says that "God is manifested in time. Each of his 
acts marks a kairos, a solemn and decisive moment in history" he just 
repeats what Origen said. But Origen has gone fa r more than scholars 
like Puech did. The "decisive moments", in history are actually a/7 the 
moments of history, eventhough God is manifested only In a few of 
them. Even in our day no one (as neither Puech does) has portrayed the 
dramatic character of time in such a vivid way.
It is the fundamental eschatoiogical conception of time wnicn 
constitutes the crucialitu  of it. For the quality of every action is 
decisively coloured by the moment at which it  takes place; that is, the 
quality of every action depends also on the kairos at which it  takes 
place. Thus, it  is through the notion of "kairos" that the crucia litu  of
the temporal element of an action (which action proper, as we said, is 
a spatio-temporal occurrence) Is stressed. Finally It is the crucialitu  
of time in its e lf which is vividly underlined by such a conception of 
"kairos”; and this crucialitu  is actually Illuminated by the 
eschatoiogical perspectives of moral action in time.
Conclusion
The substantial Question which was discussed in this chapter is 
how Origen perceives function in time and how end to what extent this 
perception is indicative of a certain character of time. All the four 
particular topics discussed in this chapter not only confirm Origen's 
conception of time as discussed in the previous chapters, but they also 
further elucidate certain aspects of it.
in order to portray our conclusions we can make a distinction  
between ''anacyclological" and ''teleologies!’’ view of time.
The form er indicates a time without any beginning or end, a 
time in which occurrences are regularly repeated; events just ’’happen" 
and "recur" in a purely natural sense and there is no any conception of 
them a constituting any kind of process towards a goal or "end" 
whatsoever.020 in this tim e what is of main in terest is the m orally  
indifferent world and indeed thought is pre-em inently preoccupied with  
the ideal to know nature.
The la tte r  indicates a tim e in which occurrences are noi 
regularly repeated or even not repeated at all. As future is contingent, 
repetition or non-repetition of certain occurrences is a Question of no 
particular significance. What is of crucial importance is the quality qx 
these occurrences. Such a time is conceived as having both a beginning 
and an end -an end which also marks the “teles" of whet we have 
discussed as "movement in time". This time is determined by the 
creation and the final consummation of the world, what constitutes the
measure and criterion  of this quality lies in the fact that those 
occurrences are understood to be directed towards an end, both in a 
sense of atteinng to a goal and termination of time. This end (xsnog) 
actually indicates the significance of the whole movement. Divine and 
creaturely w ill encounter each other in time and what is of main 
in terest is not the morally indifferent nature 02/ but the morally 
crucial character of free action of rational creatures. In this 
coneption of tim e, the pest prepares for and announces the future and 
the future accomplishes end explains the past. Past events bring in 
themselves "an image" (or "prefiguration") of the future ones .
The conclusion from the discussion in this chanter is that 
Origen’s conception of time is a "teleologies!” one. His thought is mainly 
preoccupied w ith the crucialitu  of movement in time,, especially the 
perspectives of this movement in the time to come. He firm ly  holds a 
conception of isRog not only in the sense of "end", but, predorninently, 
in the sense of fu lfilm ent of the promise and realization of expectation 
fa ith  and' hope. Thus his conception of time is fundamentally 
characterized by categories such as providence - prophecy - promise - 
expectation - realization - fa ith  - hope - waiting - fulfilm ent . This 
succession of categories par excellence underlines the direction of free  
moral action in time towards an "end", which constitutes the salvation. 
So the entire course of history is actually the striv ing towards 
salvation. The entire world moves continuously from a "beginning" to an 
"end". The anacyclologica! conception of tim e is rejected not only on tne 
grounds of creaturely freedom but also because it  is unacceptable to 
the teaching of the scriptures which teach about a beginning of the 
world, of the sionificance of its  existence, of its  duration and final elmW '
and of its  consummation. Besides, the conviction that the redemptive 
deed of Christ was an s$‘ d'nof occurrence which happened once and for 
ell plays a decisive role in this teleologies! conception of time, what
happened at the time of Jesus was an event which in its e lf was 
performed for all the ages and i t  was actually a prefiauration of what 
w iii happen to the entire  "body" of Christ, namely the entire world, at 
the end.
How Origen perceives human being throughout an aeon, what is 
the meaning that tim e aquired a fte r the incarnation of Christ., how he 
considers the deeper meaning and significance of notions such as 
"prophecy" and "kairos" -a ll these show that his conception of time is 
pre-eminently characterized by the concern for the ultim ate  
implications of free moral action. Time is the "means” where the w ill 
of Cod and that of rational creatures encounter each other and come to 
a dialectical relation. Thus action in time is not a purposeless natural 
event, but it  is a meaningful process directed towards an "end". This is 
why Origen has "selected" those definitions of xsRoc which are 
indicative of his conviction that it  is the ib Roc which oecisively 
determines the quality of free moral action in tim e and, subsequently, 
his own conception of time; and it  is his conception of "kairos" that 
most vividly underlines the crucia lity  of time in itself.
it is ironical therefore that, although H. Pueclr23 portrays the 
Christian ideas on this question is a way actually expressing Orioen’s 
views, he adduces the name of Origen as an example of deviation from  
this conception of time and history. Likewise, the assertion of J. 
DanielotP29 that Origen's kind of exegesis leads to the loosing of its  
eschatological character, is absurd. On the contrary, we do agree w ith  
H. de Lubee^0 who quite correctly  denies this allegation:
Our discussion so far has shown that there is a continuity of 
time and a discontinuity of space, not in the sense of space's movement 
in timeDO! but in the sense that space is consisted of particu lar 
"soaces" distinct from one another.
Accordingly, movement in space-time has two directions:
One is "horizontal" and this is the direction towards the future. 
This is a continuous movement and, as far a certain rational creature  
is concerned, it  takes place throughout a certain rank of life, it is 
actually the movement along the temporal course or what is realized as 
the flux of time.
There is also another kind of movement, which we would call as 
a "vertical" one. This is discontinuous and takes place only at the end of 
each aeon, it is the movement from one rank of life  to another, 
according to divine judgement. This is a movement from one particu lar 
"space" to another, namely a "transposition" from a certain rank of life  
to another. As the rank of life  of a rational being at an ensuing aeon is 
determined only by divine judgement, this movement would not take 
place, in the event that a rational creature is found to deserve not to 
change rank of life  but to continue to live in the same one in the aeon 
which begins at that moment. This kind of movement constitutes the 
realization of the "existential causality", as discussed in chapter 2.
Thus, as fa r a certain rational creature is concerned, those two 
kinds of movement in space-time have d ifferent characteristics.
"Horizontal" movement takes place in a certain space (that is, 
the certain rank of life ) and the rational creatures moves from a 
moment of time to another moment of tim e . In this case it is the 
particular space which is constant. This movement is mainly regarded 
as free moral action. Thus, once the particu lar space in which a 
rational creature lives is given and constant for a period of an aeon, 
the crucia lity  of being in space-time is mainly underlined is terms of 
time -as it has particularly  been discussed in this chapter.
"Vertical" movement takes piece at a certain tim e (namely, at 
the moment of consummation and judgement) and it  is a movement from  
a particular space to another particular space. In that case it  is time 
which is constant, since the time of consummation end judgement is a
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time of "non- durst ion”. Here space In its e lf, as a certain rank of life , 
is of main in terest, as the outcome of judgement is realized as a 
"transposition" from one particular space to another. Thus the 
crucia lity  of being in space-time is, in this case, underlined in terms 
of space.
We have hitherto discussed the conception of time in its e lf, its  
character, Its  relation to God, its  relation to the structure of the 
world as well as its  significance as assumed from how occurrences in 
time are considered and regarded, in having done so, it  is mainly the 
"horizontal" movement in Origen's time which has actually been 
examined. This was inevitable since the whole discussion was about 
time in its e lf, as an "extension" which is "extended alongside w ith the 
structure of this world". What we have not discussed however, but only 
alluded to, is what we have called "vertical" movement in Orisen’s 
space-time.
While the ultim ate possibility of the "horizontal" movement 
(that is, the movement towards the future) is the "end" of time its e lf , 
what are the ultim ate possibilities of the "vertical” movement in 
Origen's space-time? The enquiry of this question leads us to the 
discussion of the meaning (or, meanings) of the notion of etenw! in 
Origen's thought.
Chapter 4: Time and the notion of ete rn a l
§1. Eternal life.
OrigerVs conception of eternal life  should be regarded in the 
context of his perception of the world consisting of particular "worlds" 
or spaces of different quality from each other. His general view is that 
"the entire universe of things that exist, both celestial and 
supercelestial, earthly and infernal may be spoken of in a general way 
as a single perfect world, within which or by which those other worlds 
that are in it  must be supposed to be contained".1 In the Latin rendering 
of Princ there is a reference to the Greek "Apocalypse of Baruch" in 
which "seven worlds or heavens" are asserted to exist; i t  is also stated 
there that "above" all these "worlds" "there is another one", which 
encloses all the other "spheres in its yet more magnificent circuit, so 
that all things are within i t  as this earth of ours is under the heaven".2
This view, however, is not fully Origen’s. For, in his works in 
Greek, he refers explicitly to this pagan notion of "seven heavens" 
stating that i t  cannot be accepted by Christians as it  is nowhere found 
in the scriptures.3 Elsewhere he says that although there are "heavens", 
he does not know "how many" they are.4 This consideration actually 
stems from his conviction that it  is "above our nature" to know how 
many the ranks of life are and what their exact classification is.5 Thus 
he quite often refers to "heavens" in contradistiction to the one 
"heaven",5 but he nowhere attempts what he regards as impossible, 
namely to say how many these "heavens" are.
As for the scriptural grounding of this view, he appeals to Paul 
who speaks of Christ who "ascended up far above all heavens" 
(Eph.4,10), the term "heavens" being in the Plural. Henceforth he 
employs the scriptural narration of the "ladder" which was seen in a
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vision by Jacob7 The figure of this ladder reaching to heaven and 
angels ascending and descending on it  and the Lord standing on its top 
suits him best, as it  very much fits  in with his conception of the 
world.8
In view of this world-picture, Origen's conception of eternal 
life  is to live in the highest rank of life of this world.
This world which is supposed to be "above" all the particular 
spaces of this "single perfect world" is regarded as "the sphere" which 
"is called in the holy scriptures ’good land' and 'land of the living'.9 
This particular "world ... has its own heaven ... in which the names of 
the saints are said to be written, or to have been written by the 
Saviour.10 This is the heaven "which contains and encloses that 'earth' 
which the Saviour in the gospel promises to the 'meek' and 'gentle'.11 
This is another world which "excels in quality and glory but is 
nevertheless contained within the lim its of this world".12
In Origen's view “there is another 'heaven' and another 'earth' 
besides the firmament, which is said to have been made after the 
second day, and the 'dry land’, which was afterwards called 'earth' ". So 
"this earth of ours, which was formerly called 'dry land', took its new 
name from that earth, just as our firmament was called 'heaven' after 
the designation of that heaven.13 "There is also that other earth, of 
which the scripture speaks, the one that flows with milk and honey, 
which the Saviour in the Gospel promises to the meek, when he says: 
'Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the earth'. This earth 
which we inhabit is in its true designation called the 'dry land'; just as 
the heaven which we behold is properly called the firmament. But the 
firmament takes the name of heaven from the appellation of that other 
heaven, as the scripture teaches in Genesis".14
Accordingly, at another point, Origen reiterates that the saying 
"In the beginning God made heaven and earth"15 refers to the very
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beginning of creation and asserts that "that heaven and that earth there 
spoken of" pertain to this highest particular world and they "exist as a 
dwelling place and rest for the pious, so that the saints and the meek 
may be the firs t to obtain an inheritance on that earth.15
That world is "a world of saints and of those who have been 
completely purified and not of the wicked, as our world is."17
The scriptural basis for the notion of that world is sought in 
Paul, who says that "if the earthly house of this our tabernacle be 
dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, 
eternal in the heavens".18 There is also appeal to the Old Testament 
arguing that "when it  is said elsewhere, ’Because I shall see the heaven, 
the works of thy fingers’19 and when God said through the prophet about 
all visible things that ’My hand made all these',20 he declares that that 
'eternal house’ which he promises to the saints in heaven was not 'made 
with hands’, which undoubtedly signifies a difference in creation 
between the 'things which are seen’ and the 'things which are not 
seen'.’’.21
Thus the perception of the promised "eternal life" pertains to 
"that heaven and earth" in which "the end and perfection of all things 
may find a safe and most sure abode. There, for instance, those who 
have for their offences endured the sharp reproof of punishments by 
way of purgation and have fulfilled and discharged every obligation may 
be found worthy of a dwelling-place in the ’earth’; while those who 
have been obedient to the word of God and have already here by their 
submission shown themselves receptive to his wisdom may be said to 
gain the kingdom of that heaven or heavens. Thus a worthier fulfilment 
may be found for the saying, ‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall 
inherit the kingdom of heaven’22 and for what was said in the psalm ’He 
shall exalt thee, and thou shalt inherit the earth'23 For we speak of 
descending to this earth, but of being ‘exalted’ to that one, which is on
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high.".24
Thus when Origen speaks of eternal life he does not only refer 
to a personal experience (according to scriptural affirmations of 
eternal life  being within men)25 but he also holds a perception of 
eternal life  as another w orld, namely the highest of the ranks of life 
which comprise the entire world. This world is portrayed by 
expressions such as "To this land belongs that heaven which, with its 
more magnificent circuit, surrounds and confines it, and this is the 
true heaven and the firs t so to he ca lled :'26
According to this perception, he speaks of the "kingdom of 
heavens" in a twofold sense.
First, he regards this notion as pertaining to the existential 
"atmosphere", so to speak, of the eternal life, as a personal experience 
of a human being. This experience is mainly coloured by characteristics 
such as wisdom, logos, truth -which indeed are conceptions of Christ 
himself. Thus, in some passages, Origen points out that this "kingdom" 
is Christ himself.27 Although this "kingdom" is mainly understood as 
"the goods to be enjoyed a fte r the resurrection" (id  pexa xrjv 
avaaiaaiv aga9a), it  can also be understood as the "preaching" (10 
Kgpu^pa).28 Regarded as a personal experience this "kingdom of heavens" 
is not held to be "in some other place" but in the "disposition" (ouk ev 
xoniu soiiv, ev 6e 6ia9eaei)29 of a man who accepts and realizes the 
"virtuous life" (evapexog ^uf)),30 according to the scritpural saying that 
this kingdom of heaven is within men. Accordingly, he states that "it is 
a habit in scripture to name contemplation of the aeon to come as 
kingdom of heavens".31
Beyond this perception, however, Origen emphasizes that this 
"kingdom" of God, although experienced now to a certain extent through 
a personal experience, i t  is itself the existential atmosphere of the 
particular world appropriate to it, namely the eternal life. Thus in the
416
Fragment XXXVI from his comm John, quoting John 3,5 ("Verily, verily, I 
say unto thee, Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he 
cannot enter into the kingdom of God"), he develops this distinction as 
follows:
"As kingdom of God one should understand the status of those 
who duly live according to his laws. And this [kingdom] w ill have its 
abode in the place appropriate to it, and by that I mean the place in the 
heavens; but since [this kingdom] is here named as kingdom of God 
whereas in Matthew it  is named as kingdom of heavens,32 it  should be 
said that Matthew names it  in respect of those who are under the reign 
rather than the places where they live  whereas John and Luke33 have 
named it  regard to God who reigns. It is like speaking of the kingdom of 
Romans when we name it  so regarding those who are ruled and denote 
this either by the place when the te rrito ry  of it  is meant, or denote it 
by the people participating in it.".34
Although eternal life may (in a sense, and to a certain extent) 
be personally experienced in the human rank of life, yet that life in 
itself is a "world" of its own. Flence eternal life  is determined by a 
there. This is a point which Origen makes in selDeut. He maintains his 
view of eternal life  consistently as the "earth" which is "the promised 
land"35 being in a certain there. This is how he comments on a passage 
in Deuteronomy 8,7 (Tor the Lord your God w ill introduce you in an 
earth which is good and fruitful"):
"It was not that [kind of earth] which Christ has promised to us 
rather [he promised us] the kingdom of heavens, an earth good and 
eternal, whose watersource is Christ who waters by the nourishement 
of wisdom. ... There is the wheat which supports the human heart ... 
There is Christ, the real vineyard. There is the oil which anoints the 
heads of the saints. ... There is the fig-tree, not the fruitless and 
having just long leaves, but that which is rich by the sweetness of the
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spirit. There is the desirable sweetness of the Saviour's pharynx and 
the bride's lips, as in the song [of Solomon], which let honeycomb fall 
drop by drop and [there are] the holy stones (R(9oi o( agioi), who, during 
their life  on the earth, were unyielding to temptations although they 
have lived amidst them and thus were imitating the nature of iron. 
There are the pieces of copper, from which [those holy stones] have 
constructed their intelligible armour [against those temptations]. And 
their principal work is to bless God ceaselessly .".36
Thus, although Origen stresses that the eternal life is to be 
reached in the future (since he regards it  as a promised land), he 
stresses that rational beings (here called "holy stones") live there now. 
What he stresses, nevertheless, is that this eternal life  is another 
space of the world and this is why i t  is stated as being there (EksO. 
When Origen speaks of "another aeon", in contradistinction to "this 
aeon", he understands this "another" aeon not only as a future time but 
also as “another world" in another space into which w ill be transposed 
those who are not there yet. This is the sense in which the aeon to 
come constitutes a hope. It is exactly this notion by which his 
spatio-temporal perception of reality is underlined. Thus he 
understands and uses the term "aeon" both in the sense of a temporal 
"age" and in a spatial sense, namely as "world".
In homJer he clearly states that "aeon" has also a spatial 
meaning, namely "world" and says that the "kingdom of God" is not to be 
found "in this aeon", namely "this world", but it  comes from “the higher 
spaces" of this world (ouk saiiv fj paaiRsia xou 0eou sk io u  aiiuvog 
xouiou, aRRa ano iiuv Kpeitioviuv xwptwv).37
Furthermore, when he speaks of "a new aeon which is hoped for" 
(Kaivog auuv ecmv sRni^opevog) i t  is by the term "hoped" (eRm^opevog) 
that he denotes the temporal character of this "aeon", namely that it  
w ill occur in the future; yet he immediately appeals to Isaiah in order
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to explain that this "aeon" is "a new heaven and a new earth"38 and he 
further reiterates the also spatial character of this "aeon" stating that 
"there" (sksQ  (not then) "life is totally different and truly blessed" and 
his further references to that "aeon" are introduced by a there (sksO  
and not by any then 39
Indeed Origen affirms that the term “earth" (ftfj) is a 
"homonym"40 as there are different realities denoted through the use of 
the same term. Vet, in as much as eternal life  is denoted by the term 
"earth" or "aeon", this reality is understood to be not only in another 
world but also in the future time . This means that in Origen's 
thought there is a fundamental connexion between Here and Now, on the 
one hand, and There and Then, on the other.41 A human being can attain 
to a taste of the existential "atmosphere" of eternal life  through a 
personal experience, yet this is only a limited taste of the eternal life 
which is perceived as an actual reality, namely as another space of the 
world.
In chapter 2 we discussed Origen’s conception of "aeon" (aujv) 
as mainly meaning "time". What we see here is that the same term 
"aeon" has also the meaning of a particular "space" of those which 
comprise the world. Bearing in mind Origen’s conception of the world 
through the figure of the "ladder" of Jacob on the top of which Christ is 
standing, one can see what Origen means when he speaks of the "span" 
(6iaair]pa) from here, namely the earth, up to the "angels who have 
been elevated" in higher spaces in the topmost of which is Christ 
himself.42
It is in the light of this conception that "eternal life" is stated 
to be "Christ himself".43
In a significant passage in Cels, Origen depicts his perception 
of eternal life  mainly in spatial terms emphasizing the fact that this 
life  is into the world. Speaking of the human beings who die during the
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consummation of an aeon, he argues that this may be taken to mean that 
these beings are certainly "banished out of the world" only when one 
takes "world" to mean just the earth. In fact, however, they "are not 
taken out of the world" but the Logos takes a human being "out of this 
earthly existence and transfers him to the world beyond the heaven for 
the contemplation of the realm of goods" (xou Ro^ ou auiov uneEjdftovioq 
svisu9sv xai eni xov unspoupaviov eni i f j  9ea iqjv KaRuv pexaii9eviog 
xonov).44 What Origen clearly implies here is that eternal life, although 
beyond th is visible w orld , and "beyond the heaven", it  is however a 
particular space into the world and indeed it  is a place from which a 
certain kind of contemplation is possible.
Hence eternal life  is defined not only by a then, but it  is also 
regarded as another world and mode of life determined by a there, 
namely the highest rank of life  of the world.
Once, therefore, eternal life  is life in this world, it  should be 
separated from divine life by the same "chasm", through the figure of 
which divine reality is understood to be transcendent to the world. 
Indeed, Origen holds that to speak of "higher" place has a relative 
meaning as it  refers to its relative quality with respect to other 
(namely, "lower") ranks of life  of the world. For although the world is 
entirely "material" and "comprises various spaces", yet they all are 
regarded as being "down" compared to the divine life; and this down 
"does not imply any spatial comparison" but a qualitative one to what 
is "invisible"45 namely incorporeal.
It is due to this conception of eternal life  that Origen uses 
spatial terms in order to depict the relative position of a rational 
creature in this "life" in comparison to other spaces in the world. The 
most usual terms used for this purpose are those of "ascending" or 
"descending", as he deems these metaphorical notions as the most 
appropriate to express the status of eternal life  as well as the dynamic
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related to it. We emphasize, however, that the use of spatial terms 
should not be regarded in terms of the three-dimensions visible 
firmament, namely as indicating geometrical distances. For, as 
discussed in chapter 1, the differences between the particular ■‘spaces" 
of the world are qualitative and not strictly geom etrical. This means 
that another rank of life  is not to be found in a certain geometrical 
"distance" from the visible world. Speaking in a stric t spatial sense, 
Origen avers that these spaces are here on the earth\ as we have seen. 
In view of this, when he uses spatial terms he does so implying the 
qualitative difference of the particular worlds and not any geometrical 
distance.
This is what he suggests through statements like this: "Like 
there are differences among those down, since there are references to 
the lowest, so there are differences among those high, as there are 
references to inheritance of the kingdom of heavens; all the heavens to 
be inherited are up, but they are not all equally up."46 This is the sense 
in which eternal life  is regarded as the topmost heaven and the "true 
heaven and the first".47
It is of particular significance to see how Origen not only uses 
spatial terms in order to allude to his notion of eternal life, but also 
classifies those terms in order to allude to different stages of this 
"ascending". In selPs he comments on the Psalm 23,3 ("Who shall ascend 
into the hill of Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place?") and he 
suggests that this passage should be compared to that in Psalms, 14,1 
("Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? who shall dwell in thy holy 
hill?"). The remark which he makes out of this comparison is that, in 
the former passage, one firs t ascends to the hill of Lord and then 
stands in his holy place; in the latter passage, one firs t abides in the 
tabernacle of God and then dwells in his holy hill.
Thus there are three categories to be considered. First, "to
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ascend into the hill of Lord"; secondly, “to dwell in the holy hill"; and 
thirdly, "to stand in the holy place of God".
It is certainly not incidental that Origen adduces the second 
passage in order to reflect as to what happens "first" and what 
"second", what is "preceding" and what is "subsequent". For those three 
categories, expressed allegorically here, allude to three very 
significant notions of Origen’s conception of time and they w ill be 
discussed later in this chapter. What is of significance at this point is 
Or i gen's view that "one dwells in many places before he ascends to the 
holy mountain of God." (noRRa ng napoiKsi, eiug ou sR9q sig t o  ctftiov opog 
xou 0sou.).48 We discuss this conception of "holy mountain" in chapter 5, 
§3, quoting a passage in selPs, 60, by which it  is explained that this 
"holy mountain" is eternal life  itself; however there is also a notion of 
a fte r the eternal life  -a notion which constitutes a pivotal point for 
understanding Origen’s eschatological ideas, as we shall see.
On the particular subject which we are discussing now (namely, 
the use of spatial terms in speaking of the eternal life) Origen 
comments as follows:
"And it  is the ultimate good (te R iko v  aga9ov) of the Lord and 
God the Logos himself that he (sc. David) names as hill; ... and when he 
becomes perfect and there is no room for further perfection, he stands 
firm  being himself a holy place of God. For he ascends walking after the 
Lord 'forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto 
those things which are before’, having the worthy goal (xeRog exwv 
a^a9ov) of standing next to God in a holy place of his (ev xonu) 
auxou)".49
Quite clearly Origen relates the conception of this end to a 
conception of another place Neverthelsss, the view of eternal life  as 
being In the world (and therefore out of God) like the rest of the 
world, is again suggested here. For he does not say that the rational
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being w ill stand "with God" nor does he say that he w ill stand "in God"; 
he says "next to God" (psxd 0sov). The difference is quite significant as 
i t  underlines Qrigen's view of the eternal life  in relation to the divine 
reality.
Those categories are considered in a twofold way, namely in 
the same sense that the "kingdom of God" is perceived. They may allude 
to a personal experience while being in the human rank of life. In that 
case this experience is limited by the human nature itself. They also 
may suggest the eschatological reality, as an objective status of the 
world in the time to come. This is why Origen deems that a human 
being can experience those eschatological realities now, yet this is 
possible only to a certain extent as these experiences are subject to 
limitations due to human nature itself or (if they are referred to 
creatures of higher ranks of life  as well) they are subject to the 
limitations that corporeality itself imposes to rational creatures.
What, therefore, is stated in the passage above may pertain to 
human rank of life, as a personal procedure during a lifetime -and 
accordingly Origen states: "Judas ascended to the hill of Lord, but he 
did not stand in his holy place".50 Yet he goes on to state that what the 
passage above signifies is eschatological promises (ena^eriiuiv), to be 
fulfilled in the time to come.
So he refers to the "ascent" to this "high" rank of life  in an 
objective (that is, in an eschatological, yet real and historical) sense. It 
does not just mean a foretaste of that by means of a personal 
experience. Thus, quoting Matt.5,5 he states that "Earth is the high 
inheritance of those 'who live' and inherit their bodies in a glorious and 
incorruptible form.".51
In Cels there is a reference to the efforts to make the ascent 
to eternal life  by those who "have done everything possible that they 
might let nothing impure enter their rational nature" so that "they
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might appear worthy of progressing to the divine realm and be drawn 
up by the Logos to the supreme blessedness of all and, if  I may so 
express it, to the mountain-summit of goodness." (eni ifjv avajxaxiij 
ndvTiuv paKapioigxa kq[, (v' ouxojg ovopdaw, ciKpiipeiav xwv agaSuiv)52
This is what is also called "topmost heavens", a place of 
"contemplation",53 which nevertheless is in the world.54 This is why he 
regards that the use of the verb "raised up" (uijjiijaep5 is "appropriate to 
[express] perfection".55
Eternal l ife  as "end". Referring to the personal perspective of 
individual rational creatures, Origen applies the term "end" (xeRog) to 
it  in the sense of achievement of a personal aim. The very fact of 
ascending to the supreme rank of life  after a consummation and 
judgement constitutes an "end" for a rational being. This "end", however, 
has no so much a temporal meaning (although it  does not lack a 
temporal meaning, too) but i t  mainly denotes the "last" (in the sense of 
highest) rank of life  as well as the achievement of an existential goal 
in a rational being's life. This is the sense in which eternal life  is 
portrayed as an "ultimate good (xsR ikov a^aSov)" and a rational 
creature as "having the worthy goal (xeRog) of standing next to God in 
a holy place of his",57 and also as a particular world having its "heaven 
and earth"58 in which "the end and perfection of all things may find a 
safe and most sure abode".59
Commenting on John,4,36, Origen refers to God who, after 
judgement brings all those who merit it  "to one and the same end'66 
which is the "eternal 7//<?".61 In like a manner he comments on Psalms, 
48,9:
"He who strives throughout his lifetime in the life  here, w ill 
at the end live the real life and w ill not face destruction." And "he who 
toils with [his] actions w ill at the end live through knowledge. ... For 
this is the meaning of 'at the end’.62 ... And as end you should
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understand the next aeon which is the end of the present one. For he 
who here had a hard and toilsome life, w ill be found worthy of living 
the promised life  in the aeon to come, and he w ill not face 
destruction".63
Origen explains his meaning further in the same work: "When he 
who is aware of the doctrine of the judgement to come sees the wise 
people dying, he does not regard it  as a destructon of both soul and 
body ... but [he regards this death] as a removal to another w orld" 
(psxoiKiav sig Koapov exepov).64
Commenting on the Psalm 139,13-14 (“! know that the Lord w ill 
maintain the cause of the afflicted, and the right of the poor. Surely 
the righteous shall give thanks unto thy name: the upright shall dwell in 
thy presence"), he states: "This is a prophecy of the judgement to come, 
in which the impious w ill be thrown to fire  whereas the just w ill be 
taken up to a relaxed life  (sig aveoiv). ... Solomon also said 'For God 
will bring in judgement everything that has been done'.65 And [David] has 
concluded this [psalm], which is entitled "to the end" (eig xsRog), by 
alluding to the hope maintained by the just."66
The actual sense in which Origen comprehends the notion of 
"end" into this context, is stated by himself:
"As with every art and science there is an end (xsRog), towards 
which he who exercises this art of science is looking, so there must be 
an end (xeRog) for rational nature",67 which is understood in a 
qualitative sense, namely the abolition of evil.
Due to the eschatological orientation of his thought, he 
primarily regards free moral action in its future perspectives. This is 
why he maintains that human life should mainly be seen in the light of 
its being "in the future time"; for "it is then that it  w ill pre-eminently 
praise God".68 In the prolonged time of Origen sins w ill be forgiven 
"later or sooner"69 Nevertheless, the "end" w ill be the same for all,
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either they now are sinful or pious, because there is "one end from one 
God through one Christ in one Holy Spirit, being reserved for either of 
them"70 This view is expressed exactly at the point where he quotes 
John 4,36, explaining that this "end" is the meaning of "eternal life" 
stated there.
So, in this meaning, "end" means the ascent of an individual 
rational creature to the supreme rank of life. This attaining to eternal 
life  constitutes a sense of "salvation" as Origen directly relates the 
notions of "end" (or, "blessed end"), "eternal life" and "salvation"71
Thus attaining to eternal life  is portrayed as "transition" to the 
supreme rank of life. This is an "end" (xefiog) which is also called "high 
mountain ridge" (aKpiupsiav)72 Hence, when he refers to this kind of 
life, he uses the term "eternal" (aiuuviog) either with verbs denoting a 
spatial transition ("...he was a supplier of joy, as he forgave sins and 
transposed those who heard to eternal life...")73 or he uses the term 
"eternal" correlated to place ("...we admit that he can provide an eternal 
residence (pioxfjv) for the soul, and say not only that he can but that he 
actually does so. ).74
This latter passage implies also the perception of eternal life  
as a space which w ill be reached in the future by those who are not in 
that rank of life  now. However, there are rational creatures who 
already are in that rank of life  as a result of their deeds during the 
previous aeon. This is the meaning of the Present tense nopstfsmt 
("provides") which Origen uses in order to emphasize that God not only 
w ill raise rational beings to eternal life, but he has already done it  
and there are now rational creatures living there.
Eternal l i f e  as contem plation. Once the character of eternal 
life, as a rank of life, has been determined, the question arising relates 
to the existential status of those who are transposed there. A main 
existential characteristic of rational beings at that rank of life  is the
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contemplation of the divine wisdom.
Attaining to eternal life is portrayed as a transposition to a 
,,place,, from which is “beyond the heaven for the contemplation of the 
realm of goods (iwv KaRtdv)"75 and yet this is a place in the world.
This highest "place", therefore, is one from which 
"contemplation" (9eav) of "goods" (iiuv KaRwv) is possible, indeed, in the 
same work Origen articulates how he comprehends those "eternal" 
things which are "contemplated" from the point of view of "eternal 
life".
"At any rate, our Paul, who was educated in those prophetic 
writings and desired the things of the higher world and the region 
beyond the heavens, and always acted in the light of those things that 
he might attain to them, says in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: 
‘For our slight affliction, which is but for a moment, works for us 
more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory; meanwhile we 
look not at the things that are seen, but at the things which are not 
seen; for the things that are seen are transitory76 but the things which 
are not seen are eternal.’77
To those who can understand he calls those things sensible as 
‘seen1 and those intelligible and comprehended only by mind as ‘not 
seen’; he also knows that those things sensible are ‘transient’ and 
’seen’ whereas the intelligible are ‘not seen’;78 Desiring to continue in 
the contemplation (9sa) of these things and being helped by his longing 
for them, he regarded all affliction as nothing and as something light. 
Even at the very time of affliction and troubles he was in no way 
weighed down by them, but made light of every difficulty because he 
was contemplating (9eav) these things. For we have a great high priest 
who by the greatness of his power and of his mind ’has passed through 
the heavens, Jesus the Son of God’79 who told those that had genuinely 
learnt the things of God and who lived lives worthy of them that he
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would lead them on to realities beyond this world.
So he says: That where I go, you may be also’80 On this account 
we hope that after the ’troubles and strivings'81 here we shall come to 
the topmost heavens (npog ckpoig ^evso9ai xoiq oupavo'ig), and 
according to the teaching of Jesus w ill receive ’springs of water- 
springing up to eternal life ’,82 and w ill have the capacity for rivers of 
visions Oewprjpdxajv), and w ill be with the waters that are said to be 
’above the heavens' which ’praise the name of the Lord’.83 As long as we 
praise him, we shall not be carried about away from ‘the circumference 
of the heaven’,84 but we shall always (cm) be engaged in the 
contemplation (9sa) of the invisible things of God, which w ill no longer 
be understood by us 'from the creation of the world by the things that 
are made’85 but, as the genuine disciple of Jesus expressed it, when he 
said 'But then face to face’; and 'When that which is perfect is come, 
that which is in part shall be done away.’."86
Thus Origen directly relates the notion of "eternal life" to the 
notion of "contemplating" "the invisible things of God". In order to see 
how Origen regards those "invisible things of God", we should recall our 
analyses in chapter 1, where we have asserted that those "invisible 
things" are the wisdom of God. Therefore this contemplation is to 
clearest possible view of the wisdom of God. This view can be found in 
the exhMar where he states:
"Why, then, do we hesitate and doubt to put off the corruptible 
body that hinders us and weighs down the soul, the ’earthly tabernacle’ 
that f ills  the mind full of many anxieties,87 and to be set free from our 
bonds and to retire from the stormy waves that are the lot of flesh and 
blood? For then we may enjoy with Christ Jesus the rest which 
accompanies blessedness, and contemplate (9ewpouvxsg) him in his 
wholeness, the living Logos. Fed by him and comprehending the manifold 
wisdom in him, and being stamped with the very truth, we may have our
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minds enlightened by the true and unfailing light of knowledge and have 
the vision (9sav) of those things which by that light can be seen by 
eyes illuminated by the commandment of the Lord.".88
Thus eternal life  is related fundamentally to a "contemplation" 
(9swpia) of divine wisdom in the most clear way, to the extent it  is 
possible from a point of view being in  the world. The very term Ssiupk 
denotes what is to be enjoyed once a rational creature is found worthy 
of being transposed to the eternal life.89
Quoting Ps. 142,8 ("cause me to know the way wherein I should 
walk; for I l i f t  up my soul unto thee") he comments as follows:
"He seeks the contemplation of the aeon to come, which in the
Scripture is also usually called kingdom of heavens." He further adds
that this psalm pertains to "the learning of the road ... on which one 
walks after he goes out of this life"; and the final destination is an 
"Earth of the living" (rfj ^u jv x u jv ) where "the Holy Spirit of God leads 
those who deserve it".90
Commenting on Mat. 17,I f f  ("And after six days Jesus takes
Peter, James and John his brother, and brings them up into an high
mountain apart, and was transfigured before them") Origen states that 
the term "high mountain" alludes to the eternal life  where "apart" (k o x ’ 
iSCav) one may "contemplate" (9eiijpfjarj) the glory of Christ. And the 
exression "after six days" was said "not in vain" as the world was made 
in six days and, therefore, in order to reach those "eternal" ones has to 
go through those six days and finally he "will find himself in a new 
sabbath in a high mountain, delighted in seeing Christ transfigured in 
front of him".91 An extensive part of this section is devoted to the 
articulation of the view that what rational creatures contemplate from 
the eternal life ’s point of view is Christ as the Wisdom of God.92
Thus, eternal life  is a place from where rational beings enjoy 
the best "sight" of the wisdom of God. It should be emphasized,
however, that this is just the best sight possible from a temporal 
point of view, namely from a place in the world. For Origen holds that 
corporeality in itself is a factor preventing creatures from ‘‘seeing" 
God Himself.93 This is a fundamental conviction which is directly 
related to the conception of a "chasm" between God and the world, 
namely of God as radically transcendent to the world.
Thus mystical experience cannot substitute what is portrayed 
as an actual perspective of rational creatures through an actual 
process in space-time. For, eternal life  "now ... is found in shadow, but 
then i t  w ill be found face to face" by virtue of the fact that eternal 
life  is “Christ himself"94
In view of this, R. Sorabji’s assertion95 that Origen "fears" that 
a human being could feel "satiety" due to his progress in mystical 
experience, is wrong. R. Sorabji has not grasped that in Origen 
"progress" is only limitedly perceived as "mystical experience". The 
actual progress is perceived as a spatio-temporal movement, according 
to the existential causality. At that point Sorabji has confused the 
"progress" either as a personal exprerience or as a real 
spatio-temporal perspective.96 It is Origen himself who enunciates that 
mystical experience w ill never be satisfied, because of man’s limited 
ability to comprehend the divine mysteries. For there are certain 
Beujpr|[JLaxa in wisdom which can be comprehended by no created 
nature.97 The "knowledge" of the multitude of 9 e u jp f j{ jL a x a  about God is 
"endless" (dRrjKiov), not only for “human nature" but also for all 
creatures.98 In searching for the divine truth, one may find the "depth" 
of certain words. But "if he rests for a while" he w ill thereafter find 
new questions before him; and once they are answered, he w ill find new 
questions, and so on.99
In that section of R. Sorabji’s book100 there is a quotation 
where Gregory of Nyssa affirms that personal progress towards the
search of God is unlimited. It is quite ironical that Sorabji regards this 
passage "as something of an answer to Origen".101 For this view of 
Gregory's is but a view of Origen. Gregory does not answer to Origen, 
he just repeats the view of his master -whom he so much admired.
In fact this is one more point on which Origen takes a view 
diametrically opposite from Plato’s:
"Plato may say that i t  is d ifficult to find the maker and father 
of the universe, indicating that it  is not impossible for human nature to 
find God in a degree worthy of Him, or, i f  not worthy of Him, yet at 
least in a degree higher than that of the multitude. ... But we affirm 
that human nature is not sufficient in any way to seek for God and to 
find Him in His pure nature, unless it  is helped by the God who is object 
of the search. And He is found by those who, after doing what they can, 
admit that they need Him, and shows Himself to those to whom He 
judges right to appear, so far as it  is possible for God to be known to 
man and for the human soul which is s till in a body to know God.".102
If a man "contemplates" the wisdom of God "during the present 
aeon", this is not an actual state of contemplation but a personal 
experience. In this sense this contemplation is very near to a figure of 
speech (ev psv xw vuv q iu jv i ... fj voqxrj xfjg aocpiag Seujpia). But in the 
"aeon to come" this w ill be a real spatio-temporal (and not just a 
personal experience and, therefore, an incomplete) state.103
Speaking of eternal life, in Origen’s thought the real contrast is 
always between Here-Now and There-Then.104 This spatio-temporal 
perspective cannot be substituted by any mystical experience, which is 
bound to be endlessly incomplete due to the fact that a human being 
seeks to see God Here and New. Paul’s affirmation about new seeing 
God "through a glass" is quite often contrasted to the future  "face to 
face".105
Commenting on John 1,16 ("And of his fulness have all we
received") Origen makes the following point:
"You should remark the exactness of what has been written. It 
is not said ‘his fulness’, but 'And of his fulness have we all received’. 
For those who, in this life participate in sanctity and knowledge and 
truth [are said to] know a part and to prophesy from a part of his 
fulness,106 but they have not his fulness. They could nevertheless 
acquire i t  after this temporary life  in the aeons to come, according to 
the apostle;107 for he says "when that which is perfect is come, then 
that which is in part shall be done away” 108 In the catholic [epistle] of 
John it  has been accordingly said; ’and it  does not yet appear what we 
shall be; but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; 
for we shall see him as he is",109 which means; [we shall see him] in 
the way it  is  possible to creatures to know God (KaStog son Suvaxov 
xoig gsvqxoig gvwvai xov 0sov). For i t  is not possible to understand the 
[expression] ’as he is’ as meaning God in Himself (ou gap oiov xs 
SKfiappdveiv xo KaSiug saxiv o 0sog auxog). We shall acquire something 
more than our present situation, as we shall become able to see not 
what is part, but being naked of any ignorance, the purest truth, as we 
shall see him as much as is  possible (xaxa xo Suvaxov auxov 
oijjopsvoi).".110
What actually Origen does here is to articulate his views in a 
way preserving his fundamental conception of the radical transcendence 
of God to the world and a notion of God Himself, who is beyond any 
possibility of being known by any creature, no matter how "high" it  is. 
This is particularly underlined in the passage above. Indeed, he is 
particularly cautious in affirming that although "contemplation" of God 
from the eternal life ’s point of view is a superior one, yet i t  is a view 
of God from within the world; it  is exactly due to this fact that God 
cannot be seen as he is in Himself and this is why Origen actually 
takes the scriptural passage of "seeing" God as actually meaning "seeing
God as far as it  is possible" from a place located into the world, 
namely from an existential status where corporeality and the 
subsequent radical separation from the divine being is s till maintained.
Hence, what Origen regards as eternal life  is the existential 
status of a rational creature who has got rid of all sin and has 
ascended into the supreme rank of life, from where the wisdom of God 
is contemplated in the best way possible. This is what Origen regards 
as "end" of an individual rational creature.
The conception o f e ternal l i f e  and Greek thought. Origen is 
conscious of the fact that his view of eternal life  might be taken as 
similar to certain doctrines of the Greeks, namely Pythagoreans and 
Platonists. It is himself who declares that he knows what Plato says in 
Phaedrusm  Through his answer to that point, his teleological view of 
time is again reaffirmed; for action in time is held to be directed by 
the hope of reaching an goalt in the sense of an expected end:
"Celsus says that Christians are lead away with vain hopes, and 
attacks the doctrine of the blessed life  and of fellowship with God. We 
answer to him thus. My good man, the implication of your attack is that 
both the Pythagoreans and the Platonists are led away with vain hopes 
in believing the doctrine that the soul can ascend to the arc of heaven 
and in the region above the heavens gaze on the things seen by the 
blessed spectators.112 By that you say, Celsus, those also who believe in 
the survival of the soul and who live so that they may become heroes 
and enjoy the company of the gods, are led away with vain hopes.113 And 
probably also those who have been convinced that the mind from 
without114 is immortal and w ill alone have life after death, would be 
said by Celsus to be led way with vain hopes.".115
At another point he affirms that it  is not his purpose "to raise 
objections to any good teachings, even if  their authors are outside the 
faith, nor to seek an occasion for a dispute with them, nor to find a
way of overthrowing statements which are sound.".116 in respect of 
this, he states:
"Celsus, then, supposes that we have taken the doctrine about 
the other earth, which is better and far superior to this one, from 
certain men of ancient times whom he regards as divinely inspired, and 
in particular from Plato, who in the Phaedo spoke philosophically about 
a pure earth lying in a pure heaven. He fails to see that Moses, who is 
far earlier than the Greek alphabet,117 taught that God promised a pure 
earth, which was 'good and large, flowing with milk and honey',118 to 
those who lived in accordance with His law. And the good land was not, 
as some think, the earthly land of Judaea, which indeed lies in the 
earth which was cursed from the beginning by the works of Adam's 
transgression.".119
In any case, if  there seems to be any similarity, i t  is due to the 
fact that Plato has taken his ideas from the ancient people of Jews.120 
Even so, however, there are only certain notions that have been 
preserved by him whereas he has distorted other facets of the Jewish 
perceptions.121
At any rate Plato was not "the firs t to state the truth of a 
place above the heavens". Long ago David had expressed this notion 
through his psalms.122 Hence Origen is quite categorical on this point:
"I do not doubt that Plato learnt the words of the Phaedrus 
from some Hebrews and that, as some writers have said,123 it  was 
after the studying of the prophets that he wrote the passage where he 
says 'No earthly poet either has sung or w ill sing of the region above 
the heavens as it  deserves', and the following passage in which this 
also occurs: ’Ultimate being, colourless, formless, and impalpable, 
visible only to the mind that is guide of the soul, round which is the 
species of true knowledge, lives in this place’."124
Origen however does not fail to portray the difference of
Christian faith of eternal life, as "end", from that of the pagans. He 
argues mainly that this holy land can be reached only through Jesus 
Christ and very clearly enunciates his belief on the question:
"Do not suppose that i t  is not consistent with Christian doctrine 
when in my reply to Celsus I accepted the opinions of those 
philosophers who have affirmed the immortality or the survival of the 
soul. We have some ideas in common with them. But at a more suitable 
time we w ill show that the blessed future life  (fj psflflouaa paxapia 
^ujfj) w ill be for those alone who have accepted the religion of Jesus, 
and who reverence the Creator of the universe with a pure and untained 
worship, uncontaminated by anything created.125 Let anyone who likes 
show what sort of good things we persuade people to despise; let him 
consider what we think to be the blessed end with God in Christ, who 
is the logos, wisdom, and every virtue, which w ill be the experience of 
those who have lived purely and unblameably, and have recovered their 
undivided and unbroken love for the God of the universe, and which w ill 
be bestowed by God’s gift, in contrast with the end as i t  is conceived 
by each philosophical sect among the Greeks or barbarians, or in the 
proclamation of some mystery-religion. Let him show that the end as 
it  is conceived by one of these others is superior to the end as we 
understand it, and that their conception is fitting because it  is true, 
whereas the blessedness in which we believe could not appropriately be 
given by God even to people who have lived a good life; let him prove 
that this hope was not declared by a divine Spirit which filled the 
souls of the pure prophets. And let anyone who likes show that the 
teaching which all agree to be merely human is better than that proved 
to be divine and proclaimed by divine inspiration. What also are the 
good things which we teach people to avoid on the ground that i t  w ill be 
better for them? For without boasting it  is self-evident that nothing 
better could be conceived than to entrust oneself to the supreme God
and to be dedicated to a doctrine which teaches us to leave everything 
created and leads us to the supreme God through the animate and living 
logos, who is both living wisdom and son of God.".126
Thus it  is Origen himself who affirms that his views have 
something "in common" with certain Greek philosophical ones. Yet the 
passage above implies some more of Origen's ideas on the conception of 
eternal life.
What he concedes as similarity of pagan perception with his 
view of eternal life  is one and single point: This is that eternal life  has 
an 3 Iso spatial character -since he regards it  as a spat to-temporal 
re a lity  by virtue of the fact that it  is a place within the world.
Beyond that, however, Origen goes on arguing that his 
conception of the end is far superior to any pagan one. It is quite 
remarkable that he does not wish to elaborate on the actual conception 
of this end. For this statement in Cels actually refers to his 
eschatological ideas on which he does not wish to elaborate at all. This 
end, of which he speaks here, is not the eternal life. For eternal life  is 
an end yet not the absolute end, on which we w ill discuss in chapter 
5. The conception of the absolute end constitutes a mystical doctrine on 
which Origen deliberately avoids to refer and he explicitly states that 
he w ill not go ahead discussing this "profound" and "great" mystery 
with Celsus.127 It was always his fear that he might "fling holy things 
to dogs and cast pearls before swine".128 That this was the case with 
Celsus is stated, in one way or another, at many points of that work.
Thus when Origen refers to the end, and stresses that his 
conception of it  is far superior to any pagan one, he has a profound 
mystery in mind which we discuss in chapter 5 in trying to portray his 
perception of the absolute end. A major diference which he states here 
is that it  is only through Jesus Christ that one may reach the end.129 
This is not just a difference in words or the figures in depicting an
existential status which would be regarded as virtually the same. 
Origen’s reference to the name of Jesus Christ is but a hint which 
implies an eschatological reality radically different from any pagan 
conception. Although this w ill be discussed in chapter 5, we note here 
is that there is only one point which appears to be “in common" with 
Platonists an Pythagoreans. This point lies in the also spat la, 
character of eternal life. There is nothing more than that "in common" 
with these Greek philosophical schools. On the contrary, there are 
substantial differences:
Eternal life  is not out of the world but i t  is within the world 
and rational creatures there are in a material state. Subsequently, this 
is not an incorporeal but a corporeal reality, namely a m aterial 
reality. Thus, eternal life  is not only a spatial but also a tempora, 
reality.
Furthermore, in that existential status there is no notion of 
"continuity" between the divine reality and the world. Even in the 
eternal life  rational creatures are held to be "down" whereas the divine 
reality is portrayed as being "up".130 Even then, God is radically 
transcendent and the hiatus between God and eternal life  is the same 
by the figure of which the world is portrayed to be out of God. This 
life  is “nearer" God, yet it  is s till radically out of God. This is why the 
"contemplation" of God cannot be a sight of God Himself, but a sight of 
God manifested by him according to his otKovoyfa.
Origen did not hold that "knowledge" (as Platonists did) is a 
means to attain to "virtue", but he held exactly the opposite view: 
Virtue, realized as Praxis, is the indispensable means for attaining to 
Knowledge. This is a conceptual counter-point of Platonism.
Indeed, Plato would have never been able to take such a view, 
for the simple reason that he did not have any "knowledge" as a datum, 
namely a knowledge yiven or revealed to him. Origen was able to take
this anti-Platonic view because he had already knowledge available, due 
to the Incarnation of Christ and the scriptures. To him "knowledge" had 
been revealed and was already available. He needed not to try to 
establish it  out of himself. The "testimonies" which through which God 
reveals himself were available to all Christians. Subsequently, the road 
to "virtue" had already been enlightened.
This is a major point on which Origen contrasts Platonism, not 
just as a matter of different view on, a particular question but indeed 
as a completely different existential attitude profoundly affecting 
every aspect of human existence and behaviour.
This contrast is not accidental at all. Origen was perfectly 
aware of the Greek conception of "virtue" as “knowledge" and it  is 
himself who articulates the exact Greek definition of virtue.131 Yet he 
himself takes a completely different view. Knowledge is given through 
the scriptures, at least as a "beginning". This means that there is only 
one way to find the secret truths hidden behind the letter of the 
scripture. This means is the practical exercise of a virtuous life 
according to the divine commandments. "It is through Praxis that we 
find God" (6 ia  npaKXiKijg supiOKopsv xov 8sov), he ave rs .132 God can be 
"approached" through "action" (kgex1 svepgeiav).133 This is a fundamental 
view extended in abundance of places throughout his works. "The 
attaining to contemplation is praxis" (n p a |ig  $ap Sswpiag a vdp aa ig ).134 
This attitude is radically different both to Platonic dialectics and to 
Plotinian or Gnostic sinking into mysticism with the hope that the full 
truth can be seen hie et nunc
Thus, through the practical virtue one is led to Christ and it  is 
through this way that Christ also leads to virtue.135 Origen's 
fundamental existential attitude stems from the saying in the 
scripture: "Wisdom will not enter into a soul that pracises evil neither 
w ill is dwell in a body involved in sin" (Eig kqkoxsxvov m uxijv ouk
ciosfisuocxai aotpia ou5e KaxoiKijasi ev aui|iaxi Kaxaxpetu apapxiag).136
This existential attitude profoundly imbues Origen’s thought. 
The relation of Knowledge to Praxis is not just a matter of morality. It 
is an issue of fundamental ontological significance. To Platonic thought, 
“knowledge" is rather a matter of intellectual research and exercise, 
quite independent from praxis. Origen's conviction is the there is an 
profound ontological relation between Knowledge and Praxis. In this 
relation, the condition of the body is as much important as the 
condition of the soul
Referring to man’s perspective to attain to eternal life  Origen 
is particularly consistent in emphasizing two things.
First, eternal life is a future perspective.
Secondly, in this process both soul and body have a crucial 
role to play.137
This view is subsequent to his conception of a rational being as 
an inseparable entity, in which the dualism "body-soul" in but a 
conceptual abstraction. Thus i t  was not Origen who was a Platonist. 
Platonists are rather those who think that it  is possible to ascend to 
wisdom and knowledge of God despite their deplorable existential 
status, both in terms of soul and body. On this Origen’s statement is 
quite eloquent:
"Certainly the knowledge of God is beyond the capacity of human 
nature (that is why there are such great errors about God among men); 
but by God's kindness and love to man and by miraculous divine grace 
the knowledge of God extends to those who by God’s foreknowledge have 
been previously known that they would live lives worthy of Him after 
he was made known to them.’’.138
In view of this, i t  is quite significant to contrast Origen’s 
conception of "knowledge". Indeed, this notion does not allude to the 
usual intellectual status of "being aware of" certain things. Knowledye
of the eternal life  (also before the actual status of eternal life, in as 
much as the ,,atmosphere,, of that reality can be personally experienced 
in the human rank of life) is not an intellectual but an entire 
existential status. This knowledge is attained through virtue, and 
above all through Christian "love".139 In view of that, "the knowledge of 
God is divided into two, namely action and contemplation. ... And in this 
affirmation there is an order ... because action is before 
contemplation" (npo xrjg 9sup(ag f\ npd|ig).140 According to this view, 
Origen refers to the "theoremata" of the wisdom of God and affirms:
“Some apperceptions have as an end (xefiog) contemplation and 
some of them have praxis as their end" ( x iv u jv  pev 9e.Qjpr|pdxiijv xo xeflog 
f\ 9sojpia eaxiv, xivwv 6s 9eajpr|pdxa}v f\ npa|ig).141
Origen was quite conscious in contrasting his own thought from 
the aristocratic Platonic opinion that only the philosophers are finally 
worthy of "knowing" and being "delivered" from this life. This is exactly 
what he rejects:
"I believe that because God saw the arrogance or the disdainful 
attitude towards others of people who pride themselves on having 
known God and learnt the divine truths through philosophy ... He chose 
the foolish things of the world, the simplest of the Christians, who live 
lives more moderate and pure than many philosophers, that He might 
put to shame the wise.142
It is on these grounds that he considers the kind of wisdom in 
the gospel. He avers that "the authors of the gospels ... have nothing in 
them that is spurious, cheating, invented, and wicked". To him the fact 
that they "had not learnt the technique taught by the pernicious 
sophistry of the Greeks"143 is a praise and opines that "it was for this 
reason that Jesus chose to employ such men teach his doctrine, that 
there might be no possible suspicion of plausiple sophisms".144 They 
were "considered worthy to be endowed with divine power, which
accomplished far more than seems to .be achieved by involved verbosity 
and stylish constructions, and by a logical argument divided into 
distinct sections and worked out with Greek technical ski 11 “.145
As he states in an earlier work, “i t  is not the composition of 
the teaching and the pronounciation of the words and the skilled 
elegance of language which lead to someone’s persuation, but the 
bestowal of divine power’’ upon what is said.145
This is the background, against which Origen affirms that "the 
eternal life" is different from the "common" one and it  occurs as a 
"result of faith and virtue".147
Hence, here is what radically contrasts Origen's mode of 
thought and conception of reality from the Platonic one: The way 
towards perfection is not thought to be made through dialectics, but 
through proper action Thus the priority of Praxis over Knowledge is 
not just a question of morality, but it  has a crucial eschatological 
significance.
It is beyond our scope to elaborate further on this topic. We 
have made these points148 just to indicate that when Origen speaks of 
"contemplation" in the eternal life, i t  is not a Platonic notion that he 
suggests. His view is far from such a conception. The existential status 
of a rational creature in eternal life  is something much more than 
mere intellectual knowledge. It is a quality of existence in which 
"knowledge" indicates the result of a certain course of moral action and 
it  there co-exists with love to God and to each other. Thus, in that 
status, the condition of existence is actually includes both knowledge 
and love, in a quality of existence which is portrayed as "friendship to 
God".149 This is the actual existential status which Origen alludes to 
when he affirms that "Christians have learned that eternal life  is tc 
know 'the only real God’ of all and 'Jesus Christ’ who was sent by 
Him.150
In view of that, R. Norris151 is entirely wrong when he asserts 
that man's final blessedness lies in the fulfilment of his vocation to 
"know". The final status is not just knowledge but it  is love to God and 
to each other.
The purpose of the incarnation of Christ was to make rational 
creatures "friends to God".152 Eternal life  is defined through the notion 
of "friendship", which portrays the relation of rational creatures to 
God and to each other. For "those who are friends of God, are also 
friends and to each other.".153
These are only some points which contrast Origen's conception 
of eternal life  to the pagan perception and which he himself refers to. 
Yet they are not the only points, as we shall further argue in chapter 5. 
We only note that this “contemplation" from eternal life is an "end"154 
which has very litt le  to do with the Platonic perception of it. For i t  is
both, the presuppositions of the walking towards this end and the
existential status of a creature in eternal life, that contrast this 
conception of end from Platonism.
In going ahead with the discussion of this conception of "sight" 
from eternal life's point of view, we should bear in mind the 
fundamental differences of Origen's conception of this contemplation 
from the Greek ideal, which was just the attaining to an ideal of 
intellectual knowledge. Our next step w ill be to enquire into Origen's 
perception of the "sight" from eternal life. For it  is after this 
discussion that certain significant conclusions about the conception of 
eternal life itself w ill be reached.
§2. Eternal life  and the notion of Infinite.
"Contemplation" from eternal life  is a state from a point of
view which is regarded as "high mountain ridge" (aKpiipciav).155 Since it  
is the Wisdom of God that is "seen" from there, it  would be plausible
to assume that this view is a '‘limitless" one. For i t  is a view of the 
divine reality, .a view of God who is regarded as "infinite", as we have 
seen in chapter 2 .
In order to see the real meaning which Origen attributes to the 
term "aeon" in this case, a significant passage in expProv should be 
thoroughly studied. This reads as follows:
"And he who hates doing his own soul harm, w ill live the long 
time of the boundless aeon" (o 6s piowv a6u<f)aai xijv qjuxgv auxou, xov 
pccKpov xou anepavxou aiwvog XP°V0V ptwcjexai).156
In this passage there are two predications which indicate two 
different conceptions. These are "the long time" (xov pctKpov ... xpovov) 
and the "boundless aeon". What he makes clear is that the time of 
eternal life is "long", which certainly implies that this time is not 
"infinite" or "endless". The Genitive "of the boundless aeon" (xou 
anepavxou aiwvog) indicates the "state" in which the term "long time" 
exists and pertains to: This state is the "boundless aeon". Thus it  is 
clear that the term "boundless aeon" has a spatial meaning and it  
indicates the "place" from which "view" is "boundless". “Boundless aeon" 
is the status, the particular "world", namely the supreme rank of life. 
Origen applies the category "aeon" to that "world" because this 
promised land has in the Scriptures been named as "aeonia (aiuma; 
eternal) life ".157
That the term "aeon" has the meaning of "world" and 
particularly alludes to ranks of life that comprise Origen's world is 
clearly stated in iiomJer, where he speaks of those who are "stronger" 
than Jeremiah "here in this aeon",158 which means "in this world",159 
and this, "because the kingdom of God is not from this aeon160 but from 
the higher spaces".161 In the same sense he uses expressions such as 
"before any time and aeon" (npo gap navxog xpovov xaf aituvog)162 where 
it  is obvious that "aeon" mainly means "world" as the temporal notion is
clearly expressed by the very term ’‘time".
In the aforestated passage of the expProv i t  is impossible for 
the term "boundless aeon" to be granted any temporal meaning. For in 
that case the whole passage would loose its meaning altogether or it  
would acquire a self-contradictory meaning. The "long time" stated 
there is the time o f the "boundless aeon". This "aeon" is not "time" in 
itself, because time can in no case be "boundless" (anepaviog). Origen is 
clear in enunciating his view that the term "boundless" (anepaviog) can 
be applied to no creature: "The contemplation of all creatures 
(gegovoiujv) is finite; i t  is only the knowledge of Holy Trinity that is 
boundless (anepaviog)".163 Thus, even from the point of view of eternal 
life, the contemplation of God by creatures is not complete exactly 
because "there is no end (nepag) of his greatness".164 This predication 
of anepaviog (boundless) can, according to Origen, be applied to God 
only.
Therefore it  makes sense to speak of "long time" but it  is 
absolutely alien to Origen’s conception of time to speak of "boundless 
time", because time is not infinite. Indeed, he does not speak of infinite 
time, but of "boundless aeon" by this term alluding to another 
perception, which we shall discuss shortly below. The important fact 
which we should bear in mind constantly during this discussion is that, 
in speaking of eternal life, Origen on the one hand does use the term 
anepaviog (boundless) and on the other, this term cannot be applied to 
time, as the notion of boundless time is totally excluded.
Thus eternal life is in itself an "end" (nepag), which 
nevertheless is an "end" in a spatial (as the highest rank of life) and in 
a moral (as the aecomplishement of the goal of self-perfection) sense. 
This conception of eternal life as an "end" (nepag) can be traced 
throughout Origen's thought as we have seen.165
The way in which Origen uses the term nspav in com m fM t165
leads to a comparison of his conception of the term omv and the term 
Q'itijY which means either "shore", "beach" (that is, the nspav according 
to Origen's own exegesis of Matt. 14,22) or "bank" (of a river). Both 
those meanings conform to Origen's conception of eternal life, namely 
as an "edge" being an ultimate spatial "end" of the world, from which a 
“view" of the infinite Wisdom is possible and yet divided from this
divine reality by a radical "hiatus", being in, as it  were, "bank" of a
river from where view of the opposite side is possible yet the river 
itself is the "chasm" between that point of view and the reality which 
is "seen" from there.
In fact, Origen's world-picture with respect to the divine 
reality is quite similar to such a perception and can be traced in a
careful study of his expressions.
In comm John he speaks about the allegorical meaning of 
"Jerusalem" and regards the term as also alluding to the divine reality. 
Here Origen speaks of the human possibility of comprehending certain 
divine truths through an "insight" of soul into this "city" of God. In is 
quite remarkable that this "act" of insight of the soul is portrayed 
through the term Stoppa which exactly means "passage by sea" or 
"crossing of a channel" and metaphorically "elevation" (of style, 
soul).167 That is, through a single term Origen provides a portrayal of 
his fundamental conception of the relation of God to the world.
Accordingly, there is another point where he explicitly regards 
eternal life  as a "shore". In using this figure he grounds i t  on the 
Scripture, namely Matt. 13,47-50. He comment on that regarding the 
whole world as a "sea" and Christ and his angels standing in the "shore" 
and judging everyone according to his deeds during a consummation and 
"elevating" them to the "regime" which they deserve or “throwing" them 
"out".168
Thus when Origen comments on Ps. 145,10 ("The Lord w ill reign
in the aeon") he says that "as the Holy Spirit announces to the church" 
Christ has reigned both before the aeons in an incorporeal form and in 
the aeons (aiumwg) in a corporeal form .169 It is obvious that the term 
Qwriojg here cannot have the meaning of "eternally", because the 
corporeal presence of Christ in the world lasted only for the lifetime 
of Jesus.
Christ is understood to be present not only in this visible 
world, but also is the supreme rank of life as he stands "as it  were, 
midway between uncreated nature and that of all created things; and 
brings us the benefits of the Father, while as our high priest he 
conveys our prayers to the supreme God".170 The figure of the "ladder" 
of Jacob, with Christ standing at the top of it, is a quite vivid 
portrayal of this perception of Origen's. This perception is portrayed 
through the figure of Christ being in the eternal life  and having on his 
right hand the "so called invisible creatures" and on his le ft hand "the 
visible and corporeal" ones; yet "Christ reigns on all of them".171 This 
figure is one of those by which the presence of the Logos both in divine 
reality and in the world is portrayed. This view of incorporeal 
creatures, namely of the "reasons" of the world, is what is 
contemplated and this is what is stated as “eternal gospel" in the Latin 
rendering of the PhncP2 This is why Origen states that “inheritance 
of a rational creature is the contemplation of both corporeals and 
incorporeals".173
To meet Christ in that supreme rank of life, is to meet and 
contemplate him in the most clear way. For "Christians have learnt that 
their eternal (aitimov) life consisits in knowing that only true supreme 
God and Jesus Christ whom he sent.".174
Thus Origen states that the "inheritance of a rational nature is 
the knowledge of God"175 adducing this comment as an exegesis to the 
passage "And their inheritance w ill be in the neon"™  This also is
what is conceived as ,,salvation“.177 This is the sense in which this 
“knowledge" is regarded as “end", since "The end (nepag) of a rational 
nature is the knowledge of the Holy Trinity".178
So a rational creature which lives in the place of eternal life 
enjoys a view towards two, as it  were, directions. First he 
contemplates all the "past aeons" and the occurrences which happened 
in them,179 which are finite due to the fact that they are creatures 
(gsgovoxa).180 Secondly, he contemplates the wisdom of God, that is he 
contemplates the divine being which is beyond the world.
This is the "contemplation of the aeon to come"181 and this is 
why Origen regards i t  as "contemplation of corporeals and 
incorporeals".182 The term "corporeals" applies to the "sight" directed 
towards the world, both in its constitution and its course in time. The 
term "incorporeals" pertains to the contemplation of the wisdom of God.
Considering how Origen perceives eternal life  we can conclude 
that to him the term aiuviog (eternal) does not imply "duration" of time, 
but rather quality of life  in the appropriate place, which is certainly 
in time . Thus we can assert that he feels the term owviog rf 
(eternal life) and amv (aeon) not so much deriving from what has been 
asserted as the Greek etymology, as act (always) 6v (being);183 rather 
the spatial character of this "promised land" should, in his 
consciousness be connected to the term a/a which means "land" or 
"earth".184 It should be emphasized that the etymology of aiwv as being 
derived from ae( ov should be read with caution and reservation -as it  
is most likely that it  is mistaken. The testimony is preserved in a Latin 
text by Varro185 attributing this etymology to Chryssippus and von 
Arnim has incorporated in his collection of texts expressing the Stoic 
thought. Yet i t  is the only passage where such an etymology is offered 
and we have every reason to regard it  as mistaken.
The original meaning of aiujv is “vital force" and this is why i t
is stated together with "sour’.186 Origen quite often uses the term atm 
in the sense of "life". Later, with the Greek tragic poets, atm  came to 
mean "duration of a life". So, the original meaning of atm', as "life", is 
actual a spatio-temporal one.187 it is only later that it  aquired a 
mainly temporal meaning. Finally, with the Greek philosophers, a im  is 
used in the sense of “eternity" as opposed to "time".188 Only after qiujv 
had acquired this temporal signification the adverb atsi comes into use 
in the sense of "always". Thereafter the adverb aie( or aei (always) is 
used and the term ai5iog (eternal) comes into use, too.
A. Chroust189 is wrong in asserting that Aristotle suggested an 
etymology of auiv as derived from aei 6v. This interpretation is one 
more case of taking Aristotle's passages out of their context and 
grambling them. In De Caelo, Aristotle is clear that attuv means life  
in the firs t place. It also may mean the divine realm -but he explicates 
that this meaning is subsequent to the divine realms' being "immortal 
and divine". It is because what is "immortal" exists "always" (aieQ190 
that the adverb aisf is related to aiLJV. It is aiei which is derived from 
aiujv -not conversly. This is why aiei does not necessarily mean 
"always" but it  may suggest just the mode o f divine life . This w ill 
become perfectly clear if  one ponders upon this expression in the 
Physics: "ftoxs (pavspov oxi xa aiei ovxa, fj aiei ovxa, ouk saxiv ev 
Xpovu.".191 We quote this pasage in the original, exactly because aisi 
cannot be translated as "always". For, what Aristotle says is that those 
which are aiei, are being aisi, exactly because they are not in time. 
Thus, what Aristotle originally means by aiei is a notion subsequent to 
being in the divine realm. It is a fte r this meaning that aiei acquired 
the meaning of "always", just because (as Aristotle explains in De 
Caelo) the divine realm is "immortal" and hence it  exists "always”.
So, we emphasize i t  is  not owv which came from  osf, but i t  is 
the adverb osf (always) which comes from om/v. We think that the
mistake of Varro is that he did not know that act is  subsequent to aim  
and it  by no means is the root of auiiv, but a im  is  the root o f ae fP 2
Thus aim iog(eternal) is what pertains to that holy (land). 
Besides as it  seems that this "eternal life" has a spatial character 
quite similar to what is expressed by the old Greek word a im  (shore, 
beach, bank), the etymology of aim iog from "earth" should not be 
regarded as unexpected.193
When therefore Origen speaks of "boundless aeon" (anepaviog 
aiwv) this should in no case be interpreted as "infinite time" because 
this notion is totally alien to his thought. Referring to eternal life  the 
use of the term aiwv alludes to another quality o f life  and not another 
quantity o f tim e . If there is a notion of in fin ity  (and certainly there 
is one, due to the use of the term "boundless") this pertains only to the 
infinity of the divine wisdom which is contemplated.194
Thus Origen makes this contradistinction among aeons on the 
grounds of the quality of life; for example he speaks of the "deceit of 
this aeon"195 and the "present aeon which is evil";196 or he says that 
"evil w ill not exist in the aeon",197 alluding to the eschatological 
perspective of abolition of evil (which w ill be discussed in chapter 
5,§1). Accordingly, he speaks of a "heavenly and better aeon" 
(snoupaviou m i Kpsinovog aiiDvog)198 in the same sense that he speaks 
of "another aeon" in horn Jen199
The duration of life  in the supreme rank is the same for that of 
all the other ones. Although there is a relativity in the perception of 
time in the various ranks of life, the duration of that life  is limited by 
the "moments" which mark two consecutive consummations. Thus, when 
Origen speaks of "anepaviog (limitless) aeon" he alludes to a 
characteristic applying only to the supreme rank of life, namely the 
"infinity" of sight. For to be in the eternal life  means to be in time. 
Consequently this means that there is not only one aeon to come, but
many of them, marked by consummations and judgements. Therefore, as 
the time to come comprises many aeons, there can be no notion of one 
“infin itite  aeon" -a notion which is totally alien to Origen's thought.
The term anepaviog aiwv (boundless aeon) pertains to the 
quality of the eternal life  in the supreme rank of life .200 This life  w ill 
last one aeon at least. The end of this temporal period w ill be marked 
by the consummation of the entire world. During this period of time, a 
rational being enjoys what Origen calls as life of the "boundless sight" 
of the Logos.201 If a rational creature w ill continue to enjoy the same 
quality of life  after the consummation and judgement, then one should 
speak not of one "boundless aeon" but of two or more "boundless aeons". 
Thus the duration of time is not expressed by the term "boundless" 
[which pertains only to the quality of eternal life] but simply by the 
term "aeons" used in the Plural. As a matter of fact, when Origen 
wishes to indicate a temporally prolonged residence in the supreme 
rank of life, he uses the term "boundless aeons". Obviously, i f  the term 
"boundless aeon" implied any notion of "everlasting duration", then the 
expression "boundless aeon" would simply mean "infinite time"; i t  would 
certainly then be absurd to speak of "boundless aeons", as the time 
thereafter could be understood as comprising one infinite “aeon", 
namely an infinite duration of time from the ascent into eternal life  
onwards.
All these remarks can be corroborated by Origen's own words, 
as in frLuc where he provides his view of eternal life  both in terms of 
space and time. It is also there that he (with his usual precision) 
speaks of "boundless aeons" in order to indicate how he perceives the 
residence in eternal life  in terms of time. Thus, quoting Luke 12,19 
["And I w ill say to my soul, 'Soul you have many goods laid down for 
many years' “] he states:
"He was saying 'You have many goods laid down' since he himself
was laid down; [and he was saying] 'you have goods laid down for many 
years', being himself lead astray on the judgement of what is good; for 
he did not know that the real goods do not exist in the cursed earth, but 
in the heaven. And there exists the rest and merriment of the blessed 
in Christ Jesus not 'in many years' but in boundless aeons2®2
Hence, the expression “boundless aeon" is actually a figure, 
according to which the adjective accompanying the noun, does not 
actually pertain to the noun itself but to the existential status of the 
rational creature. Thus, what is "boundless" is not the "aeon" but the 
existential experience (namely, the "sight") of the rational creature 
which contemplates from that point of view.
This kind of figure is generally called "metonymy"203 Origen 
was aware of this way of using Greek language and was always able to 
trace the conceptual meaning denoted by a phrase where a "metonymy" 
was found. Thus when he explains the expression "All the 
commandments of His are faithful" he comments that "he called the 
commandments as faithful because they are worthy of faith; for they 
fu lfil exactly what they promise"204 In the same way he explains the 
expression "God is faithful", as in I Cor. 1,9 as meaning "you should 
perpetually believe in him"205
Similarly he comments on the meaning of the terms "evil day" 
and “good day" stating that the term "day" "here does not denote the 
course of the sun but the deeds happening in this [period]".205
What all these expresions have in common is that the adjective, 
although applied to the noun, does not actually pertain to the noun 
itself; i t  rather pertains to the existential status of the subject in his 
relation to the noun.
So “evil" or "good" does not pertain to the day (although 
literally the term is applied to it)  but it  refers to the existential 
status of rational creatures which are "in the day". Also "faith" does
not pertain to God himself (although literally the term is applied to 
him) but, as Origen explains, "faith" pertains to the existential status 
of men in their relation to God. Accordingly "faith" pertains not to the 
"commandments" themselves, but to the disposition of men towards 
them. Accordingly, the term "boundless" does not actually pertain to 
"aeon" (although literally the term is applied to it) but it  denotes the 
existential status of a rational creature which is regarded as enjoying 
a "boundless" sight from the eternal life ’s point of view.
Thus, from that place a rational being contemplates divine life, 
yet he does not actually participate in it, as he remains within the 
world. This existential status, namely the enjoyment of a clear and 
boundless sight, gives another perception of time to creatures who live 
there.
Commenting on the passage Ps.22,6 ("Surely goodness and mercy 
shall follow me all the days of my life; and ! w ill dwell in the house of 
the Lord in a lengthy period of time") Origen regards eternal life  as a 
place "in the right hand of wisdom" as he states: "For [we speak of] 
length of time and, further, life [existing] in the right hand of wisdom, 
whereas days of life  are the various enlightements of the truth"207
Thus, what exists in eternal life  is "length of time" and "life"; 
this is why, at the same point, he regards the sight of wisdom as a 
"table of rational foods" which Christ has "prepared" (as in Ps.22,5) for 
the rational creatures who ascended there. This is the "table" which 
Origen regards as "immortality" and according to this conception he 
speaks of "life" in the right hand of wisdom.208
However he further makes the distinction between "length of 
time" (applied to eternal life) and "days of life" pertaining to the 
"various enlightenments of the truth".209
We have already discussed the notion of relativity in the 
perception of time from creatures of various ranks of life.
Furthermore, however, there is a unique characteristic of this 
perception in the supreme rank of life; for, in that place, there is no 
perspective of a further "ascending” in space-time210 “Horizontal" 
movement is directed towards the future, but the "vertical" 
perspective, as a "goal", has been achieved. Thus "movement" in that 
space makes a different sense from the same notion in the rest of 
particular "worlds" where the spatio-temporal movement is both a 
"horizontal" and a "vertical" one (or, at least, "vertical" movement 
upwards constitutes a "hope").
In eternal life  there is only the "horizontal" perspective, namely 
the movement towards the future. There are no higher stages to be 
reached and there is no "clearer" sight (from a world's point of view) 
to be achieved, as well. The lower a rank of life is, the "dimmer" the 
sight of truth is. For the hierarchy of Origen's world is directly 
related to clearness of sight of divine wisdom. This is why Origen 
regards being in eternal life  as a "reaching the truth face to face"; it  is 
no more like the sight "in this life", which is a sight "through a glass 
and in rite ".211
The term aiiSviog as a homonym. The discussion in chapter 2 
has shown that Origen regards "aeon" in a temporal sense, namely he 
attributes to i t  just the meaning of "time". Our discussion in this 
chapter shows that "aeon" has also the meaning of "world"; in this 
particular meaning the spatial sense is a pre-eminent one. Certainly i t  
is not only in Origen that the term "aeon" means either a period of time 
or "world". In the Scripture itself the term can be found with in this or 
that meaning here and there.
It is needless to say that in Origen’s thought, the term atiimo5 
(eternal) is a homonym. For there are three distinct cases where the 
term aim iog is applied, namely "eternal God", "eternal death" and 
"eternal life". Each one of these terms pertains to a different reality
which has its  own existential characteristics. Thus the term aiwviog 
may pertain to either a natural or a transcendent reality, namely, to 
the world or to the divine being.
Beyond these distinct meanings of aim iog , however, Origen 
uses the term q w v  in a sense which pertains only to the world. In that 
case the term aiujv has both a spatial and temporal meaning, namely a 
spatio-temporal one. Due to such a conception of "aeon", this is 
perceived as a natural reality because it  is a reality pertaining to the 
world.
To speak, therefore, in general of Origen’s "concept of eternity" 
is an abstraction which could be misleading. For in his thought there is 
no general and universal conception of "eternity". In fact, the very term 
"eternity" (aiujvioirjigg) is never used, as it  is never used in the New 
Testament, either. Thus one should enquire in the problem in a more 
detailed way, namely to see how the terms related to a im  are used by 
Origen. And then some quite significant conclusions might be reached:
The term aimiozqg (eternity) is not used at a ll.212 This is 
why, in the title  of this chapter, we use the expression "the notion of 
eternal" and have avoided to use the term "eternity" at all. Instead, 
Origen uses the term Jerusalem 213 The meanings which Origen applies 
to this term is a point which needs a particular attention. Certainly it  
is a homonym and there is a number of significations attributed to it. 
Nevertheless we can find something in common in all the various 
significations of this term: "Jerusalem" is called any reality in which 
"friendship with God" has been established. "Jerusalem" is a reality in 
which God is worshipped and this reality is directed to God. Thus a sou/ 
which is a "friend of God" is called "Jerusalem"214 The church is also 
called "Jerusalem"215 The scriptural term "upper Jerusalem" is used in 
order to signify the actual state of eternal life  216 In most cases, 
however, this expression is used in order to denote the created divine
reality, namely what came into being out of non-being. This "upper 
Jerusalem"217 is also called by the scriptural expression "city of 
God".218 This is the reality from which the fall occurred219 and 
therefore it  is regarded as a "fatherland"220 and "mother",221 for it  is 
in her womb that what now exists was "conceived" and came into being 
out of non-being.222 Quite remarkably, this metaphorical expression is 
applied either to a soul loved by God or to the church or to the 
rjgsyoviKov of Christ, in one and the same passage.223 At that point, the 
comment is pertinent to the term "chamber" (layisiov) (which, in the 
same work, appears as a synonym to "upper Jerusalem") found in the 
Song of Songs 1,3.
All these significations of Jerusalem, or "upper Jerusalem", 
stand in direct relation (if not synonimity) to the term eternity which 
is not scriptural and not used by Origen at all. Thus, when eternal life 
is said to be within men, the term applied to such a soul is 
"Jerusalem". The same term is attributed to the church when is said to 
be built of "living stones".224 The existential status befitting etemaf 
life  (as the topmost place of the world and perfection of rational 
creatures), is also suggested by the term "Jerusalem"225 The original 
state before the fall, into the divine life, is again stated as 
"Jerusalem" and this is why Jerusalem is stated as "mother"225
For each of these existential states a lot of Christian writers 
used the term "eternity". Origen just used the term “Jerusalem" as a 
homonym. Thus a soul is a "living stone"; the earthly church is made of 
"living stones"; the human beings in eternal life s till comprise a 
"church" of living stones227 and the originally created reality (namely, 
the providential creation) is portrayed through the figure of "living 
stones", too.
So Origen, regarding "Jerusalem" as a homonym, attributes to it  
different meanings at the same time, in selEz he actually alludes to
what is in common in the different allegorical exegeses of the term:
"Jerusalem is a symbol of knowledge and of the holy church and 
of virtue".228 Elsewhere, he states the church as a "fatherland in God" 
(xrjg Kaxa 0 sov naipiSog) 229
Thus "Jerusalem" may mean what is called "eternal life", either 
in the sense of a personal experience or in the sense of the actual 
supreme rank of life  or even in the sense of the providential creation 
into the divine being. This is the sense in which “Jerusalem" may allude 
to what others called eternity.
Subsequently, the term ommog (eternal) has either a natural or 
a metaphysical meaning, as i t  i t  may pertain either to the world or to 
God.
The term awv (aeon) has a natural meaning since it  is used 
with respect to the world.
In the Psalm 5,12 there is the passage "They w ill exceedingly 
rejoice in aeon and you w ill encamp in them", in explaining the meaning 
of this passage Origen provides a definition of what is "aeon", which is 
very indicative of his conception of it:
"Aeon is  3  natural system, comprising various bodies [andj 
containing logical d ifferentia due to the knowledge o f God ''23°
This definition of omv radically contrasts Origen’s thought 
with the content attributed to i t  by Platonists and other Greeks. 
Whereas the latter regarded the term as indicating the divine realm, 
Origen, on the contrary applies it  to the world. In chapter 2, we already 
pointed out that Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus (although 
used the temporal terms of Origen) attributed to auijv a purely Platonic 
sense -in stark contrast to what Origen did.
Philo uses the term aiwv stating that it  pertains to God and it  
is its nature to be the eternal to-day. As we saw in chapter 1, Origen 
provides an exegesis of the term "today" pertaining to God and he states
that to God there is neither "morning nor evening" -an affirmation 
which was employed by the Cappadocians as well as later Christian 
writers. No one should think, however, that this exegesis of Origen 
constitutes any kind of influence of Philo upon him. First, because 
Origen does not use the term aiwv is such as sense at all. As we 
emphasized, in referring to the divine reality, he does not use any noun 
at all. Secondly, Philo's conception of auuv is entirely formed under- 
Plato's influence: He regards aiuiv as the "exemplar and archetype of 
time" (to xpovou napdSsigpa kcu apxexunov) 231 At any rate, Philo's 
conception of time is the same as that of Plato's, namely time, by being 
an "imitation" of an "archetype", is something which constitutes an 
"affinity" between God and the world. The only difference is that aiwv, 
compared with time, is "boundless" (cmepaxog)232 and "infinite" 
(dneipog),233 regarding divine reality as a kind of endless time. Besides, 
as C. Dodd has suggested, when Philo uses the term £ufj aulivioq (eternal 
life )234 he means a life which, like that of God, is "eternal" in the sense 
of "timeless"235
By contrast, Origen regards time as the element which par 
excellence contrasts divine reality from the world. Time establishes 
no affinity between those two radically different realities. This is why 
Origen avoids using the term aiiijv in order to depict the divine reality, 
although he certainly uses the scriptural term aiwviog for God. And, as 
opposed to Philo, Origen regards eternal life  not as a timeless state, 
but as a spatio-temporal state, namely as a state into the world. C. 
Dodd suggests that in the Fourth Gospel there is an "affiliation" of 
John's thought to Hebraic antecedents which regarded "eternal life" as 
a life  "of action, movement and enjoyment".236 Certainly Dodd does not 
regard this life as one into the world, as Origen does. But these notions 
(“action, movement, enjoyment") actually constitute predominant 
existential characteristics of rational creatures in eternal life,
according to Origen’s conception of it, as w ill be discussed further in 
this chapter.
Thus Origen provides a definition of the term atm  in a way 
denoting its spatio-temporal meaning. In expProv he says that "Paul in 
his epistle to the Ephesians has described the heavens by the notion of 
height" and this expression is a symbol of "rational natures" which 
" are classified in worlds and have a body in accordance w ith their 
existential status;"2*1 Thus a "soul" which "constantly makes progress 
prepares for itself a heaven, which is a most pure creature and 
dwelling place of angels where the intelligible substances are found; [in 
that place soul w ill have received] the perception of Being (xou ovxoy) 
and w ill have apprehended the precise knowledge of things, that is to 
say the much-talked-of (noRu|_iu9ov) judgements of God."238
Thus Origen defines "aeon" as a "natural system" in a way 
which implies both the temporal as well as the spatial character of it. 
According to this definition, auuv denotes both the period of time 
between two consummations and judgements (the "horizontal" 
movement) as well as the built-up of the world during this period (the 
"vertical" structure).
in this sense, the term "aeon" denotes exactly what today is 
called "space-time". The status of the world between two 
consummations -this is how Origen articulates the spatio-temporal 
conception of "aeon".
Certainly this is a rather "static" conception of "aeon" as it  is 
regarded in a certain period of time, namely between two cosnsecutive 
consummations. Nevertheless Origen regards this "system" in a 
"dynamic" sense too, as he considers the being of "aeons" in the flux of 
time. This “dynamic" is determined by God’s judgement at every "end" of 
an aeon. In selPs he explains how God is "known as Creator and Wise 
and Provident and Judge"; when he comes to explain the last of these
conceptions of God he states: "Again he is a Judge because of the 
various bodies of rational beings and the various worlds and those 
containing the aeons"239
The expression "various bodies of rational beings" denotes a 
certain "world" (according to our discussion about the concept of 
"world", in chapter 1) or a certain "aeon" (according to the passage 
above). The term "world" is in itself perceived as a spatio-temporal 
reality. This is why Origen, speaking of time, does not distinguish 
"time" from "the world" but from “the structure of this world". The 
"world" is a reality which comprises "the structure of the world" (the 
spatial element of space-time) and "time" (the temporal element of 
space-time). This spatio-temporal reality is also named as aeon, as 
Origen’s above- mentioned definition shows. Accordingly, he makes the 
distinction between the "constitution  of life" (xrj auaxaaei xrjg £ajf|g)240 
and time, which is defined as extended alongside with the "constitution" 
of the life. Thus "constitution of life" alludes to the conception of 
space, whereas time is defined as an objective reality distinct from 
that. The entirety of this space-time is described as “life" -and here is 
the most ancient and exact (namely Homeric) sense of muiv brilliantly 
treated by Origen.
In the above-mentioned passage of expProv, however, there is 
something more that is suggested. The expression "the various bodies of 
rational beings" alludes to one world (that is, a certain spatio-temporal 
reality regarded "statically" in a period between two consummations); 
but the expression "and the various worlds" denotes the "dynamic" of 
this spatio-temporal reality. Those "various worlds" are regarded in a 
"horizontal" succession, namely as "consecutive" worlds. For it  is 
through the notion of the variation of successive worlds that God can 
be conceived as a Judge. This notion implies the outcome of a 
Judgement as a rearrangement of rational creatures in the various
ranks of life  and assumption of different bodies in accordance with 
their merits. It is only when the world is regarded in its movement and 
its subsequent "tranformations" and "rearrangements" in the flux of 
time according to God's judgement, that God may be regarded as a Judge 
-a notion which Origen wishes exactly to depict here.
In this context, the expression "and those [worlds] which 
contain the aeons" alludes to "aeons" as the particular place of eternal 
life  in a certain world. For the whole passage is a comment on the 
passage of Ps.137,16 where it  is said "And in your book w ill all be 
written". Origen's comment on this is that "book of God is the 
contemplation of corporeals and incorporeals" in which book "the 
reasons of Providence and judgement are written and through this 
[book] God is learned as creator and wise and provident and judge"241
Following from our discussion in this chapter, i t  is obvious that 
Origen alludes to eternal life. The entire comment refers to the “sight" 
which a rational creature enjoys from there. Thus the expression "the 
aeons" pertains to this rank of life  regarded in its existence in the flux 
of time. This is why, again the term" geo/is" is used in the Plural.
In the Commentary on Romans242 there is a point where Origen 
is presented an opportunity to provide an account of what eternal life  
is. This passage is preserved only in Latin and should be studied with 
particular caution because it  is Origen's eschatological ideas that 
Rufinus was most ingnorant of and confused about in his Latin 
renderings. With regard to eternal life  it  is stated that, in Scripture, 
the term "eternity" is sometimes employed to denote what has no end 
and sometimes for what has no end in the present world but has in the 
aeon to come.243 The fact, however, is this: In Origen “homonymity" of a 
term does not mean ambiguity, in the sense of vagueness. As we shall 
see in the next section, “eternal death" is treated clearly by Origen in 
his works in Greek: It is employed to denote endless duration, but this
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is implied only for pedagogical reasons. In fact there w ill be an end to 
this "death". As regards "eternal life", instead of a full account of the 
conception of it, the attention of the reader is drawn to three
scriptural passages:
The firs t is the saying of Jesus “This is life  eternal, that they 
should know You the only true God, and Him whom You did send, even 
Jesus Christ"244 The second is again a saying of Jesus; "I am the way 
and the truth and the life ".245 The third is an affirmation of Paul: "We 
shall be caught up in the clouds to meet Christ in the air and so shall 
we ever be with the Lord.".246
There are three fundamental notions which constitute Origen’s 
conception of eternal life  and they are denoted at that point: The firs t 
passage denotes that eternal life entails knowledge of God and
particularly his wisdom, namely Christ. The second passage alludes to 
eternal life as being Christ himself247 and also being "truth" (allusion 
to eternal life  as knowledge) and "life" (eternal life  as
"immortality" )248 It is also suggested that eternal life  is the result of
a walk “after" Christ, who is the "way".
It is no incident that no scriptural passage where Christ is 
stated as the "gate" is quoted at that point. For to human beings Christ 
is the “way". In this account of eternal life one can discern Origen’s 
notion that Christ is the "way" for those to whom he is not yet the 
"gate", and he is the “gate" only for those to whom he is no longer the 
"way”.
The third passage clearly denotes that attaining to eternal life  
is a "transposition" to a higher space and being with Christ.
One can see, therefore, that i t  is mainly to the quality of life  
and the way towards it  that the reader’s attention is drawn, in fact, on 
this point Rufinus seems confused and he feels i t  necessary to add, as a 
kind of conclusion: “As therefore to be ever with the Lord has no end,
so too we must believe that life  eternal has no end".249
R. Toll inton finds this latter affirmation inconsistent250 -as it  
in fact is: His remark is that in the Greek text of I Thess. 4,17, the 
word nay tots (ever) and not si'g toy attuva (in the aeon) is used. What 
he suggests is this: How can the notion of eternal life  be treated 
through a passage where no notion of "eternal" does not appear at all?.
We could add that in the second passage (John, 17,3) there is no 
notion of “duration" at all -and yet this passage, too, is adduced as an 
account of what eternal life  is.
What has eluded Tollinton is that there is no the question of 
"duration", but that of "quality" of life, being discussed at this point. 
Hence the passage John, 17,3 has no notion of duration at all, and the i 
Thess. 4,17 also has no notion of "eternity" at all. Yet these are the 
passages that Origen found most appropriate to quote in order to 
indicate his conception of eternal life. As we have argued, Origen’s 
eschatology has totally eluded Rufinus and this is a factor because of
which the rendering of Princ in Latin has suffered most. This lack of
comprehension leads him to interpolate this "conlusion" in the passage 
above. R. Tollinton is right in pointing out that this “conclusion"
actually constitutes a discrepancy into the whole text. But i t  is also 
obvious that Tollinton himself has not actually grasped Origen's
conception of eternal life, either. For even if  (hypothetically) Origen 
adduced a scriptural passage where the expression si'g toy mma 
appears, it  would not entail that he implies any notion of everlasting 
duration. Not only because time is clearly held as finite, namely as 
having a beginning and an end. But also because Origen treats the very 
expression sig xov aiuva as not implying everlasting duration. In the 
“On Psalms", for example, he regards the expression stg toy rntuYa (as 
in Ps.48,9) as implyimg only the duration of a lifetime .251
Accordingly, the expression "always" (aeO does not imply
everlasting duration. It may mean "always -as long as time exists" or 
simply "each time" without any implication of duration.252 In that case 
i t  alludes mainly to the principles according to which the world exists 
(for example, the existential causality), as well as to the relation of 
the world to God. Also asi may mean "always -during a certain period 
of history"253 or "always -throughout a lifetime".254
So it  is not the absence of the expression sig xov aiwva, as 
Tollinton remarks, which is the real question. The real point lies in the 
actual conception of eternal life by Origen.
Thus, the term "aeon" pertaining to natural reality may allude 
to three aspects of this reality:
First, “aeon" may allude to the "vertical" structure of a certain 
world ("due to the various bodies of rational beings").
Secondly, i t  may suggest the conception of the world’s course in 
the flux of time ("and the various worlds") alluding to the consecutive 
worlds in the prolonged time. Thus “aeon" may indicate the "dynamic" of 
the world in time, through which only the perception of God as Judge 
can be portrayed. Regarding this entirety of space-time, which is a 
finite series of "aeons" Origen feels that he may well speak of "eternal 
law" (voyov auijviov)255 alluding to the existential causality as a law 
established throughout the whole time ("horizontal" view of 
space-time) as well as thoughout the whole world ("vertical" view of 
space-time). Both these expressions can be articulated by one, namely 
throughout the aeons. In fact, this is exactly the analysis that Origen 
makes at that point of comm John and he plausibly relates the notion of 
"eternal law" to a notion of "always" (asQ: This "eternal law" has been 
established by God in the entire space-time, both in the whole length 01 
time and in the whole height o f the world, namely in all ranks of life.
it is according to this spatio-temporal perception of "aeons" 
that Origen speaks of Christ as a "coming eternal judge" (nepi xou Yiou
xou 8 eou xou aiumou Kpixou epxopevou) 256 Obviously "eternal judge" 
cannot mean that the “act" of judging w ill be an "endless" one. For 
judgement takes no time at all. What the meaning of auuviog here is that 
the entire aeon (namely the whole length of the time of its aeon as 
well as all the ranks of life of the aeon) w ill be judged.
in this sense, atmtog means "what pertains to the aeons", 
indeed Origen regards the scriptural expression “eternal years" (sxr| 
aiwvia? 57 and certainly does not regard the expression as denoting 
"endless" years, since the duration of a year is a definite number of 
days. His exegesis is that the years are called omma just because they 
are into the aeons (kqi xujv ev auxoig exiOv), namely because aeons are 
consisted of years, and "years are consisted of days".258
Regarding a similar scriptural expression, namely "eternal 
years" (xpovoi aujdvioi),259 H. Sasse is confused and asserts that by such 
an expression the biblical "concept of eternity is weakened".250 His 
general view at this point is that "the concepts of time and eternity 
merge"261 His view is that "the concepts of limited and unlimited time 
merge in the word auuv."; this constitutes an "inner contradiction" due 
to the fact that in the expression xpovoi aiwvioi there is “s tric tly  a 
contradiction in terms."262 In view of our discussion here, the meaning 
which Origen attributes to the expression "eternal years" (exp aiujvia) 
excludes any obscurity and any "inner contradiction" in the use of the 
term "eternal" at this point. The fundamental presupposition excluding 
any ambiguity, however, is that Origen regards the term “eternal" as a 
homonym. Once the homonym is "clarified" Origen's thought emerges in 
its clarity, too.
Thirdly, the notion of "aeon" may allude particularly to the 
supreme rank of life  of each world, namely to the "space" of eternal 
life. There are two particular notions clearly implied here, namely that 
this place is contained in the world ("and the [worlds] which contain
the aeons) and that the term can be placed in the Plural ("...the aeons") 
in the same sense that the term “world" is placed in the Plural, too 
(... worlds). That is, "aeons" denotes eternal life, as the supreme rank of 
life, in the successive worlds.
In the light of this analysis we can see what is actually denoted 
by Origen in the passage where he provides the above-mentioned 
definiton of "aeon".
The passage on which he comments is the Ps.5,12 ("E(g cuiuva 
a^aflfiidaovxai k q i KaiaaKgvaiasig ev auxoig"). We find the English 
translation of this verse as "let them ever shout for joy, because thou 
defendest them". However this translation does not contain the term 
"aeon" (sig xov aiujva) which is the main point of Origen’s exegesis here. 
So Origen’s point can be followed either through the Greek passage 
(quoted by him) or through a literal English translation of it, which 
reads thus: "They w ill exceedingly rejoice in aeon and you w ill encamp 
in them". The comment which he makes on this passage provides his 
conception of “aeon" both, as the entire reality of space-time in the 
period between two consummations and the eternal life  as the supreme 
rank of life  of the world. The entire text of his comment reads thus:
"Aeon is a natural system, comprising various bodies [and] 
containing logical differentia due to the knowledge of God. He [sc. David] 
says that they w ill exceedingly rejoice in aeon (sig xov auDva) because 
[there w ill be] an aiiiiviog encamping in them.’’.263
The point which Origen makes is to relate the scriptural 
expression rfgmwva (in aeon) with ornrnog (eternal). The two terms 
are obviously closely related anyway, since the latter is derived from 
the former. Once more Origen scrutinizes the Greek language of 
scripture.
It is clear that the term aiuiviog (eternal) above pertains to God 
himself, as it  is clearly denoted both in the psalm and in Origen's
conirnenl on it.
What is of particular significance is the expression of Origen’s 
"in aeon". To those who would translate the term "in aeon" (sig aiwva) 
as “for ever" (as i t  is usually translated) Origen offers an explanation 
of how he understands "aeon" at this point, so that there can be no room 
for regarding the term "aeon" as denoting some "endless duration". Thus 
the expression "in aeon" itself does not indicate when but where the 
rejoicing w ill take place. The temporal implication is denoted not by 
“in aeon", but by the Future tense "they w ill exceedingly rejoice", 
according to Origen's fundamental conviction that "ascending" to eternal 
life  is a "hope" for the actual relization of a historical perspective 
which w ill take place in space-time; and it  is not just a "mystical" 
experience which could fully take place hie et nunc in a Plotinian or 
Gnostic sense.
Thus the expression "in aeon" denotes Origen’s conception of 
eternal life  as a particular space into the entire spatio-temporal 
reality of the world.264
indeed Origen portrays eternal life  as being both there265 and 
the/r66 Eternal life in itself is another place which w ill be attained to 
at the future tfm e2bl and the "land of Israel" is firm ly related to the 
"future day" (ev ifj pcRRouoT] gyspa) 268 Thus he speaks of the "day of 
God" alluding to the "day of the resurrection of the saints"; to this "day" 
he is looking forward because this is the day on which “we w ill attain 
to the blessedness in Christ".269 And regarding the passage in Matthew 
19,29 ("And everyone that has foresaken houses or brothers or sisters 
ot father or mother or wife or children or lands, for my name’s sake, 
shall receive a hundredfold and shall inherit eternal life.") he points out 
that when Christ speaks of "multifold" he refers to "this aeon" whereas 
when he speaks of "eternal life" he refers to the "aeon to come".270
Thus, Now is connected to Here and Future, as hope, is
connected to There271
This is an attitude completely different from that of the 
Gnostics. To them ’‘perfection" (xsRsiumig), "consummation" (ouvisfisia), 
"restoration" (anoKaxaoxaoig) are already present in the person of the 
Gnostic; the "perfect" (xeRsiog) man is already "consummated". This is a 
manifestation of the general Gnostic view of time as something evil, 
untrue and a kind of slavery. Generally, the Gnostic conception of 
"salvation" is wholly exempt from temporal conditions. Subsequently, 
the Gnostic tendency is to negate time or, at least, to dispense with it  
in order to surpass it. In the Gnostic thought the role of time is 
reduced to a minimum and the tendency is to annul it. Knowledge of 
oneself implies redemption from oneself, just as knowledge of the 
universe implies the means of freeing oneself from the world and of 
dominating i t .272 in Platonism, this knowledge was, in the final 
analysis, the mathematical knowledge.273
In view of this fact, the effort of certain scholars to allege 
that Origen's conception of redemption is essentially identical to the 
Gnostic and Platonic one is but a fanciful extrapolation. Such 
allegations have been made by H. Jonas274 and A. Nygren275 Not only 
have these authors not seen the spatio-temporal character of Origen's 
thought, also they have not even attempted to distinguish between what 
many scholars currently call "spatial" and "temporal" thought forms. 
Furthermore they have been unable to see Origen’s terminology in its  
deeper significance. Thus the outstanding characteristic of Origen’s 
thought has eluded them; they have not seen that, in Origen, progress 
is perceived as a real development in the process in space-time, as an 
actual spatio-temporal reality firm ly related to future time -and not 
as a subjective personal experience, which at any rate is regarded as 
possible only to a limited extent.276
The different attitude of Origen towards time, the dramatic and
meaningful character which he attributes to it  constitute the Christian 
conception of time so vividly portrayed by him277 To him there are two 
kinds of "knowledge".
First, i t  is the natural science; “to know the constitution of the 
world, the energy of its elements, the beginning and end and middle of 
times and the sort which is stated in the Wisdom [of Solomon]278 
Although he had a profound knowledge of this kind of knowledge, it  was 
beyond the aim of his enquiries and he appears unwilling to discuss it  
much.278
Secondly, i t  is the kind of knowledge which constitutes the 
"nourishment of soul, without which one cannot be saved", namely "the 
exact teaching of how to live  " (o nsp( xou nug pituxsov QKpipfjg 
Floftog) 280 This is what constitutes the kind of knowledge regarded by 
him as most important, because it  is directly related to "salvation" as 
a real spatio- temporal perspective which has a completely different 
content from that of either the Greeks or the Gnostics.
In Princ there is a reference to the content of this knowledge 
rendered through the scriptural term "wisdom of this world" (as in I 
Cor. 2,6-8):
"Now this wisdom contains in itself nothing which can enable it  
on questions of the divine nature, or of the cause of the world, or of 
any higher matters whatsoever, or of the principles of a good and 
blessed life; but is such, for instance, as deals wholly with the arts of 
poetry, grammar, rhetoric, geometry and music, to which we should 
probably add the art of medicine."281 As for the mystical knowledge of 
the pagans, this is stated by the also scriptural expression "wisdom of 
the rulers of this world". This includes "the secret and hidden 
philosophy of the Egyptians and the astrology of the Chaldaeans and 
Indians, who profess a knowledge of higher things, and further the 
diverse opinions of the Greeks concerning the divine nature.".282
Therefore, A. Harnack’s allegation that Origen's "Gnosis ... is in 
fact the Hellenic one" is absurd.283 What is more damaging in this 
viewof A. Harnack is that i t  seems to have exerted a major influence 
upon later works on Origen's thought. In fact the misleading assertions 
by E. de Faye284 and H. Koch285 were directly influenced by Harnack's 
allegations.
It is widely asserted that to the Greeks the ideal was to know 
the cosmic process as a whole, to render nature wholly transparent to 
understanding. That a Greek is not interested in the "particular" and 
that there is no state of definitive rest, of accomplished task and 
fulfilled destiny.286 By contrast, in Christian thought, Providence is a 
concern with each unique event and action287
Where does Origen’s thought lie in respect to these two 
existential attitudes? It is quite ironical that his thought has been 
assessed as “too a Greek" one, in spite of the fact that all the 
characteristics currently attributed to the Christian thought are 
profoundly present in Origen’s works. The problem is that these 
characteristics are not grasped simply because the vast bulk of his 
works is being ignored.
It is not the knowledge of nature that is of interest to him. 
Besides, i t  is Origen who spoke of w ffsmopspsg ifjg  npovofag (the 
detailed care of Providence), namely the immidiate care of God for the 
most particular, even of a sparrow, even what seems to be of no 
importance.288 And it  is above all in Origen that the concern for a task 
to be accomplished and a destiny to be fulfilled constitute the major 
preoccupation of his entire work. His thought was not "too a Greek" one. 
On the contrary, what contemporary scholars portray as the 
fundamental existential attitudes which contrast the Christian from the 
Greek thought are outstandingly present throughout his entire work; and 
these are the characteristics which profoundly imbue his thought. In
fact, the kind of "knowledge" which Origen suggests as worthy of being 
pursued is found neither in intellectual activity nor in the 
contemplation of nature. This "knowledge" is stated in the scriptures 
and its understanding is not a question of dialectics but it  is a result 
o f a way o f living.
This is the dramatic break between Origen’s thought and any 
Gnostic or Greek conception of "knowledge". For its content, the 
dialectics about it, as well the way for attaining to this "knowledge", 
are originated in (and deeply imbued by) a radically different 
conception of time and its intrinsic meaning.
As a matter of fact, this is why Origen articulates eternal life, 
as hope t in both spatial and temporal terms speaking of "this aeon and 
on the earth" in contrast to "the aeon to come and in heavens" because 
"the kingdom of heavens is there"288 From the present life ’s point of 
view, eternal life is a real spatio-temporal perspective, perceived as 
another place, to be reached in future time.280
In view of this, R. Hanson's assertion,281 that Origen dissolves 
the historical significance of the eschatological, is not correct. For, as 
our analysis shows here, Origen does not "demythologize" eschatology 
as Hanson alleges.282 And certainly he does not "abandon" eschatology as 
alleged by M. Werner.280 What Werner sees in Origen is "a process of 
the de-eschatologizing of Primitive Christianity in the course of its 
Hellenization’’.284 In fact, however, all Werner does is to postulate a 
verdict without providing an account of what this 
"Hellenistic-Neoplatonic eschatology" of Origen285 comprised. The only 
clear point is his distinction between "individuelle" and "kosmisch- 
orienterten Eschatologie." But as our ensuing discussion in chapter 5 
shows, Origen’s eschatology retains its "cosmic" features par 
excellence. For the notion of the "perfection of resurrection" applies to 
the "world" and not to the "individual".
Hence, the study of Origen's conception of cuiuv and auiviog must 
always take into account the context in which these "homonyms" are 
used. For it  is only after a "clarification" of the homonyms that one 
may discern the real meaning of those terms.
So if  we are to "clarify the homonyms",295 we could say that 
aim  means the whole world, as Origen himself makes it  clear. Yet the 
same term may suggests the eternal life, as the highest "ridge" of the 
world, from where the clearest "sight" possible can be attained. In this 
sense, therefore, this is the "ridge" of the "aeon" (world) or, as Origen 
calls it  at another point, i t  is the "aeon" of the "aeon". In selPs, 60, it  
is quite clearly stated that to be "eternal" is to be in the "holly 
mountain" of God; this place, although made by God, is in the world and 
out of God. We discuss this very significant passage in chapter 5, 13. 
For this statement not only enunciates Origen's conception of eternal 
life, as portrayed in this chapter, but also elucidates his eschatological 
ideas -an aspect of his thought widely misunderstood (if not entirely 
ignored) hitherto.
Indeed, he does so commenting on Ps. 144,21 ("My mouth shall 
speak the praise of the Lord and let all flesh bless his name in the aeon 
and in the aeon of the aeon"). The last expression is currently 
translated as “for ever and ever". In the Psalm, the expression "in the 
aeon and in the aeon of the aeon" is clearly connected with an 
implication of "now"; the verb “suRogeixuj" (let bless) is an Present 
Imperative form. Origen, however, regards this expression in the 
following way: "Any flesh which praises the name of the Lord w ill be in 
the aeon and in the aeon of the aeon which means that it  w ill see the 
saviour of God in the aeon and in the aeon of the aeon."297
It is clear that the "aeon and the aeon of the aeon" is 
understood to lie in the future ("will be", "will see") as attaining to 
the place where the promise w ill be fulfilled and enjoyed by rational
creatures. Thus Origen affirms where w ill be the "flesh" which now 
“praises the name of the Lord". And this "where" is in the "aeon" (that 
is, in  the world) and particularly in the "aeon" (“edge") of the "aeon" 
("world"), according to the above- mentioned definition of "aeon" which 
Origen has made in the same work.298
The case is not so much that Origen regards “aeon" as a
synonym to "world". It is not a question of synonymity. What is
fundamental is that he regards the "world" as a spatio-temporal 
reality. Although he has made the conceptual distinction between "time" 
and "structure" of the world (or "time" and "constitution" of life), the 
fact is that he holds a spatio-temporal conception of the world -and 
this exactly what is indicated by these distinctions. The notion of time 
implies that of space and vice versa. None of them can be regarded in 
itself as a reality not related to the other. In the final analysis, this is 
the deeper conception denoted by the expression that time is "extended 
along side with" the "structure" of the world. The expression in the 
Princ is quite characteristic: "This world, however, which is itself 
called an 'age' (Wis.13,9), is said to be the end of many ages."299 Here 
Origen states the view of "aeon" as expressed in seiPszm Speaking of
the “world" there can be no actual abstraction of "space" apart from
time or "time" apart from space. Those two elements of the created 
reality are closely connected in Origen’s mind.
It is quite interesting to see how this tight connexion of space 
and time appears in the articulation of Origen’s views. Commenting on 
Ezekiel 16,26 "And you committed fornication in threefold (xpiooiug)" he 
states that the adverb "in threefold" (xpioowg) is stated “instead of [the 
term] ‘in many places (nofiRaxou); for the three times (xpovoi) are 
understood to comprise the whole aeon".301 It is remarkable that the 
term ipiaadg although fundamentally meaning "in three ways", is 
explained as implying the "three times" (xpovoi), namely past, present
and future. Besides, however, it  is stated that the same verb is being 
used instead of saying “in many places".
Hence, in Origen's mind to act "in many places" is a substitute 
expression for to act “throughout time". So he says that the expression 
"in threefold" is used instead of the "in many places" because the three 
times comprise the whole aeon.
What we conclude from this analysis of Origen's is that, even in 
this case that "aeon" is attributed a temporal meaning, the spat fa, 
meaning of it  is implied, too. In like a manner, when "aeon" is used in a 
predominantly spatial sense, its temporal meaning is implied as 
well.302
Therefore it  is not a question of synonymity of the terms “age" 
and "world". But it  is the case of a unique and single conception of 
"aeon" in a spatio-temporal sense.303 The terms “aeon", "world" and 
"time" are inherently connected to each other. Thus he uses expressions 
such as “the things of this world and of this aeon" (id  Kaia xov koouov  
kq i xov aiLJva xouxov)304 (aeon mainly implying time); or, "before any 
time and aeon" (npo gap navxog xPoyou Ka^  aiwvog)305 (aeon mainly 
implying space). In any case, when Origen articulates the expectation 
and hope of attaining to eternal life  he says; "But we look forward to 
another aeon of life" (Husig 6e e(g dRRov aiujva pRenopsv ^ujijg) 306 In 
this case the spatial and temporal characteristics of aeon are 
inseparably interwoven, so that "aeon" means the spatio-temporal 
reality of eternal life  as an expected reality.
What we can generally say in concluding this question is this: 
When "aeon" is regarded with respect to the "horizontal" perspectives 
of a rational being, then is has a predominantly tempora, 
significance.307 When "aeon" is regarded with respect to the "vertical" 
perspectives of a rational being, then is has a predominantly spatia, 
significance.308 In either case, however, the spatio-temporal character
of "aeon" is not altogether extinguished, even if  only the spatial or only 
the temporal characteristic of “aeon" is mainly regarded in the 
articulation of a particular facet of Origen's thought.
There is a distinction which has gained a lot of currency among 
certain scholars. It has been asserted that "for the Hebrews who have 
their existence in the temporal, the content of time plays the same role 
as the content of space plays for the Greeks"309 On this, Boman follows 
von Dobschutz.310 This view actually stems from the writings of von 
Or el l i ,311 Johannes Petersen,312 H. Robinson,313 and John Marsh314 J. 
Muilenberg315 has taken the same view, which also constitutes a 
fundamental premise of 0. Cullmann's.315 Boman states that “as the 
Greeks gave attention to the peculiarity of things, so the Hebrews 
minded the peculiarity of events; ... for them time is determined by its 
content. Time is the notion of occurrence; i t  is the stream of 
events.".317
Thus a sharp distinction has been made by drawing a line: Greek 
thought is determined by notions such as "space" and "nature". Hebrew 
thought is defined by notions such as "time" and "history".
We shall not deal with the question in itself; neither shall we 
discuss the meaning of the fact the Hebrew language lacks the very 
word "time"318 nor shall we deal with the fact that i t  was the Greeks 
who developed the problematique of time; nor shall we enquire what is 
the meaning of the fact that the 'father of history", namely Herodotus 
was a Greek -and so was Thucydides. Discussions on these (at least the 
firs t two) questions have already taken place. For example, i t  has been 
sustained that the fact that the Greeks developed the problematique of 
time, whereas the Hebrews lacked any word for "time", shows that the 
Greeks who were preoccupied with space \ This is a contention of E. von 
Dobschutz.319 It is there that he conjectures that the spatial notions 
(regarded as the "Greek" element) in contrast to temporal ones
(regarded as the Hebraic element) is the criterion which might be used 
as a scale for measuring the extent of hellenization in Christian 
thought. At any rate we regard these "distinctions" and "scales" and 
"measures" as exteremely over-simplistic and utterly misleading -as 
the adoption of them in the interpretation of Origen's work shows.
The study of the relevant works shows that such a view has not 
been established through independent approaches of scholars. It is not 
the case of each one having made for himself an assessment in terms of 
philosophy of history and reached the same conclusion. It is rather a 
view enunciated by one scholar (as far as we know it  was E. von Qrelli) 
and henceforth it  was transmitted. The philological articulation of the 
notion, in its simplistic form, is rather elegant and tempting. Besides 
it  is convenient. For all one has to do is to reject any notion of "space” 
and to adhere to notions such as "time" and "history" -and thus he is 
"safely" thinking as a "Christian". Our discussion in chapter 5 on the 
case of 0. Cullmann shows that it  is not enough. One may employ only 
the notion of "time", to reject "space" as "danger" and "contamination" 
-and yet to think in a way far more "Greek" than Plato himself did. 
indeed this is what actually 0. Cullmann did.
As regards Origen's thought, he was not haunted by obsessions 
of the kind -presumably because he had a very good command of the 
Greek thought. For the better one knows something the less he is afraid 
of it. Thus he has been ably to make radical transformations of the 
Greek thought in the conception of time. Hence both "space" and "time" 
had to play a role in the development of his thought -and so they did, as 
our ensuing discussion w ill further show.
What is fundamental in Origen's thought is that he did not unify 
the various uses of the terms a im  or ammog under the non-biblical 
term of "eternity" (aiwvioxqg) 320 H. Basse's confusion about the meaning 
of (what he postulates as) "eternity" is that he tries to interpret a
non-biblical term (which is a misleading abstraction) through biblical 
passages. This unification constitutes a fundamental mistake. Origen 
did exactly the opposite. Not only does not he use the term "eternity" at 
all; but also (as a thorough study of his work shows) he discerns the 
various meaning of auuv and auuviog which are actually treated as 
homonyms. The unification which is portrayed by the term "eternity" 
can lead but to impasses and confusion -and Basse's case is but an 
example of a widspread phenomenon regarding this point. Origen not 
only avoided this and was always scrupulous in the use of the term aiwv 
and auOviog; but he also made further distinction in the meaning of the 
term atm  and he had grasped the essentially spatio-temporai 
character of it, in the case that the term ommog does not pertain to 
the divine reality.
This spatio-temporal conception of Origen actually constitutes 
an invaluable inheritance for Christian thinkers -but it  has been 
entirely neglected. Christian scholars have been preocuppied with their 
obsession to abolish any spatial implication in the conception of the 
world and its course in time. H. Puech regards it  as a 
"contamination"321 and 0. Cullmann as a "danger" from Greek thought. 
What is contradictory, however, is this: H. Puech says that the "vertical 
interpretation" of the course of the world (which he deems to be the 
Greek attitude) with Christianity "gives way ... to a horizontal 
interpretation of the segments of time through one another"322 But, at 
the same time, he speaks of a "plan of God" adding that "the total 
history of the human race" is "willed and governed by God"323 We shall 
not pursue any questions concerning creaturely freedom out of tricky 
affirmations like this. We only ask this: Is not the perception of a "plan 
of God" in itself a "vertical" conception of the meaning of history? We 
think that it  is. Origen did hold such a vertical conception, too.324 But it  
was also Origen who established what Puech calls "horizontal"
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interpretation of history. When Puech says that in Christian view of 
time "the image anticipates the model"325 all he does is to repeat what 
Origen established as a Christian meaning of history: “Those former 
bear in themselves an image of those la tte r" (Tiiv gap Seuxepuv eiKova  
fspei id  npwxa),326 he affirmed long ago. That Puech did not know this 
view of Origen could not matter at all, i f  he did not adduce the case of 
Origen as an example of Greek rather than Christian conception of 
time.327 Furthermore, in order to contrast these two conceptions of 
time, he appeals to Augustine -who, however, was profoundly influenced 
by Origen’s conception of time, as we have proven in chapter 2.
In the light of Origen's conception of time it  would be quite 
hard to find what Augustine's real and original contribution to the 
formation of a Christian view of time was. On the contrary, it  can be 
said that in Christian thinkers after Origen the profound perception of 
the world as a spatio-temporal reality, in which time is not only 
directed towards a goal and end, but i t  has a profoundly dramatical 
character, fades. And this disintegration of an original and brilliant 
perception is mainly due to the eviction of the spatial element of this 
whole conception. Inevitably, this led to a crippled conception of the 
relation of time to space, a crippled conception of reality itself, which 
is too obvious in the writings of authors such as H. Puech and 0. 
Cullmann and many others. The established findings of modern science 
prove how the abandoning of Origen's brilliant conception of space-time 
has led to simplistic and rough affirmations about time proper (and 
the above mentioned authors are just a few amongst many). For no one 
would assert that a theological treatment of time could be at any rate 
sound without a profound knowledge of what time proper is and the 
problematique surrounding this question. This is what the Greek 
philosophers knew profoundly. This is what modern scholars who offer 
theological treatments of time do not want to know. And this is what
477
constituted Origen’s background in establishing his view of time. 
Perhaps this is the reason why Origen is justified by modern science. 
The account of time which he established w ill be, sooner or later, 
overwhelmingly accepted as the original and most brilliant articulation 
of the Christian conception of time.
§3. Eternal life  and freedom.
Origen’s view of eternal life, is in accordance with his notion of 
existential causality. This particular world is the rank of life  attained 
to by a rational creature who reaches this state of blessedness "through 
a kind of progress",328 for "souls, advancing and ascending litt le  by litt le  
in due measure and order, firs t attain to that other earth and the 
instruction that is in it  for those better percepts to which nothing can 
ever be added"329
Thus eternal life  is reached through a kind of progress and 
evolution in time. Origen very vividly portrays this notion by employing 
the figure in Matt. 13,45-46, where the "kingdom of heavens" is 
resembled with a "goodly pearl". He takes the view that this simile of 
eternal life to a pearl is not without cause; it  was employed because of 
the way in which a pearl is created. This simile indicates the fact that 
walking towards eternal life  is realized through "many changes" and 
“alterations" until a. rational being is "made perfect". All this procedure 
is understood to take place in time, "it is said that the formation of the 
pearls in Indies takes place gradually through long time as the animal 
takes many changes and alterations until is becomes perfect."330
Eternal life, therefore, is an existential status which is 
understood to be the result of a "walking", namely gradual evolution 
towards moral perfection, in exhMar the direction of this course 
(though not eternal life itself) is portrayed thus:
"Let us not be surprised that the wonderful blessedness of the
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martyrs who enjoy deep peace and calm and brightness has to be begun in 
apparently dark, and, so to speak, wintry weather, it is by journeying in 
this life on the straight and narrow way001 in winter that each one of 
the blessed will have to show what ability he has gained for following 
the right road; so that after this life  there may be fulfilled the word in 
the Song of Songs said to the bride who has come through the winter: ‘My 
beloved', she says, 'answers and says to me, Arise, come my friend, my 
lovely, my dove. Behold, the winter is past, the rain has dispersed and 
gone away.'302 You also should remember that you cannot hear that ‘the 
winter is past* unless you have battled bravely and manfully with the 
present winter. After the winter is past and rain has gone away and 
dispersed the flowers w ill appear. 'Planted in the house of the Lord they 
shall flower in the halls of our God.’.”330
This notion of "walking" towards the eternal life  is in tune with 
Origen's fundamental conception of time as extension of a teleological 
character, as well as his view that eternal life is a temporal status to 
be reached within the framework of existential causality. This notion is 
clearly expounded in Cels:
"if anyone should want to have suggestions of the deeper truths 
about the way in which the soul enters into the contempation of the 
divine things, derived not from the most insignificant sect which he has 
mentioned (sc. the Orphites) but from the books, some of which are 
Jewish and are read in their synagogues, and in which Christians also 
believe, and some of which are only Christian, let him read the visions 
seen by the prophet Ezekiel at the end of his prophecy where different 
gates are depicted, conveying in veiled form certain doctrines about the 
various ways in which the more divine souls enter in to the higher 
life .334 Let him also read from the Apocalypse of John about the city of 
God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and about its foundations and gates. 
(Rev.2i). And if  he is also able to learn by means of symbols the way
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indicated for those who w ill journey to the divine realm, let him read 
the book of Moses entitled Numbers; and let him ask anyone competent to 
initiate him into the statements about the encampments of the children 
of Israel, of what nature were those fixed on the eastern side which are 
mentioned firs t, and of what sort were those on the south-west or 
south, and what were those which faced the sea, arid what were those on 
the north side which are mentioned last305 For he w ill perceive truths 
of considerable profoundity in the passages."335
in commMdtt, Origen refers to him who by the proper moral action 
w ill become "perfect" and "once acted in this way, he w ill have a 
treasure in heavens, becoming a heavenly [creature] himself;"337
Thus eternal life is directly related to free moral action. Proper 
action is regarded as a "beginning"338 of the "walking" which leads to 
eternal life. This relation of freedom to eternal life  is underlined by the 
affirmation that “he who w illed  to become perfect w ill have a heavenly 
treasure in the place of His"309
This w ill is a fundamental element of the "walking" towards this 
goal. This is why he calls eternal life as a "chosen life" (aipexfj gwfj).340 
in Dial there is a more detailed view of this notion and among others it 
is stated: "Let us then take the eternal life  up; let us take it  up by our 
free will. God does not grant us it, but he sets it before us;" (Ou SCoujqiv 
auxijv rjpiv o Bsog aRRd napaxiSrjaiv) 341
Beside this, however, in Origen's thought there is a notion that 
man is not intrinsically capable of achieving such a goal without help. As 
he points up, "human w ill is not sufficient in order to attain to the end" 
( ouk apm xo dv9pwnivov 9eReiv npog xo xuxeiv xou xsRoug) 342 So "those 
who think that they have the natural capacity to attain the end in Christ, 
are deluding themselves" (eauxoug gap anaxwaiv 01 vopCgovxeg apKstv 
npoc xo xuxeiv xou ev Xpiaxu xsRoug) 343
This is an attitude opposite not only to Platonism, but also to
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Gnosticism. Whereas to the Gnostics salvation is obtained blb 
knowledge,044 to Origen ‘'knowledge" is but a by-product of salvation, 
which is obtained through praxis. At any rate, man is not self-sufficient 
in attaining knowledge, which can be achieved only by God's grace since 
"He is found by those who, after doing what they can, admit that they 
need Him"345
A comparison to Plato's thought would be quite revealing at this 
point, in the State , Plato stresses that "it is impossible for anyone 
except the philosopher to have enjoyed the contemplation of the real 
being and seen how delightful i t  is" (xqg 5e xou ovxog 9eag, oiav qSovfjv 
sxei, a&uvaxov aRRw gsgeua9ai fj m  cpiRoaocpaj) 045 Many scholars would 
regard the use of the word Sea (used by Plato here) as a "Platonism" of 
Origen. What has eluded all of them, however, are the substantial 
differences in Origen’s thought. There is nothing of the "aristocratic" 
character of Platonism in Origen. Salvation is possible fo r anyone once 
he has acted according to the word of Jesus. The causative relation 
between Praxis and Knowledge are completely inverted in Origen. No 
philosopher w ill be able to "see" Christ unless he has acted properly. 
And if  a simple minded man has followed in actuality the teaching of 
the word, he w ill be saved. Here Origen stands in sharp contrast to 
Platonic dialectics and its conception of the possibilities and 
perspectives of a human being.
Subsequently Origen considers that attaining to eternal life 
becomes possible by the help of the son of God. Through this notion 
Origen composes two fundamental views of his theology: First, that 
eternal life  is a "chosen life". Secondly, that knowledge of God can be 
attained not only through free moral action but also through the help 
(the "grace") of God. This is what is suggested by affirmations like "... he 
who can ascend to the mountain edge through self-improvement, he 
ascends walking behind the Lord".347
in commJohn Origen elaborates on this view stating that Christ is 
"all the flights of steps for us" (nrivxeg eiaiv 01 ava(3a9go[ o awxijp)048 
and walking alongside him we can "ascend through him" (uj enipaivovxeg 
o5euopsv). And "as far as the conceptions of his are concerned, ’road’ is 
different from 'oate349 as one has at at firs t to oo forth to meet thew \J
road so that afterwards he w ill reach the gate".350
Thus out of the conception of the presence of Christ, as Logos, in 
the world, Origen holds that Christ is present in eternal life  as well. 
Nevertheless, he is there conceived of as the "oate" whereas in the rest* u
of the world he is understood to be present as the "road".351 Origen is 
clear, however, in stating that "Although he (sc. Christ) somewhere 
points out that he is both road and gate,352 he is clear that to him whom 
he is s till road he is not gate yet353 and he is no more road to him that 
he is already a gate."354 For Christ is regarded as a "gate" only to those 
who have already reached eternal life.
This is how Origen depicts the conception of the presence of 
Christ in the world and points out the difference of his presence in the 
eternal life from his presence in the rest of the world..
The changelessness o f e ternal l i f e .  From the affirmation that 
eternal life is within the world follows that it  should be subject to the 
general rules established in this world, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, namely temporality, corporeality, existential causality, 
judgement etc.
Origen himself speaks of some "conditions of the blessedness" (xwv 
opuv xfjg paKapioxTjxog) relating them to the "word" of Christ “who 
convinced" the faithful about the eternal life .355
The notion of the existential causality itself establishes the idea 
of the conditionality for the residence in the supreme rank of life  -like 
in any other rank of life, in Princ this idea is explicitly stated:
"it is non the less possible for one who has become at the present
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time a vessel of honour in consequence of certain former righteous 
deeds and yet has not acted similarly here nor in a way befitting a 
vessel of honour, to become in another age a vessel of dishonour; just as 
on the other hand it  is possible for one who by reason of acts older than 
this life  has become here a vessel of dishonour to become, if  he amends 
his ways in the 'new creation' a 'vessel of honour sanctified and meet 
for the master's use, prepared unto every good work'."055
Since eternal life denotes a quality of life in the world, it  is 
consequent on Origen's fundamental principles that i t  is a prerequisite 
for the residence in a life  of a certain grade and quality to act 
according to the quality of this rank of life. Indeed he regards eternal 
life  as the one of the supreme quality and blessedness yet he also 
regards it  as an active state, according to his general view of perpetual 
free moral action into the world.
Certainly the kind of action in the eternal life  is different yet it  
is s till action How Origen perceives this activity in the eternal life  is 
portrayed in this passage in commJohn:
"And which is the city of the great king, the real Jerusalem or the 
church which is built of living stones, where [there is] a holy 
priesthood357 and spiritual sacrifices are being offered to God by the 
spiritual and those who have comprehended the spiritual law? But it 
should be understood that when the fulness of time comes358 then the 
real adoration and perfect piety w ill be performed not in Jerusalem and 
one w ill live not in flesh but in spirit359 and not in figure but the whole 
of him w ill live in truth, having been made of such a quality that he w ill 
be of the kind of worshippers which God requires them to be."°60
Those who live in eternal life  are portrayed as “holy stones" (o( 
R(9oi 01 dg io i) who have as "their main task to praise God ceaselessly" 
CKaf to xouxtuv K8(pdrlaiov to anauaxug suRogsiv xov Bsov) 351 This is why 
Origen regards the "daily bread", which is asked of God through prayer,
as necessary not only for the present aeon but also for the aeon to come. 
Indeed, those who w ill be resurrected (namely those who w ill be found 
worthy of attaining to eternal life) w ill also be in need of a "bread 
befitting that aeon" (xov dpxov xov oiksiov xou psRRovxog aiwvog) by 
virtue of the fact that they also are in an active state352
The activity, therefore, in eternal life is what Origen portrays as 
"spiritual sacrifices" and "perfect piety" or "to bless God ceaselessly". 
This is the pre-eminent reason for Origen to describe the existential 
status in the eternal life  as an "altar". The contemplation itself from 
the point of view of eternal life is not a passive state but an active one. 
This is why he states that in that state "Altar is the contemplation of 
corporeals and incorporeals"°5° So even the very status of "sight" is 
understood to constitute an active state of a rational being.354 
Accordingly, in exhMar Origen states:
"Let us each remember how often we have been in danger of dying 
the common death055 and reckon that we may have been preserved in 
order that, baptized in our own blood and washed from all sin, we may 
dwell beside the heavenly altar with our comrades in the fight"355
in this passage Origen not only reiterates his conception of 
eternal life as having also a spatial character (“xdg Siaxpipdg ... 
noir)aiLJiis9a") but he further alludes to the active character of it  as he 
describes it  as "the heavenly altar" ("xw ev oupavoig 9uaiaaxnpiiu"). in 
view7 of this, in selPs, he states that the "life of the soul" is mainly 
regarded in "the aeon to come"; for it  is mainly "then that it  w ill praise 
God" 057
Hence eternal life is regarded not as a state of immobility, but as 
an active one. it is exactly due to this active character that this life  is 
regarded not as an irreversible condition but as an existential status 
which may change if  the activity of a rational being living there is not 
always the appropriate one.
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Origen's view is that God "judges" the world through his holy
angels, in explaining Ps. 2,11 he states that "kings are said to be those
saints who judge the earth" and avers that it  is contingent that those 
who are "judges of the earth" might "rejoice exceedingly" yet
"carelessly" and forget that this is a rejoice in God and so they might 
fall in "weakening out of careless relaxation" (xauvwaiv) and self-conceit 
(omoiv)". These characteristics constitute a cause of "fall" (sKneoiooiv) 
and Origen affirms that these saints "may fa ll, once the divine visitation 
abandons him who had been found deserving to be reasonably exhalted 
because of certain estimable deeds he had previously committed."353
in deOr he speaks of the perspectives of "soul" being orientated to 
the "eternal life", as he does in Princ where he speaks of the
perspectives of a soul towards the "boundless aeon", in the passage here 
Origen not only corroborates that view, but also further articulates the 
notion of a "second" fall of the soul, after its ascending to the "topmost 
edge of goods" (aKpujpsiav agaSiuv).
"I do believe that God dispenses every rational soul with a view tc 
its  eternal life  and that it  always maintains its free w ill, and of its 
motion either mounts ever higher and higher until it  reaches the topmost 
o f goods, or on the contrary descends through carelessness to this or 
that excess of wickedness. When a rapid and quick cure causes some to 
regard lightly, as easily cured, the diseases into which they have fallen, 
so that after being restored to health they fa ll the second time into the 
same condition; in such cases God w ill with good reason disregard their 
increasing wickedness to a certain point, and even overlook it  when it  
has developed in them to such an extent as to be incurable, in order that 
continuance in the evil may cause them to take their f i l l  and be glutted 
with the sin they desire; thus they may become conscious of their 
harmful condition and hate what they formerly welcomed, and so when 
they are healed they can posses more securely the health that comes to
4o5
their souls by being healed.".^9
This passage does not just refer to what happens to a man during 
his lifetime, although his remarks pertain to what happens during a 
lifetime, as well; but it  mainly refers to soul "with view to its eternal 
life", namely what is described above pertains to the life  of a rational 
being throughout aeons?1®
In order that no doubt should remain as to what Origen means by 
this view regarding the perspective of eternal life, he elaborates on this 
notion in the next paragraph of the same work. He there explicitly 
speaks of the "exodus" (s|sR96vcsg), of the soul from “this life" and his 
remarks pertain to the existence of a rational being "in long periods of 
time" 371 The discussion at that point refers to rational beings which 
"went out" of human rank of life  and "remember through how much pain 
they have gotten rid of" living here. Yet Origen takes the view that it  is 
possible either "never to fall in this [rank of life] again" or “after long 
periods of time" some rational beings, "if they are not careful", might 
"forget what they suffered in this life" and come to this rank of life  
again so that they "for a second time" find here the evil desires which 
again arose in them because of their oblivion of their suffering here due 
to the elapse of "long period of time"372
Thus the notion of fall “for a second time" from "the topmost of 
goods" actually refers to the existence of rational beings in the various 
ranks of life and particularly here, it  refers to a "fall" from the eternal 
life.
This notion is also clearly stated in a relevant analysis in the 
commJohti which is adduced as an exegesis to the passage of John,8,51 
("Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a man keep my saying, he shall never 
see death")373 In Origen's view the kind of "death" stated here is that 
which is referred in the passage "The last enemy destroyed [is] 
death" 374 This "death" is just "the enemy of his who said 'I am the
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life'.’’37D This "death is regarded to be by nature an obstacle" and "this is 
the death which w ill never be seen by anyone who keeps the word" of 
Christ375
it is obvious that there is a notion of conditionality in this 
biblical passage, expressed by the word sdv (if). The scriptural 
expression "in the aeon" has a predominantly temporal meaning and 
denotes a "perpetuity of immortality" in the time thereafter. Although 
Origen does not in any way dispute the meaning of the passage, it  is very 
indicative of his conception of time that he attempts an additional 
philological approach to this. Thus he states:
"i enquire if  the [expression] ’In the aeond77 can be considered as 
also pertaining to place , so that the whole [expression] is thus: if one 
keeps my word in the aeon, he w ill not see death. For it  is certainly 
plausible that one does not see death for such a length of time as long at 
he keeps the word of Jesus; but once one lost this word, he then saw 
death. But if  one is able to enquire in the deeper reasons and understand 
in what sense the saying ’And thou hast brought me into the dust of 
death’378 is said by a human being and in what sense Paul says 'Who 
shall deliver me from the body of this death?' he w ill comprehend in 
what sense as long as the word was kept death was not seen by him 
who was keeping it; but when someone did no more keep it  because he 
got tired of being careful and keeping the word or he lost watchfulness 
about keeping it, then he faced death, not because of anyone else but 
because of himself. And anyone should regard this doctrine as an eternal 
law; for once we took the word [of Christ] up, it  w ill always (aeQ be 
said to us the saying 'If a man keep my saying, he shall never see death’. 
And it  is like, so to speak, when someone sees darkness for long he 
looses his eyes, in the same way once death is seen by him who did not 
keep the word [this death] kills and mortifies the eyes of him who saw 
it  and makes him blind, so that he w ill be in need of him who opens the
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eyes of the blind. And 1 do think that this is the reason why the blind, of 
which the blind in the gospel were a symbol, lost their eyes, namely 
because they faced death since they did not keep the word [of Christ]”.'379
it is most significant of Origen's spatio-temporal view of reality 
that he wishes to consider the expression "in the aeon" as pertaining to 
place, as well as to time. The reason for doing so is that this his notion 
of existential causality makes actual sense in a spatio-temporal reality, 
namely is a reality where not only the temporal but also the spat/a/ 
character of it  is taken into account.
According to the notion of existential causality, Origen portrays 
his conception of eternal life  as a state which can be attained and 
continuously enjoyed on certain conditions which he calls as "eternal 
law" (vopov auliviov). Eternal life  is enjoyed as long as those conditions 
are honoured. It is exactly the consideration of the also spatia, 
character of eternal life  and the existential characteristic of 
"contemplation" from there, that stand at the basis of Origen's analysis 
here. The core of his conviction that attaining to the eternal life  is not 
an irreversible process is vividly articulated by his "as long as ..." 
notion, as in the passage above.
As a matter of fact, this is not the only place where Origen 
articulates this "as long as." notion. This is also stated in Cels where 
he uses the same words (ooov) to depict the conditional character of the 
residence in the eternal life. Thus he states:
"For we have a great high priest who by the greatnes of his power 
and of his mind 'has passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God380 
who told those that had genuinely learnt the things of God and who lived 
lives worthy of them that he would lead them on to things beyond this 
world. So he says: 'That where i go, you may be also'.381 On this account 
we hope that after the 'troubles and strivings'382 here we shall come to 
the topmost heavens (npog ckpoig $sveo9ai xoig oupavoig), and according
'to the teaching of Jesus w ill receive 'springs of water springing up to 
eternal life ’,'383 and w ill have the capacity for rivers of visions 
(9sojprjpdxajv), and w ill be with the waters that are said to be 'above the 
heavens' which 'praise the name of the Lord'384 As long as we praise 
him (oaov ge aivouusv auxov), we shall riot be carried about away from 
'the circumference of the heaven',085 but we shall always (asO be 
engaged in the contemplation of the invisible things of God, which w ill 
no longer be understood by us 'from the creation of the world by the 
things that are made080 but, as the genuine disciple of Jesus expressed 
it, when he said 'But then face to face'; and ‘When that which is perfect 
is come, that which is in part shall be done away.'.''387
in accord with his (as well as scriptural) view that "eternal life" 
is also a personal experience attained, to a certain extent, in this life, 
Origen applies the same conditionality to this conception of "eternal 
life" as well. Thus he saus: "If you believe that Paul was caught up to the 
third heaven, and was caught up to Paradise and heard unspeakable words 
which man cannot utter,388 you w ill accordingly realize that you w ill 
have the immediate knowledge of more and greater matters, than the 
unspeakable words revealed to Paul. For after receiving them he 
descended from the third heaven, whereas after you have acquired this 
knowledge you w ill not descend again, i f  you take up your cross and 
follow Jesus whom we have as 'a great high priest who has passed 
through the heavens'.389 And i f  you do not fa ll away from those who 
follow him you yourselves w ill pass through the heavens"090
Similarly, it  is quite remarkable to see how Origen comments on a 
certain passage in selPs namely the passage 29,7 ("in my prosperity I 
said, I shall never be moved"), in the Greek text there is a semicolon 
after the word "mine" [prosperity]; thus the meaning of the passage is "I 
w ill never (eig xov aiuiva) be moved; this is what I said in my 
prosperity". Origen, however, regards the structure of this phrase in a
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different way; he puts the semicolon not after the word ,,mine“/ but 
after the word "said"; so the passage reads as follows: "And I said; In my 
prosperity i w ill never be moved ". This is the passage on which Origen 
comments thus:
"it is either Christ or a just man who says the ‘I said1; then, after 
the semicolon in this word (e ix a  ysxa xrjv  sni xouxuj axi^yfjv) [he says] 
‘in my prosperity i w ill be not be moved in the aeon’ (sv zf\ su9qvia you 
ou yfj aafleu9iu  sig xov aiujva). it is befitting to be said that he who is in 
prosperity is not moved. As we have many times said, this pertains to 
the human nature of the saviour. And according to Symmachus, i f  the 
expression is 'in my quietude', it  may indicate the calm and 
impassiveness of the soul made perfect; anyone who has reached this 
condition w ill no more be moved. For i f  one is in spiritual prosperity he 
w ill never be moved.".391
So he regards this expression in such a way that he maintains the 
notion of contingency of "not being moved in the aeon”.
This "as long as.,notion pre-eminently emphasizes Origen's view 
of eternal life as an active state.
Thus the opinion of H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti that Origen seems 
to regard eternal life  as an immutable state'392 is erroneous. When 
Origen speaks of "rest" in the higher places of the world, he does not 
allude to any state of immobility whatsoever. Perpetual free moral 
action is a fundamental characteristic of the world as conceived by him. 
When he speaks of "rest" he just speaks relatively, namely he compares 
the quality of the life on earth (which is a life of suffering and toil for 
the pious -particularly those of his era) to the quality of life  in the 
higher places of the world. All he does is a comparison -nothing more 
than that, in any case he does not regard life  in higher places as 
inactive. Thus he states that "to those in flesh and blood there are more 
pains and precarious life than those who live in an aetheral body"
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(nfleioug $dp 01 novoi kcu sniacpaflfjg fj ^ojfj xwv sv aapia kcu aiuaxi napd 
xoug sv at9eptio awuaxO.'39'3 Eternal life is a "life of relaxation" (sCg 
dvsoiv)394 but not a life of inactivity. So when Origen speaks of "rest" in 
eternal life, he does not fail to point out that it  is not an absolute one, 
but a kind of "rest befitting blessedness" (x r jv  o ik s io v  xfj yaxapioxpxi 
avdnauaiv avanauawysSa).0933
in the Fragment CV of the "Commentary on John", he comments on 
the passage 14,3 ("And if  i go and prepare a place for you, i w ill come 
again and receive you unto myself; that where i am, there ye may be 
also"). His remark is that this "place" has been prepared by the
providence of the Father so that "those who live virtuously and according 
to rigid discipline may perpetually dwell in those prepared favourable 
circumstances" 396 It is obvious that here as well Oriqen maintains theu
notion of conditionality regarding the residence in the eternal life. Once 
ascended into that quality of life, one has to live according to a rigid 
discipline (Kaxa ndoav aKpifteiav), that is according to what Origen has 
named as "conditions of blessedness" (xwv opuv xqg uaKapioxrjxog) 
directly relating this notion to that of eternal life .397
in v ie w  o f th is  no tio n  O riaen s ta te s  th a t "those  who Genuinely hear
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of Jesus, at firs t follow him, then, learning about his abiding are
allowed to see it  and once they come they see398 and stay ’in him1 
[John 1,40], all of them ‘on that day° 99 and perhaps some of them stay 
for longer."400
it is through this allegorical exegesis of the passage Matt. 13,36, 
and particularly through the term perhaps, that the contingency of 
staying in the eternal life is again pointed out.
As a matter of fact, Origen holds that to ascend and live in the 
eternal life, which he also calls "immortality",401 is something 
continaent and therefore it  is a reversible condition.
In comm John he regards both the sayings "Who only has
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immortality'402 and "i live, the Lord says'400 as meaning that "no one of 
those who live beside God has the life which is altogether unchangeable 
and unalterable." (ou&svog xwv napd xov 8eov gwvxwv exovxog xqv 
dxpsnxov ndvxp K ai avaRnoiujxov gamy)404 Further he clearly states that 
" those" (referred in the passage above) are "the living in their own 
world" (kcu ^wvxujv sv x^pa i&ia xugxavovxiuv),400 namely those living in 
the eternal life. Elaborating on this subject he comments as follows:
"Together with our enquiry about the living God and life, which is 
Christ, and [about] those living in their own world and those living who 
are not justified in the sight of God,405 and having cited what is denoted 
by the [saying] 'Who only has immortality' we shall add that no rational 
being has blessedness (y a K a p io x q x a ) as an inseparable attribute." (wg  
axw pioxov aujipsprjKog). For if  i t  has blessedness and the previous life  as 
an inseparable attribute (sdv  gap axw p iaxo v  sxq  xrjv u a K a p io x q x a  ko:( xqv  
npoqgouysvqv giofjv) "how can be true this which is said about God 'Who 
only has immortality?' "407
in Cels Orioen enunciates the notion of "faliina" from the eternal 
life, which also here is called as "life" according to his analyses 
discussed above. He affirms his notion of the various ranks of life  
comprising the whole world and also reiterates his view of eternal life 
as the "supreme" one:
"it was necessary for God, who knows how to use even the 
consequences of evil for a needful end, to put those who became evil in 
this way in a particular place of the whole [world], and to make a school 
of virtue to be set up for those who wished to strive law fully408 in 
order to obtain it. His purpose was that when, like gold in the fire, they 
had been tried by the evil409 and done everything possible that they 
might let nothing impure enter their rational nature, they might appear 
worthy of progressing to the divine realm and be drawn up by the Logos 
to the supreme blessedness of all and, if  i may so express it, to the
492
mountain- summit of goodness (o K p w p s ia v  iwv ag aQ o jv).’410
Yet i t  is in the same paragraph that Origen emphasizes the notion 
of the irreversibility of this “ascending" to the "supreme" rank of life:
“It is not possible for that which is good contingently ( k o t o  
ouypsprjKog) and consequentially (s£ snigsvriuaiog) to be good in the 
same sense as that-which is good in its own nature (jm  ouoiujoiog aga9w); 
goodness in the former sense w ill never go away from him411 who, so to 
speak, receives the living bread for his preservation. And if  i t  goes away 
from someone, it  is himself who caused it  because he neglectec 
(pa9uynfjaaviog) to partake of the living bread and the true drink."412
What Origen depicts here in the final analysis is the radical 
difference between God and the world: God is unchangeable whereas 
rational beings are changeable and convertible due to the very fact that 
they have been created. This notion is in accordance to the principle as- 
articulated in Cels, namely that "the universe is cared for by God in 
accordance with the conditions of the free w ill of each rational being, 
arid that as far as possible it  is always being led on to be better" since 
"the nature of our free w ill is to admit various possibilities (for it  
cannot achieve the entirely unchangeable nature of God)"410
This is the sense in which Origen affirms that the category of 
"goodness" (aga96v) is fundamentally attributed to God only and it  is only 
"unwarrantedly" attributed to anyone or anything else.414
Thus it  is pointed out that "angels are of a race which is superior 
to human one" yet "many among the angels become lower than human 
beings" whereas "many among men, who are lower than angels in nature, 
become superior to certain angels who were superior but became lower 
due to certain causes"415
It is again through the "as long as.'.' notion that Origen expresses 
this re-arrangement out of the fall of angels:
"As Jong as they were keeping their f irs t estate’ and did not
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leave ‘their own habitation416 they were far more different than human 
beings and superior to them" whereas human beings "become superior to 
angels" and ascend to "the dwelling place of angels" "once they do 
everything that may raise them to the kingdom of heavens"417 This, 
since "a more rational existential status may be changed to a less 
rational, suffering this because of much laziness and negligence; 
accordingly a less rational character may revert to being rational, in 
spite of its former negligence of the word of God"418
This general principle applies to eternal life  too, since it  is an 
existential status within the world. These views can also be traced in 
Princ and thus the pertinent passages there can be confirmed as 
expressing Origen’s thought authentically. So, speaking of the world he 
states:
"These are they who dwell 'in heaven and on the earth and under 
the earth419 the three terms indicating the entire universe, that is all 
those beings who started from one beginning but were drawn in various 
directions by their own individual impulses and were distributed 
throughout the different ranks of existence in accordance with their 
merit; for in them goodness does not reside essentially, as it  does in 
God and his Christ and in the Holy Spirit. For only in this Trinity, which 
is the source of all things, does goodness reside essentia lly. Others 
possess it  as an accident, liable to be lo s t420
Again, he affirms that in rational creatures "the good" exists 
"within them as an accident and not by nature, that is, not 
essentially"421 And “For every nature which is alterable and changeable, 
even though it  may be glorified in works of righteousness or wisdom, 
cannot be said to possess a glory that is sincere and bright, by reason of 
the fact that its righteousness and wisdom are accidents, and whatever 
is accidental may also be separated and lost ,"422 With respect to the 
"holy powers" it  is pointed out that "goodness is not in them as part of
th e ir  essence" fu r  "essentia l goodness is  found ... so le ly  in  C h ris t and the 
Holy S p ir it ,  and o f course in the Father a lso."423
Speaking o f the c re a tu res  which are "in  the hand o f God", Origen 
s ta te s  th a t " i f  they do not fa l l  fro m  the hand of God, in  th is  way tak ing 
them selves away fro m  i t ,  they w i l l  not be plucked out; fo r  no one plucks 
out o f the hand of the Father."424
The same notion is  expressed in  homJer. Quoting John 10,29 ("No 
one is  able to  pluck out o f my Father’s hands") he po in ts  out th a t i t  has 
been w r it te n  th a t "no one plucks o f" but i t  has not been w r it te n  "no one 
fa lls  away o f h is  hands" (ou urjv gegpanxai o n  ujg ouSsig apna^si, ouxwg 
ouSsig Sianmxei sk xwv ysipwv auxou). "For the s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n  is  fre e  
(xo gap auxs|ouaiov sReu9spov so n ). And I say; No one p lucks out o f the 
hand o f the shepherd, no one can take us out o f the hand o f God; but i t  is  
we who can fa i l  fro m  h is hands because o f our negligence.’’ 423
The same fundamental conception o f freedom  o f choice is
m aintained fo r  the "ascending" to  e te rna l l i fe ,  as w e ll. W ith  respect to
e te rna l l i f e  as "end" (as discussed be fo re) Origen again s treeses th a t 
a tta in in g  to  i t  is  c lose ly  re la ted  to  the fundamental fa c u lty  of
c re a tu re !u  freedom. Thus, considering the meaning o f "end" (xsRog) found 
in  the t i t l e  o f many Psalms according to  the tra n s la t io n  o f the Seventy, 
he comments:
"To anyone who s trugg les  i t  is  v ic to ry  th a t c o n s titu te s  h is  "end" 
(xeRog) ... thus the psalms e n tit le d  ‘in  the end' (e(g xeRog) announce the 
v ic to ry  of C h ris t, who, according to  Akylas, w i l l  be ca lled  as
v ic to ry -m a k e r (viKonoiou), since he w i l l  have brought v ic to ry  to  those 
conquered; fo r  he who is  conquered by C h ris t has conquered e v il w hich 
occurred in  him  and abolishes i t  being sub jec t to  C hris t. C e rta in ly  the re  
is  no one who is  conquered by C h ris t against h is  own w i l l ;  fo r  C h ris t 
conquers by persuading, being the Logos o f God"426
Origen's conv ic tion  th a t e te rna l l i f e  as not an ir re v e rs ib le  s ta te
stems from two fundamental notions of his thought.
F irs t,  e te rna l l i f e  is  a sp a tio -tem p o ra l cond ition , namely a 
p a r t ic u la r  "w o rld ” which is  contained in to  the whole w orld .
Secondly, ra tio n a l c re a tu res  are endowed w ith  the fre e  choice.
i t  is  out o f th is  v iew  th a t e te rna l l i f e  is  not re la ted  to  any notion 
o f eve rla s tin g  du ra tion  and thus the conception o f e te rna l l i f e  is  
cons is ten t w ith  the conception o f tim e  as f in ite .
§4. Eternal death
Like o ther notions in  Origen’s thought, "death" also is  regarded as 
a homonym, which means th a t th is  p re d ica tion  applies to  m ore than one 
o f actual e x is te n tia l sta tes, indeed, in  Dial, Origen expounds the notion 
o f death perceived in  a th re e fo ld  way. The same perception  is  a lso found 
throughout h is  w orks , ye t i t  is  in  Dial, th a t th i is  question is  handled ac 
hoc. In doing so, he emphasizes th a t he e n tire ly  grounds h is  v iew s of 
death on the sc rip tu re .
The f i r s t  kind of death is  to  liv e  unto God and to  die unto s in , 
according to  the saying o f Paul in  Rom.6,10. This is  c e r ta in ly  a "blessed 
death". Th is is  the kind o f death th a t Jesus died; "For in  th a t he died, he 
died unto s in "427
The second kind is  th a t according to  which a man dies to  God,u  *
according to  the saying "The soul th a t s ins, i t  sha ll d ie "428
T h ird ly , i t  is  the common conception o f the death, as "Adam live d  
nine hundred and th i r ty  years and d ied "428
Whereas the f i r s t  kind o f death a c tu a lly  co n s titu te s  the way for- 
ascending to  e te rna l l i fe ,  the second one is  th a t through w hich a ra tio n a l 
being descends and fa l ls  to  the low e s t and d im m est rank o f life .  
R ecalling the s c r itp u ra l fig u re  o f the "ladder" o f Jacob, i t  could be said 
th is : Whereas e te rna l l i f e  is  "C h ris t h im se lf"430 who is  on the top of 
th a t ladder, e te rna l death is  the low es t p a rt o f i t ,  i t  is  the fa r th e s t
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distance fro m  C h ris t, the low es t rank o f l i f e  among those which 
c o n s titu te  the e n tire  w orld .
Thus e te rna l death401 is  an actual s ta tu s  in to  the w o rld  and i t  is  
perceived as the co u n te r-p o in t o f e te rna l l i f e  in  te rm s  o f m oral 
e x is te n tia l q u a lity  and, th e re fo re , in  te rm s  o f "space” w ith in  the 
make-up o f the w orld .
In a passage where "heavenly Jerusalem " is  a ttr ib u te d  the meaning 
of e te rna l l i f e  432 Origen a f f irm s  th a t the counte rpo in t o f i t  m ust be the 
s c r ip tu ra l "Gehenna":
"Finding Gehenna described in  the gospel as a place of 
punishment400 we searched to  f in d  out i f  i t  was mentioned anywhere in  
the ancient books, espec ia lly  in  v iew  o f the Jew s’ use o f the word. We 
found th a t in one passage the s c r ip tu re  m entions a Chasm o f the son of 
Ennom; but we are in fo rm ed  th a t instead o f the w ord  ‘Chasm’, though 
w ith  the same meaning, the Hebrew te x t reads ‘the Chasm o f Ennom and 
Gehenna’. By ca re fu l study o f the te x ts  we also fin d  th a t Gehenna o r the 
Chasm o f Ennom is  included in the p ro pe rty  assigned to  the tr ib e  o f 
Benjamin404 o f which Jerusalem  was also a part. And by considering  the 
in fe rence  fro m  the fa c t th a t the re  is  a heavenly Jerusalem  w ith  the 
chasm o f Ennom belonging to  the p ro p e rty  assigned to  Beniam in, we fin d  
an a llus ion  to  the do c trine  o f punishments w hich are tra n s fo rm e d  in to  
the means by which ce rta in  souls are p u r if ie d  through to rm e n t."405
In commJohn Origen speaks o f "down to  Hades o r a space o f th is  
s o rt"  (sv d&ou Kdxuj f\ xtvi xoiouxw x^piw )435 which is  regarded as an "end" 
(xeRog) in  the sense of being the m ost d is ta n t fro m  God. Thus, whereas 
e te rna l l i f e  is  a q u a lita tiv e  end, in  the sense o f being nearest God, the re  
is  also another end, namely the space which is  m ost rem ote  fro m  God. 
indeed the "spaces" below the human rank o f l i f e  are c la s s if ie d  according 
to  q u a lity , in  the same way th a t the "heavens" (namely the h igher spaces) 
are c lass ifie d . So there  is  e x p lic it  re fe rence  of the lo w e s t "space"
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(xonov) w hich is  the “d a rkes t” among the dark ones (oxoxog ijv  xo sv 
okoxsoi pa9uxepov)437
Thus, Origen speaks of "tw o  extrem es" (6uo, Cv’ ouxwg ovouaow, 
aKpoxrjxag)433 The fo rm e r extrem e alludes to  the q u a lity  o f being "son 
o f God" whereas the la t te r  re fe rs  to  the q u a lity  o f being a 
"d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposed son" (xaxd Sidpsxpov cvavxiov uiov), namely "son 
o f the e v il daemon and Satan and d e v il"439
This c la s s if ic a tio n  is  also expressed in te rm s  of “ra t io n a lity ”. 
Th is is  why, in  the d e fin it io n  o f "aeon", the "various bodies" are due to  
the "log ica l d if fe re n t ia "  w hich again are due to  the d if fe re n t “knowledge 
o f God"440 Thus the conception o f " tra nsp o s ition " o f bodies to  another 
rank o f l i f e  is  po rtrayed  as an a lte ra tio n  fro m  a "m ore ra tio n a l s ta te " to  
a "more ir ra t io n a l"  (Kaxdaxaoig rlogiKUjxspa psxapdRRsi sig 
afioftujxepav)441 Subsequntly the w o rs t damage th a t may occur to  a 
ra tio n a l being is  expressed as the "u tm ost ir r a t io n a li ty "  (soxdxqv 
a fio fttav)442
This is  the s ta te  which Origen p o rtra ys  as "e te rna l death" (xov 
anspavxov 9dvaxov).440
The expression "e te rna l death" is  found in  a number o f po in ts  
throughout Origen’s works. He also uses s im ila r  expressions such as 
"e te rna l punishm ent’444 and "incurab le  punishments" (xcdg avrjKsaxoig 
KoRdasaiv)445 and quotes prophets who "u tte re d  many th re a ts  about the 
e te rna l punishment" as w e ll as the gospel where the re  are re fe re nces  to  
the 'Gehenna and the o the r endless to r tu re s " 445
in fa c t, however, these re fe rences o f Origen do not im p ly  any 
notion of e ve rlas ting  duration. His deeper conv ic tion  is  th a t the 
sta tem ents about an "endless" punishment have a purpose w hich is  
educational, p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  those who are not w il l in g  to  fo llo w  a 
C h ris tia n  way of liv in g  because o f ignorance and in c a p a b ility  to  see the 
fu l l  depth of C h ris tia n  fa ith . His v iew  is  th a t the p r im a ry  task of
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C h ris tia n  teaching is  not to  th re a t but to  t r y  to  convince about the tru th  
of th is  be lie f. Thus in Cels he sta tes:
“For our p a rt, because o f the many and innum erable fa c ts  which 
have persuaded us to  liv e  the C h ris tia n  l i fe ,  i t  is  our p r im a ry  des ire  to  
do a ll in  our power to  make a ll men fa m ilia r  w ith  the whole o f the 
d oc trine  o f C hris tians. But w here we fin d  some who are p re jud iced  by 
s lander againsts the C h ris tians  so th a t, under the im press ion  th a t 
C hris tia n s  are godless fo lk , they pay no a tte n tio n  to  those who c la im  to  
teach about the d iv ine w ord, the re  we do eve ry th ing  possib le, in 
accordance w ith  the p r in c ip le  o f love to  mankind, to  es tab lish  the t ru th  
o f the d oc trine  th a t the re  w i l l  be e te rna l punishment fo r  the im pious, 
and to  make even those who are u n w illin g  to  become C h ris tia n s  accept 
the d o c tr in e ."447
A ccord ing ly , he re fe rs  to  the "s im p le-m inded" and 
"unsophistica ted" who " t r y  to  devote them selves to  the C h ris tia n  re lig io n  
out o f fe a r o f the threatened punishments; so success fu lly  are they 
overcome by the gospel th a t by fe a r o f what are ca lled  in  the s c r ip tu re  
eve rla s tin g  punishments they despise every to r tu re  devised by men 
against them and death and countless agonies."448
So the purpose of these " th re a ts "  is  pedagogical and i t  is  
p a r t ic u la r ly  the s im ple-m inded people th a t Origen has in  m ind when he 
re fe rs  to  th is  teaching. The p rim e  concern, however, is  to  guide human 
race tow ards the proposed d if fe re n t e x is te n tia l a tt itu d e  and action , 
through persuasion.
"We are concerned w ith  the im provem ent o f human race, w hether 
we use th re a ts  o f punishments w hich, we have been persuaded, are 
necessary fo r  the whole w o rld , and probably also not unbene fic ia l to  
those who w i l l  s u ffe r  them ."449
It  is  no accident th a t here, w here Origen re fe rs  to  the re a liz a tio n  
of punishments, he does not apply them the te rm  "e te rn a l" a t a ll. He uses
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the f ig u re  of punishment os “cure" in o rder to  suggest th a t the purpose 
of punishment is  not an e ve rla s tin g  s u ffe r in g  but punishment co n s titu te s  
a m an ifes ta tion  of d iv ine  dispensation tow ards a b o litio n  o f ev il.
"Moreover, the ‘th re a ts ’ are s im p ly  p roc lam ations o f w hat w i l l  
happen to  bad men. S im ila r ly  one m igh t ca ll the w ords of a physician 
th re a ts  when he says to  pa tien ts  'i w i l l  cu t you and apply ca u te riz in g  
irons  i f  you do not obey my o rde rs  and regu la te  and conduct yo u rse lf in 
th is  way o r th a t’.’’ 450
In fa c t, however, Orioen does not hold th a t the re  is  anu
*  *  W  W
e ve rlas ting  punishment, in chapter 2 we have a lready discussed how he 
perceives the outcome of a judgement. What co n s titu te s  "punishm ent" is  
to  be transposed to  a lo w e r rank o f l i f e  and to  assume a body b e ff it in g  
such a "space" o f the w orld . A t the end o f the aeon, however, the re  w i l l  
be a new judgement and the p o s s ib ility  o f s e lf im provem ent alw ays 
ex is ts . For h is conv ic tion  is  th a t the re  w i l l  be a f in a l s ta te  in  w hich e v il 
w i l l  have been abolished. However, h is  opinion is  th a t th is  t ru th  should 
not be said ve ry  o ften  and before  the ears o f anyone:
"And the punishments th a t occur round Jerusalem  are fo r  those 
who are being re fin ed ; ... i t  is  not r ig h t to  explain to  everybody a ll th a t 
m ight be said on th is  subject. Nor is  th is  the approp ria te  moment, i t  is  
r is k y  to  com m it to  w r it in g  the explanation of these m a tte rs , because the 
m u ltitu d e  do not re q u ire  any more in s tru c tio n  than th a t punishment is  to  
be in f l ic te d  upon sinners, i t  is  not o f advantage to  go on to  the tru th s  
which l ie  behind i t  because the re  are people who are sca rce ly  re s tra in e d  
by fe a r o f eve rla s tin g  punishment (6 ia  ioug po^ig <poBtu xrjg a iuvtou 
KoRdaswg) fro m  the vast flood o f e v il and sins th a t are com m itte d  in 
consequence o f i t . " 451
C erta in  passages in which “co n tra d ic tio n s " seem to  appear, should 
be considered in  the lig h t of th is  a ff irm a tio n .
in expProv Origen speaks o f the "u tte rm o s t i r r a t io n a li ty "  and
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d ire c t ly  re la te s  i t  to  what he ca lls  "endless death" (cmepavxov 
9avaxov)452 Yet a t the same po in t he alludes to  h is  conv ic tion  about the 
f in a l a b o litio n  o f e v il, averina th a t s inners w i l l  "o f necessity"/  w  w
(ava^Kcuiug) be r id  of th e ir  s in  in  the aeon to  come. In another chapter in
the same w ork  he a ff irm s  th a t "v ir tu e  destroys e v il and th is  w i l l  happen 
in  the aeon to  come u n til e v il is  abolished"453
Thus, even when he he speaks o f “e te rna l" death, he does not 
a c tu a lly  im p ly  any notion o f e ve rla s tin g  duration. For the re  are 
fundamental prem ises in  h is  conception o f tim e  (and in h is  thought, in  
general) th a t exclude any notion o f eve rla s tin g  duration. Such prem ises 
are the conception o f tim e  as f in ite ,  as w e ll as the conv ic tion  about the 
f in a l a b o litio n  o f e v il and the re s to ra tio n  o f a ll,  w hich w i l l  be discussed 
in chapter 5.
Hence when Origen speaks o f eternal what he has in  m ind is  not 
so much a quantity o f tim e  but a quality o f e x is te n tia l s ta tus. In 
respect o f th is  the re  is  an essentia l s im ila r ity  between the notions of 
e te rna l l i f e  and e te rna l death, as both a llude to  a q u a lity  o f l i f e  ra th e r 
than a qu an tity  o f tim e ; they are also re la ted  by v ir tu e  o f the fa c t th a t 
these tw o  q u a litie s  o f l i f e  are d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposite and re sp ec tive  to
the tw o  extrem e ranks o f l i f e  th a t com prise  the whole w orld .
In the l ig h t o f th is  conception, c e rta in  a ff irm a tio n s  o f Origen 
could be understood w ith o u t being regarded as s e lf-c o n tra d ic to ry . Thus 
he re fe rs  to  s inners saying th a t "an im pious one wanders about being in 
an e te rna l de s tru c tion  (anwfleia a ium a) des iring  and com m iting  w hat is  
not pleasing to  God"454 I t  is  obvious th a t, in  expressions lik e  th is , the 
te rm  “e te rn a l" cannot be taken as im p ly ing  any notion o f e ve rla s tin g  
du ra tion  but i t  im p lies  a ce rta in  q u a lity  o f l ife . Thus "e te rn a l" suggests 
the "e x tre m ity "  o f the q u a lity  and not the "dura tion" o f a life .
Hence, the conclusion of H.Crouzel455 th a t Origen is  not qu ite  sure 
about the meaning o f the te rm  ommog stem  fro m  the fa c t he has not
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understood how Origen s p e c if ic a lly  uses th is  te rm , i t  is  not a case of 
"hes ita tio n " as Crouzel argues. What appears to  va ry  is  the way in  which 
Origen presents h is v iew s, according to  the audience he is  speaking to. 
Yet, as fa r  as h is  theology i t s e lf  is  concerned, he has no "he s ita tions" 
whatsoever. Origen’s v iew s on the question are c ry s ta l c lear, i t  is  the 
senses in which the te rm  a iuviog is  used th a t has eluded H. Crouzel, 
namely the fa c t th a t th is  te rm  is  used e ith e r fo r  pedagogical reasons (in  
th is  case th is  te rm  is  included in  s c r ip tu ra l quota tions) o r in  a sense 
ind ica ting  a q u a lity  o f l i f e  ra th e r than q u n tity  o f tim e. The fa ilu re  to 
grasp th is  fa c t lead Crouzel to  the conclusion th a t Origen is  not sure and 
has "hes ita tions  ... apropos the d e v il’s s a lva tio n "456
Out o f the notion o f u n iv e rs a lity  o f nature  o f a ll ra tio n a l 
c re a tu res , as discussed in  chapter 2, Origen e x p lic it ly  s ta te s  th a t devil 
can be saved. His conv ic tion  about the fin a l a b o litio n  of e v il a llo w  him  
to  asse rt th a t the devil w ill d e fin ite ly  be saved. Thus, w ith o u t any 
fu r th e r  comment on th a t extensive a r t ic le  o f H. C rouzel, we only note 
th a t the asse rtion  th a t "Origen con tinua lly  has ita tes  about the meaning 
o f aiwviog" is  ju s t  not co rre c t.
Another po in t w hich should be made is  th a t Gehenna, as a place fo r  
punishment, is  a p a r t ic u la r  "space" o f the w orld . To be transposed the re  
means th a t "consummation" and judgem ent has taken place, in Origen's 
thought "punishment" im p lie s  "judgem ent" and "judgem ent" im p lie s  
"consummation" o f an aeon. These notions are f i r m ly  connected and i t  is  
only once th is  conception has been understood th a t h is notion  of e te rna l 
death could be understood, too. in de fin ing  "judgem ent" as “ tra n sp o s itio n " 
to  bodies (e ith e r "angelic" o r "dark and dim " ones) he adds th a t "the 
im pious w i l l  not be re su rre c te d  in the fo rm e r judgem ent, but [they w i l l  
be re su rre c ted ] in  the subsequent one"457 Thus Gehenna is  a place w here 
ra tio n a l c re a tu re s  are transposed only a fte r a judgement. The same 
happens w ith  e te rna l life .
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H. C rouzel’s conclusion458 th a t Origen seems to  be the f i r s t  to  
open paradise up to  the sa in ts  before  the re s u rre c tio n  is  e n tire ly  
erroneous, i t  is  Origen h im se lf who answers such a llegations: For i t  is  
Origen h im se lf who a ff irm s  th a t to  believe th a t any "a lte ra tio n "  
C [isxapoR f|)459 namely tra n sp o s itio n  to  another rank o f l i fe 450 may take 
place "before  the consummation o f the aeon" (npo x ijg  ouvxeR siag  xou 
aiw vog) is  an opinion held by those who "have not grasped the meaning of 
the s c r ip tu re  and des ire  im possib le  th ings" ( jif jx s  xrjv $pa(pfjY vsvorjK svat 
kcu xwv aSuvaxiiJV sniQuysi'v) 451 For according to  the e x ite n tia l ca u sa lity  
th is  tra n fo rm a tio n  ( lik e  a ll the tra n fo rm a tio n s  o f bodies) take place only 
a f te r  a consummation and judgem ent452
When Origen speaks o f the dead being in C h ris t, he does not mean 
th a t they have been transposed to  another rank o f l ife . C h ris t is  present 
in  a ll ranks of l ife . The dead are s t i l l  human beings l iv in g  in  the 
in te r im  between th e ir  death and the expected consummation and 
judgem ent, as we discussed in chapter 3, §1. E terna l l i f e  (in  the "upper 
Jerusalem ") o r e te rna l death (in  the Gehenna) are re a l sp a tio -te m p o ra l 
s ta te s  in  which a human c re a tu re  w i l l  be transposed only a fte r the 
consummation and judgement o f the whole w orld .
Conclusion
Origen regards e te rna l l i f e  and e te rna l death not so much as a 
duration o f existence but ra th e r as a quality o f existence. V/hen he 
expounds the goal (expressed in  a s c r ip tu ra l language, namely as in 
Gal.6,7-8) "so th a t we sha ll reap not co rru p tio n  fro m  the fle sh  but 
e te rna l l i f e  fro m  the s p ir i t " ,465 he p r im a r ily  re fe rs  to  a quality o f 
existence and so also when he re fe rs  to  e te rna l death. For, as fa r  as the 
duration of such an existence is  concerned, th is  is  de term ined by the 
p r in c ip le  of e x is te n tia l causa lity , which anyway applies to  the e n t ire ty  
o f Origen's w orld . Hence the tem pora l im p lic a tio n  o f the te rm  auovioi
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(e te rn a l) is  only of secondary s ign ificance , since the re  is  nothing special 
p e rta in in g  to  the du ra tion  of the supreme or lo w e s t rank of l i f e  
v is -a -v is  the re s t o f them. C e rta in ly  the re  are po in ts  where s c r ip tu ra l 
s ta tem en ts  about endless punishment are echoed in  Origen's works. 
However he qu ite  c le a r ly  considers the im p lied  notion o f everlastingness 
as spelled out fo r  pedagogical reasons. S t r ic t ly  speaking (namely, 
re fe r r in g  to  h is  fundamental theo log ica l and ph ilosoph ica l conv ic tions), 
h is  conception o f eternal does not suggest any notion o f everlastingness.
i t  is  obvious, th e re fo re , th a t in  Origen's thought the te rm s  aim 
(aeon) and aim iog (e te rn a l) are homonyms. Unless th is  c ru c ia l po in t is  
grasped, m iscom prehensions are inev itab le . For i t  is  one th ing  to  speak 
o f the eternal God ye t eternal life  is  qu ite  another and s t i l l  eternal 
death is  a th ird  conception.
There is  a tes tim ony by Leontius Byzantius, p a rt o f w hich reads 
thus: "They (sc. the O rigen is ts ) say ... th a t the te rm  au iv  suggests a 
d e fin ite  tim e  and when the s c r ip tu re  says th a t the punishment w ill,  be 
e te rn a l, i t  im p lie s  but a d e fin ite  t im e "454
One should always be h igh ly ca re fu l in d is tin gu ish in g  between 
Origen's thought and w hat la te r  was h is alleged thought -n o t only by 
those h o s tile  to  i t ,  but also by the so -ca lled  "O rigen ists". For qu ite  o ften  
the la t te r  presented v iew s e n tire ly  a lien  to  Origen's thought as being h is 
ideas.455 However the v iew  th a t “e te rna l death" does not im p ly  "endless 
tim e " is  a c tu a lly  Origen's. For one th ing, i t  is  a v iew  stem m ing fro m  h is 
ove ra ll theo log ica l v iew s, and p a r t ic u la r ly  h is  conv ic tion  th a t the 
re s to ra tio n  w i l l  d e fin ite ly  occur, as we sha ll discuss in chapter 5, § i.  
For another, i t  stem s fro m  h is very conception o f tim e , w hich excludes 
any notion of in f in ite  tim e  or e ve rla s tin g  dura tion  whatsoever.
Thus the notion o f “e te rn a l" may a llude e ith e r to  the tim e le ss  
d iv ine  re a li ty  o r to  a tem poral s ta tu s  in  the w orld .
E ternal l i fe ,  as a c e rta in  q u a lity  o f e x is te n tia l s ta tu s , is  a
promise o f God to  ra tio n a l beings of the e n tire  w orld . Th is is  th e re fo re  
a goal, an "end" fo r  a ll those who s tr iv e  fo r  th e ir  sa lva tion  and hope to 
a tta in  to  e te rna l life .  This hope is  a fundamental c h a ra c te r is t ic  of 
Origen's conception of tim e. Once the notion o f e te rna l l i f e  has been 
discussed, the content o f "hope" is  now more c lear. The fa c t is , however, 
th a t the e te rna l l i f e  i t s e lf  is  a tem pora l re a lity ,  as w e ll. The question 
which then a rise s  is  th is : Once the "end" of an ind iv idua l ra tio n a l 
c re a tu re  has been a tta ined  and i t s  "hope" has been fu l f i le d  by ascending 
to  e te rna l l i f e ,  is  the re  any "nope" fo r  those being a lready the re?  Since 
hope is  a fundamental c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f Origen's conception o f tim e , i t  
should e x is t i n . a ll ranks of l ife .  T he re fo re , i t  should e x is t in  the 
supreme one, namely the e te rna l l i fe ,  due to  i t s  being a tem pora l s ta tu s , 
too. The question w hich a rise s  then is  th is : What is  the actual content o f 
"hope" in th a t rank o f l i fe ?  This question b rings us to  the study o f 
Origen's eschato log ica l conceptions, namely the u lt im a te  perspectives of 
the w o rld  and the end o f t im e  its e lf .  Th is is  w hat we sha ll d iscuss next.
Chapter 5: The end of Time.
§1. The final abolition of evil
As an "end", eternal life constitutes a goal which has a personal 
and individual character. To attain to eternal life, however, does not in 
itself mean that evil has been extinguished in general; for this happens 
only to certain individual rational creatures. Yet there are creatures in 
other ranks of life where evil still does exist. So the world is still in a 
teleological spatio-temporal process.
Thus, what has hitherto been studied as “end" (xefiog) mainly 
pertains to an individual rational creature as this “end" has to do with 
the moral perfection of a particular being, according to the existential 
causality. This "end" therefore has a moral meaning and a personal 
character, it is certainly no accident that, in Greek, the term "teleios" 
(xeReiog; perfect) is directly derived from the term "telos", which is 
here mainly understood as moral perfection of an individual being.
Origen clearly expounds this view in a passage in Cels which 
reads thus:
"It is impossible for any man to look up to God with virtue from 
the beginning. For of neccessity evil must exist among men from the 
first, as Paul says ‘But when the commandment came sin revived and 1 
died.*1 Furthermore, we do not teach that for the unrighteous man to be 
accepted by God, it is enough for him to humble himself, conscious of 
his wickedness. God will only accept him a fte r condemning himself for 
his past life , walking humbly because of the past and in an ordered 
way in respect of the future."?
This is how Origen perceives the spatio-temporal movement 
towards what we have discussed as "telos", namely the ascent of an
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individual rational creature into eternal life. Furthermore, in the “On 
Psalms”, he also depicts the meaning of this conception of "telos": "One 
should know that, like as every art or science there is an end (isflog) 
which he who pursues this art or science strives to, so there must be 
an end (isflog) for a rational nature; and this end is to become endowed 
with life in Christ, as the Apostle says.".3
Beyond the "end" which pertains to the individual course of a 
rational being in space-time, nevertheless, Origen envisages an 
eschatological reality which is marked by the total abolition of evil. 
For his conviction is that evil, due to which the actual world came into 
existence, will finally be abolished. Thus he avers:
"There was [a reality] in which there was no evil and there will 
be [a reality] in which evil will no more exist; for the seeds of virtue 
are indelible".4
At another point he states accordingly: "There was [a reality] 
when there was no evil and there will be [a reality] when it will be not. 
But neither was there when there was no virtue nor will there be when 
it will be not. For the seeds of virtue are indelible".5
Quoting Ps. 118,70 ("Their heart became as hard as the milk 
which became cheese; but I stuck in the study of your law") he 
comments thus:
"As there was [a reality] when cheese was not cheese, so there 
was [a reality] when daemons were not evil. And if milk is older than 
cheese, it is obvious that virtue is older than evil;".6
It is in the same way that he comments on Ps.36,10 ("For yet a 
little while and the wicked shall not exist") stating that a "sinner will 
not vanish into non-being" but "he will not exist in as much as he is a 
sinner", namely it is the evil in him which will be extinguished.7 For 
"evil did not exist in the beginning and it will not exist for ever".8
In the light of these passages, similar affirmations attributed
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to Origen may be regarded as expressing his authentic views. By the 
so-called Fragment 21, P. Koetschau quotes a passage of Justinian 
which reads thus: "there was when that which has been lost was not 
lost and there will be when it will not be lost".9
In frLuc Origen states that Tull power"10 has been given to 
Jesus Christ11 so that he will bring peace through the blood of his 
cross to all those being either on earth or in the heavens;12 and he 
adds:
"Certainly he has not yet established peace, as it becomes 
obvious by the fact that there is still war due to the existence of evil; 
however there will definitely be an absolute peace.".13
This state which Origen visualizes in the above-mentioned 
passages, pertains to the entire world and indeed this state of things 
constitutes another conception of "end" (xeRog).
In Cels this conception of "end" is articulated thus:
"I will say a little in order to make clear that this remark 
about uniting every rational being under one law is  not only possible 
but even true . ... we believe that at some time the Logos will have 
overcome the entire rational nature and will have transformed every 
soul to his own perfection, when each individual simply by the exercise 
of his freedom will choose what the Logos wills and will be in that 
state which he has chosen. And we hold that just as it is unlikely that 
some of the consequences of physical diseases and wounds would be too 
hard for any medical art, so also is it unlikely in the case of souls that 
any of the consequences of evil would be incapable of being cured by the 
rational and supreme God who is predominant on all.14 For since the 
Logos and the healing power within him are more powerful than any 
evils in the soul, he applies this power to each individual according to 
God's will; and the end o f things is  the abolition o f ev il.”15
It is to the Scripture that Origen appeals (namely, Wis.3,7-13)
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in order to found his view that "The prophecies say much in obscure 
terms about the total abolition of the evils and the correction of every 
soul".16
So the discussion in this section shows that this "end" is not 
just a hope. The final occurrence of this reality constitutes a strong 
conviction of Origen’s and it is a fundamental element of his theology 
to affirm that this "end" will definitely occur fo r sure.
§2. The perfection of all.
It is obvious, therefore, that the term "end" is regarded as a 
"homonym". For there are different conceptual contents and realities 
denoted by the same term "end". In order to understand how Origen 
perceives the various conceptual contents of "end" (xeRog) one should 
enquire into the scriptural passages where he grounds his different 
conceptions of the term "end".
The conception of "end" as the final perspective in regard to 
attainment of eternal life by all rational creatures is grounded on the 
passage in Psalms 109,1: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit you at my 
right hand, until I put your enemies a footstool under your feet" as well 
as similar expressions in Heb.10,13 and in I Cor. 15,25.
Thus, commenting on Psalm 9,27 ("The Lord will reign in the 
aeon and in the aeon of the aeon - BaoiReuosi Kupiog eCg xov aiwva, kcu 
eig xov aiujva xou aiwvog") he states: "For the Lord must reign 
throughout the aeons (6ia xwv aiujvuv) until he has put all the enemies 
under his feet.... And the Lord reigns in the aeon (eig xov aiwva); and it 
is befitting kings to provide for those who are their subjects."17
It is a strong a conviction of Origen's that this "end" will or 
necessity come to pass as a concrete spatio-temporal reality is the 
future. Quoting Ps.40,9 ("He who now is sleeping will not raise up?") he 
his exegesis of the passage reads as follows:
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“He says that the resurrection follows sleeping o f necessity. 
For sleeping denotes death. Resurrection will follow death o/ 
necessity ,18
It should be stressed, however, that this "necessity" does not 
imply what one would take as a kind of moral determinism. This 
"necessity" is grounded on the conviction that resurrection has been 
promised and "prefigured"19 and "exemplified"20 by Christ. In this sense, 
there is a prophecy that resurrection will fo r sure occur. This 
"necessity", therefore, is grounded on the faith and conviction that the 
prophecy and promise will be fu lfille d  It is reasonable to believe that 
this prophecy will be fulfilled by virtue of the fact that prophecies of 
the scripture have already been fulfilled. On this, Origen states:
"Since ... the prophets who made many predictions of the future 
are proved to have spoken the truth concerning many events which have 
come to pass, and give proof that there was a divine Spirit in them, 
obviously we ought also to believe them, or rather the divine Spirit in 
them, concerning events which are still future.".21
It is on this basis that resurrection is said to follow "of 
necessity". Jesus said to Peter "Whither I go you cannot follow me now; 
but you shall follow me afterwards"22 and this is the passage on which 
Origen appeals in order to affirm that the expression "You shall follow 
me afterwards" will be said "to each one of all which the father gave in 
the hands of the son" (npog sko o xo v  x ljv  ndvxuv o 6s6u jksv xw u iw  o naxgp 
eig xa namely to all rational creatures; yet it will not be said
to all at the same time (eni xov auxov xaipov) and this is the meaning 
of the scriptural expression "afterwards".23
It is therefore after this promise of Jesus Christ to the entire 
world that they will follow him in due time, that resurrection is said 
to follow "of necessity". Thus movement in time is conditioned by what 
Origen calls "the end o f the promise (xo xeflog xrjg ena^srliag), as it
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has been written in the Acts of the Apostles, in the passage ’until the 
times of restoration of all things (axpi xpoviov anoKaxaaxdaewg navxwv), 
which God has spoken by the mouth of his holy prophets since the world 
began’24 in Jesus Christ”25
Thus there is no question of any moral determinism in Origen’s 
conception of time. It is rather the case of a teleologies1 time, in 
which a divine promise has been given and realized in the first place 
in the person of Jesus Christ. After that event, what was established in 
time was fa ith  and waiting and expectation\ that this promise will 
definitely be fu lfille d  at the end.
This is the ground on which Origen enunciates his convictiot 
that the entire "body” of Christ will finally be resurrected26 and 
reiterates that this eschatological expectation is a "promise" 
(sna^sfl(av) expressed in the scripture, namely in the Revelation of 
John.27
Therefore H. Crouzel's assertion that the eschatological reality 
which Origen visualizes through the notion of total abolition of evil is 
not an positive affirmation but just a "great hope" is wrong. This 
mistake is actually originated in the fact that H. Crouzel confines his 
arguments only to what is in Princ and from that follows a subsequent 
mistake, namely that this opinion of Origen's has "its antithesis in the 
same work". Thus Crouzel concludes that Origen appears to have 
"hesitations and alternating positions’’.28
Here is one more example in support of our view that to ground 
views only on the Princ is most likely to lead to serious mistakes 
about Origen’s thought. The abundance of Origen’s affirmations extant in 
Greek, according to which the final abolition of evil is not just a "great 
hope" (as H. Crouzel alleges) but a strong conviction, once more show 
that, in enquiring in Origen’s thought, the Latin rendering of Princ 
should be regarded only as an ancillary source; and even in that case, it
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should be read with much caution.
The notion of perfection of all rational creatures portrayed as 
"the resurrection of the real and more perfect body of Christ" is quite 
indicative of Origen’s conception of the resurrection. This conception, 
nevertheless, is stated as "a mystery great and difficult to 
speaculate’’29 while he ponders upon the passage in Ezekiel, 37,1-11, 
where the prophet speaks of the "dry bones":
"And when the resurrection of the real and more perfect body 
of Christ will take place, then the bones of Christ, which are now and 
in the time to come dry, will come together, bone to bone and harmony 
to harmony,30 no one deprived of harmony will reach unto a perfect 
man, ’unto the measure of the stature of the fulness’ of the body of 
’Christ’.31 And then the many bones will become one body as all the 
members of the body, being many, constitute one body.32 And it is only 
God who will judge who will be a foot and hand and eye and hearing and 
smell, who will comprise the head, who [will be] the feet and the rest 
of the parts both those weaker and lower and unseemly and those 
honourable; it is He who will compose the body33 and it is then that he 
will bestow more honour upon those who are now inferior, so that 
there will be no more ’schism in the body, but the members have the 
same care one for another’34 and if one member suffers, all the 
members will suffer with it and if it is honoured, all [the members] 
rejoice with it.".35
The conception of "resurrection" of the entire "body" of Christ 
is fundamental in order to understand the meaning of this "end". In fact 
the notion of "body" of Christ36 is one of the most expressive of 
Origen’s theology.
In Cels it is stated that "the divine scriptures teach the 
doctrine of the resurrection in a mysterious form (puoxiKuig) to those 
who are capable of hearing God's words with a divine power of hearing;
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and they say that the temple will be rebuilt with living and precious 
stones. This obscurely refers to the doctrine that each of those who 
are united through the same Logos ... is a precious stone of the entire 
temple of God.".37
Origen grounds this view by appealing to scriptural passages 
such as I Peter 2,5 and Eph.2,20. Again he suggests his conception of 
the “end” quoting a passage of Isaiah:
"Some such mysterious meaning (xiva puaxiKov exei vouv) is 
contained in the passage of Isaiah addressed to Jerusalem, which reads 
as follows: 'Behold I prepare for thee a carbuncle as thy stone and 
sapphire as thy foundations, and I will make thy battlements of jasper 
and thy gates stones of crystal and thy wall of chosen stones. And all 
thy sons shall be taught by God, and thy children shall dwell in much 
peace, and shall be built in rigteousness'/'.38
At that point of Cels Origen states that "it is not the 
appropriate moment" to explain the deeper meaning of these stones and 
their nature.39 Yet in comm John he cites the same passage of Isaiah 
(namely, ls.54,11-14) as well as the passage ls.60,13-20. He there 
concludes that these sayings denote the resurrection of the entire body 
of Christ. For "those who feel in captivity were once in the temple and 
they will again return there and will be rebuilt and become the most 
precious40 of stones; for it is also from John in the Revelation that one 
has the promise (cna^sRiav) that once he overcomes he will be a pillar 
in the temple of God and he shall no more go out.".41
As Origen himself points out, these are his interpretations of 
the sayings of "the temple and house of God and the church and 
Jerusalem" whereas the entire discussion is about the expression in 
John 2,21, where there is reference to the "temple of his (sc. Christ's) 
body".42 This is the context in which he speaks of "the great 
resurrection of the body of Christ, namely [the resurrection of] his holy
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church".43
Origen’s view is that the notion of "body” of Christ is expounded 
"mystically and in obscure way in the divine scriptures"44 yet he offers 
an exegesis of its meaning:
"According to the teaching of the divine scriptures the body of 
Christ, the soul of which is the Son of God, is the whole church of 
God,45 and that the limbs of this body, which is regarded to be a 
whole, are those who believe, whoever they may be. For a soul gives 
life to a body and moves it, since it has not the power of 
self-movement like a divine being; so also the Logos, which moves and 
acts upon the whole body for needful purposes, moves the church and
each of the members of the church who do nothing apart from the
Logos.".45
§3. The absolute end
The notion of "end" as the "final" one is grounded on the passage 
in I Cor. 15,28: "And when all things shall be subdued io him, then shall 
the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, 
that God may be all in all" and in I Cor. 15,25; "Then comes the end, 
when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and Father; when he 
shall have put down all rule and all authority and power.".
In commJohn, Origen states his views in a way mindful of
using scriptural language:
"Since the Father gave all things into his hands and in Christ 
will all be made alive, justice of God is distinct from everyone being 
dispensed to according to his merits; this is denoted as after the 
[saying] 'In Christ shall all be made alive47 follows the [saying] ’But 
everyone in his own order’48 Again you should see that there are 
various orders of those who will be made alive in Christ, when the 
saying ’The Father has given all things unto his hands’ is fulfilled;49 and
514
you can understand it through the [saying] ‘Christ the firstfruits; 
afterward they that are Christ's at his coming, then the end’ (I 
Cor. 15,23), which end will occur with Christ at his presence, when ‘He 
shall deliver the kingdom to God and Father" (I Cor. 15, 24) having 
previously abolished all rule and all authority and power (I Cor. 15, 24 ). 
And I think that they are those against which the struggle is taking 
place, so that there will no more exist any rule and authority and 
power against which this struggle [takes place]; and it is due to this 
that there will no more be struggle, since all rule and authority and 
power will have been abolished. What impels me to consider that the 
abolished ‘all rule and all authority and all power’ are those against 
which the struggle [takes place], is the saying of Paul which follows 
that phrase, namely ’For he must reign until he has put all his enemies 
under his feet’ (I Cor. 15,25); and then ’The last enemy is abolished, 
namely death’ (I Cor. 15,26); and it certainly stands accords with the 
[saying] ’The Father has given all things unto his hands’ (John 13,3), 
which the apostle expresses more clearly stating: ’But when he says 
that all things are put under him, it is clear that [all things are put 
under] except for him who put all things under him’ (I Cor. 15, 27). And 
if all have been put under, it is also clear that ‘[all things are put 
under] except for him who put all things under him’ (I Cor. 15, 27); 
hence also he, about whom it has been written ’He strengthened himself 
against the Lord the Almighty’50 will be among those subject to him, 
having been conquered since he was inferior to the Logos and having 
been put under the image of GocP1 and having been a footstool under 
Christ’s feet.".52
This passage in commJohn is of utmost importance. For it is 
here that Origen portrays his conceptions of the "end", as "perfection of 
all", namely as subjection of all the "enemies" of Christ to him. In the 
same passage he articulates another notion of "end" which is, so to
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speak, the "final" one, namely when Christ "surrenders the kingdom" to 
the Father It is a remarkable passage, higly indicative of his 
eschatological conceptions and nontheless of his overall way of thinking 
as a theologian, as Origen expounds his notions almost entirely using 
scriptural language.
In the same work he reiterates his conception of the final end 
at the point where he ponders upon the meaning of the term "until" 
(eojg) which "denotes a notion of time".53 It is there that he states that 
"after the consummation of the aeon" Christ will "be with" his disciples 
u n til all his enemies be put by the Father as a footstool under his feet" 
and "a fte r th a t, when the son surrenders the kingdom to God and 
Father, he [sc. the Father] will tell them ’Lo, I am with you;* ".54
It is remarkable that Origen speaks of Christ reigning 
"throughout the aeons" (6ia xwv aiwviuv) and connecting this perception 
to a notion of "until".55 This means that it would be misleading to 
translate the expression 6ia tujv auuviuv as "eternally" -at least when 
one expounds Origen’s thought. Further (namely, in the passage above), 
the notion of "until” is related to a perception of an "after that".
Thus the succession of notions is this:" Christ reigns throughout 
the aeons... u n til... a fte r th a t...".
This conception clearly indicates that the "end", perceived as 
the "subjection of all the enemies" to Christ, is followed by an ’’after 
that”, which means that this "subjection” (namely, the perfection of all) 
does not in itself mark an absolute end. It is exactly through the 
expression "after that" that Origen portrays his notion of the final end, 
namely when Christ will surrender the kingdom to God and Father.
This notion of the final end is enunciated at another point in the 
same work, where Origen explicates his own conception of the absolute 
end:
"And I do believe that th is is  the end, namely when the Son
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surrenders the kingdom to God and Father and when God becomes all in 
all".56
Origen here uses the phraseology of I Cor. 15,24 and then that 
of I Cor. 15, 28. This is a point which shows how unfair Augustine was 
to Origen in attributing to him an infinite repetition of worlds.
In view of our discussion so far, the opinion that Origen has no 
ideas which can be called eschatological is absolutely absurd. This is 
what Hal Koch alleges. He argues that Origen has no eschatology and 
there is no actual direction of the world towards an end; what he 
comprehended in Origen’s thought is that "the whole is an uninterrupted 
development which is in all circumstances directed by Providence in 
the way which is best for all men".57 However, if Origen’s thought were 
to be characterized by one expression it would be that this thought is 
earnestly and dramatically eschatological -and this fact has totally 
eluded H. Koch. Our ensuing discussion in this chapter will show that 
the earnest eschatological orientation constitutes the predominant 
characteristic of the whole of Origen’s thought.
In commflatt, Origen alludes to his notion of consummation as 
the "end" of an aeon yet not as an absolute end. It is according to this 
perception that he extends his views of divine judgement.58 Consequent 
on his views of the outcome of judgement, he avers that "the just will 
shine’’59 not all of them equally but "differently" (SicKpopug) one from 
another; yet this "difference" pertains not to what will happen not at 
the end, but only "in the former stages" (Kaid xag apxag).60 What he 
holds is that when Jesus says that "the just will shine like the sun in 
the kingdom of their father" (Matt.5,16) he "indicates a certain secret 
truth Qiuaifjpiov)" which has to be elucidated.51
This is a point where again Origen provides a clear exposition 
of his conception of time. His view is that the saying of Jesus "Let your 
light so shine before men" (Matt.5,16) may refer to three different
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existential states: It may refer to the apostles of Jesus during their 
lifetime; it also may refer to the period "after the exodus and until the 
resurrection", namely to the period until the end of the aeon, as 
discussed in chapter 3, §1. Finally, it may refer to the time "after the 
resurrection"62 and this will continue "u n til"  all rational creatures 
become "a perfect man"63 " and they a ll become one sun; it is then that 
they will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their father.".64
It is exactly through this notion of "a fte r the resurrection ... 
u n til... a ll become one sun" that Origen articulates his conception of 
time until the point of perfection of all rational creatures. He refers to 
that status saying that they "will no more shine differently as in the 
early stages" but they will "a ll [shine] like one sun".65
Origen is particularly conscious of the various meanings that 
the term "one" CEv) may have; thus he affirms that "the [term] ‘one* is 
used in many ways and in many figures of speech"66 So, when this term 
is used pertaining to the universal perfection it has a particular 
meaning befitting this notion; this meaning is to be "one body" of which 
Christ is the "head". This body, as "one", however, is not yet a 
historical reality. For evil still exists and this entails "diversity" 
which is the opposite of the desired "one" body. Yet it is due to the 
conviction of final abolition of evil and the "resurrection" of the entire 
"body" of Christ, which was "exemplified’67 at the time of his 
incarnation, that Christ is the "head according to a prefiguration (K a id  
npoxunuaiv) of his resurrection’68 which will be realized at the time 
when all rational creatures will be restored in "one" body. For that 
time marks the victory over those who "fight against the unity of the 
temple", namely the "body" of Christ.69
Thus Origen holds that there will be a future time at which all 
rational creatures will be "saved", namely they will have attained to 
the highest rank of life. But even in that state the radical "chasm"
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between God and the world will still exist. It is quite characteristic 
how he portrays this relation to God in a passage commenting on 
Matt.3,2:
“Kingdom of heavens ... is the presence of him (sc. Christ); for 
it is this [presence] which grants us the partaking of the spirit and the 
elevation to heavens, and to the saints [it grants] the existential 
orientation towards unchangeable good in the aeon to come (kcci to sig 
a a^9ov xoig a^otg sv xui saopsvu aiwvi axpenxov)."70
The preposition stg (to) indicates a state "towards" or "near" 
what is "good" and "unchangeable", namely God, since it is only to Him 
that Origen attributes the property of being "essentially good" and 
"unchangeable", as we have seen. The same preposition also indicates 
the "goal" or "direction" of a person or condition; and it is quite 
remarkable that Origen does not depict this state of the "saints in the 
aeon to come" as " in  (which would be sv) unchangeable good" but uses a 
preposition indicating that there is a further goal to be reached. The 
universal perfection is not the absolute end, which constitutes a reality 
subsequent to perfection of all, as we shall discuss next.
The notion of "after" the eternal life . It is a fact Origen that 
holds a notion of a fte r the eternal life. In Cels he suggests this notion 
when he states:
"Surely these narratives, particularly when properly 
understood, will appear more impressive than that of Dionysus, that he 
was deceived by the Titans so that he left the throne of Zeus and was 
torn in pieces by them, that after this he was put together again and 
was, as it were, restored to life, and went up to heaven?71 Or are the 
Greeks allowed to explain and allegorize this story as referring to the 
soul, while against us the door has been closed so that we may not give 
any consistent explanation which harmonizes and agrees in all respects 
with the scriptures inspired by the divine spirit dwelling in pure
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souls? Celsus does not understand the meaning of our scriptures at all. 
On this account his criticism touches his own interpretation and not 
that of the Bible. If he had understood what follows upon a soul whicl 
w ill he in eternal life  (x[ aKoRou9e( ijjuxfj ev aiuviaj eaopevT] gwfj) and 
what is the right view of its essence and origin, he would not have 
ridiculed in this way the idea of an immortal entering a mortal body; 
(our view here does not accept the Platonic doctrine of the 
transmigration of souls, but a different and more sublime view). He 
would also have understood how because of his great love to man, God
made one special descent in order to convert those whom the divine
scripture mystically calls ‘the lost sheep of the house of Israel*,72 
which had strayed down from the mountains; in certain parables73 the 
shepherd is said to have come down to them, leaving on the mountains 
those which had not gone astray.”74
What constitutes the content of "hope” of rational creatures in 
this existential status is not to stay "out" of the divine reality ac 
infinitum  but to "enter into" the timeless eternity of God. This "hope" 
may be fulfilled only through Christ and this is the sense in which 
Origen regards Christ not only as the "road" but also as the "gate" to 
God;75 this is the sense in which the Logos "in not yet gate to those for
whom he is road and he is no more road to those for whom he is
gate".76
Thus Christ is the "road" leading to an "end", namely eternal 
life; yet this end is not an absolute one. To those who have reached this 
"end" he is the "gate" through which they will enter into the timeless 
eternity of God. This is why Origen quotes the passage in John 11,25 "I 
am the resurrection" stating that Christ "is the resurrection ... but also 
the gate through which one enters the utmost blessedness".77
What constitutes "hope" in eternal life is exactly to "enter" 
into the divine reality through Christ. Subsequently Origen calls the
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place of eternal life not only as "topmost edge" (ctKpujpsiav)78 but he 
also calls it as "topmost edge of hope" (aKpwpsiav eRni&og).79 
Accordingly, in homJer, he avers:
"It is possible that we change our abode and, from being today 
in the lower regions to ascend and become body of God which is above; 
thus if we ascend and improve ourselves we shall become" "body of God 
which is in height".80
Commenting on Ps.56,2 ("In the shadow of your wings I shall 
hope until evil passes away") he states: "Until evil passes away a just 
person maintains his hope in the shadow of the wings of God; but once 
evil passes away and it is abolished into non-being, he will no more 
hope in shadow, but in him.".81
Thus fundamental characteristics of Origen's conception of 
time, namely hope and expectation are maintained also in the time of 
eternal life, even though in that case these categories acquire a 
different significance.
In portraying this conception, Origen remains fully consistent 
with his fundamental perception of a radical "chasm" between God and 
the world. In comm John he speaks of the "world" which was created as 
entirely "material ... for those who were in need of material life"; this 
world nevertheless "has various particular spaces".82 Since to be in the 
world means to be material, the entire world (and even the supreme 
particular worlds in it) is regarded as being "down" if compared to the 
incorporeal divine reality. So eternal life is regarded as also being 
"down" "not so much in a spatial sense" (ou xoaouxov xonw) (for there 
can be no spatial comparison between incorporeal and corporeal nature) 
but compared to the "immaterial and invisible and incorporeal" (xa auRa 
Kai xa aopaxa Ka( xa aawpaxa)83 divine reality, which is "up" (avid). 
When therefore it is said that "Christ came to seek and save that which 
was lost" (as in Luke, 19, 10) "he came in order to transpose those who
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became citizens of what is down to what is up (rjR9sv xoug Kdxw kcu 
norlixo8pa(pT)9evxag sv xofg Kaxw pexaoxfjoai en( xa avuj). For it is he 
who descended to the lowest parts of the earth,84 for the sake of those 
existing in the lowest parts of the earth; but he also ascended above all 
the heavens, paving the way (oSonoiuiv) for those who will and are 
genuine pupils of him, that is, paving the road which leads to what is 
above all the heavens, namely to what is incorporeal (sni xa egaj 
aajijidxajv)/*?5
This affirmation of Origen has a real spatial significance and 
it is exactly stated at the point where he expounds his views of the 
spatial structure of the world and its relation to God. But even when 
Origen speaks allegoricaly and "not spatially"85 he again uses the same 
phraseology.
Thus the final goal of striving for salvation is not to stay in 
the eternal life for ever, but to enter into the divine reality.
The "perfection of resurrection". The condition of universal 
perfection is what Origen regards as "resurrection" of the entire "body" 
of Christ. Since this "end", however, is not the "final". For this marks 
the "subjection" of all enemies to Christ and is to be followe by the 
"surrender" of the kingdom by the Son to the Father. So, although 
attaining to eternal life (even as an individual) constitutes a 
"resurrection", Origen visualizes a "resurrection" which is superior to 
any one, namely superior to either individual ascent to eternal life or 
the perfection of all. In commJohn he articulates his notion as the 
"perfection of resurrection" (xo xefteiov xrjg avaaxaaewg) in a passage 
reading thus:
"And his (sc. Christ‘s) resurrection is completed in three days 
in all. This is why resurrection both took place and will take place, 
since we are buried with Christ and resurrected with him;87 for the 
[expression] ‘we are resurrected with him’ is not enough to express the
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completeness of resurrection. 'In Christ shall all be made alive, but 
every one in his own order; Christ the firstfruits, afterward they that 
are Christ's at his coming, then the end.*88 For it was one kind of 
resurrection his being in the paradise of God on the first day89 and it 
was also a kind of resurrection when he is seeming saying 'Touch me 
not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father;".90 But the perfection 01 
resurrection (to tsRsiov xrjg avaoxaosujg) was when he ascended to the 
Father.".91
In view of this conception, eternal life is not the "final end". In 
this state, rational beings are "at the right hand of wisdom"92 and in 
real "life",93 it is a state of resurrection of the entire "body" of Christ, 
but it is not a state in  the Father. It is a reality in the world and, 
thus, in time. Therefore this reality is separated from the divine 
eternity by a radical "chasm". The very fact of being in  the world is 
the cause due to which "viewing" of God "as he is"94 is impossible, since 
"not even the beings of the supreme rank of life see God, not due to 
their incapability but due to God’s incorporeality."95 For in the Wisdom 
of God there are "apperceptions" (9siiipfjpaxa) which can never be 
apprehended by any creature96 at all, not only a human one but any 
creature97 as they can be known only to the Son and to the Holy Spirit 
and to no one else.
As we emphasized in chapter 1, Origen portrays the radical 
transcendence of God to the world in terms of space (expressed as 
corporeality) and time. In the passage above, this "chasm" was 
expressed in terms of corporeality; yet Origen expresses it in terms of 
time, too:
"Mind, which is subject to creation and because of that [it is 
also subject] to time, does not see God as he is. This is why it has not 
simply been said 'No one has seen God’ (John,1, 18) but the [word] 'ever' 
(nwnoxe) (John,1, 18), which denotes a notion of time (xpoviKov xi), has
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been added, so that the saying has a meaning like this; as long as it is 
possible to speak of 'ever* (which implies a notion of being in a lower 
status) ("ooov xpovov to  TiujnoTS' Suvaxai Regsa9ai, wg aqpafvov xi 
unoKSipevov) mind is ruined (spnenpaxai) in corporeal life. This is why 
mind cannot see God by an intellectual act. And we comprehend him 
vaguely and to the extent that it is possible to us through the 
theological conceptions which we hold of him; but God himself has a 
comprehension of himself not through something like that (sc. through 
something like theological conceptions) but in a way appropriate to 
himself, since he is both the comprehension and what is comprehended. 
This is why it is only the son who knows him, as he is comprehended by 
the Father and he comprehends the Father.".98
What, therefore, rational creatures "see" from the eternal life's 
point of view is not God Himself, but it is it is a view through the 
Logos, according to the saying in John 14,9, "He that has seen me has 
seen the Father". This has been said "because he who has seen the Logos 
of God, contemplates God, from the Logos ascending to God; for it is 
impossible to contemplate God, unless through the Logos. And he who 
contemplates the wisdom, whom God made before the aeons toward his 
works,99 he ascends from having known wisdom to her Father; for it is 
impossible to comprehend God of wisdom, unless through being elevated 
to this by wisdom.".100 "Thus the saviour is all the flights of steps, the 
first, as it were, of these being his human nature; and boarding on it 
we walk up to the rest of his, as he is the entire road of stairs, so 
that we can ascend through him who is also of the nature of angels as 
well as [of the nature] of the rest of the higher powers.".101
In this sense, therefore, the existential status in eternal life is 
the closest to God, compared to the rest of ranks of life; yet is is 
"outside" the divine reality. In Origen's view, the "blessed" and "saints" 
do not live in  God but vis-a-vis (svavxiov; face to face) God and it is
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"only them" who live in this way.102
The absolute end. Thus Origen makes the distinction of stages, 
as it were, of resurrection; of them it is "to ascend to the Father" that 
is regarded as "the perfection of resurrection".103 It is indeed through 
this notion that he portrays his conception of the absolute end. And it 
is exactly this "end" that Origen regards as "restoration" 
(anoKaxdaxaaig).104
The very word "apokatastasis" (anoKaxdaxaaig) is used in Acts, 
3,21, whereas the verb anoKa9ioxuj (to restore) is used in 
Jeremiah, 10,10-29. In homJer Origen considers the passage Jer.10,19 
("Therefore thus said the Lord; If you return I will restore 
(anoKaxaoxfjow) you") and comments on that as follows:
"These words are said to each one whom God will call to return 
to him. And it seems to me that a certain secret truth (puoxfjpiov) is 
denoted by the expression ’I will restore you*. No one is restored to a 
place if he has not been there before; restoration (rj anoKaxdoxaotg) is 
understood as a return to a familiar state. If a bone of mine is 
dislocated, the doctor tries to make a restoration (anoKaxaoxaoiv) of 
the bone. When one is exiled from his country, either fairly or unfairly, 
and then acquires the right of staying in his country lawfully, he is 
restored (aneKaxsoxq) to his country. In the same sense you should 
understand a soldier expelled from his troop and then restored 
(anoKa9ioxa|isvou). Thus he here says to us who have gone away that, if 
we return, he will restore (anoKaxaoxfjosi) us. Indeed such is the enc 
o f the promise ( to xeflog xrjg sna^sRiag), as it has been written in the 
Acts of the apostles in [the passage] ‘until the times of restoration of 
all things (axpi ypomv anoKaxaoxaoswg ndvxwv), which God has spoken 
by the mouth of his holy prophets since the world began’ (Acts,3,21) in 
Jesus Christ".105 The three examples which Origen uses in order to 
explain the deeper meaning of "restoration" have been chosen not by
525
chance; for all three of them signify Origen’s conception of both the 
"fall’’ and resurrection. Thus, in selPs, he describes the resurrection 
as the ’’receiving back ... our ancient fatherland".105
In view of the ananlysis of Origen’s in homJer, H. Crouzel’s 
assertion that the notion of anoKazdamvig (restoration) is drawn only 
from I Corinthians 15,23-28, is not correct.107
The conviction that "apokatastasis" will definitely occur is, 
therefore, based on the fact that this has been promised by God and it 
has also been "exemplified" and "prefigured" through the 
resurrection.108 This notion of restoration pre-eminently underlines 
the teleological character of Origen’s conception of time. For 
restoration is the goal towards which the entire world is directed. It 
is according to this conception that he comments on the passage of 
Ezekiel109 "And he will restore his vines" stating that "they will be 
restored (anoKaxaoxf|oovxai) in Christ. It is in him that the prophecy 
will reach its end (Toutuj Kaxanauoei rj npotprjxsta).".110
In commMatt Origen clearly avers that "apokatastasis" marks 
the "end of things" as he states:
"For even if we become able to see God by our mind or heart, 
we do not see him ’as he is’ (I John,3,2) but as he appears to us 
according to his dispensation; but at the end o f things (sni 6e xw xsRei 
xujv npagpaxiijv) and at the "restoration  (anoKaxaaxdasujg) of all things, 
which God has spoken by the mouth of his holy prophets since the world 
began' (Acts, 3, 21) we shall see him not like now, that He does not 
seem as he actually is, but as it is appropriate to that time, which he 
is.".111
When the restoration of all rational beings will have taken 
place, the entirety of Christ’s resurrected "body" will enter into the 
divine being. This is how the realization of the "perfection of 
resurrection", the "surrender" of the kingdom from Christ to the Father
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and the absolute end is portrayed. This final end will be realized 
through a "jump" of this “body” through Christ unto the radically 
transcendent reality over the "chasm" which defines the world as the 
"out" of Cod. If Origen holds the notion of "a fte r the eternal life" this 
is exactly in order to articulate what is going to happen then, namely 
the "perfection of resurrection" as entering into the divine reality.
In commJohn Origen comments on the saying in John 4,14 "but 
the water I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up 
to eternal life".112 He regards this "springing" as reminiscent of a 
similar notion, namely the "skipping" of the bridegroom, as in the Song 
of Songs, a scriptural book which he regards as containing the most 
secret truths of Christian faith.113 The promise of Jesus to the 
Samaritan woman (as in the above-mentioned passage in John 4,14) is 
the promise of Christ to the soul, for its elevation to the eternal life 
through Christ. Yet it is exactly there that Origen affirms that, 
although this promised eternal life constitutes a fulfilment of Christ's 
promise to the world, there is nevertheless an "after" this eternal life, 
which will follow the elevation of rational creatures to it. This is how 
he articulates this notion of "after the eternal life":
"And surely he (sc. who will inherit eternal life) w ill jump 
a fte r the eternal life  unto the Father who is above the eternal life ; 
for Christ is life;114 but he who is greater than Christ115 is greater 
than life.".116
Not only the fact that "life" here is put in the context of 
attaining to eternal life, but also other explicit statements of Origen 
that the term "life" par excellence pertains to the eternal one, show 
that he holds that rational beings have a perspective which is begone 
eternal life. The spatio-temporal character of eternal life is again 
implied here. Thus, in the passage above, Origen indicates the temporal 
element by the term a fte r the eternal life , whereas he indicates the
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spatial element by the term above the eternal life . Both those notions 
suggeste to the divine reality as being beyond the world.
It is also quite significant that this perspective of rational 
beings is portrayed as "greater" than “life". What Origren actually 
means here is that this "jump" marks the "end" of the world's existence 
itself. When he affirms that "Christ is life" and the Father "is greater 
than life" he actually alludes to the radical transcendence of God to 
space and time. We should recall at this point, Origen's affirmation, 
discussed in chapter 1, that of all conceptions of Christ it is only 
Wisdom and Logos that exist in themselves regardless of the existence 
of the world; the rest of the conceptions of Christ are related to the 
existence of the world. Therefore, to "jump" to a reality which is after 
and above the world, is to enter into a reality which is "greater" than 
"life", that is, a reality beyond the world -namely, the divine reality.
This notion of an expected "jump" after the eternal life is very 
significant in order to understand Origen's view of the eschatological 
perspectives of the world. This is why, in Cels, he refers to Jesus 
Christ who "passed through the heavens"117 and "promised those that 
had genuinely learnt the things of God and who lived lives worthy of 
them that he would lead them on to what is above the w orld ; for he 
says "So that where I go, you may be also".118
It is in the light of this view that Origen’s conception of the 
"perfection" of resurrection should be understood. When he literally 
speaks of "space" (xonoug),119 he refers to Christ as him who "came in 
order to transpose those who became citizens of what is down to what 
is up. For it is him who descended to the lowest parts of the earth,120 
for the sake of those being in the lowest parts of the earth; but he also 
ascended above a ll the heavens, paving the way fo r those who will be 
and are genuine pupils to his, namely paving the road which leads to 
what is above a ll the heavens, that is to what is incorporeal ,".121
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This analysis has a literal spatial meaning, as Origen himself 
states. However, continuing this analysis and speaking "not spatially" 
(ou xoniKiug)122 he explains the passage "[He who] ascended up far above 
all heavens"123 by using the same language as in the case of literally 
speaking of "space":
"For the intelligible ascent of that soul (sc. Christ's soul]) 
leaped over a ll the heavens so that it can be said that it reached Goc 
him self,".124
It is generally known that the figures of speech indicate one’s 
overall philosophical perception of the reality. This is what happens 
with Origen here. Beyond that, however, he uses the same expressions 
not only when he speaks in allegories using figures, but also when he 
expounds literally his eschatological perceptions. For he holds that 
certain scriptural affirmations may be understood both "non-spatially" 
(ou6s loniKUjg) and "spatially" (xoniKwg)125 according to the perception of 
the world as consisting of particular "spaces" (xwpioig) of different 
qualities.
In selPs there is also a reference to this notion of Christ's 
"entering" into the divine reality after his resurrection. Commenting on 
Ps.23,8 ("and be ye lifted up eternal gates") he states:
"He says to them the 'be ye lifted up' as if they were rational 
beings; and certainly they are spiritual and not temporary because they 
are immaterial and intangible (6 ia  xo auRov Kai axfjpaxov).126
It is through this figure of speech that Origen visualizes 
Christ’s "returning" to the Father or what he calls as "the perfection of 
resurrection". It is in a similar figure that he portrays the return of 
the entire resurrected "body" of Christ to the divine reality. Since the 
resurrection of Christ exemplified what will happen at the "end" and 
was a prefiguration of the eschatological resurrection of the entirety 
of the world, it is in the same way, therefore, that his resurrected
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“body" (that is, the entirety of rational creatures) will "enter" into the 
divine being.
A careful study of a passage in Cels again shows that Origen 
expresses the same notion there, namely that there is a reality above 
“the arc of heavens" (which, in the same work is denoting eternal 
life127 and this reality is "above the heavens" (unepoupaviov) and 
"outside the world".128 The passage reads thus:
"Even an uneducated Christian is convinced that every place in 
the world is a part of the whole, since the whole world is a temple of 
God; and he prays in any place,129 and by shutting the eyes of sense and 
raising those of the soul he ascends above the entire work
(unspava(3aivsi xov oRov Koapov). He does not stop even at the arc 0/
heaven (xai ou6‘ en( xfjv aijJtSa (axaxai xou oupavou), but comes in mind 
to the super-celestial region{mz$Q\}$6N\.o\i ... xonov),130 being guided by 
the Divine Spirit and being as it were outside the world he sends up 
his prayer to God. His prayer is not concerned with any everyday 
matters; for he has learnt from Jesus to seek for nothing small, that is 
sensible, but only for things that are great and truly divine which, as 
God’s gifts, help in the walking towards to the blessedness w ith Hirr
attained through His son who is the Logos of God.".131
Certainly this passage refers to an personal experience of a 
man during his praying. But this experience is portrayed in terms of 
Origen’s conception of both the relation of the world to God and the 
final perspective of the world, namely to live "with" God in his eternal 
being.
This final goal, namely to live "with" God, is found in the same 
work and articulated in a way really befitting Origen’s scrupulous use 
of the language. It is characteristic that, in order to denote the final 
being "with" God, he does not use any word directly denoting "place", but 
he uses the word 6 is |a ^ f| which generally alludes to "a way of
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living".132 Thus he again refers to the souls striving "to reach to 
become in communion (Koivumav) with God" and "to attain to living with 
God and with what is befitting divine life".133 For to Origen the end of 
the world lies not simply in reaching an "abode" which is nearest God 
but to become "associated with" God.
Accordigly, in expProv, he avers that he who follows a life 
according to the word of Christ "will not only have intercourse 
(npooopiRrjosi) with God but also he will become cohabitee (ouvoucog) 
with him.".134
This passage requires a clear rendering of the terms used, 
because their nuances are vital. The translation above, although near to 
the text, is but the nearest way to render this Greek text into English. 
The terms used are "prosomilo" (npooopiRw) and "synoikos" (ouvoucog). In 
a sense, both may mean "to be associated with". But there is a 
difference which is very significant for the subject discussed here. The 
verb npooopiflu) means "to hold an intercourse with" or "to converse 
with". In the passage above, this term alludes to eternal life and 
denotes the best communication of creatures with God; yet creatures 
are regarded to live in a "place" which is "out" of the divine being. The 
adjective ouvoucog, however, denotes something slightly (but 
significantly) different; to be ouvoucog means "to dwell in the same 
house with" or "to enter the house as an inmate".135 This is what Origen 
here articulates as the final perspective of a rational creature, namely 
to "enter" into the divine reality.
It is in the light of this conception of the "end" that expressions 
like "the teaching about the blessed life and [the teaching about] the 
communion with God" (xui nspi xrjg paicapiag £uf|g Roguj icai xuj nepi xrjg 
npog xo 9eiov Koivuviag)136 should be understood. For Origen, who never 
uses superfluous phrases, here alludes to two different eschatological 
conceptions, namely the eternal life and the final end.
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Accordingly, in the context of his perception that to be in  the 
world, in itself, is an obstacle to "seeing” God,137 he affirms that in 
order to "see" the "face of God" a human being has to be "altered" 
(pcxapdRfleiv as 6eQ and to become not just "angel" but "to become God" 
(rj6r| Ka( Ssov).138 This is the final goal which, in another of his works, 
Origen alludes to by the expression "to be deified".139
There is therefore a final "end" which Origen articulates using 
terms such as " w ill jump a fte r the eternal life  unto the Father who is 
above the eternal life ; promised ... that he would lead them on to 
what is above the world... above a ll the heavens, that is to what is 
incorporeal.’’; "leaped over a ll the heavens " and ... reached Gog 
h im s e lf."He does not stop even at the arc o f heaven, but comes in 
mind to the super-celestial region... being ... outside the w orld ... in the 
walking towards to the blessedness w ith Him attained through His , 
"will not only hold intercourse (npooopiRf|osi) with God but also he wih 
become associate w ith (auvoirog) H im ."; the communion w ith God; to 
become God; and, to become deified.
This is the kind of life, namely the life with the Father, which 
Origen calls as "calm and dimensionless life" (axapaxou xai a&iaaxaxou 
£u)f|g).140 For this alludes to a reality transcendent to both space and 
time. Until it comes to pass, however, rational beings are "outside" the 
divine life, as they are in the world.
At this point we quote a statement in selPs, 60, which 
epitomizes, in the most explicit manner, Origen’s conception of eternal 
life with respect to divine life; in the same passage there is reference 
to the notion of "holy mountain" as suggesting eternal life, according to 
our analyses in chapter 4, §1; it is also here that the notion of after 
the eternal life is clearly enunciated. The passage reads thus:
"The Saviour is the real and persistent hope of the saints; ... 
Once one has been perfected, he sojourns (napoiKeO in the aeons in that
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tabernacle (sv emvu xu 0KT|vujpaxi); this is suggested by the [saying] 
"Who will encamp in your holy mountain"? (Ps.14,1). For what is eternai 
is this tabernacle, which was made by the Lord and not by man. (Aiuiviov 
$ap xouxo xauxov ov xrj OKrjvfj, rjv ern^sv o Kupiog Kai ouk av9pwnog). 
However, whilst this tabernacle is a state of perfection, so that it is 
the Holy of holies, there is a state a fte r that, which is superior to 
rational creatures, in which state they (sc. rational creatures) will be 
in  the Father and the Son, or rather in the Trinity. This is why it is 
has been said about sojourning in the aeons and not inhabiting in the 
tabernacle. (flRrjv si Kai ouxuj xsflsioxTjxog exei fj xoiauxq OKrjvfj, uig Kai 
A^ia xuv agiwv sivai, aRR‘ ouv eaxi pex‘ auxrjv Kaxaaxaaig unepsxouaa 
xuiv Ro^ikujv, Ka9‘ rjv soovxai sv Flaxpi Kai Yiuj, paRRov 6s xrj Tpia6i‘ 6io 
napoiKsiv sig xou aiuivag, aRR* ou koxoiksiv sv xw aKrjvwpaxi siprjxai).".
In this superb passage, the final destination of rational 
creatures is quite vividly portrayed as moving into a state after 
eternal life -and this state is the divine reality itself. To exist in 
space-time is sojourning, that is, a temporary status which had a 
beginning and will come to an end. And this end is clearly envisaged as 
"entering into" the divine life.
Only once how Origen perceives eternal life has been grasped, 
what seems paradoxical may well be understood: Origen regards this 
life both eternal and temporary -as it is explicated in the aforestated 
passage. If one considers the conception of eternal only in terms of 
duration (and indeed, everlasting duration), then the association of the 
terms "eternal" and "temporary" may seem as inwardly contradictory. 
But it is not; and this can be grasped only if the real meaning of 
eternal life (as discussed in chapter 4) has been properly understood.
Thus the state of eternal life is a place where rational beings 
wait to enter into the divine reality through Christ. This "entering" 
constitutes their hope in that existential status. While to those still =
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in the lower ranks of life, Christ is the "road" (being not yet the "gate" 
to them), he is the "gate" (being not the road any more) to those who 
will finally "jump" from the eternal life to the Father, who is after 
and above the eternal life. For Origen is clear in enunciating his view 
that Christ is the gate leading to God,141
Accordingly, regarding the passage Ps.21,28 ("For the kingdom 
is of the Lord and he reigns upon the nations") he comments thus:
"For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his 
feet. It is the same as if he were saying that [this will happen] when 
all the wicked will become just, having stopped to be earthly and 
corruptible.".142
It is quite remarkable to see how Origen comments Ps.21,31 
("And my soul lives in him"). The expression "in  him" (namely, God) is a 
challenge to his exegesis, but he does face it. He again alludes to his 
statement about the soul of Christ stated in commJohn: "For the 
intelligible ascent of that soul leaped over a ll the heavens so that it 
can be said that it reached God him self .".143 It is in the light of this 
passage that he provides this exegesis on the above- mentioned passage 
of the Psalms: "It is only the soul of God which lives in God, having 
knowledge not only of what is created (xuiv gsgovoxuv) but also of God 
himself."144 So, in a passage suggesting a notion of being in  God Origen 
remains consistent with his fundamental view that the world is out of 
God; and he does so although he here has to employ an allegory of the 
term "soul". For, strictly speaking, he regards the term "soul" as 
applying only to the human rank of life.145
So Origen holds that there will be an "end" of the kingdom of 
Christ and it is exactly on the Psalms as well as on Paul that he 
grounds this view. This "end" will occur when all rational beings will 
have been raised up to the eternal life. It is certainly no accident that 
he expresses this conception by using the same words as in the
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above-mentioned passages of the Scripture. And the core of this 
conception exactly lies in the expression that Christ will “reign u n til", 
as the very term "until” denotes a temporal termination of this "reign".
In commJohn Origen states the passage of John 13,3; "Jesus 
knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he 
came out of God and he goes to God, he rises from the supper."; and the 
text continues with Origen’s own comment: "Surely then those which did 
not formerly exist have been given into the hands of Christ; and not 
some of them have [been given] whereas some have not [been given], but 
all of them [have been given to the hands of Christ]; this is what David 
sees through the spirit and says the [saying] The Lord said unto my 
Lord, Sit you at my right hand, until I put your enemies a footstool 
under your feet*."145
Thus, as regards the eschatology of Origen, there are two 
distinct conceptions of the end:
First, the "end" alludes to the subjection of the entire world to 
the Son; this is portaged as the resurrection of the entire "body" of 
Christ. This end, however, it is not the final end.
Secondly, the "end" is conceived as the subjection of the Son to 
the Father. It will occur when the entire world, existentially being in 
the status portrayed as "resurrected" body of Christ, "jumps" through 
Christ into the timeless being of God and time reaches its end. This 
marks the absolute end of the world and is perceived as the final end.
This is a fundamental distinction which should be made in 
Origen’s conception of the end. For unless this distinction has been 
made there will be a lot of confusion about what Origen really held. 
This confusion has not been avoided, as we shall discuss later in this 
chapter.
It is in view of these different conceptions of the "end" that 
certain interpretations of Origen should be understood. He considers the
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saying about Christ in Revelation, namely that he is "first and last".147 
Commenting on this, he states that Christ "regarded as firs t is 
different from being the Alpha and the apxn (beginning); and regarded 
as la s t, he is different from being the Omega and the end.".148 What he 
suggests here is the two different conceptions of the term "end" as 
discussed above. For Christ is understood to be "first" regarded in his 
relation to the creation; he is the wisdom who "willed" "to establish a 
creative relation to the future beings" and brought them into being, as 
Logos of God. But he is "Alpha and apxrf' regarded as wisdom, who, in 
herself, has nothing to do with creation. Accordingly, Christ is "last" 
regarded as he who will "surrender the kingdom to the Father"; that is, 
he is again regarded in his creation with the creation. But he is "Omega 
and end" if one regards the final end, when there will be no more world 
and "God will be all in all", as we discuss later in this chapter. In 
short, Christ’s conception as "first and last" allude to his being the 
Logos, whereas his conception as "beginning and end" allude to his being 
the Wisdom of God.
According to this distinction, in the "On Proverbs", Origen 
provides a similar exegesis on the passage Prov.1,7 "Fear of the Lord is 
the beginning of wisdom". He there states that when in the Revelation is 
is said "I am the beginning and the end" (Rev. 1,8), Christ is the 
"beginning" since he gave the creatures their being; and he is the "end" 
due to his being the means for their perfection.149
These different conceptions of "end" can also be traced in the 
Latin rendering of Princ. Indeed it is only after the distinction of the 
various meanings of "end" has been made (namely, what Origen calls as 
"clarifying the homonyms") that a study of this translation may be 
possible. For, as we shall argue, many of the miscomprehensions 
surrounding Origen’s thought are due to failure to regard the notion of 
"end" as a homonym and to "clarify" it properly, namely to enquire into
536
which "end" the text refers to. In the light of our previous discussion, 
therefore, we may now consider how Origen’s thought appears in Princ:
"The end of the world and the consummation will come when 
every soul shall be visited with the penalties due for its sins. This 
time, when everyone shall pay what he owes, is known to God alone. We 
believe, however, that the goodness of God through Christ will restore 
this entire creation to one end,150 even his enemies being conquered and 
subdued. For so says the holy scripture: ’The Lord said unto my Lord, 
Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies the footstool of 
thy feet'.151 And if it is not very evident what the prophetic language 
here means, let us learn from Paul the Apostle, who says more openly, 
'Christ must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet’.152 
But if even this clear declaration of the Apostle is not sufficient to 
inform us what is the meaning of 'putting enemies under his feet’, hear 
further what he says in the words that follow: 'For all things must be 
made subject to him’.153 What then is this ’subjection’, by which 'all 
things must be made subject’ to Christ? In my opinion it is the same 
subjection by which we too desire to be subjected to him, and by which 
the apostles and all the saints who have followed Christ were subject 
to him. For the word subjection, when used of our subjection to Christ, 
implies the salvation, proceeding from Christ, of those who are subject; 
as David also said, 'Shall not my soul be subject to God? For of him 
cometh my salvation’."154
There is particular care in dealing with the meaning of this 
"subjection". As the question seems to had been controversial, he refers 
to "the heretics" who do not understand the real meaning of the 
apostolic words and takes some further steps towards clarifying how 
he perceives the meaning of the "subjection" of the son to the Father. 
Thus "the subjection of Christ to the Father reveals the blessedness of 
our perfection and announces the crowning glory of the work
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undertaken by him, since he offers to the Father not ony the sum total 
of all ruling and reigning which he has amended throughout the entire 
universe but also the laws, corrected and renewed, of the obedience and 
subjection due from the human race" So "when the Son is said to be 
subjected to the Father the perfect restoration of the entire creation 
is announced, so when his enemies are said to be subjected to the Son 
of God we are to understand this to involve the salvation of those 
subjected and the restoration of those that have been lost.".155
So the view that Christ "must reign till he puts his enemies 
under his feet"156 is found alike in the writings in Greek. It is also 
stated that Christ was incarnated "to renew the capacity not only for 
ruling and reigning but also for obeying" and it was he who "first 
fulfilled in himself what he wished to be fulfilled by others and not 
only became obedient to the Father ‘even unto the death of the 
cross’,157 but also at the consummation of the age, by his inclusion in 
himself of all those whom he subjected to the Father and who through 
him come to salvation, he himself, with them and in them, is also said 
to be ’subjected’ to the Father, when ’all things’ shall ’subsist in him’ 
and he shall be the ‘head of all things’ and in him shall be the ‘fulness’ 
of those who obtain salvation. This then is what the apostle says of 
him: ’When all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son 
also himself be subjected unto him that did subject all things unto him, 
that God may be all in an’."158
So when it is stated that "in all those periods and ages to come 
... the dispersion and division of the one beginning is to be restored to 
one and the same end",159 it is the "end" as "restoration" that this 
passage refers to.
It is obvious, therefore, that the notion of "subjection" of the 
entire world to Christ implies the perfection of the world; that is, it 
pertains to the m oral status of the world. The natural status of this,
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however, remains unchanged; the world does exist, as it previously did, 
as a natural reality. The "subjection" to Christ means the "salvation" of 
the entirety of rational creatures, namely the "ascent" of them all to 
the supreme rank of life.
Accordingly, after the analysis of "that earth", namely eternal 
life,160 the text concludes as follows:
"This, then, is how we must suppose that events happen in the 
consummation and restitution of all things, namely, that souls, 
advancing and ascending little by little in due measure and order, first 
attain to that other earth and the instruction that is in it, and are 
prepared for those better precepts to which nothing can ever be added. 
For in the place of ’stewards’ and ’governors’161 Christ the Lord, who is 
King of all, will himself take over the kingdom; ... and will reign in 
them until such time as he subjects them to the Father who subjected 
all things to him (I Cor. 15,28); or in other words, when they have been 
rendered capable of receiving God, then God will be to them ’all in
all” ' 162
In view of Origen's notions as found in his works in Greek one 
may discern similar ones behind a vague rendering of the text of Print 
Thus a certain passage reads as follows: "and just as by his present 
coming he has fulfilled that law which has a ’shadow of the good things 
to come’,163 so also by that glorious coming the shadow of his first 
coming will be fulfilled and brought to perfection . For the prophet has 
spoken of it thus: ’The breath of our countenance is Christ the Lord, of 
whom we said that under his shadow we shall live among the 
nations’,164 that is, at the time when he shall duly transfer all the 
saints from  the temporal to the eternal gospel, to use a phrase 
employed by John in the Apocalypse, where he speaks of the ’eternal 
gospel’.".165
It is there that one may discern the notion of the perfection of
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resurrection as well as that this "perfection" pertains to the entire 
body of Christ as his incarnation was a prefiguration of that 
eschatological resurrection. Indeed, even the notion of "jump" of this 
resurrected body to the divine eternity can be traced behind the phrase 
that Christ shall "transfer all the saints from the temporal to the 
eternal gospel". The distinction between "temporal" and "eternal" 
clearly indicates that this "transfer" is from a temporal to a timeless 
reality, namely to the divine one. The "saints" no more "contemplate" 
the eternal gospel but they are "transferred" into it. It is exactly then 
that the "perfection" of resurrection is realized, in exactly the same 
sense that Origen speaks of "perfection of resurrection" in comm John.
At this point Koetschau incorporates the so-called Fragment 30, 
in which Justinian attributes to Origen a notion of "continuous passion" 
of Christ. The last phrase of this passage, however, regarded against 
the background of the Latin text above, stands in accordance with 
Origen’s authentic views. For the passage concludes by Justinian’s 
assertion that according to Origen this "suffering" of Christ "will 
happen in the ages to come until the end of the whole world...".166 That 
the real meaning of this "passion" has entirely eluded Justinian has 
been discussed in chapter 3. What is of significance for the question at 
hand, however, is that the "perfection" of resurrection and the 
"transfer" of rational beings from what is "temporal" to what is 
"eternal" is connected to the notion of the "end of the whole world". 
This sequence of notions, as extended in Princ, is indeed what Origen 
really held about the eschatological course of the world and its final 
destination and end.
The dissolution of corporeality into non-being. This notion of 
"after the eternal life" and the final end of the world alludes exactly to 
corporeality dissolved into non-being. For the "entering" into the divine 
reality and to be "in communion" with God and indeed to be "deified"
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actually implies and entails that there will be no more any radical 
"chasm" between God and the world. This, in the final analysis, means 
that what constitutes the make-up of the world, namely space and time, 
will come to an end. The termination of the existence of corporeal 
nature is just a particular consequence of the reality of space coming 
to an end. For corporeal nature is but a demonstration of the reality of 
space, which, in Origen’s works, is particularly expressed in terms of 
corporeality.
In fact, Origen holds a conception of a perspective of corporeal 
nature to be dissolved into non-being. In exhMar he affirms that "in 
God" there are "apperceptions ... which no nature which is in a body is 
able to comprehend if it does not get rid of any body (|ifj npoxspov 
anaRFIa^siaa navxog aujpaxog)".167 This reality alludes to the entering 
into the divine reality, as it is clearly suggested from the continuation 
of this passage. Origen refers to the "liberation" of the entire 
creation,168 namely the dissolution of heavenly bodies into 
incorporeality and he also alludes to his notion that in Christ there are 
"apperceptions" which can be comprehended only by him. It is an 
eschatological hope that these apperceptions will be comprehended 
when the absolute end will occur. Thus he states:
"For I am persuaded that God is keeping and storing in himself 
far greater wonders than are seen by sun, moon, and the choir of stars, 
and even by the holy angels whom God made ’spirit' and 'flame of 
fire’,169 so that he may reveal them when the whole creation is 
liberated from the bondage of the enemy to the liberty of the glory of 
the children of God.’’170 This is one of the points where the 
perspectives of corporeal nature are directly related to the final 
abolition of evil and the subsequent absolute end.
Accordingly, at another point he states: "And I think that it is 
they who with a great desire to come to union with God (npog xo
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Koiviovrioai xiu 8eui) withdraw and separate their soul not only from the 
earthly body but also from any body (ou povov ano xou grjivou aujpaxog 
arlfld kcu ano navxog awpaxog) that love God with all their soul;".171 In 
the same work he affirms that God "shows Himself to those to whom He 
judges right to appear, so far as it is possible for God to be known to 
man and for human soul which is  s t ill in  a body (av9piljnou 6e ijjuxq exi 
ouaa sv awpaxi) to know God.".172
Even the creatures of the highest ranks of life do not "see" God 
"not because of their incapacity, but because of God's incorporeality"; 
for "mind" which is bound with both time and corporeality cannot see 
God, because He is invisible from a "material life's" point of view. Thus 
it is not possible to see God due to the very fact that creatures are 
"involved with matter".173
As Origen affirms at this point, mind is involved with matter 
due to the very fact that it is created. This is the notion through which 
any allegation of Origen’s views’ affinity to the Platonic ones is 
excluded. What is originated in the "fan" is not the change of 
existential status of any pre-existing incorporeal world but it is the 
creation itself of rational creatures. Thus the fundamental cause of 
not "seeing" God is not "corporeality" itself, but it is the very fact that 
rational beings have been created as individual personal hypostases. 
And to be in the actual creation, in itself, o f necessity entails to be in 
time as well as in corporeality. This is how his views on this subject 
are fundamentally different from those of Plato’s. Certainly "material 
life" is a "fallen" status174 yet this notion has nothing to do with the 
Platonic views. For it is not a fallen status of any pre-existing 
personal individual incorporeal creatures. It is a status of temporal and 
corporeal beings; their being "fallen" is understood to lie in the fact 
that they are created as individuals and not to the fact that they are 
by essence temporal and corporeal -which is an essential and
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inescapable characteristic of being in the actual creation.
What Origen actually portrays by affirmations like these is the 
‘‘hope" to return to God, the "fulfilment" of the "final" end as it has been 
exemplified and prefigured in the person of Jesus Christ. This is why, 
in the same paragraph, he cites scriptural passages like "When shall I 
arrive and see the face of God?"175 and "I shall pass through in the 
place of the wonderful tabernacle which is located as far as the house 
of God (eug xou oikou xou Geou), with a voice of rejoicing and of 
confession of a festal sound.".176
It is remarkable that he cites those scriptural passages that 
most properly allude to his view of eternal life and the final end. Thus 
he cites the passage of the Psalms where the "final end" is implied, as 
it speaks of "arrival" (that is, reaching the final point of a destination) 
and "seeing the face of God" which, in Origen's view, is possible only 
when any body has been discarded. On the other hand, he cites the 
passage in Acts where the eternal life is spoken of as a place where 
one does not "arrive" but he "passes through", which implies that this 
place is not a final destination but a temporary residence; and it is 
also stated that this place is located "as far as the house of God" (ewg 
xou oikou xou 8eou) but it is not in  the house of God.
In selPs Origen clearly states his view that "the corporeal 
substance" will be "abolished".177 Thus it is not unexpectedly affirmed 
that "incorporeal nature is the throne of Christ"178 as it is 
incorporeality that exists beyond time whereas corporeal nature exists 
but for a definite period of time.
In Cels he speaks of "ways that have been appointed for the 
alterations of bodies, which [bodies] comprise the w orld , for as long 
as it  ex ists")13 So here he again refers to his notion that the world is 
a material reality which will exist but for a definite period of time. He 
further suggests the same conception as he speaks of "the day after the
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making of the world which is the object of his activity as long as the 
world exists, the day of the sabbath and the cessation of God.".180 In the 
same work, it is quite indicative of his views that he speaks of "a 
certain fixed time when the world will be brought to the end, which it 
must necessarily have since it had a beginning.181
The very affirmation that the world will finally come to an end 
is actually implying the notion that corporeal nature will come to an 
end of existence. For the categories of "corporeality" and "world" are 
firmly connected in Origen’s thought, so that one of them cannot make 
sense without the implication of the other, as we argued in chapter 1. 
This notion is also found in selPs where Origen states:
"For if the moon is abolished time is abolished, too; and once 
time is abolished the perceptible world will come to an end’’.182
What is significant in this passage is not only the implied 
conception of the end of the world; but also the view of time as 
"extended alongside with the structure of this world" is reiterated. 
What Origen actually says here is that space and time exist in close 
relation to each other and their end can be perceived only as as 
simultaneous. Thus, in the passage above, one can discern this: In the 
first sentence, "abolition of space" (expressed as "moon") is stated as a 
cause for abolition of time. In the second sentence, "abolition of time" 
is a cause of abolition of space (expressed as "the perceptible world"). 
The succession of these two sentences denotes the notion of 
sim ultaneity of either existence or non-existence of space and time; 
that is, it indicates the existence or non-existence of space-time as 
one reality.
The passage above183 seems to indicate a certain affinity 
between Origen’s conception of time to that of Chryssippus who 
directly related time to the heavenly bodies. The fundemantal 
difference, however, lies in Origen’s different perceptions of what is
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“material" and "temporal". Thus, although time is certainly related to 
the heavenly bodies, yet is is understood to exist in a "broader" world 
and not only to the perceptible one. This passage, nevertheless, is 
indicative of Origen’s view of "place" on the one hand and rational 
beings as "inhabitants" of these places on the other. So, the reality 
space-time will come to an end and this end will be the final end 
regardless of whether or not there will be rational creatures in the 
particulars "spaces". So, although at the time of the "end" human beings 
may not exist at all (as they may have attained to higher ranks of life), 
their "space" (namely, the perceptible world) will exist and it is only at 
that time that it will be dissolved into nothing, together with the 
entire reality of space-time, of which this particular world is 
understood to be a part.
Accordingly, in deOr, Origen again relates the existence of 
time to that of heavenly bodies, as he states:
"And we have to consider if the words written of feasts or 
solemn assemblies that take place according to ’days’ or ’months’ or 
’seasons’ or ’years’184 are to be referred to ages. For if ‘the law’ has ‘a 
shadow of the things to come’185 it must needs be that the many 
sabbaths are a ’shadow’ of so many days and that the beginnings of 
months (xag voufiqviag) come round in intervals of time (6ia xpovucaiv 
6iaaxr)}idxu)v), and I know not under which moon accompanying which sun 
they [i.e. the beginnings of months] are determined (eviaxaa9at).186
This passage is quite indicative of Origen's conception of time. 
He is not interested in relating heavenly bodies to the very existence of 
time as an "extension" (&iaoxq|idxojv) in itself; but he regards the 
heavenly bodies as rather indicating the particular periods (days, 
months, years) of time and not establishing the very reality of time 
itself. This is a fundamental view of Origen and it is according to it 
that he regards the heavenly bodies as having been subjected to
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“vanity", namely to carry out the task of indicating the various periods 
of time and the "kairoi" in which certain actions are taken by "angels" 
who "read the book of God", namely the heaven which indiacates the 
appropriate times. Thus, heavenly bodies are certainly connected to 
time; yet as heavenly bodies do not in themselves establish the reality 
of time in itself but they just indicate the various periods of it. They 
are connected to time its e lf only in as much as they are understood as 
indicating the very reality of space . In respect of this, Origen’s 
conception of time is essentially beyond that of Chrysippus. This is the 
basis on which Basil employed Origen’s conception of time and attacked 
Eunomius assertions about time proper, as we saw in chapter 2.
Indeed, Origen holds a much more general conception of the 
close relation of time to space, particularly expressed as corporeality. 
In frJohn he states expresses his view that "mind" is subject to being 
in time due to the very fact that is has been "created"; and he further 
affirms that "mind" will be subject to being in time as long as (ooov 
Xpovov) "material life" exists, namely as long as corporeality exists.187 
Thus the existence of time its e lf is not understood to be essentially 
related to the existence of of the heavenly bodies, but it is related to 
the category of being created and it is thus that the reality of time is 
held to pertain to the entire world and not only to the visible 
firmament.
As we mentioned previously, in Origen's thought the notions of 
"cyclicity" and "vanity" stand to a close relation. This conception mainly 
stems from considering the text of Paul in Rom.8,20-21, where he says 
that "The creation was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by reason 
of him who subjected it in hope, because the creation itself also shall 
be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the 
glory of the children of God". His view is that here "hope" means that 
the "sun and moon and stars and the angels of God should fulfil an
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obedient service for the world; and it was for those souls which on 
account of their excessive spiritual defects required these grosser and 
more solid bodies and also for the sake of those others for whom this 
arrangement was necessary that the present visible world was 
instituted.".188
Besides "cyclicity", the notion of "vanity" is also closely related 
to that of "corporeality". This is why Origen deems that "everything 
pertaining to corporeality is vanity" ( id  aujpaxiKd navxa paxaioxqg 
eaxiv),189 and "bodies themselves is vanity and to carry out actions 
pertaining to body is vanity" (iva  jiaxa ioxqg xa aujjiaxa fj Kai xo noieiv 
xa oujiaxiKd).190 This is a main reason for Origen not to be particularly 
interested in the nature itself and to refer to it only secondarily.191
In this context, "hope" means the extinction of heavenly bodies, 
that is, the world’s coming to an end. So he states:
"Nevertheless, the entire creation cherises a hope of liberation, 
a hope of being ’delivered from the bondage of corruption'192 when the 
‘children of God', who had both fallen and become scattered, have been 
gathered into one,193 and when the others have fulfilled in this world 
the rest of their duties, which are known solely to God, the Artificer 
of all things.’’.194
In Origen’s view, especially stated in many points of commJohn■ 
the movement of heavenly bodies certainly is not a "free" movement. 
Their "hope" in that case is that their "bodies" will at the end be 
abolished and thus this non-freedom will come to an end. This is 
supposed to happen when corporeal nature itself will be dissolved into 
non-being, namely at the end of the world. This is the sense in which 
the "end" constitutes their "hope".
As a matter of fact, the very notion that corporeality will come 
to an end of existence can directly be deducted by the very fact that 
the world will come to an end, in the sense discussed above. According
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to the fundamental existential characteristics of the reality of the 
world, (that is the world as comprising space and time) ,,end,, of the 
world automatically entails the "end” of corporeality as well as of 
time. There can be no other sense in which the entire resurrected 
"body" of Christ can be understood to come in union to the divine reality 
which is radically transcendent to both space and time.
To trace this conviction of Origen, namely that corporeality 
will at the final end be abolished, in the Latin translation of the Princ 
is not difficult in itself. However, since in that work the various 
meanings of "end" as a homonym have not been distinguished, there is a 
lot of confusion surrounding this notion. Rufinus has obviously tried to 
modify the text so that he might render a work with "orthodox” views 
or at least render a rather obscure text; yet he did so without being 
conscious of the slight (and yet very substantial and absolutely clear) 
nuances in the eschatological notions of Origen. On the other hand, there 
are the opponents; they are either people hostile to Origen himself or 
people much later than his era who were opposing Origenism rather 
than Origen himself; that is, they were opposing what was claimed to 
be Origen’s thought -but a big question mark should be put on whether 
Origenism always expounded Origen’s authentic views. In any case it is 
clear that the fundamental as well as subtle conceptual distinctions of 
Origen’s eschatology eluded both sympathizers and opponents of his 
thought.
Thus, in the Princ one can see the notions of "end" mixed up, 
just because Rufinus is unaware that this term is a homonym. In the 
Second Book, there is a discussion about bodily nature and the 
destination of rational creatures. There is no need to discuss 
carelessness as in the use of the term "soul" being applied to all 
rational creatures although Origen himself, in his works in Greek, is 
always scrupulous in applying this term only to human beings and to
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stress this fact. What is of importance here is that this discussion 
actually refers to the "form"195 of the resurrected bodies. If this 
exposition is seen in the light of this conception of Origen, then one 
may discern much of his authentic views there. Most significantly, 
behind the Latin rendering, one could discern Origen himself stating 
that to speak of a "soul" being "clothed" in a body is but a "metaphor".196 
Furthermore, one can discern Origen’s really anti-Platonic notion that 
rational creatures are understood to live only in bodies; this again 
underlines that in Origen’s thought there is is no room for notions of 
any actual "dualism" of spirit- matter or soul-body or any notion of 
"intelligible world", as rational creatures are regarded as actually 
inseparable entities living a corporeal life.
It is in the light of these convictions of Origen that paragraph 3 
of this part of the Princ should be understood. The arguments adduced 
there that "in the end" corporeality will not "return to non-existence" 
actually pertains to just the "end" of an "aeon". The discussion is about 
those rational creatures being "saved" and transposed to 
"immortality"197 which, as drawn from the works in Greek, actually 
means the status of being in the eternal life. Thus it is stated:
"It will be seen to be a necessity that, if bodily nature were to 
be destroyed, it must be restored and created a second time. For it is 
apparently possible that rational creatures, who are never deprived of 
the power of free will, may once again become subject to certain 
movements. This power is granted them by God lest, if they held their 
position for ever irremovably, they might forget thet they had beet 
placed in the fin a l state o f blessedness by the grace o f God and not by 
the ir own goodness . These movements would again undoubtedly be 
followed by a variety and diversity o f bodiesout o f which a world is 
always composed; for it would never exist except as a result of 
variety and diversity, and this can in no way be produced apart front.
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bodily m atte r''™
What Origen actualy does here is to articulate his decisive 
opposition to Platonism. The "final state of blessedness" is the eternal 
life itself; and rational creatures attain to it by the grace of God, since 
their "will is not enough in order to attain to the end".199 In the 
passage above it is reiterated that the status of eternal life is a 
corporeal one and also (which is directly related to the former notion) 
a reversible one, as discussed in chapter 4. Thus, to attain to eternal 
life does not, in Origen’s view, entail that a rational creature lives an 
incorporeal life, for there is no notion of "a life apart from the body" 
and eternal life is in  the "world" which "is always composed" of "a 
variety and diversity of bodies’’.200
In order that no doubt should remain as to which "end" (namely, 
the end of an aeon) Origen refers here, one should see how the work 
continues. The passage stated above is the conclusion of paragraph 3. 
Immediately after that Origen goes on with paragraph 4; and the 
subject discussed in that paragraph is Origen’s view that the 
consecutive worlds are not "similar to each other and in all respects 
alike", namely to articulate his views of the non-recurrence of 
identical worlds. So, it is also from the course itself of Origen’s 
exposition that one may see what the discussion if the previous 
paragraph of the work was actually about. No matter what the 
interventions of Rufinus in the text may be, the logical sequence of 
Origen’s exposition is still there and no intervention can extinguish it. 
The chapter at hand is about "the beginning of the world and its 
causes",*201 he makes an introduction in what he is going to discuss in 
this chapter. The §1 begins thus: "It remains to enquire next, whether 
there was another world before the one which now exists.’’202 Then (in 
§2) he portrays the teleological character of the course of the present 
world and the meaning of the resurrection as a hope to be realized at
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the end of this aeon for those who deserve it. Then (§3) he insists that 
those who will be saved will live in bodies, too. Next (§4) he rejects 
the doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds. It is only at the end of 
the chapter (§7) that there is a reference to the "end and perfection of 
all things".203 In the course of this exposition (§6) Origen did not fail to 
explicate that "it is certainly foreign to our mode of reasoning to speak 
of an incorporeal world that exists only in the minds fancy"; and, as he 
himself points out, this remark constitutes his attitute towards the 
notion of "the existence of certain imaginary forms which the Greeks 
call 'ideas'.".204
Hence not only the text itself, but also the study of its context, 
namely the logical course in which Origen expounds his thought, clearly 
show that the "end" which he refers to is the end of the aeon -not the 
perfection of all; least of all, the final end.
It is in the light of this discussion that one should see how 
unreasonably Koetschau has incorporated the so-called Fragment 19 in 
this section of the Princ. Justinian speaks of when "what has been 
subjected to Christ shall in the end be subjected also to God" and "then 
all will lay aside their bodies;".205 It is obvious that Koetschau has not 
grasped what the discussion in that paragraph is about, and quite 
falsely has regarded this passage as relevant to the views expounded 
there. On the other hand, Justinian, too, has not grasped Origen's 
authentic views; for his passage (attributing views to Origen) continues 
thus: "and I think that there will then be a dissolution of bodily nature 
into non-existence, to come into existence a second time if rational 
beings should again fall.".206
It is only the notion of dissolution of bodily nature that echoes 
Origen's authentic views here. Yet, even so, it is certain that Justinian 
only accidentally includes this phrase here; for there is no doubt that 
he had totally miscomprehended what Origen really held. In chapter 2
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we argued that Origen holds no notion of corporeality coming into 
existence “for a second time" as he does not hold any notion of timeless 
causality which Justinian falsely attributes to him. Beyond that, 
however, Justinian attributes this view to Origen in the context of his 
false impression that Origen held some notion of a beginningless world 
of incorporeal rational beings. This is what he actually means when he 
speaks of "rational beings" which would "again fall" and certainly he has 
attributed this view to Origen in other passages of the same work of 
his.207 Thus, when he speaks of "end" and "dissolution of bodily nature" 
it is only in letter that he echoes Origen's views. Justinian himself was 
not only unaware of what Origen really held but even he had a false 
knowledge of that. For it is obvious that Justinian does not regard this 
"end" as the absolute end o f the w orld ; he rather regards it as a 
transformation of a beginningless and endless world, from a corporeal 
to an incorporeal form. Besides, this "end" of corporeality is regarded, 
as it were, as a "temporary" one, as corporeal nature may well come 
into existence again according to an assumed "causality" accompanying 
an "eternal" and essentially incorporeal world. In view of our previous 
discussions in this work it would be superfluous to discuss here how 
these allegations of Justinian are far from Origen's authentic thought.
For similar reasons, namely failure to grasp the different 
conceptions of "end", Jerome also attributes false opinions to Origen. 
He alleges that, according to Origen, "he who is perfectly subjected to 
Christ must be understood to be without a body, and all are to be 
subjected to Christ, then we too shall exist without bodies, when we 
have become perfectly subjected to him." What Jerome has not grasped 
here is that subjection to Christ is a corporeal status and this is not 
what is perceived as the final end. Besides, the expression "to live 
without bodies" would never have been used by Origen, for to him "life" 
of creatures is inseparable from the notion of corporeality; thus the
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very expression "to live without bodies" is in itself a 
self-contradictory one, exactly in the same way that it could be absurd 
to speak of any "incorporeal world".
Accordingly, Jerome alleges that to Origen "...all things have 
lived without bodies, then bodily existence will be swallowed up, and 
that which was once created out of nothing will be resolved into 
nothing. And a time will come when its use will once again be 
necessary.".208
The last point is similar to Justinian's allegations as discussed 
above. What is of interest, however, is that Jerome, in a way, admits 
that Origen did not hold any notion of "eternity" of the world or, at 
least, any notion of its beginninglessness. This is exactly opposite to 
Justinian’s allegations.
The expression "out of nothing ... into nothing", however, is far 
too simplistic and actually distortes Origen’s views. What is "out of 
nothing ... into nothing" is the world as a "katabole" (Kaxaporif|) namely 
as a fallen state, as a symptom of the existence of evil. Origen’s 
perception of Creation, however, actually "out of God ... into God". The 
first part of this notion alludes to the conception of the "fall" whereas 
the second alludes to that of "resurrection". As he regarded both of 
them as "mysteries" and secret truths which are difficult to be 
speculated, he consciously avoided to speak much of them. It is then not 
surprising that this is exactly where many of his opponents selected 
the ground for distorting his authentic views.
In the light of the discussion above, we can now consider 
certain assertions of Jerome on Origen’s eschatological ideas and 
particularly those about corporeal nature.
"And further, when the same apostle says that ’the whole 
creation shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the 
liberty of the glory of the son’s of God’, we understand it in such a way
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as to say that the first creation of rational creatures was also an 
incorporeal one, which was not meant to be in bondage to corruption 
for the reason that it was not clothed with bodies; for whenever bodies 
are, corruption follows immediately. But it will afterwards be 
’delivered from the bondage of corruption*, when it has received the 
glory of the Son of God and when ‘God shall be all in all*.209
We are also led to believe that the end of all things will be 
incorporeal by the statement of our Saviour, in which he says, That as 
I and thou are one, so they also may be one in us*.210 For we ought to 
know what God is and what the Saviour will be in the end, and how the 
likeness of the Father and the Son has been promised to the saints, so 
that as the Father and the Son are one in themselves, so, too, the saints 
may be one in them. For we must either suppose that the God of the 
universe is clothed with a body and enveloped with some sort of matter 
in the same way as we are with flesh, in order that the likeness of 
God’s life may in the end be brought to the level of the saints; or, if 
this view is unseemly, as it most certainly is to those who desire even 
in the smallest degree to dwell on the majesty of God and to apprehend 
the glory of his unbegotten and all-surpassing nature, then we are 
compelled to accept one of two alternatives and either despair of ever 
attaining the likeness of God if we are destined always to have bodies, 
or else, if there is promised to us a blessedness of the same life that 
God has, then we must live in the same condition in which God lives.’’211
To trace Origen’s views in this passage (which the translator G. 
Butterworth, regard as "filling” the "gaps left by Rufinus") is not an 
easy task. For here one is faced with the phenomenon always appearing 
in the allegations about Origen’s thought: There are seeds of authentic 
views of Origen yet mingled with arbitrary assertions or offered with 
some crucial facets of them missing so that they actually are 
quasi-truths; and these quasi-truths constitute the worst distortion of
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Origen’s authentic views.
First, however, we can discern in that passage Origen’s opinion 
that corporeality will come to an end.
Indeed Origen refers to a state of an absolute non-existence of 
the world, not only in the past but also in the future. In the Princ it is 
stated that ’’if there will ever be a time when there will be no world 
anywhere, or if there ever was a time when there was any world at 
all’’;212 also, in the same work, he refers to ’’when the universe reaches 
its perfect end". At that point he comments on the scriptural passages 
"I will that, where I am, these also may be there with me"213 and "as I 
and you are one, that they also may be one in us",214 and regards those 
sayings as alluding to a reality that "all things are lo longer in an age, 
but ’God is all in all’."215
This passage is not extant in the Greek original text; but we 
have no reason not to accept that the term "age" (saeculum) used here 
is Rufinus’ rendering of the term "aeon" which exactly is used by Origen 
in order to denote the reality of the world. Therefore the notion of not 
to live in an "age" is denoting the notion of not to live in the "world", 
namely in a spatio- temporal reality.
On the other hand, it is obvious that Rufinus has tried to not 
state explicitly Origen’s view that corporeality will finally come to an 
end. Thus he offers a particularly obscure rendering of the relevant 
points with ambiguities studiously left under phrases like this; "So far, 
then, we have discussed the question of our bodily nature and of the 
spiritual body. We leave it to the reader’s judgement to choose which of 
the two opinions he decides to be the better.".216 At another point he 
speaks of the "end of all things"217 and offers three different 
possibilities for what the "end" will be, stating: "Each of our readers 
must judge for himself, with all care and diligence, whether one of 
them may be aprroved and adopted."218 Thus he goes on with
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articulating three possible "ends" (...either ... or ... or else ...). In that 
text the conceptions of the final perfection of all rational creatures 
and that of the final end have been mingled together and therefore 
there is a lot of confusion. For the former "end" is one in which 
corporeal nature still exists whereas the latter, namely the absolute 
end, marks the end of corporeality. This failure to grasp the different 
notions of the end as well as the concern of Rufinus about what was 
regarded as "orthodoxy" lead him to leave the conceptions unclear and 
to leave the reader to "judge for himself".219
It is from the same work, however, that one might deduct that 
corporeality will finally cease to exist. Origen holds that "the end and 
the consummation of all things should consist of a return to this 
beginning"220 and, in general, his conviction is that the "end" will be 
like the "beginning". This notion stands, in the same work, side by side 
with statements such as "bodily nature was created out of nothing 
after a space of time and brought into being from non-existence";221 
and "bodily nature ... did not exist before it was made".222
In the same work there are statements of the "end which is 
renewed after the pattern of the origin and the issue of things made to 
resemble their beginning",223 and further: "But some think that this 
perfection and blessedness of rational natures can only remain in the 
condition which we have described above, that is the condition in which 
all things possess God and God is all things to them, if they are in no 
way impeded by union with a bodily nature. Otherwise, if there were 
any intermingling of a material substance, they consider that the glory 
of the highest blessedness would be prevented. On this subject the 
arguments that may be raised have been fully dealt with and discussed 
by us in a previous chapter."224
There should be no doubt that the last phrase is of Rufinus who 
does not wish to deal with the question of corporeality again. The
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"previous chapter" of which he speaks is the passage in Book II, chapter 
3, §2,3. But, as we discussed in the previous pages, the question which 
is actually enquired at that point is the corporeal nature of rational 
creatures at the end of the aeon; and obviously this has not much to do 
with the question of corporeality at the final end.
Here it is apparent again that Rufinus has not grasped the 
distinction between the different meanings of "end". Thus he just poses 
the question stating what "some think", without stating that the opinion 
of these "some" is the opinion of Origen himself at this point of Princ. 
This is the way in which, we think, Rufinus has modified the passage in 
this point in his effort to avoid a further discussion of this question 
which he obviously regarded as a tricky one.
Regarding the passage of Paul in Rom. 8,20-21 according to 
which the entire creation cherises a hope of liberty, a hope of being 
"delivered from the bondage of corruption", together with the saying 
"The fashion of this world passes away"225 Origen develops the 
following syllogism in order to ground his view that these sayings 
point both to a "beginning" and an "end" of the world:
"If the creation was subjected to vanity by reason of a certain 
hope, it was certainly so subjected from a cause, and what proceeds 
from  a cause must necessarily have a beginning; since apart from some 
beginning the creation could not have been subjected to vanity nor could 
it hope to be ‘delivered from the bondage of corruption' if it had never 
begun to be a servant to corruption"; therefore "the world both had a 
beginning and is expecting an end".226
It is further argued that when Christ says that "heaven and 
earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away' "he shows 
that it is corruptible and destined to come to an end.".227
This notion is explicated in Princ already since the beginning 
of the work, namely in the Preface: "The Church teaching also includes
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the doctrine that this world was made and began to exist at a definite 
time and that by reason of its corruptible nature it must suffer 
dissolution. But what existed before this world, or what will exist 
after it, has not yet been made known openly to the many, for no clear 
statement on the point is set forth in the Church teaching.".228
In the light of Origen’s works in Greek, the relevant 
affirmations in Princ about the world expecting an "end" may be 
regarded as expressing Origen’s thought authentically. What is a 
delicate question, however, is Origen’s views on what is above stated 
as "before this world, or ... after it.". This topic will be discussed later 
in this chapter.
Regarding the passage in Gen. 49,1 "Gather to me, ye sons of 
Jacob, that I may tell you what shall be in the last days" as well as the 
expression "after the last days", he points that "If then there are ’last 
days’ or a time ’after the last days’, it follows of necessity that the 
days which had a beginning also come to an end.’’.229 He further appeals 
to other scriptural pasages in order to conclude that the world "is 
corruptible and destined to come to an end".230
We conclude, therefore, that among Jerome’s allegations about 
Origen’s thought it is only his testimony that corporeality is held to 
finally come to an end that actually expresses Origen's authentic views.
On the other hand, however, it is inaccurate to attribute to 
Origen an opinion such as "the first creation of rational creatures was 
an incorporeal one", as Jerome does in the above mentioned passage. For 
such an assertion actually implies the creation of a "world" of 
individual incorporeal creatures231 -a notion far too alien to Origen’s 
authentic views.232
In chapter 1 we have undertaken a certain approach to Origen's 
views on this topic. In Dial he makes an introduction of more than two 
pages before uttering a few words about this question. In those
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preliminary remarks he repeatedly expresses his “anguish" as he was 
about to speak of these "highly delicate notions";233 he regards this 
question a "mystical"234 truth; and, finally, after a long introduction in 
which he expesses his anguish because of the slippery ground on which 
he was about to walk, he indeed speaks of "man" as in himself being 
"two men" of which one is "incorporeal" and was "formerly" made 
alluding to his conception of the wisdom of God, as discussed in chapter 
1. But if Origen held what Jerome claims he held, he would simply and 
purely expound his views on this subject without long introductions in 
which he expressed his "anguish" because of what he was going to talk 
about. Certainly neither Plato nor Plotinus, nor anyone else who held 
the Platonic views, had any difficulty in enunciating them simply and 
clearly; neither did they feel any "anguish" intending to speak about 
them. Origen feels so, however, just because he is far from holding any 
simplistic view of an "incorporeal world" existing before the corporeal 
one; he holds a different perception of world’s coming into being yet 
he regards this truth is a mystical one which needs "listeners who have 
a mind able to apprehend the truth plainly"235
Certainly Jerome was not one of them -to say the least. For he 
was not able to apprehend that what Origen refers to is not any 
incorporeal world but God’s wisdom herself. He did not apprehend that, 
in Origen’s view, the end of things will be incorporeal, not because 
there will be any "change" of the form in which the world exists but 
because the entire resurrected "body" of Christ will "enter" into the 
divine being and this "body" will then be the Wisdom of God and not 
"world" any more. This is the sense in which Origen affirms that the 
end will mark the termination of the existence of corporeal nature. 
This is the reality indicated under figures such as that at the "end of 
things ... God is said not only to be in all things but even to be all 
things" and "the mind will no longer be conscious of anything besides or
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other than God".236 However awkward Rufinus* translation may be at 
that point, in the light of our previous analyses one can discern 
Origen's authentic views behind these figures of speech.
This is the sense in which Origen holds that the "end" is the 
same as the "beginning"237 and affirmations such as "the beginning or 
the end of all things could not be comprehended by any except our Lord 
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit"238 should be understood in the light of 
this perception of the end.
It is quite characteristic of this perception that Origen speaks 
of the "beginning or the end".
What he means by "restoration" is the return to that original 
state. In homJer he makes an analysis of the term "to restore" 
(anoKa9iaxdJ?39 and he regards a certain "mystery" denoted by the 
saying in Jeremiah, 15,19 "Therefore thus said the Lord; If you return I 
will restore you (Aid xouxo xa5e Kupiog' sav sntaxpsijjqq, kgu 
anoKaxaaxfjaw as)".240 This is the "mystery" of the final resurrection 
and return to God.
Therefore, this return is exactly the return to the state where 
the only reality is the divine one; a reality where "there will no longer 
be any contrast between good and evil, since evil nowhere exists; for 
God, whom evil never approaches, is then all things".241
This restoration is described by Origen as the "day of God"242 
when the "blessedness" will be attained to; it is also as "day of God" 
that he portrays the notion of the eschatological "sabbath" of those who 
will attain to it "the day after the making of the world which is the 
object of his activity as long as the world exists, the day of the 
sabbath and the cessation of God, in which those who have done all 
their works in the six days will feast together with God;".243
This end marks the return to the state "before" the actual 
creation of the world. In that reality Christ "was not in need of
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rooting-out words, when he was ‘in the Father1, he was not in need of 
words digging-down and demolishing the worse; for there was nothing 
which had to digged down, there was nothing which had to be rooted 
out".244
To “enter“ into the divine reality does not allude to all 
becoming ‘‘sons*’ of God, but to all becoming son of God. For it will be 
the state as before the fall. The distinction drawn between "sons” and 
“son" is very substantial as it is indicative of how Origen perceives the 
reality in which there is no world at all. As already mentioned, the 
concept of the "fall" is held by Origen to be a “mystical" doctrine. It is 
because the "end" is understood as a "return" to the primeval state that 
Origen regards also the concept of "resurrection" as a "mystery great 
and difficult to contemplate"245 and as a doctrine comprehended only by 
"the wise".246 He, nevertheless, provides some substantial indications of 
how he comprehends this "end". Thus, in commJohn he states that the 
" end " is "the so-called restoration (Ka( to xsRog auxrjg ev xfj flsftOfievT] 
anoKaxaaxaasi), because at that time there will be no enemy left, if it 
is true the [saying] 'he must reign, till he has put all enemies under his 
feet; and the last enemy will be destroyed, namely death’.247 For then 
there will be one action by those who reached near (npog) to God ... so 
that they d ll become ... exactly son (uiogl as now only the son knows 
the Father." And this will happen " when they become one as the son anc 
the Father are one (aRF' ozav ysvmzat sv tig  <o> uiog ra t o nazrjp s i 
aot'v). ",248
This passage provides the light, in which certain crucial 
affirmations of Origen should be understood. When he speaks about the 
son stating that “it is only the son who knows him, as he is 
comprehended by the Father and he comprehends the Father."249 he 
contrast this knowledge from that of creatures because they are 
spatio-temporal beings. This is why he says that "mind" cannot see God
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now, because mind is "created" and therefore "subject to time and 
corporeality"
However, he avers that "at the end o f things (eni 6e tuj xsRei 
xujv npagydxujv) and at the "restoration  (anoKaxaoxaosujy) of all things, 
which God has spoken by the mouth of his holy prophets since the world 
began* (Acts, 3, 21) we shall see him not like now, that He does not 
seem as he actually is, but as it is appropriate to that time, which ht 
/is".250
This means that at the final end God will be seen in Himself, as 
the son knows Him. The explanation for Origen holding such a serious 
notion lies exactly in the fact that all will have become son -not sons. 
Therefore, it is not a question of a personal "mind" which just will get 
rid of corporeality and will see God Himself. Such a Platonic notion is 
entirely alien to Origen’s thought. The notion of all becoming son (and 
not sons) directly stems from his conception of the resurrected "body" 
of Christ and will be discussed later in this chapter as an outstanding 
perception which par excellence underlines the non-individualistic 
character of his conception of resurrection.
It is in a similar way that this notion is described in the Latin 
translation of the Princ:
"When events have begun to hasten towards the ideal of all 
being one as the Father is one with the Son,251 we are bound to believe 
as a logical consequence that where all are one there will no longer be 
any diversity.".252
This is the sense in which the "beginning or end" is stated to 
be incomprehensible and Origen explicitly states this view in the Princ:
"Moreover Isaiah, knowing that the beginnings of things could 
not be discovered by mortal nature, no, and not even by those natures 
which, though diviner than man’s nature, are yet themselves made and 
created, knowing, I say, that none of these could discover either the
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beginning or the end says; ‘Tell ye the former things, what they were, 
and we shall know that ye are gods; or declare the last things, what 
they are, and then shall we see thet ye are gods.’253 ... neither the
armies of the holy angels, nor the holy thrones, nor the dominions, nor
principalities, nor powers can wholly know the beginnings of all things 
and the ends of the universe.".254
Whenever Origen speaks of being in  the world (even of the 
eternal life), or of the world itself, he always uses a phraseology
implicitly or explicitly denoting that the world is out of God. In the
passage above he speaks alludes to the eternal life speaking of the "end" 
as a "subjection" of all to Christ, speaking of "all" (navxsg) those who 
reached "near (npog) to God" but he does not portray this state as ir. 
God; besides, he does not fail to point out that this is an active state as 
he speaks of "action" (npa i^g) of all those who reached "near" to God.255
By contrast, when he speaks of the reality either "before" the 
fall or "after" the end, he uses a language clearly denoting that this is 
a state in  God. He who "fell" was "in  godhead" (sv 9soxt]xi);255 and God 
"will receive (or, gather together; auvd^ ovxog) all to one end".257 Thus 
the purpose of striving in time is entering into the divine reality. It is 
God who constitutes the content of hope and expectation, as Origen 
affirms that "I look forward to God and it is him self who is my 
expectation and hope" (aRRa npog auxov pRenu xov Seov, auxov sxwv 
npoaSoKiav kcu sRn(6a).258
With respect to this, the following passage is quite eloquent: 
"Certainly the soul of Christ, living in its own perfection, was 
in God and the fulness of divine life (ev 0ew kou xuj nRqpwpaxi); it came, 
out of there (em9sv e£eRr)Ru9uia) being sent by the Father and 
assumed the body from Mary. But other souls came out (s|rjR9ov) of God 
not in this way, namely they came out being neither sent nor escorted 
by the divine will."259
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So what is in the worid is understood to be out o f God and 
vice versa.260 It should be noted, however, that this notion of "out" does 
not imply that God is a certain "whole", "out" of which the world exists. 
The notion of "out" is simply a figure261 through which Origen portrays 
the radical transcendence of God. For, as we discuss further in this 
chapter, Origen enunciates that God is neither a "part" nor a "whole". As 
the term "whole" applies to the world, God is actually beyond the whole. 
At any rate, Origen stresses that the scriptural figures (such as 
"in-out" or "up-down") which he employs in order to depict the relation 
of God to the world (namely the radical hiatus between divine reality 
and the world) certainly have not any spatial significance whatever. 
They are figures which allude only to the qualitative difference of the 
"immaterial and invisible and incorporeal" divine reality from the 
world which is all "material and has various spaces".262
At this point it is worth while recalling Origen’s analyses about 
the world, which came into being out of non-being becaused God willec 
so. Indeed, in chapter 1, the notion of the w ill of God and the creation 
as an outcome of God’s freedom has been extensively discussed.
What we see here is that Origen regards the world as the 
"whole" which is portrayed as the absolutely out of God. Thus the 
world is but an out of God and yet it came into being by God’s w ill263
It is extremely striking that G. Florovski makes exactly this 
exposition of the Christian view of creation, particularly emphasizing 
the notions of God’s w ill as well as the perception of the world as 
being out of God. However he attributes those views to Athanasius.264 
That he did not know the views of Origen should be not a matter of 
particular importance. The fact is, however, that he makes these 
assertions in a work which is supposed to portray a radical contrast 
between Origen’s and Athanasius' views of creation. The first half of 
his work is an exposition of views allegedly those of Origen and drawn
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from certain passages of the Latin rendering of the Princ The 
second half is supposed to expound the views of Athanasius which are 
allegedly the counterpoint of those of Origen’s.
So, after he has expounded what he regards as views of 
Athanasius’, he concludes by stating that the notion of the world as 
created by the w ill of God (namely, the distinction between the ’’will” 
and the "essence”265 of God) as well as the notion that the world is the 
out of God and is directed towards an end, not only constitute views 
established by Athanasius but they are also "a step beyond Origen"! This 
is the main point and the main conclusion of that work. What he thinks 
is that those views were articulated "for the first time" by Athanasius 
in the climax of the Arian controversy.
We leave for the reader to judge whether these views of G. 
Florovski constitute an irony or a tragedy.
§4. The raison d'etre of Time
In the light of this analysis it is now possible to see the deeper 
meaning of an affirmation of Origen in Cels. In the last section of the 
Fourth Book a careful reader may discern that a main issue in the 
dispute is the so-called eternity of the world. Generally in this work 
Origen articulates his own views and arguments using Celsus’ own 
words to the largest possible extent.266 This is what Origen does in 
this section as well.
Celsus’ view as articulated by Origen in the beginning of the 
section is that God does not return to him self through time (ou6e 6 ia  
Xpovou npog eauxov o Osog sniaxpstpsi).267 This is a current Greek view 
according to which the world has neither beginning nor end and creation 
out of nothing is a generally accepted view among various Greek 
schools of thought. Even Plato, who spoke of a beginning of time,268 did 
stick to the general tradition of his time. The Demiurge did not create
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exnihilo  but he put in order a pre-existing matter.269
At that point, too, Origen articulates his own view using 
Celsus1 words and simply denying Celsus1 negation; so, as two negations 
make one affirmation, he states:
“But God cares not only of the whole (xou oRou), as Celsus 
thinks, but he par excellence takes particular care of every rational 
being. And there will be no time when providence will have abandoned 
the world. For even if some part of it becomes very bad because the
rational being sins, his providence is (oiKovo|ieO to purify it and
through time the whole to return to Himself" (kcxi 6ia xpovou xo oRov
enioxpstpsiv npog eauxov)270
This passage is of particular significance. For it is here that 
two different conceptions of time confront each other. It is the
teleological conception of time and its dramatic character that here 
Origen argues for.
In contrast to Celsus who denies any notion of return of God to 
himself "through time" (6 ia xpovou), Origen extends his conviction which 
indeed constitutes his view of the raison d’ etre of time. Time is not 
just an indifferent natural element but it is a creature existing due to 
the divine dispensation (oiKovopia) is that "through" which what is out 
of God will return to become in  God.271 Meanwhile though, namely until 
the world reaches this "end", time is where the dialectical relation 
between the will of God and that of rational creatures takes place.
It should also be noted that the term whole (xou oRou) refers 
to the world itself.272 To portray the world as the "whole" (xo oRov) is 
a Stoic expression.273 Origen, however, rejects the Stoic doctrine that 
God is immanent in the world, as we have seen.274 He also explicitly 
opposes both "the Stoics and the followers of Plato" who held that the 
"whole" world is "god".275 His view is that God is neither "part" nor 
"whole" and this also is one of the articulations that underline the
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radical transcendence of God. At a point of the same work the relation 
of God to the world is portrayed thus:
“All things are parts of the world yet God is not part of the 
whole (ndvxa a^p \ispr\ Koapou, ou&ev 6s pepog oRou o 8eog); for God 
must be regarded as not incomplete as the part is incomplete. And 
probably a deeper inquiry could show that strictly speaking, just as God 
is not a part, so also he is not the whole (8sog wonsp ouk soxi pepog 
ouxwg ou6s oRov), since the whole is made up of parts (snsi xo oRov sk 
[ispiuv soxi).276 And reason does not demand that we should accept the 
view that the supreme God is made up of parts, each one of which 
cannot do what the other parts can.".277
Thus, in Origen's reply to Celsus the term "whole" means the 
world itself. The notion of "returning" to God constitutes a return to a 
reality which is beyond the whole. In the same passage, the expression 
Stdxpdvou which we translated as "through time" may also mean "after 
a time",278 which also implies the conception that time in itself is 
finite, namely has a beginning and will come to an end.279 It is 
interesting, however, that it is Origen himself who, in other parts of 
his work, enunciates how he comprehends the real meaning of the 
preposition 6trf (through). Thus he holds that this preposition denotes 
the notion of "to minister to" or "to serve to" (rj Sid npo9soig xo 
unqpsxiKov ep(pcuvei).280
This is how Origen perceives the deeper significance of the 
existence of time, as well as that of the entire world, in general: It 
came into being in order to "serve" rational creatures, namely to 
render their freedom meaningful. Time exists for the sake of rational 
creatures so that they strive for their return to God from whom they 
have fallen.
The deeper perception of the eschatological perspectives of the 
world, as expounded in the above-mentioned reply to Celsus, is also
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very vividly expressed in a very eloquent passage in commJohn. It is 
there that the notion of to-come-out-of-God is related to the 
eschatological perspective of restoration as established by the 
incarnation of Christ.
Indeed it is most characteristic of Origen's perception of both 
the fall and the resurrection that he speaks of Jesus as his who "came 
out of God281 for the sake of those who had come out o f God" (6ia xa 
s|sR9ovxa 6s ano xou Bsou s|fjR9sv ano xou 0eou); "whereas before he 
w illed not to go out o f the father\ he went out o f God, so that those 
who went out [of God] come in the hands of Jesus in due time and order 
and so that the dispensation of their going to God by following Jesus be 
realized; for they will be with God as a result of their following him 
(sc. Jesus)".282
It is exactly through the expression in due time and order (o6w 
Kca xa^s i) that the deeper reason for the existence of time is 
suggested. In fact, what follows these affirmations of Origen’s is his 
exegesis that the saying of Jesus to Peter "Whither I go you cannot 
follow me now; but you shall follow me afterwards"283 will be said "to 
each one of all which the father gave in the hands of the son" (npog 
SKaoxov xwv navxujv o 6s6ujksv xw uiuj o naxfjp sig xa xe P^asX namely to 
all rational creatures; yet it will not be said to all at the same time 
(sni xov auxov Kaipov) and this is the meaning of the scriptural 
expression "afterwards".284 Accordingly he comments on the saying 
"Whither I go, you cannot come"285 affirming that although it is noi* 
not possible to go where Jesus went it will be possible in the future, 
as there is the "present aeon"286 and an "aeon to come" as well as "the 
aeons to come".287
The same notion, namely the conception of time as an extension 
through which rational creatures will return to God, is found in a 
passage in commJohn, which is of utmost significance. Yet is has to be
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treated carefully because its syntax demands a careful analysis and in 
certain translations it has been misinterpreted. The passage in the 
original text reads as follows:
"Ta pevxoi gs xrjg sxoipaoiag xujv Ri9wv aipopsvwv xai 
euxpsni^o|isvwv eig xrjv oiKoSopqv, xpioiv exeoiv enixeRoupeva, e[i<paiveiv 
poi 6oks( xou sv aiujviw xf) xpiaSi au^svoug Siaaxfjjiaxog xov oRov 
Xpovov."288
This is a passage in the section where Origen comments on 
John,2,2Iff, about the "temple" of the body of Jesus. It is here that he 
expounds his views of the resurrection289 and through the figure of the 
"restoration" of the temple he alludes to the eschatological reality of 
the resurrection.
In order to put the words in the passage above in their proper 
sequence, and thus to see its exact meaning, one has to take into full 
account Origen’s fundamental conception of time as well as the meaning 
of terms being used both here and in phrases both immediately before 
and after this text. Thus the real order of the last (and crucial) phrase 
is this: "... &oks( poi e|i<pa(vsiv xov oRov xpovov xou 5iaaxf||iaxog 
ou^evoug xou [gevso9ai] sv xrj aiwviw xpid&i"; and the translation of the 
whole passage is this:
"The expressions referring to the preparation of the stones 
which are raised up and prepared in order to construct the building (sc. 
the temple of Solomon) certainly seem to me to signify the whole of 
time, namely the temporal extension which is demanded in order to 
move into the eternal Trinity".290
In this passage Origen consciously avoids to use any verb which 
could indicate this "moving" into the Trinity. We have put the verb "to 
move" for the purpose of clarity yet in the Greek text there is no verb 
at all. Indeed at this point Origen uses his language in a superb way. For 
what he denotes is only the direction in time, namely the movement in
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time having as goal and end the ‘’entering" into the divine being. In fact, 
however, there is no predication whatsoever referred to the existential 
status "after" (so to speak) this "entering" into the divine being. If 
Origen explicitly used the terms "moving" or "being" then one might 
assert that what happens at the absolute end is that rational beings 
exist as such namely, as personal individual incorporeal creatures into 
the divine being. But this would entail that in that existential status 
rational beings may live as incorporeal individual personalities -which 
is far too alien to what Origen really held. As a matter of fact, there 
is no verb which might be used in this case and this is why Origen 
repeatedly states that the doctrine of resurrection is "great" and 
"difficult to contemplate".
What he actually refers to at this point is the "perfection of 
resurrection", as discussed in the previous pages. It is quite indicative 
of his conception that this passage is immediately followed by an 
affirmation referring to "when" this "entering" into the divine being 
will occur. He states that "these will happen when peace will be 
absolute after the years of dispensation following the exodus from 
Egypt..." (xauxa 6s saxai oxav rj etpfjvT] xsReiw9f| jisxa sxq xqg oiKovopiag 
xwv Kaxa xrjv an' Ai^unxou s^ov...).291 At this point we should recall 
that it is in figures of "absolute peace" that Origen portrays the reality 
of the final abolition of evil. Here he uses the same terms in order to 
portray the same eschaxological reality. Further on he uses the same 
expression.292
Thus the real meaning of this passage is elucidated not only by 
pondering upon this passage itself but also by the study of the terms 
which are used both in this passage and immediately before and after 
it, namely the whole context of this passage as well as the conceptual 
context of Origen’s thought as found in other works of his.
Beyond that, nevertheless, there is the aspect of the actual
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content of the passage. Any structure which would lead to an 
interpretation that there is time in the divine being, would be not only 
arbitrary but also false both on grounds of philology and Origen’s 
authentice views.293 For the term au^evoug can in no way be applied to 
the expression sv aiwviw xrj xpiaSi just because there is the preposition 
sv In order to be able to speak of a time applied to the eternal Trinity, 
the phrase should be ou^evoug zij aiuviuj xpiaSi. That is, the 
preposition sv should not exist at all and the term ouggevoug to be 
related to a Dative form. But in this case the preposition sv does exist 
and Origen himself gives a sample (at a point shortly above this 
passage) of how he uses and understands the term au^evoug, namely 
that here is goes with Genitive and i t  means “related to". Therefore, 
that the term ou^svoug does not apply to the phrase sv aiuvioj xrj xpia&t 
is not actually a matter of structural contingency or exegetical choice. 
If this relation of the two expressions were employed, i t  would simply 
and purely be a mistake both on grounds of grammar and structure of 
the Greek language which subsequently would lead to distortions of 
Origens thought, namely to the notion that the divine reality is a 
temporal one.
But i t  is in the same work that Origen explicitly states his 
views that no notion of time can be applied to the divine being 
whatsoever, as we have discussed in chapter 1. It is not possible, 
therefore, to explain this passage in a way directly opposite to the 
fundamental conceptions of Origen’s enunciated in the same work.
The conclusion of the discussion concerning this passage is that 
here Origen clearly denotes some facets of his conception of time 
itself as well of his eschatology. Indeed, speaking of "the whole time" 
he indicates that time is finite and it  is also an "extension" as the very 
term 6taoxq|ia (extension) is being used here. Beyond that, however, 
what is significant for our subject here is that time is  the extension
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though which a ll rational beings are "prepared" in order to enter intc 
the divine being. It is in the light of this conception that Origen 
employs the allegory of the whole of time portrayed by the figure of 
"three days"; as he explains, in the same part of this work, the "first" 
day is a figure of the duration of existence of evil, the "second" alludes 
to the consummation of the world and the "third" is the day of the 
resurrection of the entire world.294
It is remarkable that, in both the reply to Celsus and in 
commJohn}^ Origen explicitly relates the notion of "return" to God 
with the notion of "dispensation" (oucovojiia). Also, in both cases he 
clearly states that this "dispensation" (oiKovo|iia) w ill take place 
"through time" (6ia xpovou) and indeed "in due course and order" (o6w kcu 
id§ei). Time is a means for the divine "dispensation" to be realized and 
for creaturely freedom to make sense and be exercised. Thus time, as 
an element of the make-up of the world established by God, is exactly 
what par excellence shows that divine dispensation does not oppress 
freedom; for i t  is due to the very reality of time itself that creaturely 
freedom acquires an actual meaning.
Hence, from the previous analyses i t  becomes obvious that those 
rational beings which attain to the eternal life  have a twofold hope and 
expectation. The fulfilment of their hope to through Christ "jump" onto 
the timeles divine reality has an indispensable pre-requisite; this is 
that all rational creatures w ill have attained to the eternal life. The 
"perfection of the resurrection",296 namely the "entering" into the 
divine reality through Christ (who, to them, is the "gate") w ill not take 
place unless all "enemies" w ill have been "subjected" to Christ and the 
"last enemy", namely "death", w ill have been "abolished".
This means that the "end" w ill occur through time and "this 
subjection w ill be accomplished through certain means and courses of 
discipline and periods of time;".297 In commJohn\ Origen expounds his
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views through an entirely scriptural language, as he states:
"Since it  is through Christ that God reconciles the world to 
himself298 as i t  (sc. the world) previously had been an enemy due to the 
existence of evil in it, he is a benefactor to the whole world; yet, to 
those who receive the benefaction, he is a benefactor through a certain 
course and order (o&ui Kat xa|ei), as he does not put all the enemies as a 
footstool under the feet299 all at once ( ouk a9p6ug). For the Father says 
to the Lord of each one of us; ’Sit at my right hand, until I put your 
enemies a footstool under your feet.' (Ps.109,1). And all the
occurrences happen until the last enemy, namely death, w ill by
abolished by him.300 Whatever the subjection to Christ is, i f  we are to 
understand i t  mainly as in the [saying] ’And when all things shall be 
subdued unto him, then shall the son also himself be subject unto him
that put all things under him’,301 then we shall duly to his goodness
comprehend how the lamb of God bears and takes away the sin of the 
world.".302
So, although Origen holds a notion of an "end" as personal 
perspective of an individual rational creature, his conception of 
"resurrection" has not an "individualistic" character. This conception is 
one more point which contrasts strikingly Origen’s made of thought 
from the dialectics of Plato: There is nothing of the aristocratic 
Platonic notion about a few souls who, through the study of philosophy, 
w ill be delivered from the world -which world w ill have no end. 
Accordingly, Origen rejects equally the Gnostic doctrine that there are 
men who are "by nature" capable of salvation, the "spiritual" men. The 
quality of a man is not due to what he is "by nature", but i t  is the 
result of his own action.303 In fact, the portayal of "salvation" through 
the notion of the "body" of Christ is one more facet of Origen’s throught 
which shows how different this was from either the Platonic or the 
Gnostic ones.
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It is due to his conviction that a rational creature in eternal 
life  is existentially characterized by "love" both to God and to each 
other, that the "perfection of resurrection" is perceived as pertaining 
to the entirety, and only to the entirety, of rational creatures. The 
"body" of Christ w ill not be "perfectly" resurrected (that is, i t  w ill not 
ascend to the Father) until a ll rational creatures have been united in 
love to God and to each other. This is what is visualized as the 
perfection of all rational creatures and subjection of them to Christ. 
And this is the deeper meaning of the constant allegory of the "bride" 
of Cant either as "church" or individual "soul" or rational animal304 
and, in any case, are both portrayed by the figure of "body of Christ".305 
For the final destiny of an individual rational being is the very same 
destiny of the entire church, namely the entire world which w ill have 
been "subjected" to Christ. The final entering into the "chamber’306 of 
Christ is the same for a "soul" and the entire church. The former is 
neither earlier nor later than the latter. The "perfection of 
resurrection" is one eschatological reality which pertains to ah 
rational creatures once "subjected" to Christ. It is through this "all" 
that the individual perspective of a rational being is portrayed and 
identified to the salvation of the entire world.
The conception of the content of this eschatological reality is 
quite indicative of Origen’s conception of time. For, although 
eschatological intuitions are a common theme in human thought, there 
are profound difference as to how eschatological conceptions are 
vizualized and portrayed. W. Herberg307 asserts that "eschatologies have 
appeared in two radically divergent forms, distinguished by their 
attitude to time and history". The distinction in drawn thus: "On the one 
hand, ultimate destiny may be seen as consummatory o f nature ; on the 
other hand, i t  may be seen as a fu lfillm en t, rectifica tion \ or 
transfiguration o f b istort/'. Herberg delineates three forms of
574
eschatology; "naturalistic, eternalistic, and historistic" and they are 
regarded as "reflecting three basic modes of undestanding reality". The 
basic distinction, however, is drawn between the "historistic" and the 
other two; for he deems that the attitude toward time and history in 
both "naturalistic and "eternalistic" is essentially non-historical.308
In adducing this account of W. Herberg, we keep our 
reservations about the distinction "time and history is Hebraic" 
whereas "spatial is Greek", which actually underlies his classifications 
there. Even so, we note that Origen’s eschatological concern does not 
stop in the "salvation" of the individual which was a Gnostic attitude 
and Herberg rerards i t  as a characteristic of "Greek and Oriental" 
indicative of the attitude toward time and history.
When Origen insists that eternal life  is in  the world, he does 
so because he conceives "resurrection" as having a non-individualistic 
character at all. The "perfection of resurrection" (which constitutes 
Origen’s perception of the ultimate eschatological perspective) applies 
to the "body" of Christ. For the time being this "body" is the church; but 
at the "end", when all w ill have been "subjected" to Christ, this "body" 
w ill be the entire world. This is what the "resurrection" pertains to.
It is then quite absurd that A. Harnack regards Origen as one of 
the "high-watermarks" of the processes he describes whereby the 
departure or "apostasy" from Primitive Christianity was effected. 
Origen is described as the most "Hellenistic" and the most consistent 
and thoroughgoing "de-eschatologizer".309 What is worse is that 
Harnack, here regards "Hellenism" as synonymous with "Gnosticism".310
In view of this conception of "resurrection", Origen repeatedly 
refers to the concern of higher creatures close to God (called by Origen 
as "friends of God"),311 for the salvation of lower creatures. Thus "the 
friends of God, angels and souls and spirits ... work together" and "pray 
together and join in petition"; so "together with men", who
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wholeheartedly and genuinely pray to God, "countless sacred powers 
pray together, although uninvoked, thus assisting our mortal race" and 
"feeling agony together with us, seeing the daemons opposing and 
fighting against the salvation of those who most have dedicated 
themselves to God".312 It is a "characteristic of a saint to 'weep with 
them who weep'313 for i t  is "a weeping originated in love";314 it  is 
because of this love that "many times the saints also suffer together 
with those who suffer because of their sins".315 Accordingly, "angels 
rejoice at those who repent";316 and the "saints, being raised up by 
angels, enter into the marvellous tabernacle of God", namely they reach 
"the blessed end " which they "expected to occur sequently to them"; 
and "when a soul, after its  tria l, enters into the heavenly holies and a 
triumphant loud voice is shouted as there is a crowd which celebrates 
at the salvation of him who is saved.".317
But not only the "angels and souls and spirits"318 are concerned 
about the course of rational creatures below them. Christ himself does 
so, too. He prays together with those praying and i t  is he who conveys 
the prayers to the Father319 It is he also who "laments and mourns at 
our sins".320 And "It is God the Logos who sends prayer up to the Father 
taking up to himself the passions of man, of whom he undertook the 
[human] nature"321
It is in the light of this conception that the notions of 
"pre-crucifixion" and "re-crucifixion" of Christ (as discussed in chapter 
3) should be understood. Origen's constant view is that the passion and 
resurrection of Christ was both a real and concrete historical event 
pertaining to the person of Jesus Christ as well as a prefiguration of 
what is going to happen to the entire world at the "end". Although the 
notion of "knowledge" plays a part in the ideal of rational creatures, i t  
is secondary to the notion of "love" in Christ. The fulfilment of the hope 
w ill be realized through love. This is why Origen emphasized that "all
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the saints hope for everything due to the existence of love" in them.322 
Love is the existential characteristic through which, and due to which, 
the restoration and "perfection of resurrection" w ill occur. Until this 
end comes, however, the "body" of Christ suffers and this is in the 
condition in which Jesus was at the time of his passion. The 
restoration which w ill continue to be "hoped for" until the end, was 
prefigured in Jesus' own hope for his restoration during his assuming 
the human nature. It is remarkable that Origen applies the notion of 
"hope for restoration" to the human Jesus and states:
"It is not astonishing that [the Saviour] hopes for his own 
restoration", according to the [saying] '0 Father, you glorify me with 
the glory which I had before the world existed beside you';"323 for "it is 
possible that he said that 'in solitude' at the time when all his
disciples were given scandal and abandoned him."324
This is the sense in which Origen considers that not only the 
resurrection but also the "hope for restoration" was "exemplified"325 in 
the person of Jesus. Subsequent to his resurrection, his "body" w ill be 
restored, too. However, until the realization of this eschatological 
expectation, Christ w ill be suffering:
"John [the Baptist] says showing him; 'Behold the lamb of God 
which bears and takes away the sin of the world';326 [and he says that] 
because he bears the sin until the last enemy, namely death, is
abolished, so the entire world w ill become without any sin; and he does
not say either 'he who w ill bear but not already bearing’ or 'he who
bore and no more bears'; for the bearing acts upon each one in the 
world until sin w ill be abolished from the entire world and the saviour 
surrenders the purified kingdom to the Father; since not the slightest 
sin is being subject to the Father's reign, [the kingdom] w ill, in all its  
entirety, receive again all which is of God when the saying 'That God 
may be all in all' (I Cor.15,28) w ill be fulfilled."327
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So the hope for restoration w ill be realized when all rational 
creatures w ill be raised up to eternal life. The final end w ill be an 
“entering” into divine eternity not of individual beings, but of what is 
portrayed as the “resurrected body" of Christ, namely of the entire 
restored world united in love to God and to each other. This is the 
sense in which resurrection has not an individualistic character.
The point which Origen makes in his above-mentioned reply to 
Celsus is that the final purpose of divine dispensation (o iK o v o p ic x ) is the 
world to come to an end by its own free moral action. This is the end 
which time serves to. For God "has ordered everything so that each 
spirit or soul, or whatever else rational existence ought to be called, 
should not be compelled by force against its free choice to any action 
except that to which the motions of its own mind lead it, -for in that 
case the power of free choice would seem to be taken from them, which 
would certainly alter the quality of their nature itself".328 But "at the 
same time" "through the unspeakable plan" of God's "word and wisdom ... 
the motions of their free w ills should work suitably and usefully 
together to produce the harmony of a single world, some being in need 
of help, other able to give help, others again to provide struggles and 
conflicts for those who are making progress, whose diligence w ill be 
accounted the more praiseworthy and whose rank and position 
recovered after their victory w ill be held the more securely, as i t  has 
been won through difficulty and toil".329
Origen is strongly convinced that "souls are not driven on some 
revolving course which brings them to the same cycle again after many 
ages, with the result that they do or desire this or that, but they 
direct the course of their deeds towards whatever end the freedom of 
their individual minds may aim at".330 In any case, "all things work 
towards an end.".331
Due to this conception of the course of the world in time Origen
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holds that the end w ill not come "all of a sudden, but gradually and by 
degrees, during the lapse of infinite and immesurable ages" as "the 
improvement and correction w ill be realised slowly and separately in 
each individual person.";332 and "this training of ours in the body 
extends over a very long period, namely up t i l l  the time the bodies 
themselves ... are found worthy of incorruptibility and immortality by 
reason of the word and perfect rigteousness of God"333
Thus the world is in need of time. For however "diverse ... the 
motions may be ... they nevertheless combine to make up the fulness and 
perfection of a single world, the very variety of minds tending to one 
end, perfection.'334 This course towards "perfection" takes place but 
"through time" (6ia xpovou);335 and i t  is exactly through this notion that 
both the reason o f existence of time as well as its teleologica/ 
character are underlined.
Besides, the "end", as "subjection" of all to the Son, is portrayed 
through the scriptural saying "until I put your enemies a footstool 
under your feet". On the term "until" (ewg), Origen's comment is that its  
usual meaning in the scripture is to indicate the "most urgent 
character of the time of what is indicated" (xov Kaxsnei^ovxa nepi xou 
6r]Roupsvou xpovov).336
Thus time, although prolonged, is understood to have not only a 
teleological but also a dramatic character, since the striving towards 
the end takes place through an encounter of divine w ill to creaturely 
one.337 Time is understood not just to be directed towards an end, but 
to be directed towards an end urgently required.
This is the intrinsic meaning of time. Particularly after the 
incarnation of Christ, the whole of time to come is fundamentally a 
time of tension between "already" and "not yet".338 This tension is 
portrayed through the notion that every moment of time constitutes a 
crucial "kairos"339 as well as that once the church has already been "in
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betrothal"340 with its  final destination (namely, "resurrection"), this 
destination is earnestly and urgently striven for. This is what 
constitutes the intrinsic meaning of time and its  inherent dramatic 
character.341
This is a major contrast in Origen's conception of time to what 
0. Cullmann has presented as the biblical view of time. When Cullmann 
postulates that the "infinite" time342 is consisted of "three aeons at 
least",343 he does not say what the reason of existence of time is 
either before creation or after the end of the present aeon. The only 
argument he adduces is that he wants to avoid "the danger" of regarding 
"eternity" according to a "Platonic perception of timeless eternity". 
Nothing beyond that. But the way in which he treats time is actually not 
far away from a certain Greek mode of thinking.
It is far too simplistic to speak of "Greek"344 thought as i f  all 
the philosophical categories were perceived in a unique and universal 
way. "Hellenism" was not only Platonism -which was but a school of 
thought, a prominent and glorious one, yet not the only one. This is 
what Cullmann does not seem to be actually aware of. Thus time before 
creation is postulated as existing, yet there is no reason provided for 
time to exist. It is just an axiom taken for granted. In that "time", 
however, nothing happens. This status does not essentially differ from 
a Platonic conception of timelessness. All Cullman has done is to name 
the status of "timelessness" as "time". There is no difference ir. 
actua lity . As it  is a state where nothing happens and there is not any 
dramatic reason for time to exist. The difference between 
"timelessness" and "time" is just a difference in words and there is 
nothing beyond the expressional difference. On the other hand, that time 
is "infinite" in both directions was an Aristotelian as well as a Stoic 
doctrine. To the Stoics god was also in  time, as Cullmann holds.345 To 
him, time of both "previous" and "next" aeon is nothing more than ar.
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element which in its e lf is  o f no actual interest t since nothing happened 
and nothing is going to happen in it. What Cullmann calls as "new 
creation" is a state absolutely immutable; nothing happens and nothing 
is expected to happen there. So he can provide no answer to the 
question about the meaning of a "rectilinear direction forward"346 once 
the end of the present aeon occurs.
in Cullmann's thought only the present aeon is a time of a 
teleological character.
By contrast, in Origen is all time (from start to finish) that has 
a teleological character.
Thus Cullmann can provide no reason for time to exist. He 
deems i t  enough to adduce scriptural passages and to make the 
extrpolation that the passage in Revelation 10,6 "there should be time 
no longer" just means "there w ill be no more delay".347
Besides, both the Stoic view of time as well as Cullmann's 
conception of "past" and "future" aeon, regard time is an indifferent 
element. This time is certainly not a dramatic one, its  existence is 
not necessary and it  is certainly not a teleological time. Cullmann 
feels that i t  is enough to affirm that the aeon to come w ill be not the 
same to the previous one.348 Yet i t  is he who stresses that "aeon" 
means "world".349 But since time in its e lf is not connected to the 
world itself350 his syllogism can by no means entail that the time of 
the aeon to come w ill not be the same. For 0. Cullmann does not 
distinguish any quality of time at all. On the contrary, everything is 
time and this is why he holds that there can be no actual distinction 
between time and eternity in themselves. Eternity is but a very long 
time and nothing more than that. Thus the only distinction he makes 
pertains to quantity of time.351 Such a time, however, cannot have the 
essential characteristic which constitutes the teleological and 
dramatic character of time. In the final analysis, this is the kind of
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time which caused Marcus Aurelius to sink into despair and depression.
Hence, Cullmann actually employs what he desperately wants to 
avoid: The "danger" of "Hellenism".352 For the realities which he wants 
to postulate as "in time" are indeed realities of Platonic "rest"; and 
time is an indifferent element according to a purely Stoic perception. 
In trying to avoid "Hellensism", he quite unconciously fell into the way 
of thinking of more than one Greek school of thought.353
The contrast with Origen's conception of time is quite obvious. 
He excludes any existence of time either "before" or "after" the 
creation of the world and yet he stands radically outside any Greek 
conception of time. After all he was acquainted with Greek thought far 
better than any contemporary theologian and he did not regard this 
Thought as a kind of "ghost" haunting him nor as a "leper" which should 
be avoided by all means. His work Cels is an outstanding sample of how 
calmly and brilliantly he faced Greek philosophical attitudes, exactly 
because he had a very good command of them. This is why he has been 
able to transform Greek conceptions, go beyond them and establish his 
own Christian conception of time.
Thus he affirms the timelessness of the reality "preceding" or 
"following",354 exactly because a hypothetical time in these realities 
would be a time which could not have the fundamental characteristics 
of his own conception of it; that is, i t  would not be a teleological 
time, neither a dramatic one; nor would i t  be a time earnestly needec 
for a certain purpose to be fulfiled in it; that is, a time existing for 
the purpose of attaining to an end urgently required.
There are, therefore, two certain fixed points which determine 
the existence of time itself, namely its beginning and end. The former 
is what Origen calls "beginning of actual creation" {crpxd 
KOGfJonouayjt^  The latter is "the end of things" ( id  zsflog zm 
n pa $yd zw '^  which is expected to occur at the time of "restoration"
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(anoKaxaoxaoig) 357
The ascent of all rational beings to eternal life  marks the 
"subjection" of the entire world to Christ and it  is subsequently to this 
that he "surrenders" the kingdom to the Father and the entire 
resurrected "body" of his enters into the divine being. This is the sense 
in which Origen affirms that "it is possible" "from today being down" 
(ano xou ofjpspov sivat sv xoig Kaxuxspw) to be transposed ([isxaprjvaO 
and "to become body of God which is up" (woxe geveo9ai xou Qsou owpa 
xo avwxeptd)358
This marks the end of time and the end of the entire world 
since the causes of its  coming into existence (namely, the world as 
Kaxaj3oflfj or a "fallen" state) w ill have ceased to exist. Thus it  
becomes obvious why Origen regards the status of eternal life  as a 
temporal one. For, in that place, rational creatures are in an active 
state but they also "wait" for the ascent of all rational creatures in 
that state. Unless the last of them is found worthy of attaining to that 
rank of life, time w ill not come to an end, exactly because i t  is an 
indispensable means for free moral action to be realized and to make 
sense. End of time can occur only at the end of the world, when no 
rational creature w ill be in need of time in order to exercise his 
freedom aiming at his perfection and ascent.
it  is a conviction of Origen's that "names" in themselves have a 
particular ontological significance. Beings have been named by the Holy 
Spirit who "does not simply establish names"; for they are 
"characteristics of various kinds of action"359 This is why Origen 
states:
"Do enquire into the interpretation of names; for they have 
forcefully been named by the Holy Spirit; besides you should know this, 
namely that names indicate habits and states and qualities from which 
i t  is possible to see the fitness of what is named."360 Accordingly,
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referring to the beings of higher ranks of life, he states that the names 
"of the higher powers are not names of natures of animals but names of 
ranks, in which this or that rational nature has been placed by God361 
In another work Origen states that "there is an entire teaching about 
names, which is very profound and mystical" and, according to this, 
names are not just a matter of human convention362 He there critisizes 
those who hold this latter view of names. It is mainly Aristotle and the 
Stoics that he has in mind and he explicitly refers to them in Cels, 
where he again expounds his views of the ontological significance of 
names.363 And in deOr Origen articulates a definition of what is a 
name: "A ’name’, then, is a principal appellation which manifests the 
quality of the being named.".364
Thus Origen's view is that a name is directly related to some 
kind of function It should be stressed, however, that this conception is 
related only to the world and i t  can in no way be applied to the name of 
God, to which Origen refers, too. Accordingly, this conception can be 
applied to Christ only in as much as he is related to the world. 
Speaking even of Christ himself, Origen directly relates the 
"conceptions" of him to function (xa npa^paxa Ka9' wv xa ovopaxa 
Keixai).365 This is subsequent to his view that all the conceptions of 
Christ, except of those of Wisdom and Logos, are related to the world.
Generally Origen holds that "one should not neglect the names, 
because certain actions are signified by them (npa^pdxwv aqpaivopsvajv) 
which are useful for the interpretation of the passages".366 So a name 
and a certain kind of action are held to stand in a close relation. In the 
final analysis, the various names of rational beings express the 
diversity of the world -diversity which is a fundamental 
characteristic of a "fallen" status. So, in certain cases, he uses the 
term names as synonymous with the term rational creatures.367
It is probably because of his opinion about the "names" that a
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notion such as this has been attributed to him:
“The creation of all rational creatures consisted of minds 
incorporeal and immaterial without any number or name, so that they 
all formed a unity by reason of the identity of their essence and power 
and energy and by their union with and knowledge of God the Word; ... 
they took bodies, either fine in substance or grosser, and became 
possessed of a name, which accounts for the differences of names as 
well as of bodies among the higher powers; and that thus the cherubim, 
with the reigns and authorities, the lordships, thrones and angels and 
all the other heavenly orders came into being and received their 
names.".368
It would be superfluous to comment again on points discussed in 
the previous pages, such as the notion of incorporeality. What is stated 
about "names", however, deserves a brief comment.
Origen himself does not at all speak about names either "before" 
the fall or "after" the restoration. It is due to his holding both the 
doctrine of fall and that of resurrection as "mystical" ones that he does 
not do so. The passage above has actually nothing to do with his 
thought. This is but a text plainly extending Platonic views, to which 
Origen’s thought was alien. If there is something which might be 
regarded as echoing Origen's views of "names" i t  would only be 
accidental and certainly the author of the text did i t  unconsciously. 
Therefore i t  would be misleading to discuss Origen’s views about 
"names" in connexion with a text which has nothing to do with his 
authentic views. When, as we have seen, Origen articulates what he 
regards as highly subtle notions almost entirely using a scriptural 
language, and indeed a succession of scriptural passages, i t  would be 
absurd to accept that a text in entirely Platonic language may express 
what Origen held as one of the most sublime and "mystical"369 notions 
of Christian faith. This text should be rejected as a whole and Origen’s
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views of "names" should not be considered in relation to i t  whatsoever. 
This is our conclusive comment on that text which G. Butterworth 
regards as not only virtually but also literally authentic, without, as he 
usually did, adducing any evidence for that at all.
Origen’s conception of reality in the world’s absence (namely, 
either "before" the fall or "after" the absolute end of it)  is the divine 
reality. It is, therefore, natural to assume that the only "name" that 
may make sense at that state is the name of God, as Origen refers to 
this.370 The category of "name" attributed to creatures, however, is 
closely related to "function" and "change" of personal creatures. In 
other words, i t  is by essence related to the category of "diversity" 
which in no way may be attributed to the divine reality. Beyond that, in 
order to be possible to speak of "name" of a creature, i t  is an obvious 
pre-requisite that this creature e x is ts that is, i t  has been created as 
a personal individual hypostasis. This creation, however, is related to 
space and time, that is to the existence of the world itself. Thus the 
category of "name" cannot make any sense in thw world’s absence, in 
exactly the same way that any category ontologically related to the 
world cannot make sense in the absence of the actual existence of the 
world.
The term which Origen uses in order to depict his notion of the 
significance of names is quite indicative of how he perceives it. He 
says that the names indicate "pragmata" (npdypaxa).371 The term 
(Plural of the word "pragma") is derived from the verb "pratto" (npaxxw; 
to act) from which the term "praxis" (npagig) is derived as well. 
Etymologically the word "prag-ma" signifies the "result" of an action.372 
The very term npdypaza indicates action and it  particularly signifies 
the result of an action, as the root (or, "theme") of the word is that of 
the verb "pratto" (npaxxw) which means "to act". It is indicative of how 
good command of Greek Origen had, that he himself explicates that
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"names" are "characteristics of various kinds of action".373
It is certainly no accident that Origen has employed the term 
npdtffiaza in order to articulate the absolute end of the world. For, as 
discussed above, i t  is through the term zo zefiog ztiv npatfpdzaw (the 
end of things) that he portrays the end of time and of course the end of 
the world itself.
Thus the npdgpaza, namely what alludes to function , w ill 
come to an end and this w ill be the absolute end. So, also from this 
point of view, "names" do not make sense once "pragmata" (namely, the 
world itself) have come to an end.
In view of this discussion, certain affirmations in Princ\ may 
well be regarded as allusions to the reality following the absolute end 
of the world. Thus there is an analysis of how the "end of things, in 
which God is said not only to be in all things but even to be all 
things"374 is understood. This is portrayed as a state where "the mind 
w ill no longer be conscious of anything besides or other than God, but 
w ill think God and see God and hold God".375 We cannot know the extent 
to which these expressions are Origen’s own words. In view of our 
discussions, however, we can assume that they must be not very far 
from them and therefore we could take them (to a certain extent) into 
consideration.
What these expressions vaguely allude to is a reality where 
there are no "names". This means that a creature is not "distinct" in the 
sight of God because "distinction" is an existential characteristic 
pertaining only to a state of "fall". Strictly speaking, therefore, there 
is no more personal identity of creatures. For the person which is  in 
that reality is Christ himself. In fact this is the state of the 
providential creation, as portrayed in chapter 1.
This is the sense in which what now are "creatures" then w ill 
be "deified" and they w ill no more have any consciousness of individual
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existence and identity but everything w ill be God. It is also according 
to this perception that the saying in Isaiah Tell ye the former things, 
what they were, and we shall know that ye are gods; or declare the last 
things, what they are, and then shall we see thet ye are gods.’376 is 
stated in the Princ 377 And this is the sense in which those who now 
are individual creatures then w ill be not "sons" but son of God. 
Whereas in creaturely status the personal identity of creatures lies in 
their relation to God, in that state the personal relation between /  and 
You can be understood only as the relation between the persons of the 
Trinity. This end of the world actually is the eschatological ‘'sabbath** 
of Christ, namely the "rest** from his perpetual intelligible advent and 
work in the world.378
This final end w ill be accomplished through free moral action 
in space-time. And when the "jump" from being out of God (that is, from 
corporeality and time) to being in  God (that is, to incorporeality and 
timelessness) occurs, then the “world", namely corporeality and time, 
w ill come to an end and w ill cease to exist. This "jump" means that 
there is no longer any chasm between God and the world just because
there is no more any "out" of God, there is no more the reality of
space-time as the reasons of its coming into existence w ill have passed 
away.
Thus, the reality "after the resurrection" is the divine one, in 
which no time can be applied. This is the reality which Origen depicts 
as the perpetual "day" of God, in which there is neither morning nor 
evening. Certainly G. Florovski, who attacked Origen on the basis of 
views drawn from the Princ could have never imagined that such are 
the views of Origen. So he speaks of an "after the resurrection*'379 in 
which there w ill be no time. He appeals to John of Damascus who 
described that reality as "a day without evening". Yet what is
dramatically striking, is that this is a passage in which John of
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Damascus does nothing more but to repeat the same words of Origen's 
as found in commJohn and at the points where he expresses his 
temporal notions.380
Thus, as far as time is concerned, what G. Florovski depicts as 
his own views supported by those of John of Damascus, are just the 
views of Origen and the crucial temporal terms which are used are 
those which Origen firs t introduced in forming his Christian view of 
time.
It is because the "fan" was a coming out of God and the 
"perfection of resurrection" is exactly the "return" to the Father, that 
Origen perceives the final end as a return into the Father. To portray 
the reality "after” the end clearly is as d ifficult as to portray this 
reality "before" the fall. For in both cases one has to portray the life  of 
God -which is impossible. Origen speaks of "beginning or end" just 
because both these terms indicate one and the same reality, namely the 
divine one.
This was why Origen does not to elaborate on the question of 
the reality after the final end, namely on the notion of resurrection. 
For he deemed both the doctrines of fall and resurrection as "secret" 
and ineffable. He knew that, once those truths are explicitly enunciated 
in words, they are almost bound to be misunderstood.
On the other hand, however, he was confident that a man may 
comprehend these doctrines through divine enlightenment. It was his 
anti-Platonic attitude on the causative relation between "virtue" and 
"knowledge" that led him to leave those truths unarticulated. For a 
Christian i t  was a virtuous life  (and not just any kind of intellectual 
exercise) that might lead to a comprehension of these secret truths 
through the Holy Spirit.
In view of our discussion about Origen's conception of 
"knowledge" and the way of reaching it, we can now consider his
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existential attitude in treating these mystical doctrines.
In Dial he extensively expresses his "agony" and awe as he 
intended to say a few words on the "secret" doctrine of the soul. The 
reader of those introductory words of Origen should note a very 
significant point: He does not say to his listeners "listen carefully, so 
that you can understand" or "concentrate on the words, in order to 
comprehend them". But he says: “We have arrived in a mystical teaching 
... transform yourselves, leave evil aside, leave aside any opposition, 
wrath, quarrels, anger, grievances, dissension, so that there w ill be no 
schisms among you but you all are restored in one mind and in one 
disposition". And yet he continues: "I feel agony intending to speak, I 
feel agony intending not to speak." (A^ujviw smeiv, a^wviw m i |ifj 
sinstv).381
This existential attitude in pursuing knowledge is a point a 
major contrast between Origen and Platonism. Yet, at the same time, i t  
was the same view inhibiting him from elaborating on these mystical 
doctrines. For i t  was his conviction that once a man has (through 
proper disposition and action) prepared himself for the Holy Spirit to 
visit and enlighten him, then there is no need to express through words 
what is by nature beyond language. For the man who deserves to learn 
those truths w ill be enlightened and w ill directly be tought by God.
These are his personal existential convictions, due to which 
Origen did not wish to elaborate on these mystical doctrines. In spite 
of this fact, however, history has shown that he was misunderstood and 
the simplistic characterization of Platonism was attributed to him. It 
is worth while then to try and elaborate a litt le  further on his views 
on this crucial question, namely on the reality "after" the final end. For 
one might, for instance, ask what w ill the eschatological perspective of 
the Church be. Will i t  be extinguished into nothing -as Jerome accused 
Origen? And what is the ground on which Origen affirms that the
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teaching about the soul” is "mystical" (anoppqxov),382 and though his 
views have nothing to do with Plato how do they constitute a "more 
sublime doctrine"?
To answer these questions we should recall the actual meaning 
of the "world" and particularly of "life" as well as its relation to time. 
Origen’s view is that speaking of "life" one should see that life  became, 
namely i t  came into being out of non-being and that creaturely life  did 
not exist when time did not exist either.383
So, considering Origen’s perception of God and the world, there 
are four existential realities which should be distinguished:
First, the reality of God, the divine life  in which there is 
nothing but God Himself.
Secondly, the divine reality in which God "decorated" the "body" 
of the "multi-embroidered" wisdom, namely the providential creation.
Thirdly, the fall out of the "body" of Christ. It is then that 
creation comes into existence, namely space-time and rational 
creatures, as individual personalities, come into existence.
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Fourthly, the "restoration" to the reality "before" the fall, 
namely the "perfection of resurrection". This w ill take place when the 
absolute end of the world occurs and space-time reaches to an end.
The fall is understood to have occured out of this reality. This 
is also the reality which constitutes the eschatological expectation 
which is portrayed as "restoration". Indeed that reality is perceived as 
a kind of "our ancient fatherland" which w ill be attained to after the 
resurrection.384 This is the sense in which Origen refers to the 
resurrection of Christ stating that i t  was "the firs t-fru its  of our 
nature" that "was elevated above all the heavens"385 Thus when Jesus 
gave a promise to his disciples saying "I w ill come again and receive 
you unto myself386 he meant that he w ill take them also in the heavens 
where he himself is so that they enjoy what he enjoys; and, in order to
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portray the content of this reality, Origen quotes Paul: "If we suffer, 
we shall also reign w ith him "?87 This quotation is one more allusion 
to the final expectation as "deification" of rational creatures.
In commliatt Origen refers to Christ saying that "for the sake 
of the church he le ft the father with whom he was when he was 'in the 
form of God' [Phil.2,6] and he also le ft the mother, as he was son of the 
upper Jerusalem (kcu auxog wv uiog xrjg avu Ispouaaflfjji)".388 At that 
point, Origen repeatedly refers to the mystery denoted by the saying of 
Jesus in Matt. 19,5-6 about man and woman that "they twain shall be one 
flesh" and "Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh".389 And he 
insists upon the deeper meaning of the saying "they are no more twain, 
but one flesh" which he repeatedly quotes in those sections of the 
commliatt
It is in view of the affirmation in that passage of Matthew, 
namely "For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall 
cleave to his wife"390 that Origen speaks of Christ who "left" his Father 
as well as his "mother" (namely, the divine reality, portrayed here as 
"upper Jerusalem" of which Christ is "son") in order to become "one" 
with the church.
This is what constitutes the eschatological perspective of the 
church. In support of this, at the same point, Origen adduces the sayings 
of Paul "you are the body of Christ and members in particular";391 for 
"there is nothing else apart from the church which would be said to be 
'body' of Christ and ’members in particular' "392 It is for the sake of 
the church that "the Word was made flesh and dwelt upon us"393 and 
"cleaved to his wife which has fallen here and they become twain in one 
flesh".394
It is quite remarkable that, in that section of commliatt, Origen 
feels i t  necessary to enunciate many times and with obvious emphasis 
the expressions "they are no more tw o" ( ouksxi s ioi 6uo) but they are
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"one flesh" (afifid aap| ji(a).
In respect of this, the expressions about Christ who "became" 
one flesh with the church is but a prefiguration of the eschatological 
reality. This means that these should be understood in the context of a 
conception of time in which, after the incarnation of Christ, the future 
has become present through the fundamental categories which 
determine Origen's conception of time, namely prophecy, realization\ 
faith, hope, expectation, fu lfilm ent as discussed in chapter 3. The 
present historical reality is now "in betrothal" (ev appapuvi) to the 
eschatological one. In the light of this conception Origen affirms that 
when Paul says "we have been resurrected together with" Christ395 he 
already lives a life  "according to the hoped blessed and perfect 
resurrection, although he has not been resurrected yet.".396
But, as far the eschatological reality itself is concerned, i t  
s till lies in the future. Origen was aware of the question which might 
be raised by some, namely by those who might argue that since the 
union of Christ to the church in "one flesh" has already taken place 
there is no reason to affirm that this "union" is a future occurrence. On 
this question he says this:
"It is in the sayings of our saviour in the scriptures that each 
one should try to learn about the reality a fte r the resurrection Yet 
what pertains to that reality are written in the scriptures not litera lly 
so that they could be comprehended by anyone but [they are written] in 
allegory."397 For "the law having a shadow of good things to come"398 
contains "narrations about women and men and good marriages" but one 
should not stick to the letter of the narrations because they actually 
refer to "the wedding o f the saviour to the church which w ill take 
place in the aeon to come. " 399
There is a point which should be made here. The expression ev 
xu jjsflrlovxi aiuvi (in the aeon to come) is frequently used by Origen in
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order to denote the final eschatological reality. This happens mainly in 
his Commentaries where he provides an exegesis of a certain passage 
at hand whereas in his treatises (such as Cels or deOr ) he is 
absolutely clear that there is an (unknown to rational creatures) 
number of "aeons" to come until the eschatological reality portrayed as 
"the aeon to come" w ill actually occur. Thus, although he holds that 
there are many "aeons" to come, and he speaks of a "former judgement" 
(at the end of this aeon) as well as of a "second" one,400 yet, in 
expProv, he alludes to the time of the final abolition of evil through 
the expression "in the aeon to come" (ev xtu peaRovxi aiuvi)401 meaning 
the final aeon of all time. In general, when Origen employs the 
scriptural expression "the aeon to come" (o peaauv aiuv) he suggests 
the eschatological reality which constitutes to aim of free moral 
action throughout all time. Thus the "aeon to come" (o psaRuv aiuv) does 
not necessarily mean "the next aeon"; i t  more often means the " ffna, 
aeon" in the series of aeons which comprise the whole continuum of 
time.
In the same way, he portrays the eschatological reality through 
the scriptural expression "end of aeon". In that case he alludes to the 
end of the re a lity  of aeon, namely to the end of the world, as a 
spatio-temporal reality. This is the context in which he provides an 
exegesis of the reality which he calls "after the resurrection". In this 
passage his notion of Christ and the resurrected "body" being "in one 
flesh" is again manifestly present:
"It would not be unreasonable if  some people allege that after 
all the days of this aeon he who said ’And, lo, I am with you’ w ill no 
more be with those who have accepted him ’until the end of the aeon'; 
for 'until' (swg) in a certain sense denotes a conception of time. To 
those people i t  should be said that 'I am with you’ is not the same to 'I 
am in you’. For, i f  we are to speak strictly, the saviour is not 'in' his
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disciples, but he is ‘with’ them spiritually, as they have not yet arrived 
at the consummation of the aeon. But once the consummation of the 
world, which has been crucified to them,402 occurs and they face it  in 
accordance to their preparation, then since Christ w ill be not with 
them but he w ill become in them and they w ill say the saying ‘I live; 
yet not I, but Christ liveth in me'403 and the ’Since you seek a proof of 
Christ speaking in me’.404 We say this maintaining that a somewhat 
similar exegesis should be understood for the expression ’all the days 
until the consummation of the aeon’ in as much as i t  is possible for 
those expressions to be understood by human nature as i t  is s till Cexi) 
in this rank of life  (evxau9a); i t  is in the context of this exegesis that 
the ’I (s^uj)’ should be understood so that, until the consummation of the 
aeon, he who emptied himself and assumed the form of a servant is 
with those who have been sent to teach all the nations; and as if  before 
he emptied himself he were in a different status, so after the 
consummation of the aeon he w ill be with them until all his ’enemies 
w ill be put down as a footstool under his feet405 by the father; and 
after that when the son surrenders the kingdom to God the father, the 
father w ill say to them ’Lo, I am with you’; and whether i t  w ill be said 
of all the days until a certain time or merely all the days or not all 
[the days] (naaag) but all [the day] (naoav), this is a question to be 
enquired into by him who wants to do so.’’.406
One can see that in the same passage Origen speaks of the 
eschatological reality, through the notion of after ’’the consummation of 
the world". In that reality Christ w ill be not with but in  the 
resurrected world. However, a litt le  further he says that "after the 
consummation of the aeon he w ill be with them until" the end. This is 
not a contradiction. It is in accord with the account which we provided 
above that the terms "end of aeon" should be understood as the context 
requires. Anyhow, the whole passage makes clear that Christ is with
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the world as long as space-time exists. The “restoration" w ill mark the 
return to the reality in which Chrsit is intUe resurrected body, in "one 
flesh". This is why Origen (always thoroughly scrupulous in the use of 
language) depicts the presence of the Logos in the world through the 
term oRu xu Koofiu aupnapsKxsivojievog (extended alongside with  the 
whole world).407
In that reality 6 od w ill be seen as he is in himself, namely as 
the Son knows him, due to the very fact that what now are rationat 
creatures then they w ill be son of God408 and w ill be out of time and 
corporeality.409
The eschatological perspective is therefore perceived as the 
state in which corporeality and time w ill have ceased to exist and the 
relation to the father w ill be in itself the relation of the son to the 
father. In that state the only conceptions of Christ that may s till exist 
are those of Logos and Wisdom. The conception of "life" as creaturely 
life  w ill have cease to exist as i t  is a conception which is understood 
to pertain not to Christ in himself but to others (oux auxu aRRa 
sxepoig).410 Since, therefore, the final unity of all in the one 
resurrected "body" means the abolition of any "distinction" or 
"diversification" the category of "others" does no more make any sense; 
for resurrection means that all w ill have become son?u
This is the conception in the light of which Origen considers 
Paul’s affirmation "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all 
things":412 He states that the expression "of him" (s| auxou)413 
"suggests the beginning of existence of everything" (napiaxag xrjv apxqv 
xijg xwv navxwv unoaxaaeug); the expression "through him" implies the 
world's being kept into existence (Koa xijv auvoxgv ev xu ’61' auxou’); 
and the expression "to him" suggests the end (xa( xo xeRog sv xu 's(g 
auxov’) .414
The notion of "out" applied to the world in Origen’s thought,
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deserves particular attention and consideration. It has been asserted 
that in Christianity there was a distinction between "out of nothing" 
and "from God", the former being used for the material universe, the 
latter being normally for Christ the Son, on the grounds that he is of 
one substance with God the Father.415 In Origen this distinction is 
entirely different and certainly much subtler. He has no problem 
making the distinction between "out of nothing" and "from God", in 
contrast not to what is asserted about Christian thought, but also to 
the Neoplatonic one.416
In Origen’s thought these conceptions are absolutely clear: The 
notion of "coming into being out of non-being" applies to the 
providential creation, whereas the notion of becoming "outside of God" 
indicates the actual creation’s coming into existence. Thus the "outside 
of God" suggests the actual spatio-temporal reality of the world. 
Whatever is in  this reality is regarded to be outside of God.
In the light of this clear distinction of Origen's, a comparison 
to the notion of "out of the world" in modern Existentialism would be 
particularly interesting. Origen would certainly endorse J.P. Sartre's 
statement that "Without the world there is no selfhood, no person; 
without selfhood, without the person, there is no world’417 -but the 
agreement could be only verbal and accidental. For what Sartre 
suggests by this expression is that man is nothing apart from his 
environment and he actually rejects the very idea that man’s essence is 
prior to his actual being. In existentialism the notion of "ex-sistence" 
is taken in its root sense, namely "standing out". But the "existence" 
means the fact of finding ourselves into the world.418
It is remarkable that the existentialist conception of 
"existence" as "standing out" is based on the notions of ecstasy and 
transcendence419 But, in the firs t place, i t  seems that whereas in 
Origen the notion of ou t, applied to man, is perceived as "outside of
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God”, in Existentialism this notion of out is stated as "out of the 
world" -under certain presuppositions and in a certain sense.
However, the question is not as simple as articulated here. And 
we do believe that a study of Origen's thought with respect to 
existentialists conception of out would be very fruitful. At this point 
we cannot pursue this discussion further. We only say that we would 
not be surpised if  what i t  seems as "difference" would eventually be 
proved to be not the case and Origen to have anticipated the deeper 
sense of the "potential being" as well as the notions of "quest of 
authentic existence" and the "attainment of selfhood" expressed in 
terms of his theology.
In this work we have treated the question of the nature of 
rational creatures only to a certain extent -namely, in as much as it  is 
related to our topic. We regard the question, however, as far from 
being exhausted, and we contend that this aspect of Origen's thought is 
s till generally misapprehended. For what does Origen mean when he 
affirms that "in each one of us there are two men."?420 He certainly 
avers that in each man there is what was made in the providential 
creation and the other made in the actual creation. So, does it  mean 
that each man has two personalities? This is the point which has just 
been left out of study by those who find it  a simple solution to 
attribute "Platonism" to him. But the matter is not as simple, as they 
would like to allege. If a man were but a "fallen" soul (in a Platonic 
sense), then the question is about a change of one personality -from 
an incorporeal to a corporeal status. Origen, however, is clear that 
what was made "in the beginning" was not "man and woman" but "male 
and female", namely i t  was human nature -not individual persons, 
which was made then. So when he affirms that in each man there are 
two men, he does not mean two persons, but he means the individual 
personality as well as the perfect human nature which was made in the
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beginning. This is the context in which this perfect human nature should 
be studied in its relation to the Logos, who is also present in each 
individual rational creature. However such a topic needs a study of its 
own.
Thus i t  can be said that, in Origen’s thought, "to come into being 
out of non-being" implies the providential creation, whereas "to go 
outside of God” implies the actual creation. Therefore, created beinb 
applies to the providential creation whereas created existence, in a 
literal linguistic sense,421 applies to the actual creation.
Thus the notion of "becoming into God" constitutes the actual 
meaning of "restoration" -an eschatological goal w ill be attained 
through "the good road which leads to the good father" (a^a9ri $ap o6og 
rj anctftouaa npog xov aga9ov naxepa).422 This is the sense in which 
Origen speaks of the "restoration of the whole" (xrjg anoKaxaaxdoeojg 
xou navxog)423 the term "whole" (navxog) being in the Singular, and, as 
we have seen, meaning "the whole world". For, as he says, "not only one 
nation ... nor two, but all the ends of earth ...will return".424 It is 
against this conceptual background that the notion of "return of the 
whole" to God "through time"425 should be understood.
This is how Origen conceives both the origin and the 
eschatological destination of the world. And this is the sense in which 
he speaks of the wisdom of God, namely of Christ, as a vogxog 
Koopog426 in which Jesus "teaches that we have our origin".427 The final 
reality w ill be the "body" of Christ, "the whole church of God"428 in its 
resurrected form, as the "bride church"429 living with Christ in "one 
flesh".
The church came into being out of God’s creative rsvvrjdfjui 
(Let be) yet fell out of the upper Jerusalem,430 yet she s till is the 
"body"431 of Christ. To Origen, the "get out" (sgsr)9s), in the Song of 
Songs 1,8, is reminiscent of what was told to the church once the fall
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occurred.432 However the church has already received the ‘'betrothal" of 
its return and cherises the "hope of resurrection".433 So after that 
"exodus" the "whole world" (oflog o Koopog) will again "enter into the 
house of the upper Jerusalem".434 Origen constantly relates the figures 
"body of Christ" to "church" and "soul" or "rational animal"435 in general 
and expresses his conviction that the church w ill be again in its 
perfect and glorified form, namely i t  w ill be into "the mystery of 
wedding" and "the perfect rest"436
Since what was created in the beginning was "invisible", the 
"earth" itself out of that creation was "invisible and unbuilt" (xai 10 
xgg $f|g aopaxov Kai aKaxaaKeuaaxov), too.437 This was the creation 
which God saw that was "good", namely the "reasons" of everything in 
the providential creation which was incorporeal, due to the very fact 
that these Bogoi (words, reasons) are incorporeal. This is the most 
sublime conceptual content aplied to "upper Jerusalem", the supreme 
"city of God" in the wisdom of God, the "embroiderment" of the body of 
the Wisdom.
This "body" is the original reality of the church and this 
reality, once came into being w ill never be dissolved into non-being. 
"For we know that even if  heaven and earth and the things in them pass 
away 438 yet the reasons of everything w ill in no wise pass away.439 
For they are being like parts in a whole or forms in a species, which 
were uttered  by the Logos who was the divine Logos with God in the 
beginning."440
The creative act of God brought Being out of non-being. The 
creative utterances of God "in the beginning", these R6$oi which in 
themeselves are the creatures, came into being out of non-being. They 
are wisdom themselves. For they constitute what Origen depicts as a 
"made"441 yet "living wisdom'442 which "has a soul, as i t  were".443 This 
is the sense in which he portrays them as "like parts in a whole or
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forms in a species".
It was because of the fall that Being became Existence and the 
actual spatio-temporal reality of the world was made, as a "downfall" 
(Kaxaporlfj) out of God.
Time is the means through which Existence w ill become Being 
again. Existence w ill pass away when the reason for its being "out" w ill 
have passed away. What is a Kaxaf3oflf} will pass away. But the created 
wisdom, the "embroidery" of the "body" of Christ, which came into being 
out of God creative rsvvrjSfjzijj, constitutes the created Being which 
w ill not pass away.
Anyone who has studied Plato carefully (and we believe that 
those who attribute "Platonism" to Origen did not) would see that this 
is one more point on which Origen dissents from Platonic mode of 
thought and Platonic notions. To Plato i t  was an axiom that "everything 
that has a beginning has also an end".444 As opposed to that postulate, 
Origen affirms creation out of non-being (an un-Platonic notion, as 
well) and explicates that, although th is creation had a beginning, i t  wih 
have no end Thus, both the notions of "beginning" and "end", related to 
creation, are articulated by Origen in a way and in a context thorougly 
contrary to the most fundamental premises of Platonic thought.
So "restoration" actually means the return to the creation 
portrayed by the terms nofrjotg and tfsvsotg. This is the state which he 
calls "beginning" (apxg) as contrasted to the "end".445 It is certainly no 
incident that, in his extensive analyses in the same work, i t  is the 
Wisdom, namely Christ, who is identified with the term apxrj. Thus 
what now are distinct creatures are understood as fallen from what 
was perfect into what is imperfect; and this happened to all those who 
"left their own residence" as they "did not remain faithful to their 
beginning" Qirj xrjprjaavxsg xrjv eauxuv apxgv).446 Thus when it  is said 
that Jesus came in order to "make perfect the work"447 of God it  is not
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suggested that the work of God in itself was made "imperfect” but 
Jesus came in order to help for the "return" to God "not only of man, 
but of every rational soul". At that point, however, Origen again points 
out that in the scriptural saying "In order to make perfect the work" of 
God there is "a deeper mystery denoted" by those words (grouped 6 f| sv 
xoig xonoig f?a9uxspov xi svanoKs(o9ai puaxfjpiov).448
Thus i t  cannot be said that the creative act of God was futile. 
For i t  is Origen's conviction that "God makes nothing superfluous nor 
anything made by him is futile ."449
In respect of this, the church, perceived as the created "body" 
of Christ, w ill not be dissolved into nothing by virtue of the fact that 
"to come into being out of non-being" exactly pertains to the reality of 
restoration. This is the sense in which Origen affirms that the created 
work of God w ill not pass way.
In a significant point in the expProv, he affirms that 
"creatures" (^s^ovoxwv) themselves, (which are again stated as 
npd^paxa) will pass away (napsfleuoexaO. Yet the reasons of them w ill 
not pass away they constitute a creation made in wisdom, which was 
manifested through the words of Jesus Christ which "will never pass 
away" (ou6s $dp oC Ro^oi napeflsuaovxat xou luxrjpog gpujv Igoou 
Xpiaxou).450
Commenting on Psalm 21,28, ("All the ends of the world shall 
recollect and turn unto the Lord") Origen states that "After knowledge 
came oblivion and after oblivion w ill come recollection. Therefore is 
has well been said 'they shall recollect'; for since they have received 
their own being by God, they shall remember the ir creator and once 
they remember him they shall return; not one nation, as i t  has been 
said, not only two either, but all the ends of the earth, being 
enlightened through the light of the knowledge of God".451
Thus, Origen's conviction is that the return to the "knowledge"
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of God w ill definitely happen. In his view, the deeper meaning of this 
eschatological "knowledge" is exactly that of "union" as it  is found in 
Genesis 4,1 and it  is exactly this notion of "union" that he deems as a 
"great mystery" using (actually quoting) the very same expression of 
Paul in Eph.5,32. This is the reality to which Origen alludes when he 
expresses his conviction that "there was [a reality] when evil did not 
exist and there w ill be [a reality] when it  w ill not exist".
Indeed this is the divine reality in which what came into being 
out of nori-being w ill be in union with the Son of God and the saying of 
Paul "I live; yet not I but Christ lives in me" (Gal.2,20) w ill be not a 
figure but a reality .452
Although Origen cites this passage of Paul, he did not wish to 
elaborate much on the actual content of the eschatological reality 
denoted by this, as he regarded this as a deep and ineffable mystery.453 
It is only at a point of commMatt that he provides a hint of how he 
perceives this mystery, namely how is i t  possible to hold that personal 
identity w ill reach an end and this end in itse lf constitutes the 
"salvation" of the person. There he again appeals to Paul’s Gal.2,20, yet 
proceeds to affirm that "salvation" of a soul is to enter into the divine 
bliss  (aflFT smsp vooupev t o  au}£sa9ai xfjv ipuxfjv paKapiov sivai, 
avcupspopevqv en( xqv sv 8 suj auxrjpiav). In view of this, he deems that 
the saying of Jesus "Whosoever wants to save his soul, he shall lose it; 
and whosoever loses his soul for my sake he shall find i t "454 alludes to 
this eschatological reality. For to lose one's soul is not necessarily 
something bad, but there is "a loss of soul in a good sense and for the 
sake of Christ, since it  w ill be the beginning (npooipiov) of the blessed 
salvation (x q g  p a K a p ia g  o a jx r p a g ).455
We said above that to use the expression "after" the creation is 
an inaccurate expression, since time is terminated at the absolute end. 
Origen obviously was conscious of that as he always treated language
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with a profound scrutiny. This is why, in his reply to Celsus, he just 
for one moment uses this term456 but he instantly points out that this 
is a question which cannot be discussed due to its being an ineffable 
mystery. Thus he states:
"Then Celsus next says: ... ‘Obviously the members of the great 
church confess this, and believe that the story of the making of the 
world current among the Jews is true even in respect of the six days 
and the seventh on which, according to scripture, God ceased from his 
work457 and ‘retired into the contemplation of himself458 yet Celsus, 
because he did not read the scriptures carefully and did not understand 
them, says that God 'rested', which is not the word used. But the 
teaching about the creation (nepi 6e xrjg Kooponouag) and about the 
sabbatism which remains for the people of God after i t  (kcu tou psx' 
auxrjv anoRsmopevou oappaxiopou xw Raw tou 8eou) is a doctrine which 
is mystical and profound and 'a word great and hard to explain'.".459
Hence Origen here uses the term Koaponoua which is the term 
currently used by him in order to denote the "world" itself and yet he 
also uses the expression fis z ' auzrjv (after the "world"), suggesting an 
"after" the duration of the creation. The reality visualized is the 
"sabbatism (oappaxiopou) for the people of God". This is an expression 
used in Heb.4,9, yet Origen does not use i t  as a quotation, as he does 
with the passage Heb.5,11. In any case, the expression "after the 
creation" is Origen's. Yet i t  is obvious that he does not wish to make 
the slightest implication about this eschatological reality. All he does 
is to affirm that the absolute end of the creation is to be "followed", as 
i t  were, by a reality which is stated through the word of Heb.4,9, 
namely "sabbatism".460 and this "sabbatism" is to come "after" the 
duration of the world.461 This is the reality of which he says that i t  is 
almost impossible to depict in words, since i t  is a teaching "great", 
"mystical", "profound" and "difficult to interpret".
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If Origen held a notion reminiscent of Platonic views would it  
be so d ifficult for him to say a few words about it? It is in the same 
work, namely Cels, that he has no hesitation in affirming that certain
points of his thought appear to be similar to Platonic views and he
quite exactly enunciates which these points are, discusses them, and 
quite often cites expressions from Plato’s works.
There are quite a lot of scholars who point out that certain
points in Origen's thought are "Platonic".462 Yet what they almost
always forget to add is that i t  is Origen himself who both determines 
these points and, not rarely, juxtaposes his own views with the 
Platonic ones. So the reader draws the impression that this "similarity" 
of Origen's views to Platonism is an outcome of a painstaking work by 
those scholars.463
At this point, however, Origen knows that his views have 
nothing to do with those of any pagan philosopher. This is why he does 
not proceed with any further discussion on this question and all he does 
is to affirm the ineffability of his own views. It is certainly no 
incident that this section of Cels is one of the shortest of the entire 
work. Origen cites the challenge of Celsus yet he does not regard him 
worthy of reply on a question which requires the listener to be of a 
completely different existential background to that of Celsus. Even 
then, there could also be litt le  which might be possible to articulate in 
words.
Why Origen adopts such an attitude is quite clearly enunciated 
in the same work, namely Cels:
"The doctrines about these questions are great and mystical. To 
this teaching the saying 'it is good to hide the mystery of the king464 
is befitting. For we do not want the teaching about souls (which do not 
assume a body according to a doctrine of transmigration) to be cast 
before just any audience, nor that holy things should be given to the
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dogs, nor that pearls be cast before swine.465 For that would be 
impious, as i t  constitutes a betrayal of the secret mysteries of the 
wisdom of God (npoSooi'av nspiexov xwv anoppfjxwv x r jg  t o u  Bsou ao(p(ag 
R o ^ io jv ) ,  of which it  is well written; ’Wisdom w ill not enter into a soul 
that practices evil neither w ill i t  dwell in a body involved in sin’ (Ei'g 
kcckotcxvov TO1!7 °^K oo<p(a ou5s KaxoiKijaei sv oiupaxi
Kaxaxpew apapxiag)466 It is then enough to give an account of the 
doctrines which are said in a mystical way, under the guise of a story, 
by just following the course of that story, in order that those who have 
the ability may work out the meaning of the passages for 
themselves".467
Origen’s constant care was to not "betray" what he held as 
secret mysteries of the wisdom of God entrusted to him. This care 
prevented him from giving a full account of these mystical doctrines, 
even at the risk of his thought being misunderstood. History shows that 
while his frequent explicit statements are far from being similar to 
any Platonic perceptions, have been not proven adequate in preventing 
miscomprehensions.
Thus, in conclusion of the discussion on Origen’s eschatological 
perceptions, i t  can be affirmed that the work of the incarnated Christ 
was not futile and the eschatological perspective of the church is not 
to be dissolved into nothing as Jerome falsely attributed to Origen. On 
the contrary, the eschatological perspective of the church is to be one 
body and "one flesh"468 with Christ. For this reality is a reality createc 
by God "in the beginning" and it  is Origen’s conviction that this reality 
w ill have no end whatever. Thus, although he visualizes a notion of 
God Himself, namely a divine reality in which there is nothing created, 
and he holds that God created out of an act of his w ill, i t  is also his 
conviction that once a creative act of God occurred, there w ill be no 
end of what was made "in the beginning".
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This is how Origen maintains that the church w ill have no end. 
It w ill enter into the divine reality being the resurrected '‘body" of 
Christ and w ill be "one flesh" with him and, in that reality, life  w ill be 
only the divine one, namely the life  of Christ himself, in a reality of 
which Paul's saying "I live; yet not I but Christ lives in me"469 is a 
figure. This is the mysterious eschatological reality of the church in 
its union with Christ in love; and this is why Origen holds that i t  is in 
the Song of Solomon that the deepest mysteries and truths of Christian 
faith have been mystically expressed.
Thus Origen articulates his perception of the reality before the 
fall and after the resurrection through figures such as the "body" of 
Christ, appealing either to John470 or to Paul and holding that the body 
of Jesus was both a historical reality and a prefiguration471 of the 
"spiritual house",472 namely of Christ himself. Yet again Origen 
maintains his mysticism on this subject. For he states that to speak in 
detail about this "temple", namely the spiritual meaning of the "body" of 
Christ, is "difficult to articulate" (6uo6ifj^T ]xov) and "beyond our verbal 
ability" (kcu noRRw xrjg Rs|swg )v psi^ov).473
It is obvious from Origen's own statements discussed in this 
work, that the doctrines of both the fall and resurrection were of this 
kind and this is the reason for which he did not wish to enunciate 
explicitly and systematically his perception of the realities which 
these mystical doctrines pertain to.
It would not be superfluous to make a final point in order to 
clarify Origen's eschatological perceptions. The end as perfection of all 
rational creatures and "subjection" to Christ is different from the final 
end as "subjection" of Christ to the Father and "surrendering" the 
"kingdom" to him. The final end is understood to be subsequent, namely 
to "follow" the former one. Nevertheless there is no reason to assume 
that any period of time w ill lapse from the former end to the final one.
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The final state of perfection of all rational creatures w ill obviously 
occur at the end of a future aeon, after a consummation and judgement. 
It is then that all rational creatures s till in lower ranks of life  w ill be 
found worthy of attaining to eternal life. The outcome of that 
judgement marks the "subjection" of all rational creatures to Christ and 
the abolition of the "final enemy, namely death" as eternal life  is also 
portrayed by Origen as the state of "immortality". The "subjection" of 
Christ to the Father w ill occur immediately after that occurence. No 
measurable period of time w ill lapse until this w ill happen,474 simply 
because there is no reason for time to exist further. Beyond that, 
Origen repeatedly appeals475 to the saying in Psalms (109,1) as well as 
in Paul that Christ w ill reign "throughout the aeons" u n til all his 
enemies be put as a footstool under his feet. He has made an ad hoc 
philological analysis of the temporal notion of "until" and he is 
certainly fully conscious of its exact meaning. Thus his own 
phraseology on the question does never say that Christ w ill reign and 
then he w ill surrender the kingdom to the Father. Such an expression 
might invoke the argument that i t  is not necessary that the kingdom 
w ill be deliverd to the Father immediately after the abolition of 
"death". This is the mistake which Cullmann has made by saying that 
this w ill happen at an indefinite moment of the aeon to come. By 
contrast, Origen sticks to the scriptural "until" which actually denotes 
the time when a certain status comes to an end. So, although Origen 
also adheres to the expression of Paul that the final end w ill occur 
"after"476 the "subjection" of all rational creatures to Christ, he 
perceives the final end as occurring immediately "after" this "end".
However, so long as time exists, the earnest agony and ardent 
preoccupation is with the course in time, namely with the crucial 
importance of every moment of time and the dramatic relation between 
"before" and "after" in time. So, as long as the world exists, the
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preoccupation with the course in time is an outstanding one. For i t  is 
only through time that the restoration from "here" and “down" to 
"there" and "above" could be attained to. Certainly i t  would be 
inaccurate to assert that Origen’s understanding of the eschatological 
destiny of the world is portrayed only in terms of "before" and "after" 
and not in terms of an "above" and "beyond".477 But i t  would be far more 
accurate to emphasize the outstanding role of time (and indeed, of 
every momenta time) in the cosmic drama towards the eschatological 
fulfilment.478
Flence the distinction between these two "ends" is not so much 
portrayed in terms of a succession of periods of time but in terms of 
succession of two quite distinct existential states. There is no 
conception of a lasting duration between the state of perfection of all 
and the ensuing state of God being all in all. Such a view is perfectly 
compatible with Origen's conception of a time without duration. This is 
what allows him to include into one phrase the occurence of these two 
"ends", as the absolute end immediatly ensuing the occurrence of the 
perfection of all.
In fact, in the "Commentary on Song of Songs", such a view is 
quite clearly provided. At that point the discussion is about the passage 
in Wisdom of Solomon where the notion of "the beginning and the end 
and the middle of times" (apxqv Kat isflog Kat peaoxqxa xpovwv) is 
stated.479 The pertinent comment reads thus:
"And as to what he says about the 'beginning and the end and the 
middle of the times', he is speaking of the beginning of the visible 
world480 ... the middle is a term relative to the total count of time; and 
the end is that for which we hope, when 'heaven and earth shall pass 
away’481 ... the end is the things that are yet to be -that is, the 
perfecting and consummation o f the universe.".482
The question of probability of some "next" creation is not what
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Origen’s thought is preoccupied with, as we pointed out in chapter 2 §3. 
He cares about the creation which was created by God according to the 
narration in Genesis and his main interest is with the eschatological 
perspectives of this world, namely its salvation. He does not deal with 
possibilities of a "repetition" of what is narrated in Genesis. His deep 
concern is for the destiny of this Koayonou'a throughout time until the 
end of it. But i f  by all means one wants to find some allusions of 
Origen’s related to this question of probability of a "next" creation, 
then the conclusion w ill be that he believes that no other fall w ill 
occur.
Einar Molland expresses his doubt as to whether or not there 
w ill be an end of time according to Origen.483 He further discusses the 
possibility of a possible "new" fall and traces affirmations according to 
which there w ill be no other fall but he doubts on whether or not they 
belong to Origen or to Rufinus.
Indeed, in Princ there is the affirmation that "...nor w ill one 
who is always in the good and to whom God is all things desire any 
longer to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil."484 It is 
also true that the conviction that there w ill be no other fall is stated 
in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans485 which is preserved 
in Latin. Molland says that, as far as he knows, this latter passage is 
the only one where Origen "tries to solve the problem".486
We can say that the passage which Molland considers is not the 
only one in which Origen provides his views on this subject and we can 
affirm that the assertions that there w ill be no other fall do express 
Origen’s authentic views487
In fact the same notion appears in the Commentary on the Sonc, 
o f Songs, in a passage which reads thus:
"If all these things, I say, were brought about by virtue of His 
Name alone, what do you think His very Self w ill do? What strength,
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what vigour w ill these maidens get from it, if  they ever did attain to 
His actual, incomprehensible, unutterable Self? I think myself that if  
they ever did attain to this, they would no longer walk or run, but, 
bound as it  were by the bands of His love, they would cleave to Him, and 
would have no further power to move again. For they would be one 
spirit with Him, and that which is written: ‘As Thou Father, in me and I 
in Thee are one, so may these also be one in Us488 would be fulfilled in 
them".489
This passage however is preserved in Latin, too, and any doubt 
about its  authenticity would be justified.490 So, although E. Molland’s 
suggestion that i t  is only in one passage (mamely in In Rom. V. 10) that 
Origen "tries to solve the problem’491 is not actually the case, his 
doubts would s till remain, as the above mentioned passage from the 
Commentary on the Song o f Songs is preserved only in Latin, too.
We, however, do not think that in Origen’s thought i t  was 
actually "a problem". For similar affirmations can be found in his works 
in Greek.
Indeed Origen affirms that once the restoration of all takes 
place, then each one w ill be a "pillar in the temple of God from where 
he w ill not go out again (pfj e|saeuao|isvog s|uj)". He grounds this 
conviction on the Revelation of John (Rev.3,12) emphasizing that this 
scriptural passage is there stated as a "promise" (snaygsRiav).492 The 
same conviction is stated in commMatt, where he uses scriptural 
terms in order to affirm that indeed time itse lf has an "urgent" 
character493 yet once (anap the end there w ill be no separation from 
Christ.
Beyond that, the same notion is expressed in a Greek text of 
Cant. He refers to the "bride church, who is the body of Christ’494 and 
its eschatological perspective, which is to enter into the divine reality 
and to be in union with Christ. The saying "My beloved is in me, and I
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am in him" (A6sfi(pi&6g pou spot, kc^ u) auxuj)495 exactly implies this 
eschatological union496 and this union w ill never be dissolved, "because 
i t  has been said by a prophecy that the Lord, like a shepherd shall feed 
his flock for ever"497
Thus Origen’s conviction that there w ill be no other fall is 
grounded on his eschatological perceptions. Revelation is not only a 
promise but i t  is also a prophecy. Since i t  has been pre-announced 
that there w ill be no other fall,498 this prophecy originates in God's 
foreknowledge. Thus, according to Origen's fundemental perception of 
prophecy,499 this saying in Revelation has been said because God 
timelessly knows that this w ill be the reality which is subsequent to 
the absolute end. Therefore, the conviction about there being no other 
fall is grounded on the fact that the eschatological reality has been 
pre-announced by God in the scripture.500
With respect to this subject, a remark of H. Chadwick shows 
that he has not grasped the actual eschatology of Origen, mainly 
because he did not grasp that the notion of "end" is a homonym which 
alludes to different realities. Commenting on Molland's views, H. 
Chadwick points out that the "as long as..." notion of Origen’s implies 
that a new "fall" may be implied out of this expression501 What has 
eluded him though is that this "as long as..." (oaov gs aivoupsv auxov)502 
does not refer to the absolute end but i t  refers to the eternal life  
which is an active and certainly not irreversible state. Thus the "fan" 
implied by the "as long as ..." notion has nothing to do with Origen's 
doctrine of the fall but i t  only pertains to a contingent fall of a 
rational creatures from the supreme rank of life  of the world. Hence, H. 
Chadwick quite erroneously connects this notion to Origen’s 
eschatological ideas.503
What stands behind the conviction of Origen that there w ill be 
no other fall is actually his own Christian conception of time. We have
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already seen how he distances himself from the Greek views of time or 
how radically he transforms the actual content of terms which either 
have their origin in the Stoics504 or are found in Plotinus505 At this 
point, Origen actually distances himself from the Hebraic mode of 
thought.
It is has been maintained that one of the striking peculiarities 
of the Hebraic notion of the content of time is to be seen as follows: 
While the Greeks orient themselves towards the circu lar movement of 
the sun, the Hebrews orient themselves temporally toward the regular 
change of the moon’s phases or toward the rhythm ic alteration of light 
and darkness, warmth and cold, etc506 This means that the Hebrews did 
not think of a generation as a circle, but rather "as an eternal rhythm 
of beginning, continuation, and return to the beginning.".507
This pattern of thought as described by Boman has been set 
forth also by Glatzer who shows that the intepretation of history in 
Tannanitic literature is constructed according to a heilsgeschichtliche 
pattern consisting of three phases, namely "election", "defection", and 
"return to election". The firs t is seen as a kind of "paradisical 
historylessness" in the sense that i t  is not a "human doing", but God’s 
gracious act. Defection is the beginning of history where human doings 
are arrayed against the divine purpose. Through the dialectical relation 
between God and man history results to the restoration of the state of 
the original election.508 Thus, the divine-human drama progresses 
rhythmically through the phases of "original righteousness" (Kehr), 
"falling-away" (Verfallen) and "restoration to original righteousness" 
(Wiederkehr).509
Certainly no such notion of "rhythmic alternations" is 
predominant in the Greek thought, althought the notion of "eternal 
return" is not completely irrelevant to it.510 In fact the Stoic view of 
recurrence is another notion of "resurrection".511 This pattern,
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however, can be regarded as peculiarly a Hebrew one.
The similarity of Origen’s conception of the origin and 
destination of the world has obvious similarities to the above 
mentioned Hebrew pattern. There are, however, substantial differences 
in his thought both to the Hebrew as well as from the Hellenic mode of 
thought (or, to what is described as such).
First, Origen does not regard time as an everlasting duration. 
Time is finite, i t  had a beginnig and i t  w ill have an absolute end. Thus 
the ’’rhytmic alternations” are not different ’’qualitative periods of 
time” but they are clearly states of timelessness - time - 
timelessness.
Secondly, this "rythm” is understood to occur once and fo r a ll 
It is not the rhythm of an eternal becoming. In the final analysis i t  is 
not actually a "rhythm’’, for this notion, as Boman puts it, actually 
implies "repetition".512 This is exactly what constitutes the distortion 
of Origen’s thought by Justinian?13 and Jerome who alleged that Origen 
held that the appearance and disappearance of corporeality takes place 
"at intervals", namely intermittently.
So, Origen's conception of space-time looks similar to the 
Hebrew pattern -but he rejects the idea of an everlasting time, which 
is actually both Hebraic and Greek. Those who would by all means like 
to find the similarities of Origen’s thought to either of these two 
modes of thought would say this: The teleological pattern of history is 
indeed similar to the Hebraic one. The idea of temporal-worldly reality 
in contrast to an atemporal-divine one is similar to the Greek thought. 
And so is the idea that atemporal reality is "up" whereas temporal 
reality is "down" by virtue of the fact that the latter is a "fallen" state 
-which is a Hebraic notion in Origen’s thought! It should be emphasized, 
however, that to Origen there is no question about the "degree" of 
reality of the world. There is nothing of the Gnostic tendency to
614
denounce time as a "lie” and the material world as a lie, too. Origen is 
explicit in affirming the full reality of history514 and at any rate he 
does not regard temporal reality as a pale imitation of the atemporal 
one whatsoever.
Beyond that, a substantial difference of Origen from the Hebraic 
pattern of history is that "providential creation" is prior to the actual 
creation of the world. The "fall" however is neither prior nor posterior 
to the actual creation. In fact the fall marks the "beginning" of 
space-time.515
In chapter 4 we have quoted three different kinds of 
eschatology, as delineated by W. Herberg. We hinted our reservations of 
this classification, because i t  stems from the simplistic distinction 
that "time-history is Hebraic" whereas "space-nature is Greek" 
characteristics of thought. Well, here is Origen's eschatology -yet 
Herberg would be in difficulty to force it  into his classification. In the 
firs t place i t  is a "historistic" eschatology, because time is profoundly 
teleological and there is a purpose to be fulfilled, through 
rectification of the world. But, at the same time, the end marks the 
consummation of nature -which means that the notions of "space 
-nature" are not absent from the exposition of that eschatology. 
Certainly, Herberg would classify Origen's eschatology as an 
"historistic" one, but, in order to do that, he should make some serious 
concessions in his criteria of classification.
The point which we wish to make here, nevertheless, is that the 
world-picture of Origen is conceived in terms of space-time. He does 
not regards these two constitutive elements of the world as 
"antagonistic" -which is a current tendency among many modern 
theologians. In other words, in Origen's thought there is no room for 
the misleading and simplistic portrayals of "distinction" between Greek 
and Hebraic thought, -especially in our day, when modern science
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regards space-time as one reality.
This simplistic distinction has also been articulated thus: The 
Hebraic world-picture conceives reality as an "order of succession" 
whereas the Hellenistic one perceives reality as an "order of 
co-existence". This distinction was made by Leibniz and is promptly 
employed by Boman.516 As far as Boman is concerned, this is 
understandable - i t  supported the distinction which he employed from 
von Orelli's work517
But actually the distinction which Leibniz made was based on 
his knowledge of his era, namely when time and space were regarded as 
/^ d is t in c t  realities (whereas the notion of re la tiv ity  o f time would 
have been rejected out of hand.).
Origen did hold a notion of "order of succession" but he also die 
hold a notion of an "order of co-existence". That Space is understood 
as not only the Euclidean (three-dimensional) one, is today a 
commonplace in the Mathematical Theory of Spaces. We may well speak 
of (and study) "spaces" where the distance between two points is nil 
and yet they do not coinside (as they should, in our three-dimension 
space); and we may well make a lot of studies on "spaces" and reach 
conclusions which, in our Euclidean "space", seem paradoxical or 
impossible or even irrational.
To Origen, space-time is one reality. And, therefore, when time 
comes to an end, space comes to an end, too. The reality of space-time 
does not exist without a reason; on the contrary, i t  has a serious and 
meaningful raison d' etre. To the Alexandrian it  would be a nonsense to 
postulate an infinite time, a "time-eternal companion" of God, a time 
existing without space -and the sort of assertions that authors like 0. 
Cullmann did just for the sake of appearing "near" what was postulated 
as "Hebraic" attitude -and finally falling into a profoundly "Greek" 
(judged according to their own criteria) mode of thought.
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T. Boman criticizes 0. Cullmann's assertions thus: "Eschatology 
and belief in the timeless Beyond are not two forms of the Christian 
hope that are mutually exclusive, but they are equally necessary 
thought-forms enjoying equal privileges and complementing one another. 
The Bible knows not only of a glory that is coming but also of a glory 
that belongs to the timeless Beyond. The cessation of all conflict and 
all history, when God is everything in the universe and in all [I Cor. 
15.28], corresponds to the becoming visible of the invisible world of 
the New Jerusalem which John saw in the Spirit.".518
Accordingly, A.H. Chroust avers that "Christianity by the very 
ethical character of its  religion direct's man's thoughts above 
everything visible and present to an invisible and future world".519
So Origen's conception of the world-picture is both an "order 
of succession", (in which time has a teleological and profoundly 
dramatic and crucial character) and an order of "co-existence" in the 
entire ly m aterial reality of the one "single" world.520 Accordingly, the 
eschatological perspective entails both the fulfilment, rectification, 
trasnfiguration of history and the end of nature, namely space-time. 
The eschatologcal perspectives of the world are understood to lie in 
the rea l future time . It is through time and only through time that 
the end w ill occur, the prophesied and hoped fo r and, in the person of 
Jesus, exemplified and realized  and prefigured, and definitely 
expected eschatological goal w ill be attained, and the promise w ill be 
fu lfilled . To anyone who contends that such an attitude is Platonic, or 
Plotinian or Gnostic, the only proper answer would be to study these 
streams of thought again.
It is our view, therefore, that i t  would be rather too scholastic 
to insist on searching for similarities or differences of Origen's 
conception of time to either Greek or Hebraic ones. The reason is that 
Origen’s view of time is fundamentally fashioned by and originated in a
fact which does not exist either in pagan or Hebraic thought: This is 
the historical fact of incarnation of Christ and its eschatological 
implications. This is the decisive factor with which Origen's conception 
of time is profoundly imbued. To search for "similarities" of his 
thought to any school of thought and neglect this decisive factor of 
Origen’s thought would be but a misleading approach of his conception 
of time. The dramatic character of time has actually been intensified 
by the fact that the world is in a state of falleness but i t  is also 
already in a state of restoration  because of God's redemptive act. 
This "betrothal" to resurrection establishes a dramatic tension, 
because the world is regarded as resurrected although i t  is not 
resurrected y e t. This phenomenal paradox profoundly determines the 
character of time. In fact, the conception of time as a natural element 
of the make-up of the world, its essence and character, were formed 
according to the eschatological implications out of the historical fact 
of the incarnation of Christ. Also, the constant eschatological 
orientation of the whole of Origen's thought is vividly present in the 
formation of his coneption of time.
Conclusion
The conception of time is present in the entire theology of Origen 
as an element which has been formed in full accordance with his general 
conception of the world from a Christian point of view. In fact, the 
conception of time reflects the entirety of his theological views and 
profoundly inmbues them all.
Due to the very fact that his purpose was a theological exposition, 
he did not devote ad hoc treatises to any natural or philosophical 
problem -one of which was the problem of time. He was unwilling to 
make analyses of these questions, albeit he had a very good command of 
this kind of knowledge. What was of interest to him is the knowledge 
which "saves" and not the knowledge of physics or philosophy just for 
the sake of erudition. He was satisfied, however, that this latter 
knowledge is not superfluous. They are steps towards the essential 
study which is theology. Thus natural and philosophical knowledge are 
important stages toward theological studies, yet they have to be left 
behind as soon as one reaches the stage of speaking on theological 
grounds. His work as a master both in Alexandria and in Caesarea 
exactly shows that he paid homage to Mathematics, Physics, Astronomy 
and Philosophy because he regarded them as indispensable steps toward 
theological study -especially at his time when Christianity was striving 
to expound its own understanding of God and world and had to be involved 
in polemical debates with all sorts of non-Christian thinkers.
The scriptural reference to "beginning and end and middle of 
times", and the whole context at that point of the Wisdom of Solomon, 
are regared as indicating the natural knowledge.1 This knowledge is not 
regarded with any hint of contempt at all. However Origen insists that
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the actual aim is the knowledge which "saves" and this is the teaching of 
Jesus Christ. At any rate, all kinds of knowledge can be found in the 
Scripture: Ecclesiastes contains natural (<puau<fjv) knowledge; in the 
Proverbs i t  is the moral (T]9iKfjv) one which can be found whereas the 
deepest, the theological (9soRo i^Kf)v) one, is hidden in the Song of 
Songs.2 The firs t is a "practical" (npaKXiKqv) teaching, the second is the 
"sophistical" (ao<piaxu<r)v) and the third is the "theological" (9eofk>8iKf)v) 
one.3 No kind of knowledge is treated with contempt -after all they are 
found in the scripture and can be comprehended only by those who have 
"cleansed" themselves,4 according to his constant anti-Platonic attitude 
on the relation between Praxis and Knowledge. However, the conviction 
that theological knowledge is the most sublime and worth while one 
profoundly imbues Origen's thought throughout his entire work. His 
ultimate concern and aim is not the "wisdom of the world", neither the 
"wisdom of the rulers of this world", but the "wisdom of God".
All these mean that Origen was a theologian who ascended the 
steps of natural as well as moral knowledge. Once this fundamental fact, 
as well as his utter scrutiny in using crucial terms, is taken into 
account, then one might discern both his views of particular natural and 
moral problems. For his views of these kinds of scholarship are 
explicitly or implicitly expounded throughout his works, too.
Hence, although i t  has not been our purpose to expound the whole 
of Origen's theology, we have considered the study of all the aspects of 
his theology as an indispensable presupposition for the understanding and 
expounding this crucial facet of his thought, namely his conception of 
time. For, as we emphasized in the Introduction, how a thinker conceives 
time is actually a very reliable manifestation of his entire thought. The 
conception of time stands in close relation to one's entire way of 
perceiving the whole of reality, in natural, philosophical and theological 
terms. A certain view of time is formed according to them and i t  is a
factor which decisively affects the formation of these standpoints. So 
the notion of time both determines and is  determined by all the 
aspects of a certain philosophy or theology or attitude to life  in general.
This is the fundamental presuppositions on which we have 
approached Origen’s thought in order to see what his conception of time 
is.
In doing so we have seen that he formed a conception of time 
which is a new one, profoundly determined by the Christian attitude to 
life  and history. Stoic or Plotinian terms can be found in his 
articulations of temporal notions. But the conceptual transformations, as 
well as the terminology which he established in speaking of time, are so 
radical that in fact i t  is very difficult to speak of "influence” upon him. 
Origen ploughed his own way towards the formation of a Christian view 
of time. It is our conclusion and thesis that he did achieve it.
In affirming this, we do not make any assertions about "orthodoxy" 
or "non-orthodoxy" whatsoever, as such a purpose has been beyond our 
scope. We only suggest that the historical fact of the incarnation, 
passion, death, and resurrurection of Jesus stands in the center and 
determines the core of Origen's thought in general. He did fu lfil the task 
of a Christian thinker of his era, namely to develop a entirely new view 
of history, stemming from the historical events related to the life  of 
Jesus. His entire work shows, in the clearest and strongest terms 
possible, that he conceived a completely new philosophy o f history, a 
meaning for both the origin and the final perspectives of the entire 
world through the consideration of the historical occurances related to 
the life  of Jesus.
As a matter of fact, Origen’s answer to the question of time has 
aspects which are natural, moral and theological.
In principle, time is regarded as a natural reality, as an element 
of the make-up of the world. He employed the early Stoic conception of
time as an “extension" (Sidoiqjia) but the extent to which he would be 
regarded as indebted to the Stoics goes no further than that. He affirms 
that time is fully and unequivocably real, that i t  is also a continuum and 
a dimension of the reality. In articulating the relation of space proper to 
time proper he introduced radical affirmations which directly and 
profoundly influenced his successors in the centuries after him. He 
clearly establishes an anti-Platonic view: Time does not move. It is a 
continuum along which the world moves - i t  is a dimension of the world. 
Subsequently, time proper is not movement. The Cappadocians, and 
particularly Basil, said nothing more about time than Origen did. Basil 
just repeats what Origen established as a Christian view of time. And, in 
the light of our analyses in this work, Augustine’s originality regarding 
his theory of time has to be thoroughly re-assessed, as there seems to 
be much less (in anything) said by him and not already having been set 
forth by Origen. At any rate, our discussion here has provided the 
answer to the long standing question about the source of Augustine’s 
theory of time, namely we have showed that i t  was Origen’s views which 
were employed by Augustine. In fact, space-time is a notion which 
profoundly imbues Origen’s conception of reality. Time is also finite; i t  
came into existence out of non-existence, as a creature of God, together 
with space. It w ill also have an end, which w ill be the end of the reality 
of space-time as a whole.
The notions of timelessness and temporality are articulated in the 
most clear terms. God it  timeless whereas the world is temporal. The 
finitude of space-time is most clearly portrayed. There is no notion of 
any "sacred time" or God’s "time" or any infinite time. Time had a 
beginning, there is a reason for its existence and w ill have an end when 
this reason w ill cease to exist. The distinction between atemporal and 
temporal realities appears just because time came into existence as an 
element of the make-up of the world, which w ill have a finite duration.
"Before" or "after", (so to speak) this duration there is only 
timelessness.
Origen’s conception of time is a fundamental facet of his thought 
which profoundly determines (and is determined by) how he comprehends 
God, the world, and the relation between divine reality and creaturely 
life. His thought must be considered (and has been so) on the fundamental 
premise that he is above all a theologian, an exponent of the message of 
the scripture. As such, he is certainly not oblivious of his background, be 
it  natural science or philosophy -a background sound, extensive, as well 
as deep. What is admirable, however, is that he did not allow his 
conceptions to be influenced by this background, even though he made 
large use of the technical terminology available to him. On the contrary, 
whenever non-Christian philosophical categories are employed, they have 
undergone such a profound and radical transformation, that i t  is only in 
name that they resemble to their pagan synonys. The transformation of 
categories of the Stoic definition of time, as well as the radical 
difference of time as a "dimension" from the same category appeared in 
Plotinus, are quite eloquent examples of Origen's inspiration. The 
conception of time, and the pertinent terminology established by him, 
exerted an profound influence upon Christian thinkers of the later 
centuries. Even so, however, they have not been always able to follow 
Origen’s radical dissent from pagan conceptions all the way.
Augustine follows Origen's original perceptions, but he was unable 
to follow him in the radical transformations of the Neoplatonic 
conceptions of time related to a kind of motion of soul as well as to the 
different conceptual content that time as 6idaiaaig  had in Origen. 
Hence, as far as the conception of time is concerned, Augustine has been 
regarded not unfairly as being under the influence of Neoplatonism.
Besides, regarding the conception of aim \ again, Origen’s 
successors employed his terminology verbatim -but not his conceptions
all the way. Thus, although Origen enunciates that aiuv is a natural 
reality, Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus postulated auuv as 
the timeless divine life. In stark contrast to Origen's views, these 
writers postulated as aiwv exactly the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
conception of it. And yet, i t  has been Origen who is regarded as 
influenced be these pagans schools of thought.
If Origen holds a notion of atemporality this is not because he has 
been "influenced” by any stream of Greek thought. After all, the Greek 
schools which hold the notion of atemporality regard the world as 
everlasting and not finite, as Origen does. But he holds the notion of 
atemporality because there is a thoroughly significant reason for time 
to exist: For i t  is the element of reality which renders creaturely 
freedom meaningful. Creaturely freedom in the absence of time make no 
sense whatsoever. It is through time that the world w ill return to God. 
This is the raison d' etre of it. It exists for a purpose to be fulfiled 
and this is why time has a dramatic character and movement has a 
teleological direction.
It is through this perception that time (although in principle a 
natural element) has also serious, indeed dramatic, metaphgsica, 
implications. This is where the divine and creaturely w ill encounter 
each other and come to a dialectical relation. Creatures learn what the 
w ill of God is, through God's manifestations in the world in the various 
kairoi. Yet they are free to comform with i t  or not to do so, they are 
free to obey or to disobey. It is exactly because of this freedom that the 
duration of an aeon, of those which comprise the entirety of time, is not 
constant or predetermined. The duration of an aeon is not determined 
either by cosmical laws or by any ontological fa ta lism , but i t  is the 
outcome of this dramatic relation  between God and the world.
The nature of this relation is enlightened by the end, toward 
which the world is directed. In Origen's thought the main concern is
with the relation between Now and After, exactly because of the 
teleological character of time. The relation between present time and 
the eschatological expectation has entered in a new stage after the 
incarnation of Christ. For the world is regarded as being in a "fallen" 
status, yet at the same time is has already been "saved" out of God’s 
action. The world is regarded as resurrected but also as not 
resurrected ye t. In this phenomenical paradox lies the tension between 
Present and Future and in the dramatic character of time (due to the 
encounter of divine and creaturely w ill) the element of urgency has 
been added after the incarnation of Christ.
It is a fundamental view of Origen’s that the former events bear 
in themselves an image of the latter ones. The dramatic character of 
time has been particularly intense and the element of urgency is already 
established in it, exactly because the event of death and resurrection 
"prefigured" and "exemplified" the end toward which the entire world is 
directed. This event was both rea l in its e lf (as a historical occurence) 
as well as rea l anticipation of a future, namely of an eschatological 
perspective and expectation which is a rea l future. This means that the 
eschatological fulfilment is expected to occur through time and only 
through tim e. For the time being, however, the eschatological reality is 
realized "in betrothal" only in the church. In fact the church itself, 
through this established relation with the expected real future, 
constitutes an eschatological reality at the present time. This is 
eloquently expressed by the homonym "Jerusalem", attributed both to the 
church and to the eschatological reality. It is in the church and through 
the church that the urgent character of time is most vividly realized. 
Hence, the incarnation of Christ not only unveiled the meaning of time 
before that event, but also enlightened the meaning of i t  until the very 
end of space-time.
Thus the teleological character of the process in time has become
more intense because the eschatological direction of the entire world 
has already been realized in the person of Jesus. If there is a notion of 
“cyclicity" in Origen’s thought i t  can be found only in his affirmations 
that "cyclicity" is a manifestation of "futility" -and this latter notion is 
exactly the opposite of the meanigful and highly and earnestly desired 
end, toward which the entire world is directed.
In the light of this conception, the natural reality of space-time 
is actually conceived as the venue where a struggle takes place. In this 
struggle both divine and creaturely w ill are fully and continuously 
involved. This very fact bestows upon time a metaphysical meaning as 
well; and the dramatic character of time is underlined by the fact that 
each moment of i t  is a ka iros . The incarnation of Christ introduced 
into this struggle a particular tension -in fact the dramatic character 
of time reached its climax. The struggle is now going on, the end has 
been already realized -but the struggle w ill not finish until the 
"subjection" of all to Christ has become a reality in terms of real 
future, namely an actual future spatio-temporal reality.
The very fact that the course toward this end can be realized but
through time, determines Origen’s attitude to this element of the
worldly reality. To him time is the means through which salvation w ill 
be attained and i t  is due to the existence of time that creaturely 
freedom makes sense. It does not constitute a "slavery", i t  is not
regarded as a "curse". It is not a "destroyer" of free moral action,
because there is an existential causality established in the world and it  
is through this causality that the process of the world is perceived. 
There is no "futility" in moral action because there w ill be a Judgement 
of it. Therefore in Origen’s thought there is nothing of the melancholy 
(far less: weariness) which the very existence of time caused to the 
Later Stoics. The destiny of the world is not governed or regulated by 
the astronomical order or movement. In his strong refutation of
astrology, Origen actually rejects the fatality and stresses the dramatic 
character of time. Far from being a SouMa (slavery), time is the 
element of reality which actually serves freedom and renders it  
meaningful. Time is neither a Platonic "image" of divine life; far less is 
i t  a Gnostic "caricature" of it, and certainly i t  is not a "lie". It is simply 
the indispensable means through which the world w ill be able to return 
to God. There is nothing of the Gnostic negation of the world and their 
anticosmic or acosmic attitude. One of the most frequent expressions of 
Origen is to affirm (with an implicit, but clear, affection) that the 
world is a "perfect creature" ( to  xsRsiov t o u t i Sqyioup^qpia). The fact 
that time exists in the world in order to serve creaturely freedom is a 
cause to admire God's creative work and to be grateful to Him for His 
grace.
In short, regarding the earnestly desired future  eschatological 
fulfilment, the Christian existential tendency (as expressed by Origen) is 
to be saved through time -not from  time. So time in itse lf means hope, 
not despair and certainly not "panic terror".5 It means freedom, not 
slavery, it means expectation, because through time the promise w ill 
be fu lfilled . Time is not a source of anguish. On the contrary, i t  is 
earnestly needed in order to reach the reality of the end. For what 
Origen insists on is that evil proper is only the tendency of mind, not 
the world itself, not matter itself. His general attitude is one of 
affirmation to the world, not negation of it, because the world is 
"perfect" and i t  is not evil in itself. Thus, his attitude towards the 
reality of time has nothing of any sense of fu tility  and melancholy. 
Neiter has it  anything to do with the Gnostic negation of i t  as a "lie" or, 
at most, as having no full reality -and with the subsequent Gnostic 
disgust, hatred, terror, anguish and dispair out of time's existence. The 
loathing and revolt is not against time, but against evil. Since time does 
not destroy freedom but serves it, there is nothing of the Gnostic
altitude to shatter and destroy time and find a way to negate it. On the 
contrary, i t  is because Praxis is firs t and Knowledge comes after 
Praxis, that "knowledge" has an entirely different significance than that 
in the Gnostics. This causative relation between Praxis and Knowledge is 
directly opposite to both Platonic and Gnostic conception of knowledge. 
This Praxis is not a passive self-sinking into an atemporal mysticism, 
but i t  is an active motion in time, perceived in real spatio-temporal 
terms, according to the teaching of Jesus. It is because "salvation" is 
understood to lie in the rea l future time, and not as an "escape" from 
the world into a personal mysticism, that time is regarded with an 
existential attitude radically different from that of either the Greeks or 
the Gnostics.
Affirm ation  to the very existence of time proper, hope, and a 
profound feeling of freedom, constitute fundamental existential 
characteristics of a Christian attitude to time out of the view of the 
world and its perspectives, as portrayed by Origen. The course in 
space-time is perceived as a continuous movement forward -a 
movement towards future. A course perceived not so much as a cosmic 
process but as a movement towards salvation.
In Origen’s thought a process towards salvation is unthinkable out 
of time. Knowledge through mystical experience Here and Now has only 
limited possibilities. Since, therefore, salvation w ill be attained to in 
future, time, as a demonstration of God’s creative work, is actually a 
demonstration of God’s benevolence.
Regarding the ultimate pespective of the process toward salvation, 
Origen visualizes an absolute end which pertains to the entire  world. 
This is the "perfection of resurrection" which w ill take place when even 
the last rational creature w ill have been "subjected" to Christ.
In view of this final pespective, eternal life  is perceived as an 
end, which, however, has a personal character and it  is an "end" of an
individual rational creature -not the absolute end of the world. Eternal 
life  is a "place" to be reached only through time -therefore (for human 
beings) in future time; yet i t  is a place in  the world, i t  is a 
spatio-temporal state, like the rest of the world. Accordingly, i t  is a 
state of activity (appropriate to that status) and therefore -according to 
the existential causality- a "fall" from this state (a notion which has 
nothing to do with the original fall from the divine reality) is always 
possible. The perpetual activity and the dramatic character of time 
pertain to eternal life, like the rest of the world.
The absolute end w ill occur when evil w ill have been entirely 
abolished and there w ill be no rational creature in need of the existence 
of time in order to exercise its freedom. It is only then that the 
"perfection of resurrection" w ill take place and time w ill reach its  end, 
since its raison d'etre w ill have passed away. In Origen's thought the 
notion of "body" of Christ plays a decisive role. For i t  is par excellence 
through this notion that the non-individualistic, (and indeed: the non- 
egoistic) character of resurrection is underlined. The whole of Origen's 
considerations constitute a radical rejection of the Platonic aristocratic 
conception of "salvation".
It has been beyond our scope to deal with Origen's "orthodoxy" or 
"non-orthodoxy", as we said. Regarding his concept of time, however, one 
could note this: A rather simplistic rule has prevailed among scholars 
about the relation between Greek and Biblical thought: The Greek is 
concerned with space and nature, while Biblical thought is concerned 
with time and history. The critics of Origen stress what they see as 
"Greek" characteristics of his thought. Others, who regard themeselves 
as "sympathizers" of Origen, strive to play down (to a point of exclusion, 
if  possible) what they consider as "Greek" characteristics and to 
overstress what they regard as "Biblical" ones. The former focus their 
attention on Origen's considerations concerning place, whereas the
latter want to see only treatment of time (in fact, everlasting time) in 
his works. So, in a relatively recent work, i t  has been quite erroneously 
argued that Origen considers ‘'eternity” as an everlasting duration6 
Views about Origen like these have been discussed in our previous 
analyses, in which we have, made some remarks about the misleading 
character of the above-mentioned criteria.
What they all neglect, however, is that the position of either 
space or time in a certain conception of reality has not an "antagonistic" 
character -and this is what happens in Origen’s thought. In the final 
analysis space and time constitute one reality. The very definition of 
the relation of time to space by Origen clearly show that he had this 
feeling - i f  not the conscious conception of this fact. At any rate, this 
notion is outstandingly present in his works.
This is the fact which modern scholars want to disregard simply 
because they do not want to see that the world-picture in our century 
has enitrely changed. For the last eighty years i t  is constantly proven 
that the world in which we live is  not the Newtonean one. During the 
last decade the mathematical Theory of Tensor Calculus, which deals 
with different spaces, has began to consider the problem of different 
spaces (other than the three- or four-dimensional ones) in direct 
relation with Cosmology. Certainly, the theory deals with other spaces 
in themselves and not with any contingent "inhabitants" in them.7 
However, the problems which arise are already obvious. Even if  one 
neglects the theory of other spaces, there are significant facts which 
either cannot or could hardly be denied:
First, the notion of sim ultaneity throughout the entire universe 
(this, visible universe) makes no sense any more. In the light of Theory 
of Relativity, statements such as "any moment of time is the same in all 
places" (P. Gassendi) or "every indivisible moment of duration is 
everywhere" (Newton)8 are not valid any more. Modern scholars, so many
years after the Theory of Relativity, and in spite of its constant 
verification, do not want to (or, cannot) unwrap themselves from the 
Newtonean world-picture. However, this perception of the world is an 
irrevocable past A lot of unnecessary debates (particularly works on 
time proper) would have been avoided if  scholars were less slow in 
realizing that the premises of reflecting on crucial problems have 
thoroughly changed. That the Theory of Relativity is not easily readable 
or comprehensible does not make the fact of the radical change less real 
- i t  only produces material which is obsolete already before being 
printed. If, in Plato's era, i t  was necessary to receive what today is 
stated as "Platonic education", this was because the old mythological 
conception of the world had radically changed after the inspired 
articulations of the Presocratic philosophers. We think that our day has 
the same characteristics and reflection on metaphysical problems has 
begun to have the same pre-requisites as that distant era had. For the 
stability of the conception of the world has been profoundly shaken, 
since the conception of reality mainly in terms of space has radically 
changed. The simple, stable and easily apprehensible conception of the 
world has been shattered. This is the actual next step after twenty five 
centuries. Subsequently, i t  is no more possible to reflect on time 
independently from space. What we think is that Origen's thought, 
approached in the light of the new presuppositions, can withstand these 
developments and the challenges which only now begin to arise. Towards 
this direction a lot of research is s till necessary and we think that the 
findings of such a research w ill be of untmost interest.
Secondly, i t  becomes increasingly hard to maintain that human 
beings are the only rational creatures in the universe (and we, again, do 
not mention other spaces). What about the saving consequences of the 
Incarnation of Christ? Some centuries ago, the problem for "orthodoxy" 
was quite simple: Whether the earth is the immovable center of the
universe, was a matter of a yes or a no . The ancient affirmation 
became negation, and the whole problem was surmounted. However, the 
challenges which arise from the evolution of our new world-picture are 
not so simple. How w ill these rational creatures be saved? Were they 
already saved before human beings? And, if  so, how was God’s oucovopia 
manifested?
To all these questions Origen has already given a sound, clear and 
concrete answer: The world comprises many particular spaces. The 
divine-creaturely relation is not conceived in terms of God-man\ but in 
terms of God-rational creatures in various spaces. The Incarnation of 
Christ took place once and for all and enlightened time from its 
beginning to its end. It was the entirety of rational creatures, and not 
only human beings, which were saved out of that unique event.
To problems which only now begin to arise (and what is regarded 
as "orthodoxy" w ill have to face them sooner or later) Origen has 
provided answers many centuries ago.
Therefore, there is no need either to understress or to overstress 
the temporal or spatial aspects of Origen’s thought, just for the sake of 
following misleading and, nontheless, obsolete criteria. This thought has 
always been, and s till is, a highly controversial one. In this work we 
have argued that a main reason for this is that Origen’s work has not 
been studied as a whole. The Latin renderings create rather than solve 
problems and Greek language has ceased to be a universal one long time 
ago.
The way to eliminate misunderstandings of Origen's thought must 
not be vitiated by over-simplistic and misleading criteria of what is 
"Greek" or what is "Hebrew". Nor is i t  effective to approach this thought 
either from a "polemical" or from a "sympathizing" point of view. The 
way is to study Origen's work, especially this which is in the Greek 
original, in a manner similar to which he himself studied and
interpreted Scripture. That is, to study not only the'general views of his 
entire theology, but also to ponder upon the crucial nuances of his 
phrases and even words. This is what we have tried to do in this work. 
And, from such a study, the character of Origen’s thought arises as, we 
think, i t  really is: An intensly eschatological thought, in which the 
pivotal point is the historical life  of Jesus and its implications in terms 
of philosophy of history. A thought profoundly imbued and determined by 
categories such as providence - prophecy - promise - expectation - 
realization  - fa ith  - hope - waiting - fu lfilm ent A thought earnestly 
orientated towards a promised and, thus, expected end A thought, 
however, which clearly visualizes the realization of this end through a 
spatio-temporal view of the world and its perspectives.
APPENDIX A
In treating the question of Origen’s conception of the ’’world”, we 
pointed out that there is one case in which he applies the expression 
Koopiog vorjiog to Christ and so promised to enquire into this subject in 
Appendix A. The pertinent passage in which the expression Koopog 
vorjiog appears is in commJohnmS reads thus:
“Yet there is another world besides this sensible one consisting of 
heaven and earth or heavens and earth.1 This is a world where there 
exist those not seen,-2 and all this is a world not seen and intelligible 
world (voqxog Koopiog). The view and the beauty of this [world] w ill be 
seen by those clean in heart,3 preparing themselves through seeing this 
[world], to come to see God himself in whatever way i t  is in God’s 
nature to be seen.”.4
This is the only passage where Origen applies this term to 
immaterial things, namely to incorporeality. The danger of 
misunderstanding, of attributing to him a notion of a world of Platonic 
ideas, is quite obvious. As we shall discuss later, this danger has not 
been averted.
What is this "intelligible world" which Origen is referring to?
As if  he himself had foreseen the danger of potential 
misunderstanding of his thought, just after the passage above goes on to 
explain his view: This "world" is but the son of God.
"You should inquire if, according to a meaning in scripture, the 
‘firstborn of all creation’5 may be called cosmos, especially because he 
is the "wisdom" who is "multi-embroidered" (noflunoiKtfiog).6 For, by 
virtue of the fact that the reasons (according to which everything was 
made by God) have been made in wisdom (as the prophet says; ’In wisdom 
have you made them all’7), this would be said to be a "cosmos" 8 which is
as more embroidered and different from the sensible world as the Logos 
(who is completely immaterial) of the entire world is different from the 
material world;9 for those [reasons] which decorate matter are not 
themselves decorated by matter but [they are decorated] by the 
participation of the Logos and the Wisdom. And see whether he who says 
’I am not from this world’10 is the soul of Christ, which [soul] belongs 
to that world and contains all that world and guides towards that world 
all those who are pupils of his. That world has nothing which is down 
like this world has nothing which (strictly speaking) is up
Those who have employed the easy “solution” of construing 
Origen’s thought through the simplistic attribution of Platonism to him, 
hold that this passage gives them an adequate basis for their allegations. 
In our discussion here we shall show that to draw a conclusion about 
"Platonism” is but a total miscomprehension of Origen's thought.
First, however, we should concentrate on the text and make some 
remarks upon it.
In speaking of a “cosmos" being "in" the son of God it  is no 
accident that Origen puts the term cosmos into quotation marks. It is 
perfectly clear that the term is used just as a metaphor. This is why it  
is stated that the term "cosmos" would be used " in a sense" (xaxd xi xwv 
oqpaivo|isvajv).12
However, the question is: What is this "cosmos" which is said to be 
"in" Christ and even to be Christ himself? The answer is to be found in 
the text, too. This "cosmos" is the "reasons" of this world. Recalling our 
analyses in chapter 1, we can say that this cosmos is the providentiat 
creation This is what came into being out of non-being once God 
"uttered"13 the creative revvi/S /jw  (Let be), according to the narration 
of Genesis. For Origen is clear that what came into being out of 
non-being was but those "reasons" according to which the actual creation 
was made "later". At that stage there were no personal individuals
which came into being. All these are stated as "future beings" (xujv 
SGOjisvujv).14 It was no individual human creature that was "made" at that 
stage, but is was human nature that came into being out of non-being. 
What was created in the providential creation was not any "man and 
woman", but i t  was "male and female" which came into being out of 
non-being.
Further, Origen speaks of the future perspective of human beings. 
This is to "see" the "sight and beauty" of this world. According to our 
discussion in chapter 4, i t  is now clear that the alludes to eternal life. 
Indeed he does so in the twofold sense that eternal life  is perceived, 
namely both as a personal experience during a lifetime and as an actual 
spatio-temporal perspective and reality. It is important, however, that 
Origen does not regard this perspective as an absolute end. Eternal life, 
the "contemplation" of the son of God, is but a "preparation" 
(npoeuxpsni^oysvoi) for "seeing" God himself. This "place" is s till a kind 
of "waiting", as we have seen. Taking into account that, as long as the 
world exists, "seeing God" is absolutely impossible even for the highest 
creatures, due to the spatio-temporal nature of them,15 i t  is obvious 
that here Origen alludes to the perspective of the absolute end, namely 
entering into the divine reality.
Thus, when he speaks of vogxog Koopog he actually means the 
created wisdom. It is this wisdom which Origen calls as "our sister" 
Ca6eR(pf| rjpiov) because "Fie who made incorporeal nature, made her, too"16 
in Christ, and thus "embroidered" his wisdom, namely Christ. This is the 
sense in which he calls the son of God as "cosmos" and appeals to the 
scriptural passages where he is stated as "firstborn of all creation"17 
and "multi- embroidered wisdom" CnoRunoiKtrlog oo<p(a)18 and it  is also 
stated that God "made everything in wisdom".19
This providential creation is the upper Jerusalem in the most 
sublime conception of this homonym, for which the also scriptural
expression "city of God" is used, too. This is the sense in which Origen, 
in the above stated section of commJohti states that the "soul" of
Christ came from that world in order to "guide his pupils towards it".
And this is the sense in which Christ is stated as "come out" of God20 
and as "son of the upper Jerusalem" which is portrayed as his "mother"21 
but also a "mother" of ours.22
When, therefore, Origen speaks of Koojiog voqiog he refers to the 
providential creation of the "reasons" and "theoremata" in Christ. This is 
why he, at the same point, suggest that "in a sense" Christ would be 
stated as "cosmos" -making clear, however, (both by using quotation
marks for the word and through the expression "in a sense") that this
but a metaphor.
When Origen says that those who w ill see this "world" w ill then 
see God himself he actually alludes to John, 14,9 "Whoever has seen me 
he has also seen him who has sent me". It is he himself who quotes this 
passage and adds: "Whoever sees wisdom, whom God made before the 
aeons in the beginning of his works23 ascends from the knowledge of 
wisdom to her father; and it  is impossible to apprehend the God of 
wisdom unless i t  is done through wisdom.".24
Origen does not fail to elaborate further on the actual meaning of 
this "seeing":
"Since the son is in the father, being in form of god before his 
incarnation, i t  is God who is, as it  were, his place. And if  someone 
apprehends him being in the form of God before his incarnation, he w ill 
see the son of God not yet having gone out of god and not yet having been 
away from his place".25
So the "seeing" of the "world", to which Origen refers in the 
passage above, is but the seeing of the wisdom herself, as discussed in 
chapter 4. The Koopog voqiog is but the providential creation, in which 
no individual being was made and which is also called "wisdom" by virtue
of the fact that the providential creation is both a product of the 
wisdom of God and in  the Wisdom, namely Christ. This is why "in a 
sense"26 the son of God would be "cosmos" metaphorically.
In the light of this exposition of Origen's thought, we can now 
discuss certain views which we regard as utterly distorting what the 
Alexandrian theologian really held and really enunciated. We refer to 
views of H. Crouzel as well as of both H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti in 
their translation of Princ in French.
H. Crouzel27 asserts that, in the Alexandrian’s theology, there is 
not only what Origen himself calls providential creation, but also a 
world of "spiritual beings". So Crouzel actually seems to hold that there 
are three creations (two "spirituals" and one material) and seems to 
have no doubts that the notion of beginningless creation is a part of 
Origen’s thought.
In view of our discussion in chapter 1, i t  is needless to discuss 
this view here again in order to say that this is an extrapolation which 
is due to failure to grasp what Origen held to be the "object" of God’s 
creation, as narrated in Genesis. It is clear that Origen regards two 
creations -one providential and one actual. In the firs t, i t  was the 
"reasons" which came into being out of non-being. In the second, i t  was 
the spatio-temporal reality that was made according to the "reasons" of 
the providential creation. In the providential creation there is no 
individuality, and therefore there is no individual "spiritual being". What 
was made was human nature not any individual human being. What was 
made was male and female, not a man and woman. And the devil is called 
"man-killer" because he caused the fall of human nature not the fall of 
any individual person, as we have seen. H. Crouzel does not adduce any 
evidence for his allegations. And however hard he tries he w ill not find 
any substantial evidence (and this can be only from texts in Greek) 
where Origen speaks of any other creation apart from those two
creations, which have been discussed in detail in chapter 1. For all 
Crouzel does is an arbitrary and misleading allegation, which is but the 
usual "easy solution" of the scholars who have not comprehended crucial 
aspects of Origen's thought.
Further, FI. Crouzel and M. Simonetti speak of Kdapog vorjiog and 
Kdapog vospog28 and give an account of the difference between these 
two expressions. They assert that K ooyog vo q xog  is the world of "ideas, 
reasons, mysteries which are containd into the Logos-Wisdom and is 
eternal like him". And that K ooyog vospog is the "spiritual world" of 
individual beings. Their view is that vospog means the intelligent, the 
subject of knowledge, whereas vorjiog means the intelligible, the object 
of knowledge.29 One could hardly make so many mistakes into a small 
passage like this.
First, beyond the fact that Origen does not hold any notion of 
"spiritual world of creatures", he does not use the term Kooyog vospog 
at all. Fie uses the term Koapog vorjiog in the passage discussed above. 
Thus there can be no discussion of comparison between the two 
expressions in Origen, for the simple reason that he does not use the 
former.
Secondly, when we speak of vospog we have in mind the object of 
knowledge whereas in speaking of vogxog we mainly have in mind the 
human voug (intellect) which perceives a non-sensible reality. The 
translators assert that vospog pertains to the subject of knowledge 
whereas voqxog pertains to the object of knowledge.
This account is exactly the opposite of what is correct. For 
although the terms may be mutually substituted (when there is no danger 
of miscomprehension), there is a substantial difference between them:
When a Greek speaks of either vospog or voqxog he may have one 
and the same thing in mind.
Flowever, when he speaks of vospog what he mainly has is mind is
how this is, so to speak, constructed -namely that i t  is incorporeal.
By contrast, when he speaks of vorjiog, he mainly alludes to hou 
this is perceived -namely that i t  is perceived through mind.
So (quite conversely from the above stated account of H. Crouzel 
and M. Simonetti) the term vospog mainly indicates the object itself of 
knowledge, whereas the term vorjiog mainly alludes to the subject of 
knowledge.
That the assertion of the translators is erroneous can be proved 
by the etymology of the words.
Nospdg has a crucial letter (namely, the letter p) which is due to 
its  being derived from the verb apopfoKug® which means " f it  together", 
"construct". Thus vospog refers to the object and actually suggests how 
it  is constructed, namely that i t  is incorporeal and, onlybecause of that, 
(namely, subsequently to that) i t  is perceived through mind.
The term voqidg, on the other hand, is derived from the verb vosa 
(comprehend) and when i t  is used i t  is mainly the human intellect 
(namely the subject) which we have in mind.
Hence, vospog mainly refers to the structure of what is 
intellectually perceived.31 Norjiog mainly refers to the fact that what 
is intelligible is perceived through mind.32
This is why Origen speaks of roajjog voqiog and not of Kooyog 
vospog whatsoever. For, in employing this metaphorical expression, he 
does not actually speak of any "world", but he mainly alludes to the fact 
that those "reasons" and "theoremata" which were created in wisdom, 
are perceived through mind. To regard this creation as incorporeal is 
but a plausible fact. For this providential creation was consisted of the 
"clearly uttered words" (npoxpavu9evxag Rogoug) of God. These "words" 
in themselves, the fld$oi, are the creatures and certainly they in no 
wise would be regarded as corporeal. Besides, Origen is quite explicit 
that they are incorporeal, as we have seen.33 Even the materialist Stoics
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(to which only what was a "body" was regarded as "real") had to admit 
that "speech" is real and yet incorporeal, and included i t  into the four 
"incorporeals" which they, out of common and plausible experience, had 
to admit into their philosophy.
However, the actual difference (as expounded above) between 
voijvogmd vospog usually does not create essential misunderstanding if  
the terms are mutually interchanged. This is what Origen did. Therefore 
the translators' assertion that Origen "usually" made the "distinction", 
which they suggest, is not correct. The distinction they make is wrong 
in itself -and Origen had too good a command of Greek to make such 
mistakes. Furthermore, Origen did not make any distinction -where (and 
this was the case usually) there was no danger of misunderstanding. 
Good command of Greek as he had, however, he employed the right term 
at the point where he regarded as crucial (as he does in the passage in 
commJohn\ which we discuss here) and so he speaks of Kooyog vorjzdg 
and not of Kooyog vospog, -exactly in order to indicate his view that 
this is not a "spiritual world" in a Platonic sense, but the term voq iog  
Kooyog is just a figure implying the fact that the Logos of God can be 
apprehended through mind. He uses this figure (using also quotation 
marks) in order to indicate not how this wisdom is constructed, but 
how this wisdom is perceived.
The same care can be found in exhMar, where both the terms are 
used and the difference is particularly vivid when Origen feels that the 
distinction should be made. Thus he speaks of the "affinity" of soul to 
God by virtue of the fact that "they both are vospa and invisible and ... 
incorporeal".34 A few lines further in the same paragraph, however, he 
speaks of vorjza, referring to the relation of "human intellect to the 
voijTd" stating that God is "beyond the votiiwv" 35 Again, in a reliable 
Greek extant text of Princ, (from Phil), he implies the perception of 
soul as incorporeal through the term vospcrv: "God created incorporeal
nature to be undestructible and akin to him" (d(p9apxov ^ap (puaiv 
nsnoiqKs xijv vospav kcu  eauxiu au^evrj).35 it is by virtue of this fact 
that Origen avers that whereas corporeality w ill pass away, what came 
into being out of non-being w ill not pass away -as we discussed in 
chapter 5.
It is quite obvious, therefore, that Origen was fully aware of the 
distinction between the two terms -but he uses either of them in its 
s tric t sense only where he deems it  as necessary.
Normally, however, he uses the term voqxog in order to indicate 
that just he speaks metaphorically.37
At other points, he uses the term voqxog in its s tric t sense, 
namely to indicate what is, by its nature, perceived through mind.38
Elsewhere he uses the same term, namely voqxog, in its  looser 
sense, namely to indicate what is not corporeal.39 So there are points 
where Origen directly relates the notion of voqxog to "invisible" and 
"incorporeal".40 In that case, however, "incorporeal" suggests not any 
conception of Platonic idea, but what plausibly is not a "body". Thus he 
speaks of "incorporeal notions and words and healthy actions" (xoig 
aowyaxoig voqyaaiv kcu  flo^oig k c u  npd^soiv ugisoiv).41 In fact, this is 
reminiscent of the Stoic view of "speech" (xo R s k x o v )  as one of the four 
incorporeals.
There are many passages like this throughout Origen's works, in 
which one can see what he actually means when employs the term 
"incorporeal" in relation to the term voqxog, namely that there is no 
Platonic conception undelying such expressions.42
Elsewhere it  is the term vospog which is employed in order to 
denote what is incorporeal; in that case the term vospog is used in its 
s tric t sense.43
Sometimes the use of vospog is as loose as to imply what is 
"aetheral". This is a metaphor which, nevertheless, is derived from the
stric t sense of the word, namely vospog as pertaining to the "structure" 
of a being.44
Hence, what the above-mentioned examples show is this:
First, the distinction between the terms vospog and voqxog in 
itself, as made by the translators, is wrong.
Secondly, the re  is  no d is t in c t io n  between Kooyog vospog and 
Kooyog voqxog in  Origen, fo r  the s im ple  reason th a t he does not use the 
te rm  Kooyog vospog a t a ll.
Thirdly, Origen does not "usually" (as the translators assert) make 
the distinction between the terms vospog and voqxog. At the point where 
there is no danger of misunderstanding, the terms may be mutually 
interchanged.
Fourthly, however, when Origen wishes to denote a conception in 
which these terms play a decisive role, then the term vospog is used to 
denote what is incorporeal, whereas the term voqxog is used in order to 
suggest that he speaks metaphorically. This is exactly the case in which 
he speaks of Christ as a Koojiog vorjiog
We conclude, therefore, that when Origen regards the Son of God 
as "cosmos" he does not suggest any Platonic notion of some spiritual 
world.
Thus, according to his view that the Logos is present into each 
rational creature, he states that "Cosmos" is a multitude of "divine ideas 
and sacred words" which are within a man.45 In this sense, Origen's 
conception cannot be related to that of Plotinus’ either. For the latter 
had affirmed that "the intelligible things are not out of the mind" (oxi 
ouk  s | oj xou vou xtf voqxa)46 whereas Origen regards the Logos as being 
in a man (not in the mind of a man though) as well as out of him. In any 
case, in Princ 11,3,6, any Platonic notion of "ideas" existing in 
themselves as individual hypostases in a spiritual world is explicitly 
rejected.
In the same work, namely commJohnf1 Origen uses the expression 
vorjiog Kooyog leaving no doubt as to what he actual means by this 
term. He refers to the Logos, who is present in each rational creature 
and thus enlightens him towards apprehension of the wisdom of God. In 
this sense, the Logos is stated as "light of the voqxou Kooyou".48 This 
"cosmos" is the widom of God and the Logos "enlightens no bodies, but 
the incorporeal mind through his incoprporeal power" so that mind w ill 
be able to see what is "intelligible" (voqxa)49 In this sense the Logos is 
the light which "illuminates and enlightens the minds of men and of 
rational creatures in general.".50
Thus, the term "cosmos", applied to Christ, should be regarded in 
its  fundamental meaning in Greek, namely as "ornament". This is the 
actual sense in which Origen regards the Wisdom as "cosmos". The 
meaning of "ornament" stems directly from the scriptural expression 
about the "multi-embroidered wisdom" (noflunoiKiflog ootya)51 and has 
exactly the meaning in which Paul speaks of the wisdom of God.
In this work, too, the translators maintain the false notion of an 
"eternal world’52 which is but a world "of Platonic ideas and Stoic 
reasons"53 and further allege that Origen makes the distinction between 
the spiritual world of ideas and the world of incorporeal spiritual 
beings.55 In view of our discussion in chapter 1 (particularly §4), i t  
would be superfluous to comment further on these quite erroneous 
assertions.
APPENDIX B
In examinig Origen's account of various kinds of motion, we have 
made a classification according to his own expositions on the question. 
However, there is another classification stated in an English edition of 
deOr} which has been made according to the criterion of what is that
moves. It reads as follows:
1. a. Things without life, held together merely by their form (e.g. stones 
cut out of the quarry, wood that has lost the power of growing).
b. Bodies of living creatures and growing plants when moved, not qua 
living creatures ot plants, but by an external force, or when they move by virtue 
of the fact that they are in state of decay and, consequently, of flux.
2. Inanimate things (dipuxa: De Princ., Ill, 1:2) moved by their own inherent 
nature or soul, i.e. "out of themselves" (e£ eauiuiv), i.e. a growing plant.
3. Animate things (epiyuxa), living creatures (£uct), moved "from within 
themselves (6$' auiuv [deOr, VI,1). The impulse of the spider to weave a web, or 
of a bee to produce wax, are examples of this ( De Princ.). [In De Principii& 
Origen, while maintaining the distinction between classes (2) and (3 ), also groups 
them as objects which are moved "in themeselves" (ev eauioic).].
4. Rational creatures, which are moved "through themselves (6i* auiwv). In 
this case the mover and the mover are inseparably connected.
It is obvious that this classification is quite different from that 
which we have made in chapter 2. In this Appendix we shall show that 
the aforestated rendering of Origen's views stems from a 
miscomprehension of what he actually intended to do when he articulated 
his views on the subject.
The main element which has eluded the translators is that Origen 
was not interested in giving accounts of motion for the sake of natural 
knowledge. He was not interested in "giving accounts on natural 
questions" ((puoioRo^e(v), as we have seen.
What interests Origen is not to "base the reality of free w ill on
the faculty of motion" as they note.2 But his purpose is to relate free 
w ill with the cause of motion.
In both deOr and Prfnc, he does not actually enquire what moves 
but his concern is with the cause of movement and where this cause 
lies (namely, if  the cause of movement is "outside" or "within" the 
moving object).
Thus the classification should be made not according to what is 
that moves, but according to the characteristics applied to the cause of 
movement. This is what Origen does. For this is the approach which is in 
tune with his conception of time. And this is the fundamental element 
which has eluded the above-mentioned translators.
Further, they note that, in Prfnc, Origen "while maintaining the 
distinction between classes (2) and (3), also groups them together as 
objects which are moved "in themselves" (sv eauxo(g)".
However, there is something quite significant behind this 
"difference" of classification.
It is quite striking that, in both works, the scrupulous Origen does 
not refer to the movement of heavenly bodies. This is certainly neither 
because he forgot to do so, nor is i t  accidental anyway. For throughout 
his works the reference to heavenly movement is a very frequent theme.
The question which is pertinent to what the translators regard as 
"difference" in classification of motion from Prfnc to deOr, is this: Are 
heavenly bodies "livings beings" performing the task of indicating time, 
as they have been orderd by God, or they are inanimate objects? This is 
what has to be enquired in order to show that there is very significant 
aspect of Origen's thought, which stands behind this "difference". And the 
enquiry in this subject w ill lead not only to an answer to what this 
"difference" means; but also i t  w ill lead to answers which elucidate a 
certain facet of Origen's thought, in a way which is nonthe less 
unexpected. We refer to his views as to whether heavenly bodies are
living creatures.
The current view on the question is that Origen did hold that the 
stars are animate beings. We shall show, however, that this case in not 
quite that simple.
First, i t  seems that, in his early works, Origen considered that 
heavenly bodies have a kind of "soul". This is why, in Princ\ he does not 
distinguish between "animals and plants and in a word everything that is 
held together by its nature or by soul".3 It was the period when he 
believed that the heavenly bodies are living animals. In commJohnM is 
quite obvious that heavenly bodies are regarded as having souls of their 
own.4
In deOr, however, he clearly makes the distinction between "things 
that are moved by their own inherent nature or soul, which are also said 
to be moved e§ eauitSv by those who use the words in their proper 
sense" (Second Category -above) and "A third kind of movement" which 
"takes place in living creatures, which is called movement "from within 
themselves" (a<p sauxuv) (Third Category).
"It is not the body itself, namely ’earth' which mourns ... but you 
should understand that i t  is the angel who has been ordered for the 
earth, according to the order of the entire world. Accordingly ... there 
is an angel who has been ordered for the sun and another for the moon 
and <others> for the stars.".15
His opinion on the question is that i t  is a figure of "homonymity" 
to speak of the "earth" instead of the "angel" who has been ordeerd for 
the earth (oyuvOyujg emev xov a^sfiov 8RV auxq xq grj).17 He states 
clearly that a heavenly body itself is "inanimate" (aqjuxov) and when one 
speaks of a heavenly body it  is the angel ordered for that which should 
be understood to be the animate subject -not the heavenly body which is 
"inanimate". Thus "by the name 'earth' i t  is the ordered angel who is 
actually stated" (ouxwg 6q cpw kcu ^qv Rsgsa9ai xov sn( gqg xexa^isvov
aggsRov).18
In fact i t  seems that since the era of Prfnc Origen had grasped 
this idea for the firs t time. The following passage is quite illuminating: 
'The creation was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by reason 
of him who subjected it  in hope, because the creation itself also shall be 
delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of 
the children of God.". His view is that here "hope" means that the "sun 
and moon and stars and the angels of God should fu lfil an obedient 
service for the world; and i t  was for those souls which on account of 
their excessive spiritual defects required these grosser and more solid 
bodies and also for the sake of those others for whom this arrangement 
was necessary that the present visible world was instituted.".19
It should be pointed out that he speaks not only of "sun, moon and 
stars" but also of “ angels", stating that they have assumed “grosser and 
more solid bodies". Obviously this pertains only to the heavenly bodies 
and not to angels. For his constant view is that the higher a rational 
being is the more aetheral its body is. An angel cannot have a "grosser 
and more solid" body.
Why then does he also here include "angels" in those who perform 
a duty of "vanity", namely to indicate time? The answer to this lies in 
Origen's view that "for each heavenly body an angel has been ordered" 
-an answer which he enunciated about twenty or twenty five years after 
he wrote the Prfnc
We do not assert that in this early writing Origen is categorical 
on that the heavenly bodies do not have souls. He is s till uncertain and 
undoubtedly an evolution of his thought on this question may be traced. It 
is characteristic, however, that, even in this early writing, he does not 
appear categorical on the view that heavenly bodies have a soul. Hence 
the involvment of "angels" in his arguments.
At any rate, since the First Book of commdohn, where he referred
0^0
to the "soul of the sun", until twenty five years later, Origen went a 
very long way indeed. The notion that the names of "heavenly bodies" do 
not always indicates these bodies themselves, which are "inanimate", but 
i t  denotes (by "homonymity") the "angel" who is "ordered" for each one of 
them, constitutes Origen’s radical step on this question. This is how he 
went beyond the opinion of many Christians that heavenly bodies are 
living creatures.20
Hence, in stark contrast to what is currently believed about 
Origen, we argue that by the end of his life  he did not believe that 
heavenly bodies are animate creatures.
This is the explanation which we provide on the difference of 
classification of motion between the two works of Origen, namely Princ 
and deOr. The difference may seem not striking in the f irs t place. 
Behind it, however, there is a question which has painfully occupied 
Origen's thought. Perhaps this is why he does not specify the question at 
all.
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as accurate way. He had a way of expressing the most profound and high doctrines 
in a language simple, steady and calm, which the reader cannot help to be 
impressed by. Our view is that Origen gave instructions to Amrosius about the 
content of the letter and it was the latter who composed the letter in his own 
style; (at the end of the letter it is stated that Ambrosius wrote the letter 
dictated to him by Origen). As regards the content, there is one discrepancy which 
could be singled out. In frtieb it is stated that the Epistle to the Hebrew's was 
not written by Paul himself but it is rather a commentary written either by 
Clement of Rome or Luke, yet it surely expresses Paul's views. It is stated 
however that, since the church ancestors regarded it as being Paul's, they did not 
do it without reason and therefore the tradition should be respected. In epAfr\ 
Origen is presented to argue that he can prove that the Epistle is authentically 
written by Paul. Although the frHeb is from Eusebius’ writings (s. Bibliography), 
it should be given more credit. Somehow Eusebius became aware of what Origen 
really held on the question -and it is historically known that Eusebius was the kind 
of person who knew how to get access to information he needed for writing his 
history. Indeed the comments in frHeb about the non-elegant use of Greek 
language by Paul in his Epistles (confesed by Paul himself through the expression 
iS iu tt iq  tw  Rotfu -mentioned there) can be found (repeated many times) in Origen's 
commRom, comm 1 Cor and commEph. On the other hand, however, the defence of 
the passage in Daniel (which is the main theme of epAfr), as well the views about 
the Epistle to the Hebrews, show that Origen was unwilling to reject what the 
church tradition had established for purposes of instruction. And this is a very 
significant indication of Origen’s character: He above all regarded himself as a 
Christian pastor who was primarily concerned with the spiritual intruction of the 
Christians according to the traditional faith of the church, at the points where 
such a tradition was already established.
96. comm John, 20, XXII; s. also comm John, 2, II.
97. commGen, 3. (commenting on Gen. 1,16 ff).
98. R.P. Lawson. Origen: The Song o f Songs, Commentary and Homilies, London, 
1957, p.26.
99. homJer, 20, 1. Cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, I. As G. Bardy points out, "la 
citation est textuelle, mais Aristotle n’ est pas nomme par Origene"; Cf. G. Bardy, 
"Origene et 1' Aristotelisme", Melanges Gustave Glotz, tome I, Paris, 1932, p.78, 
n.4.
100. What the actual content of each of these realities is, will be discussed in
due course in this work.
101. It is tragically ironical that the word answer (in italics) has been used in 
cases of this sort, as it happened with R. Sorabji (Cf. Time, Creation and the 
Continuum, p. 151), whereas G. Florovski ( Aspects o f Church History, pp.69-70) 
speaks of Athanasius' "step beyond Origen" at a point where Athanasius simply 
echoes Origen’s views. We discuss these claims in due course in this work.
102. Such is the case of the assertion by H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti that the 
"eternity" of those saved is an "immutable" state. Cf. H. Crouzel - M. Simonetti 
Origene Traite des Principes, Paris,1978-84J vol. II, p.76, n.52 ref. to vol. I, 
p. 164, n.305. This point is discussed in chapter 4.
Notes to Chapter 1
1. In Greek the word for "tense" is the same to that of "time", namely the word 
XPovog is being used either for "tense" or "time".
2. Cf.John, 1,1. 3. frJohn , CX; our italics.
4 . This view of Origen is also found in the Fragment CXI of Codex MONAC., quoting 
John,1,2. (Cf. frJohn, CXI).
5 . frJohn , I. In the passages here Origen is explicit the mSiog means timeless. 
So, at least here, there can be no room for the usual dispute as to whether at&iog 
has a meaning of "timelessness" ot of "everlasting duration". R. Sorabji points out 
that Plato made no conscientious attempt to distinguish between the terms ctiSiog
and aiuviogJ Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, p. 116. As we note 
later in this chapter, it is not clear whether Plato holds the eternity of the Ideas 
to be in everlasting duration or timelessness. As regards Philo, H. Wolf son points 
out that he, too, did not make a clear distinction between aT6iog and aiuviogJ Cf. 
H.A. Wolf son, Philo, vol. I, pp.234-5.
6. Prov. 8,30. 7. expProv, 8
8. The term used for "words" here is pnpaia which literally means "verbs" both 
in the technical grammatical sense and in the sense of "words".
9. comm John,, 23, XXVIII. P. PI ass holds a view which is absolutely wrong, 
namely he attributes to Origen a notion of "sacred time" of God; he further alleges 
that Origen has taken this notion from the Jewish and Christian Gnosticism, s. P. 
PI ass, "The Concept of Eternity in Patristic Theology", Studia Theologica, 36 
(1982), p. 13. A similar view has been taken by J. Danielou in Gospel Message ana
Hellenistic Culture, tr. J.A.Baker (London, 1973), pp. 458ff, 469ff. How erroneous
the assertion that Origen had anything to do with Gnosticism is, is discussed later 
in this work. However we here point out this contradictory fact: Origen has 
particularly been criticized for holding the notion of timelessness. This has seemed 
to scholars like 0. Cullmann (s. in fra ) as a kind of contamination by the "danger" 
of Greek thought. It is then quite strange that the notion of "sacred time" is 
attributed to Origen. Such an assertion would delight the scholars who deny any 
notion of timelessness, yet it is entirely wrong.
10. commGen, 3.
11. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, p. 123.
12. We note, however, that even so, when Origen speaks of the "knowledge" of 
God, he uses Present tense (which implies timeless knowledge) and not Past tense 
(which implies foreknowledge). We discuss the question of foreknowledge in 
chapter 2.
13. expProv, 8; s. also se/Ps, 101; 102; expProv, 2Z.
14 . Princ, 1.3.4. 15. Princ, IV.4.1. 16 . P rinc)\2A .
17. The term also suggests that this fundamental theological view of Origen is 
grounded not only on the notion of divine timelessness, but also on other facets of 
his theology.
18. Cels, VI, 62; our italics. 19. exhiiar,YL\l\\. 2 0 . Cels, VI, 62. 
2 1 . selPs, 128. 2 2 . se/Ps, 118; expProv, 6.
2 3 . se/Ps, 122. 2 4 .  Cels, V I, 64.
2 5 . frtla tt, 244 . Tnv xdp akpipri gvuoiv exei nept Eauxng n xpidg ouBeiq 
olSevj
2 6 . John, 1,18.
2 7 . frJohn, XIV. 8eov #dp ou6eig opd npoopaRuv votioei in  sauxou, uianEp Kai‘ 
Empoflnv oqiEwc opav RexopeSo id  opaxd. opaxai 6e' Kai Oeoq o'lg Edv Kpivn 
opa3nvai anoKaRunxuv Eauxov. ei x<*P Ewpa xig xov Oeov, ouxug eSeupei auxov tv’ 
ouxug Etnu, otog Kai oaog e o i(v . EnE( 6e pn auxog opa aRRa Oeoq eouxo 
5eikvuoiv, ug oiov ie  eoxiv xoig xevnxoig napExei Eautov Eig Kaxavonoiv' KaSug 
Kai o auxrip (pTiai' 'Kai £p<paviau epauiov.’ (Iu .1,18) ou xdp emev’ em vog pe (6n, 
aRR'Exu epauiov Ep^aviau'.
2 8 . Cf. homLuc, 3; Ta aiaSnxd, iva pREnnxai, ouSev evepxei, aRR’ ’o uxing 
o<p9aRpog xa9£ig, e'u e  pouREiai xo aio9Tiidv pREn£a9ai ei ie  pn, pREnsi auio. Ou 
xoiauxa 6e id  3eia, ou&’ ev xu napovu, opupeva x^pig xng eauxuv Evepxeiag. Kai 
xouv xdpm Oedg ,u<p3n‘ xu APpaap n v i xuv axiuv ou xou o<p8aRpou xng ipuxng
xou Appaap povou aixiou XEVopevou xou pREnea9ai auxu xov Oeov, aRRa xou 0eou 
napaaxoviog eauxov eig ep<paviapov xu SiKa'iu, a{['iu x^vopevu xfig onxaa'iag 
auxou. Cf. also commMatt, 12, 10; 14, 24. 
29. frJohn, XIII. 6io (sc. o voug) i&eiv xov 0eov ou 8uvaxai Kaxa npo&poRnv 
vonaeug. Kai npEig Pev ek xuv nEpi auxou 9eoRoxoupevuv evv o iu v  KaC l jv  exopev  
apuSpug auxov vooupev ug oiov i e ’ auxog &e o 0edg ou 6ia xivog xoiouiou aRR’ 
oiKEioxT)xi xn npog eauxov vonaiv exei nepi auxou, auxog uiv Kai n vonaig Kai xo 
voupevov. 6io povog emaxaxai auxov o uiog uno xou naxpog vooupevog Kai vouiv 
xov naxepa.
30. frLuc, 34. 31. I John,3,2.
32. commMatt, 17, 19; vuv pev xdp, Kav a£iu9upev pReneiv xov 0eov xu vu 
Kai in  Kap6ia, ou paenopev 'auxov Ka3ug eoxiv* aRRa Ka3ug 6ia xnv npsxE'pav 
oiKovopiav npiv xwexai.
33. commMatt, 17, 19. 34. frM a tt„2 44.
35. comm John, 19, V -commenting on Rom. 1,1-7.
36. commMatt, 17, 19. 37. frM att,, 243. 38. Cf. Col. 1,15.
39. Cels, VI, 17. 40. I John, 3,2.
41. frJohn, X. Here Origen alludes to his conception of attaining to eternal life; 
we discuss this subject in chapter 4.
42. frJohn, XIV. 43. se/Ps, 118. 44. se/Ps, 118 45. ibid.
46. frM att, 54.
47. se/Ps, 45; in xdp aRn9eia Kai in xuv npaxpaxuv papiupia Kai xaig 
navxo6anatg 9aupaxoupxiaig oiov <puvn nvi xpnaapevog d Oeog, id oikeiov uipog 
xoig av9punoig unE6£i£ev.
48. se/Ps, 118; 0 vopog anoKaRutpeug Seixai.
49. expProv, 1; Ooa xdp 6ia napapoRuiv Kai o k o ie iv u v  Roxuv xo Axiov nveupa 
6ia xuv npoipnxuv eRaRnoe, xauia xoig pexoxoig Kai Koivuvoig xou axiou 
nvEupaxog Euxvuoxa xweiai, un‘ auxou xou nvEupaxog EK&i&aoKopEva.
Aa<ppaxiaiog xdp Kai aKUpepvnxog xag 9eiag rpatpdg emxvuvai ou 5uvaxai. 
50. excPs, 77; MexaRnv 6e npovoiav noioupevog o 0eog xou av9punou, Kai 
oupavov auxu avoixei, Kai ipotptiv auxu &i6uoiv oupaviov, Kai x^paxwx^ auxov 
auxog, xivdpsvog xoig o&euouoi <pug, Kai axuv Em o&oug, ag Ka9* Eauxfiv t\ 
av9pumvn (puaig ouk emaiaiai.
51. This is a Platonic and Neoplatonic conception of God as necessarily being
Creator -which has lead to the allegation that Origen held a doctrine of eternal
creation. This is a current (yet entirely erroneous) opinion. The whole question
will be fully discussed in this chapter. Those who claim that Origen held a
doctrine of "eternal creation" usually take the opinion that he is a "Platonist" for
granted, and because o f that they attribute this doctrine to him. Hence, what they 
do is this: First they establish the arbitrary allegation that he is a Platonist and 
they attribute the doctrine of "eternal creation" to him subsequent to the erroneous 
premise that he is a Platonist. What they ought to do, however, is to ground the 
assertion that he held this doctrine of "eternal creation" firsts  and only //they 
were able to do this, they would be justified to speak about "Platonism" in Origen. 
But this never happened -this logical procedure was never followed. The inference 
which underlies their thought is that since Origen is a Platonist then he n?ustho\6 
the doctrine of eternal creation, as Plato did. Henceforth they deem two or three 
misleading isolated texts of the Latin paraphrase of the Princ (points, which have 
their counterpoints though -even in that same work) constitute a sufficient basis 
in order to ground this allegation. That these points of Princ are rather 
interpolations of Rufinus is argued later in this chapter. Beyond that, however, the 
stark fact is that all these scholars have taken this view about "eternal creation" 
in Origen without any study of the thousands of pages in which the original Greek 
texts prove quite the opposite. (For an example of misleading allegations on this 
point, s. infra, n. 76).
63 . commJohn\ 2, !X; our italics.
6 4 . This sounds paradoxical, yet when one deals with a problem such as a 
timeless reality should be prepared to face some statements which sound 
paradoxical in their current use. It is possible, however, to explain how this 
synonymity is understood. In the question " when was the Logos?" the answer is 
"timelessly"; this answer is obvious identical to the answer "In timelessness". But 
this last expression is virtually an answer to the question "In what was the 
Logos?". Thus when and in what are regarded as almost synonyms by virtue of the 
fact thet they both provide one single answer referring to the being of the Logos 
in the divine timelessness.
52. commJohn, 1, XVI. 
55. Gen. 1,3.
53. ib id  
56. Gen. 1,6.
54. Psalms, 142,5.
57. Prov. 8,22.
58. commJohn, 1,XIX.
6 1. commJohn, 2, IV.
59. commJohn, 1, XXXIX. 60. ib id
62. commJohn, WWW.
65. commJohn,; 1,IX; 1, XIX; 1,XXXI; 1, XXXIV; 1, XXXIX; 6, XXXVIII; frJohn, 
I; commProv, 1; Cels, 111,81; V,39; frM att,, 237. expProv, 1; expProv, 16;
excPs, 50; adnotDeut, 16; Princ, 1.2.2., 111.3.1.
66. expProv, 8. 67 . ibid. 68 . John, 1,1.
69 . commJohn’ 2, I; our Italics. 70 . frJohn’ I; our italics.
71 . frJohn\ I. 72 . selEz, 13. 73 . commJohn, 1, XIX.
74 . s. in fra  75 . commJohn, 1, XX.
76 . C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists o f Alexandria, p.210, n.1. His note reads 
thus: "Origen distinguishes In Joan, i.22, between the Epinoiai which belong to 
Christ as properties of His eternal Nature and those which are accretious, 
assumerd for the purpose of Redemption, xdxa xap ffo<pia epeve povov, n xa( 
Ro^os, n K ai n, ndviug 5e Kai aanSEia’ ou pnv 5e K ai id daRa oaa 6i' npag 
npooeiRnipe. in Joan, i.30 To the latter class belong Firstborn from the Dead, 
iRaotfipiov, Light, Shepherd; to the former, Wisdom, Word, Life, Truth. ... the 
latter are the aiaSnxd, the former are the vonid."
The distortion of Origen's views is outrageous indeed. But it is not only a question 
of distortion - it  is a matter of ignorance. Without the slightest reservation, we 
claim that Bigg never read the Commantary on John at all. Somehow, someone let 
him know this passage in Greek (which we explain shortly below). And here is why 
we assert this:
Bigg alleges that Life belongs to the "properties of the eternal nature" of the son 
of God. But it is in commJohn too, (namely, in 2,XIX) that Origen makes an 
inspired and explicit analysis of his view: Whereas the Logos was timelessly with 
the Father (as in John, 1,1), life became in the Logos (as in John,1,4). In fact 
Origen insists on contrasting the difference between this was and became, since it 
is a very significant point for his conception of creation and its relation to God 
(we discuss this later in this chapter). At any rate, speaking of the conceptions 
(emvoiai) of the son, he explicates that there was a reality in which "the third 
and fourth" conceptions of the son (namely, Life and Truth, according to Origen’s 
order, s. in fra ) "did not exist at all" (oxe id  uno xou Roxou unoftaaadpEva xpixa 
Kai lE iap ia  ouSapuig nv). [ibid. ]. And in commJohn,2,YN\\\, he explicates that the 
conception of the son of God as "life" belongs to the category of conceptions which 
do not belong to Christ himself, but "to others" (oux auxui aaa’ eiepoig). (We 
discuss the notion of Categories of the conceptions of Christ later in this chapter). 
Having butressed his assertion on the erroneous premise that Origen was a 
Platonist (and thus he should hold a doctrine of beginningless creation), Bigg 
alleges that "life" constitutes a beginningless apperception of the son of God. How
wrong this is, will be extensively discussed and proved in this chapter. The fact 
which remains, nevertheless, is that these views of Bigg have been employed by a 
long series of scholars after him, as they found it easier to study Bigg's views 
rather than Origen's works themselves.
77. commJohn, 1, XX.
78. C. Blanc, Commentaire sur S. Jean, Paris, 1966-82J vol.1, p. 125.
79. John, 1,1. 80. Cf. John, 1,4. 81. John, 1,4.
82. John, 1,3. 83. John, 1,30.
84. commJohn, 2, XIX; our italics. E. de Faye makes a serious mistake in 
asserting that "it is in the nature of the Son to be multiple and diverse" appealing 
to Origen's analyses of the conceptions of the Son in commJohn,. What de Faye 
has not comprehended is that the conceptions of the Son, after Wisdom and Logos, 
became and they could in no way be regarded as being "in the nature" of the Son. 
Henceforth, the assertions about a "Gnostic influence" upon Origen on this subject 
are wrong. For the essential notion of Origen's about a "when the third and fouth 
conceptions of Logos did not exist yet" has eluded E. de Faye. (Cf. E. de Faye, "De V 
influence du Gnosticisme chez Origene", Revue de / '  Histoire dee Religions, Paris, 
87 (1923), p.211.). See further §2 in this chapter.
85. Cels, I, 57. The phrase used by Origen here is ooug uanepei nnxn xig Kai 
apxn xuiv xoiouxuv xuxxqvei. Similar kind of expression appears in Plato, 
Phaedrus, 245C; Philo uses a similar expression stating God as "the source and 
origin of all graces", de Nutatione Nominum, 58; Cf. De Specialibus Legibus, 
11,156. It would be misleading, however, to regard this expression as "Platonism". 
It is but a figure (undoubtedly from Origen's own readings) and this is why he 
introduces it through the word uonEpEi (as it were). Beyond that, however, what 
underlies this expresion is the fudamental view that the conceptions of the Son 
became, namely it is the creative act of God that is impled. This is the context in
which Origen's similar expressions should be regarded; Cf. Cels, IV,53; IV,44;
V III ,17; deOr, XXII.
86 . R.A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, New York, 1965, 
p. 154.
87. In view of the vast number of scholars who have asserted similar allegations 
about Origen's thought, the case of Norris is but an example. To avoid an 
unnecessary great length of this work, we have to discuss views rather than 
individual scholars. Similar allegations (namely postulating either a Platonic or 
Neopl atonic perception in Origen's thought) have been made by others, such as C.
Bigg, H. Crouzel, M. Simonetti, E. Moll and, J. Daniel ou, G. Florovski (to mention 
some of those supposed to be prominent exponents of Origen’s thought); the views 
of them, as well as of others, like (P. PIass, M. Werner, etc.). The assertions of 
these (as well as other) scholars are discussed in due course later in this work. 
While C. Bigg puts the title "Platonist” in the title of his work including Origen’s 
thought, M. Werner has no hesitation: He asserts that Origen found a secure 
position "in the religious philosophy of Neoplatonism" (M. Werner, The Formation 01
Christian Dogma, tr. S. Brandon, New York, 1957, p. 118). There are others who 
think they can provide an account of Origen’s thought through affirmations which 
are grossly misleading, such as this: "Philosophically the doctrine of Origen is a 
synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements, with the conception of 
divine providence and of divine law being Platonic and Stoic.”. (W.A.Banner, "Origen 
and the Tradition of Natural Law Concepts", Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 8 (1954), 
p.70). The author thinks that he has rendered Origen’s thought by that affirmation 
which is indicative of how much Origen’s thought has suffered by distortions.
88 . Norris, op c it, p.154. This expression (which applies to Plato’s thought) is 
typical of the scholars who regard Origen but as a "Platonist"; (Cf. G. Florovski, 
Aspects o f Church History, Greek tr. by P. Pallis, Thessaloniki, 1983; p.49). It is 
already clear, however, that Origen holds a conception of God Him self without 
necessarily thinking of the world at the same time. This is a very significant point 
of his thought to which we shall return in the §4 of this chapter.
89. commJohn, 2, XIX. 90. commJohn, 20, XVI11.
91. commJohn, 20, II.
92 . expProv. 8. P. PI ass is one of the many scholars who approach Origen’s 
thought already determined to read Neoplatonic categories in it. Thus he asserts 
that, in Origen, Wisdom is one "level" (as he calls it) below God. Such a view is 
entirely mistaken, s. P. PI ass, "The Concept of Eternity in Patristic Theology", 
Studia Theologica, 36 (1982), p. 13.
/
93. This point as well as the ensuing discussion in this chapter show that creation 
came into being out of non-being by a deliberate creative act of God. The 
allegations of Nygren who tries to argue that Origen really held a doctrine of 
emanation rather than creation is entirely wrong. (A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. 
by Phillip Watson, Philadelphia, 1953; p.382.). Nygren is one among the many 
scholars who tried to construe Origen’s thought as a fundamentally Neoplatonic one 
-this is the case at this point, too. We refer to other scholars who have made 
similar approach to Origen’s thought later on in this work.
9 4 . Gen. 1,26-27. 95 . Gen.2,7. 96. Z7/^(BGF, v.16, p.374.).
97 . Cels, IV, 40. 98 . commMatt, 14,16. 99 . Gen. 1,10.
100. Gen. 1,20. 101. Gen. 1,24. 102. commJohn, 13, XLI I.
103. Prov.8,22. 104. frJohn, I.
105. commJohn, 1, XXXIV; Cf. exhMar, XLVII.
106. Cels, V, 39. 107. commEph, Fr.Vl, p.241.
108. op. eft., p.240~ 1.
109. commJohn, 19, XXII, quoting Psalm 103,24.
110. Dial, (BGF, vol.16, p.374.). 111. commMatt, 14, 16.
112. Gen. 1,26. 113. I Cor. 15,49. homJer, 2 ,1.
114. iw v  Eoopevuv: S. commJohn, 1, XIX; id  eoopeva: s. frJohn, I.
115. Cels, VII, 37. Origen relates this conception to the saying “The invisible 
things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by 
the things that are made" (Rom.1,20).
116. s. infra, our discussion on the meaning of the "not seen" and "invisible" 
notions.
117. selPs, 138. 118. s. chapter 4. 119. selPs, 138.
120. selPs, 2. 121. commJohn, 1, XIX.
122. expProv, 1; selPs, 138. 123. selPs, 138.
124 excPs, 36; Cant, 3; Cels, V, 39; commJohn, 2, XVI11; 2, XXVIII.
125. "in" the wisdom; s. commJohn, 1, XIX; "names of the Son"; s. commJohn, 
1, XX.
126. Cf.Col. 1,15; commJohn, 1, XXXVIII.
127. He quotes Psalms, 44,2-3, where it is stated: "My heart has disgorged an 
utterance which is good".
128. Cf. Princ, 1.2.2. "...these created things that had been as it were outlined 
and prefigured in herself (sc. wisdom)...".
129. Cant, 3. It is not at all accidental that the term "theoremata" Oeupripaia) 
is used in the above-cited passage, namely Cant, 3, exactly at the point where an 
exegesis is provided about the mystical communion of the soul to Christ. It is a 
fundamental view of his that among all the books of scripture, the Song of Songs 
is the book where the most profound divine mysteries have been articulated in a
mystical way; s. expProv, 22.
130. commJohn, 1, XIX.
131. Indeed Origen is regarded as he who first articulated the phrase ouk  etrrtv 
ore ouk  jjv  (there is no when he was not) [Athanasius, De decretis Nicaenae 
st/nodi, c.27 (M.25.465)] which afterwards became famous as the pivotal phrase of 
the defenders of Christian orthodoxy against the Arians.
132. Gen. 1,26. Cels, V, 37. 133. commJohn, 19, VI.
134. s. Cels, V, 37. 135. Eph.3,10.
136. commJohn, 1, XIX; Cels, IV, 40. 137. s. Cels, VI, 77.
138. Princ, 11.2.2. 139. commJohn, 1, XX.
140. commJohn,^ , V.
141. commJohn, 1, XVII; 1, XX; 32, XVIII; C els,\lI, 44.
142. commJohn, 32, XVIII. 143. commJohn, 19, XXII.
144. commJohn, 1, XVII. 145. Cels, VII, 37.
146. Cels, VII, 7. also commJohn, 2, XVII.
147. selGen (in Gen. 11,1); Dial, (BGF, v.16, pp.367-8); frOs.
148. expProv, 7. This is one more answer of Origen’s to those who attribute him 
a notion of ’’eternity of the world" even in a mode of existing in wisdom; what 
Origen stresses is that the "theoremata" and "reasons" existing in wisdom are 
"made" and they are not beginningless; that is to say, this "made" wisdom is 
clearly distinguished from the Son of God himself who timelessly is with the 
Father; we discuss this question 1n §4 of this chapter.
149. expProv, 8. 150. ib id  151. commProv, 1.
152. selPs, 22. 153. selDeut, (commenting on Deut. 8,3).
154. commJohn; 1,XXXIV; 2, XV111. 155. selPs, 22.
156. commJohn, 1,XXXIV. 157. commJohn, 1, XXVIII.
158. commJohn, 1, XXIV. 159. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
160. commJohn, 1, XIX. 161. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
162. commJohn, 1, XIX. 163. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
164. commJohn, 1, XX; 1, XXXI . 165. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
166. commJohn, 1, XIX, quoting John 1,4; s. also, commJohn, 1, XIX; frJohn,
167. frJohn, II. It is quite characteristic that the term "rationality" (flotfiKoing) 
in Greek has the same root with the term "Logos" (Rd^og). This expresses better 
Origen’s notion that "rational creatures" (Ro#u<d) are called so because of their 
"participation" to Logos of God; s. in fra .
168. Obviously the term "before" is used in a loose sense just for the sake of 
articulation of a certain notion. For strictly speaking "before" makes no sense in a 
reality which is timeless. This is an expressions! problem which Origen himself 
faced and articulated; s. supra.
169. commJohn, 1, XX. 170. John, 1,1. 171. commJohn, 1, XIX.
172. commJohn, 1, IX. This point is very significant, because it actually 
constitutes an essential difference of Origen’s notion of "conceptions" of Christ 
from any Platonic notion of "ideas". In Plato, Ideas have a real and undisputable 
existence as beings in themselves. This means that Ideas have an essential being 
-in fact it is in the Ideas that the essense of things is to be found.
By contrast, Origen clearly states that the "conceptions", which he speaks of, have 
not any being of their own as ideas. It is particularly indicative of his notion that 
he explains that "the fact that we discern conceptions in the saviour should not 
embarass anyone; for no one should think that we do the same think in essence" 
(pn&eig 6e' npooKoniEtu 6iaKpivoviuv npuiv tag ev iu  auinpi snivoiag, oiopevog 
Kai ip ou&ia xauidv npag noieiv) \commJohn, 1,XXVIII].
Thus, the "conceptions" do not have any essential existence in themselves neither 
do they introduce any essential distinction in the son of God. They are simply 
products of human apprehension of Christ and nothing more than that.
173. s. infra. 174. commJohn, 2, XIX.
175. commJohn, 2, XVIII. 176. ib id  177. ibid. 178. ib id
179. commJohn, 2, XXVIII. 180. commJohn, 2, XVIII. 
181. commJohn, 2, XIX.
182. ibid. Particular attention should be paid to a point which is delicate: 
Recalling our remarks in n.76, it should be pointed out that the affirmation that 
life became pertains to creaturely life, as Origen himself explains ( commJohn; 
2,XIX). The conception of Christ as "life" is not beginningless by virtue of the fact
that creaturely life is not beginningless.
183. frJohn, \\. 184. ibid.
185. commJohn, 20, II. 186. frJohn,* 111; s. infra.
187. Princ, 11.2.2. 188. Princ, IV.4.4.
189. commJohn, 1, XXXIV. 190. ib id  191. Eph.2,3.
192. Phil. 3,21. 193. Gen. 8,21. 194. commEph, p.404.
195. Cf. H. Crouzel: Origins et la  conaissance mystique, Paris, 1961J Also R.P.
Lawson, Origen: The Song o f Songs, Commentary and Homilies, London, 1957J 
(Introduction).
196. Dial, (BGF, v.16, p.373). 197. ibid.
198. Cf. Mark 4,11; Matt. 13,36; similarly, Cels, 111,21.
199. I Cor.5,12. 200. Dial, (BGF, v.16, pp.373-4.).
201. selPs, 109.
202. commJohn, 20, II. What Origen means by "mystery" is stated in Cels, 5, 
XIX. He there refers to "secret truths ... which are not appropriate for the 
simple-minded and for the ears of the common crowd". Thus a "mystery" (quoting I 
Cor.50) is a "word ususally applied to the deeper and more mystical doctrines 
which are rightly concealed from the multitude".
203. homJer, 16,1. Cels, VII, 38.
204. Cels, IV, 40. 205. expProv, 1.
206. P. PI ass gives a quite erroneous account of Origen’s authentic views on this 
subject. Determined as he is to read Neopl atonic views in Origen’s thought he 
asserts that in Origen there are "no less than four different levels: God, Wisdom, 
minds before the fa ll, minds fallen into time/space/ matter" [op. o il, p.13j. He 
thus, like so many others, regards God as the Plotinian One, and Wisdom as the 
Plotinian Mind etc. and thinks that it is only the names which change. On the 
assertion about the relation of God to Wisdom we have already commented. With 
regard to the implied world "before the fall", this is wrong, too, as we 
extensively argue in this chapter as well as in Appendix A.
207. Dial, (BGF, v.16, p.374).
208. commJohn, 2, XIX.
209. This is what G. Butterworth does 1n FP, p.253, n.4, where he thinks that 
Origen’s conception that God created two universal natures, namely the incorporeal 
and the corporeal one, might be compared to what is stated in Plato’s Phaedo, 79A. 
One, however, does not have to study too painstakingly that point of Plato’s work 
in order to see that Origen’s affirmations have nothing to do with that; s. infra.
210. commJohn, 13, XXV.
211. Cf. Johanneskommentar, GCS, 4, p.249J also C. Blanc, Commentaire sur S.
Jean\ III, p.112. We think that the text at this point could be restored thus: "ARR' 
oux opuciv < 01 loiauia Rexovieg> naviog <tou opoouatou auxxeveg 1 0  eivai 1 0  
auto> Kai iujv autwv Bekukov' ei Be £&E£ato id nopvEuoai n nvEupatiKd fcuoig, 
opoouuiog ouaa <in axevvniu 9eia <puaei oaa> avoaia Kai aaepri aKoRou9ei iu  
Ro^w iw Kai' auioug nepi 9eou ou6e (paviaaiu9nvai okivBuvov eoiiv.". The word 
ffuxxevec which ve propound here as veil as the syntax of auxxEVEg with Genitive
is familiar to Origen and it is found in the same work more than once; Cf.
commJohn, 10, XXXIX, the expressions uuxxevouQ EpBopaSog and auxxevoug 
Biaainpaiog.
212 . G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, Greek tr. by P. Pall is, Thessaloniki, 
1979; p.52.
213 . G. Florovski, Aspects o f Church History, pp.45ff.
2 1 4 . De GenesiadLitteram, I, PL XXXIV, p.221. G. Florovski has written an entire 
work ( Studia Partistica, VI, 1962, 36-57, repr. in Aspects o f Church History, 
pp.45-73.) in order to prove that Athanasius' conception of creation is the 
counter-point of Origen's views. What he actually did, however, was to expound 
Origen’s views of creation (being himself unconscious of this fact) attributing 
them to Athanasius and having the illusion that they are contrasted to what he has 
taken as views of Origen. We discuss this point in chapters, §3. The same thing 
happens in this case.
215. G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, pp.53 and 310.
21 6 . commJohn, 19, XX. 217 . Gal.2,20.
21 8 . Eph.5, 31-32. On this conception of Origen we discuss in chapter 5.
21 9 . Cels, VII, 69. 22 0 . commJohn, 2, XIV. 2 2 1 . ib id
222 . We give a detailed account of this notion of Origen's in chapter 5.
2 2 3 . Cels, VI, 65. 2 2 4 . ib id
225 . commJohn, 32, 111; 20,XIX.
22 6 . We say "adumbrating" as the term "portraying" cannot actually be used, since 
nowhere Origen tries to explicate his view of the fall.
22 7 . Cels, VI, 43. In his translation of Cels. (p360, n.11) H. Chadwick regards
this affirmation of Origen as an allusion to Plato, Phaedrus 246B, C. It is Origen 
himself, however, who, in Cels, too, explicitly refers to Plato and indeed to that 
point of Phaedrus in order to state that his conception of the fall has nothing to
do with the Platonic views in general and particularly as stated at that point of
PhaedrusJs. also p. 86.
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22 8 . Ezek., 28,11-19. Princ, 1.4.4.
229 . Princ, 1.4.4. Here we remind again the awkwardness in treatment of 
temporal notions by Rufinus. He speaks of the "one's" fall "at some later tim e" 
{ib id , our italics.). Although the fundamental conception is undoubtedly Origen's, 
there is nothing of Origen’s caution and scrupulousness in treating this crucial 
point, as it appears in his writings in Greek.
23 0 . commJohn, 32, XVIII.
23 1 . ib id  It is again significant to note that Origen says that this "one" like the 
others, was "made"; he also says that "while he was in divine reality, he fell"./#/#
23 2 . Cf. commJohn, 10, XXXV. On the ontological significance of "names" in 
Origen's thought, we discuss in chapter 5.
23 3 . "arhonton" means "of those who hold the arhe", that is "the power"; but as 
here "arhe" means the wisdom itself, the term "arhonton" does not mean anything 
more than "those who are in arhe", namely "in wisdom". From this follows that the 
term "arhonton" is not any particular definition of this "one"; it simply indicates 
that, "before" the fall, this "one" was in the wisdom.
2 3 4 . commJohn, 20, XXII.
23 5 . Cels, VI, 44.
23 6 . He means Ezekiel, alluding to the passage in Ez. 28,19, which follows.
23 9 . Cf. Cels, VI, 43; also VI, 44. It is quite significant that once more the 
scrupulous Origen uses the verb KataKoRouSnoaviujv which is the Past participle 
of the verb KaxaKoRou9u and means "follow down"; 1n this way his notion that the 
world is "down" in respect of God's timeless eternity is again clearly denoted; s.
also, commJohn, 19, XXII.
2 4 0 . Cels, VI, 43. We discuss this notion of Origen about the world later in this 
chapter.
23 7 . Cels, VI, 44. 238 . CelS,V\, 44.
2 4 1 . commJohn, 1, XVII; also Cels, VI, 43.
2 4 2 . Cels, VI, 43; also, V III, 25.
2 4 4 . commJohn, 20, XXV.
2 4 3 . John,8,44.
2 4 5 . ibid. We discuss the conception of this reality in chapter 5, too.
2 4 6 . commJohn, 19, XX. 2 4 7 . commJohn, 1, XVII.
2 4 8 . selGen (commenting on Gen. 11,7); also commJohn, 5, V.
2 4 9 . Princ, VI.6.2., 11.1.3., 111.5.4., 111.6.3., 111.6.8. Cf. selPs., 117. 
250 . Princ, 1.4.4.
251 . s. also, Did], where Origen speaks of the state before the fall as an 
"immaterial and superior to any bodily hypostasis (riuRov Kai Kpduov naanc 
aupaxiKng unoatdaeug. (BGF,16,374,16).
25 2 . Cf. I Pet.2,5. Cels, VIII, 19 and 20.
25 3 . Cels, VIII, 20. 2 5 4 . Cels, VIII, 19. 2 5 5 . *  supra.
25 6 . Cels, VI, 44. Indeed, one might pose the following question: How is it 
possible to speak at the same time of both, namely of not existing any notion of 
"distinction" whatever and of "one" who committed sin and fell? How the notion of 
"non-distinction" is compatible with that of "one"? On this question Origen has 
avoided to elaborate. However he has made some very significant rematks which 
are discussed in chapter 5 in relation to his conception of "restoration" from the 
fa ll, namely Ms conception of the eschatologlcal perspective of the world.
25 7 . Gen.3,21.
258 . Cels, IV, 40. Here Origen quotes Plato, Phaedrus, 246B, CJ s. also Cels, 
VIII, 53.
271 . selPs, 32. The terms, as distinguished here, have not this meaning 
universally throughout Origen’s work. What is important is the distinction itself 
which he makes. These terms are involved and contrasted just because they are 
found in the scriptural passages on which he comments and articulates this notion. 
Thus it is possible, at another point to use the term tfEVEoig meaning the
spatio-temporal reality of the world; and indeed he does so in frJohn, XIII. The 
main point however is the distinction between the two creations, namely the 
providential and the actual one.
272 . selPs, 32.
273 . Ps. 103,24. commJohn, 1, XIX. This point should not be misunderstood. 
This "substance" suggests the "nature" of rational creatures, such as human nature 
-and not the individual substance. For in the above stated passage, Origen is quite
259 . Gen.2,23.
261. s. also chapter 5.
26 4 . commJohn, 2, XVIII.
267. commJohn, 1, XIX.
269. homJer, 1,10.
26 0 . selCen, (commenting on Gen. 3,21). 
262 . Princ, 1.5.3. 26 3 . ib id
265 . s. infra. 26 6 . Ps., 103,24.
268 . Cant, 2.
270 . frM a tt, 11.
explicit that the substances of individuals came into existence only with the actual 
creation.
2 7 4 . Prov.8,22. commJohn, 1, X.
27 5 . commJohn, 1, XIX. 27 6 . frM att, 11. 27 7 . selPs, 32.
27 8 . Job 10,8; Ps. 118,73. 279 . Quoting Heb.5,11. 28 0 . Cels, I V,37.
2 8 1 . deOr, XXVII, 8. 282 . ib id
2 8 3 . Although, at this point, Origen makes no explicit reference to any 
philosophical school, the definitions of "essence" that he propounds here actually 
pertain to those schools of thought.
2 8 4 . Cels, VI, 64. 285 . commGen, 1.
2 8 6 . commJohn, 19, VI. 287 . Cels, VII, 38. 2 8 8 . Cels, VI, 64.
289. Origins, Traite des Principes, 11,25, n.23.
290 . We discuss this expression, found in Phil, in chapter 4.
291. deOr, XXIII, 5. 292. Cels, VI, 64.
293 . commJohn, 1,XIX.
2 9 4 . In chapter 5 we suggest that a comparison of Origen's thought to modern 
existentialism would be of great interest. As regards this topic, it is well known 
that is has been a major one of controversy among existential philosophers, once 
J.P. Sartre asserted that the substance of a human being is posterior to its 
existence. However a detailed discussion on this topic is out of our scope.
295 . We speak of "human nature" as an example and just because Origen himself 
provides an account of the meaning of creation of man according to Genesis. 
However, the same statements can be made about the rest of rational creatures. 
(Cf. commJohn, 1,XIX). For, as we discuss later in this chapter, Origen's world 
comprises a number of ranks of life, of which "human" is only one among many.
296. deOr, XXVII, 8. 297. Cels, IV, 66.
298. Princ, 111.6.7. 299. Princ, III.1.13.
300 . H.C. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", From Man and Time. Papers from the Eranos 
Yearbooks, vol. 3, p.75.
3 0 1 . Irenaeus Ad versus haereses, 1,5,6.
302 . Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 11,16,74,1.
30 3 . selPs, 38.
3 0 4 . selPs, 117. In Origen's works the term tfe#ovoza (or givopeva) is
always used to refer to what has been created by God; Cf. frLuc, 58. frM att\
212. s. also chapter 2.
305. Princ, IV.4.1. also commJohn, 20, XVIII. Origen’s notion of the world as 
being out of God is very significant for his conception of time and particularly 
for the raison d’ etre of time. This point in his thought is discussed in chapter 5.
306. commJohn, 13, XXV. Here Origen rebukes Heracleon who asserted that 
creaturely incorporeal nature is homoousios to God.
307. John 17,14-16. 308. Cf. John 17,24.
309. Princ, 11.3.6.
310. Princ, 11.2.2. The expression "to have been produced from them or after 
them" shows that Rufinus had not grasped the exact views of Origen on the 
question of the substance of individual rational creatures. However it is also 
obvious that the (non-extant) original Greek text at this point quite clearly must
have excluded the notion of this substance existing without any begining.
311. Princ, 1.7.1. 312. FP, p.81, n.1.
313. Cels,MW,Zl. 314. Cels, VII, 7.
315. Cels, VI, 64. On the significant distinction between the notions of "not 
seen" and "invisible" in Origen’s thought we discuss later in this chapter.
316. Princ, 1.3.3.
317. Cels, IV, 25; III, 75; I, 8; III, 39; IV, 40; IV, 83. exhMar, XLVIi; 
commJohn, 13, XLII; 19, IV; frJohn, XLV. expProv,!.
318. commMatt, 17, 34.
319. Princ, VI11.8.2.
320. Princ, 1.7.3. Whether or not Origen considers heavenly bodies as rational 
beings is question which we discuss in Appendix B, since the notion of motion in 
Origen’s thought is related to our topic and the subject has been not properly 
treated by J. Out ton and H. Chadwick.
321. Princ, 111.5.4. On this particular subject we discuss in chapter 2, in the 
light of Greek passages affirming this fundamental conception of Origen’s.
322. Princ, VI11.8.2.
323. s. infra,; §5 in this chapter.
324. Cels, III, 42. 325. commJohn, 2, XVII.
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32 6 . Cels, VI, 71; VII, 38; s. also Princ, IV.2.7.
32 7 . "we should use the metaphor of bodily clothing..."; Princ, 11.3.2.
32 8 . commJohn, 13, L. 329 . Princ, IV.2.7. 33 0 . Wis.11,20.
33 1 . Princ, 11.9.1. 33 2 . Princ, IV.4.8. 333 . Princ, IV.4.8; our italics.
3 3 4 . Princ, 1.5.3. 33 5 . Princ, 1.7.3. 33 6 . Ez.18,4.
33 7 . selEz, 18. 33 8 . Cels, VI, 60.
33 9 . commGen, 3, (commenting on Gen. 1,16-18).
3 4 0 . commGen, 3, (commenting on Gen. 1,16-18); commJohn, 1, XXXVIII; also 
Princ, I.5.4; IV.4.3.
3 4 1 . commGen, 3, (commenting on Gen. 1,16-18). 3 4 2 . ibid.
34 3 . commGen, 3, (commenting on Gen. 1,16-18) 3 4 4 . ibid. 3 4 5 . ib id
3 4 6 . commJohn, 6, LVII.
3 4 7 . commMatt, 13,20. The text is extant only in Latin as, in this point, there 
is a small gap in the original Greek text; nevertheless there is no question about 
the validity of the Latin translation at this point, because in fact an account of the 
various meanings of cosmos follows 1n the ensuing Greek text.
348. commMatt, 13, 20.
3 4 9 . The expression "the system of heaven and earth" ( to  auainpa oupavoG 
kcu tfrig) is quite often used by Origen. This expression is actually a Stoic one; Cf. 
SVF, 11,168,11: 11,169,39: 11,192,35.
35 0 . commMatt, 13, 20; s. also Princ, 1.5.5.
351. commMatt, 12,27; 13, 20.
35 2 . Cels, VI, 49. 3 5 3 . Cels, VI, 49. 3 5 4 . Princ, 11.3.6.
35 5 . commMatt, 12,27. 35 6 . Princ, 11.3.6.
357 . ls.HI. 17, ls.lll.24, Wis.XVIII.24.
3 5 8 . I Cor.VI 1.31; Princ, 11.3.6. 35 9 . Matt.V.4.
36 0 . Princ, 11,4,3. 36 1 . Princ, 11,3,6.
362 . Cels, V, 4. 36 3 . Cels, 111,42; V, 4.
3 6 4 . homJer, 14, 17.
36 5 . commJohn, 13, XXXVII; Cf. Cels, 6,59.
366. commJohn, 13, XXXVII.
367. commJohn, 19, XXII.
368. frM att, 51. 
370. selPs, 138.
369. selPs, 21. 
371. expProv,Z.
Z72. Cels, IV, 57. s. also, Cels, 111,51-52.
373. commJohn, 1, XXVI.
374. frJohn, CXXXIX.
375. commJohn, 13, XL. At this point there are two obviously small gaps in the 
original text. E. Preuschen in the edition Der Johanneskommentar of the Prussian 
Academy propounds this restoration of the text: "ev ioig npo Tfig <eig Toug> 
aiSepioug Tonoug <o6ou> xupioig" ( Origenes Werke, 4, p.266). We think that instead 
of o&ou, which does not make much sense here, it is avapdoeug that should be 
adopted, as it is a usual expression of Origen's. Thus the text should be read thus:
"ev Toig npo ifig <eig Toug> ai8eptoug Tonoug <avapdoeug> xwpioig"; Cf. C. Blanc,
Origene, Commaintaire sur S. Jean, 111, p. 174, n.2.
376. selPs, 5.
377. commJohn, 2, XI; s. infra.
378. Cels, IV, 25.
379. o #dp adtfog xnv apxnv ex^v and xou napd 8eou ad^ ou ouk ea to  aotftKov 
u^iov ndvin aaadipiov vopioSiivai Oeou. ibid.
380. commJohn, 1, XXXI; Cels, I, 62.
381. frJohn, XVIII.
382. Cels, IV, 65.
383. commMatt, 14 ,7 . 384. commMatt, 13,31.
385. excPs, 17. 386. s. chapter 4,§1.
387. Cels, VI, 21. Indeed Origen held a notion which was "more mysterious" as 
he perceived these particular worlds being different in quality and not in terms 
of geometrical distance, s. infra.
388. Gen. 28,12-13.
389. Cels, VI, 21. Origen here alludes to Philo's work deSomniis.
390. Princ, 11.3.6. 391. John, 17:14,16.
392. Princ, 11.3.6. It should be noted, however, that in Princ the notion of a 
radical chasm between God and the world is extremely vague, in contrast to the
clarity with which this notion is explicated in the texts in Greek. Thus the Latin 
rendering of Princ may well lead to miscomprehensions as to whether certain 
passages refer to the highers rank of life of the world or to the divine reality.
393. This point is discussed in chapter 4 in relation with Origen’s conception of 
eternal life.
394. Princ, 11.3.6. 395. Princ, 11,3,6.
396. Cf. Clement, Epistula ad Corinthios, XX, 5,8: "The unsearcheable places of 
the abysses and the unfathomable realms of the lower world are controlled by the 
same ordinances ... The ocean, which men cannot pass, and the worlds beyond it, are 
ruled by the same injunctions of the Master." (tr. by Kirsopp Lake; Loeb Classical 
Library, Apostolic Fathers, vol. 1, p.45.).
397. selEz, 8. 398. Princ, 11.3.6.
399. Princ, 11,1,1; s. also, Princ, 11.2.2.; 11.3.4.; 11.1.4.; 11.9.1.
400. Princ, II,4,3; also commJohn, 1, XXVII; 2, XXII; 19, XX.
401. Princ, 11,4,3.
402. Princ, 11.4.3. He presumably refers to those who dwell in the "lower parts 
of the earth”, according to Eph.lV.9.
403. Ph1l.ll.10. 404. Princ, 1.6.2.
405. Princ, 1.5.1. The scriptural passages on which Origen grounds this notion are
the following: Heb.1,4; Col. 1,16; Eph. 1,21J Also Matt., 25 and Rev. 12,7 (for the
expression “angels of the devil"); John,12,31; 14,30; 16,11 (about the “prince of 
this world"); I Cor. 2,6 ("princes of this world") and also Eph. 6,12; Luke 7,21; 
4,33 (""evil spirits" and "impure daemons"); Phil.2,10 (being "eartly" or "under the 
earth"); Deut. 32,9 (in order to consider "the reference to certain different 
classes, as when it is said 'the Lord’s portion in his people Jacob, Israel in the 
cord of his inheritance' ’’) and Deut. 32,8 ("angels of God").
406. commJohn, 2, XIV.
407. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
408. Quoting Ps. 135,2; Ps.49,1; I Cor.8,5.
409. Quoting Col. 1,16; s. also commMatt, 17, 20.
410. commMatt, 13,20. 411. commMatt, 17,21.
412. commJohn, 1, XXXI; also Princ, 1,5, 4-5. 413. Princ, 11.3.6; 11.4.3.
414. Princ, \\\AA.
415. Cf.Col. 1,16-18. Princ, 1.7.1.
416. ib id ; s. also Princ, l.Pref.B-9; 1,7,1; IV,3,15; Ce/s, y I, 64; VII, 46. 
frJohn, XIII.
417. Princ, IV.3.15. The so-called Fragment 2 in Koetschau's edition is one of 
his interpolations in Princ, I.Pref.8, and reads thus: "The term "asomaton", that is 
incorporeal, is unused and unknown, not only in many other writings but also on our 
scriptures" -a passage from Antipater of Bostra in John of Damascus, Sacra 
Parallels, 11.770; M.96.501.
4 IB. Princ, 11.3.6. 419. selPs, 23.
420. Col. 1,15-16. IV.3.15. 421. Rom.,11,36. 422. Princ, IV.3.15.
423. Princ, 1.1.6. 424. Princ, IV.4.1. 425. Princ, IV.4.1.
426. Princ, IV.4.5. 427. Princ, IV.4.4. 42B. Princ, IV.4.8.
429. Princ, 11.10.2. 430. Princ, 11.4.3. 431. Princ, 11.4.3.
432. Princ, 11.3.6.
433. This physical structure is directly related to moral reasons, as we shall 
see in chapter 2, when we shall discuss his notion of "pre-existent causes".
434. Princ, IV.4.8. 435. ib id
436. Princ, 11.9.2. 437. Princ, 11.2.2.
438. ibid. The expression "after a space of time" should be regarded in the 
context of what we have already stated about the awkward way in which the use of 
temporal terms appears in the Princ.
4 4 0 .1 Cor. 15,44. 441. Cf. Luke 20,36: Matt.221,8.
442. Princ, 11.2.2. 443. Princ, 11.3.3.
4 4 4  Princ, II. 1.4.
445. R. Norris, like so many others, has taken for granted that what Origen 
perceives as "world" is an "order of rational spirits" {op. eft., p.148) which exist 
eternally (pp.154-5). This is not a view of Origen’s but a view attributed to him 
by those who approach his thought already prejudiced and determined to see it 
through the glasses of Platonism and Neoplatonism. The views of C. Bigg, G. 
Florovski, H. Crouzel. M.Simonetti, E. de Faye, and others, on this topic are quite
the same; assertions made by them are discussed at other points of this work.
446. commJohn, 19, XX -commenting on John, 8,23. 447. ibid.
448. The comment on the Latin meaning of ttaiafiofiri as constitutio is obviously 
made by RufinusJ for Origen wrote in Greek, not in Latin. The remark of G.
Butterworth that the term Kctta{3oRn does not appear in John is wrong; for the 
term KatapoRh does appear in John, namely in the passage John,17,24. Hence, his 
remark that this point is an addition of Rufinus (based on this mistaken 
assumption) is wrong, too. ( FP, p.420, n.1). For Origen deals with the scriptural 
use of the term KaiaPoRn in commJohn, too, as we point out in note 446. (s. supra. 
).
449. Eph.1,4. 450. Princ, 111.5.4. 451. Princ, 111.5.4.
452. commJohn, 19, XXII. 453. ibid. 454. John, 17,24. ib id
455. Cf. Fragment 5, Koetschau from Justinian’s, HhOr (Mansi IX.528) 
incorporated in his edition of Princ, in 1.2.10. Also, Fr. 10 (from the same writing 
of Justinian’s), incorporated in Princ, 1.4.5.
456. frLuc, 34. commGen, 3 (commenting on Gen. 1,16-18.)J expProv, 5. 
commJohn, 2,1; 2,11; 2, XIX; 20,XXII; frJohn, I; frJohn, CX and CXI.
457. Cf. frLuc, 34.
458. The very word Adpiozog (Past Tense) literally means "Indefinite".
459. Origen: The Song o f Songs. Commentarg and Homilies. tr. R.P. Lawson, p. 146. 
Our italics. Certainly in English the verb is used in Present Perfect tense. But in 
the Greek text, on which Origen comments, the verb is in the Past tense. The 
passage Cant. 1,10 reads thus: "i{ upaiwSn&av oi aia^oveg aou uig ipuxovog, 
ipdxnRoQ oou ug oppioKog;". The verb form which Origen points out is 
upaiuidTioav.
460. commJohn, 2, XIX; frJohn, I; homJer, 9,4.
461. frJohn, I. 462. ibid. 463. ib id
464. commJohn, 2, XiX. 465. ibid. 466. frJohn, II.
467. commJohn, 1, XVII. 468. expProv, 16. 469. commJohn, 32, III.
470. selPs, 21. 471. selPs, 144. 472. Cels, II, 79.
473. selPs, 54. 474. expProv, 1. 475. selPs, 138.
476. expProv, 18.
477. expProv, 9. According to his fundamental view of the actual content of the 
"world", Origen always bears in mind that he refers to the entirety of ranks of 
life; this is why he refers to "rational creatures" (xct RotfiKd) and not just to
human beings; Cf. commJohn, 13, XXXVII; frJohn, II.
478. selPs, 144.
4 7 9 . See, for example, selEz, 16.
480. However, whether or not creation out of nothing is a biblical notion is a 
matter which does not enjoy unanimity. As R. Sorabji points out, an early Biblical 
account of God's creative power in the Book o f Job 28 and 38 has been taken to 
mean that God put order into pre-existing chaos, rather than creating out of 
nothing. In the Wisdom o f Solomon 11,17 it is stated that God "created the cosmos 
out of a formless matter" without saying whether that matter had a beginning. In 2 
Maccabees 7,28, the reference to creation out of nothing can easily be 
reinterpreted (Cf. H.A. Wolfson, Philo, Cambridge Mass., 1947J vol.1, pp.302-3). 
Thus it has been asserted that neither in the Bible nor in the Jewish-Hellenistic 
literature is there a clear statement of creation out of nothing in a sense which 
can include a beginning of the material universe. In that case it is sustained that 
the view of creation out of nothing was invented by Christians in the second 
century A.D., in controversy with the Gnostics. Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation ant 
the Continuum, p. 194.
481. Yet even this view of Origen's has been challenged by scholars who attribute 
to him a "doctrine of eternal creation". R. Norris, for example, clearly implies 
that by this expression: "Origen feels it necessary to insist explicitly on the 
teaching that nonmaterial beings (or rather, some nonmaterial beings) must be 
classified as 'created'..." ( op. c it, p.149; his italics). In order to abide by his 
premise that Origen held a "doctrine of eternal creation" {op. c it, p. 154) he goes 
as far as to impugn what Origen so many times and explicitly states, namely that 
everything was created.
482. commJohn, 2, XIX. 483. frJohn I. 484. commJohn, 2,XIX.
485. frJohn, 1. 486. commJohn, 2, XIX.
487. frJohn, I; s. also frJohn, CXI.
488. frJohn, I. 4B9. commJohn, 1, XIX. 490. frJohn, H.
491. We certainly use the terms here by convention; for the term "past" or 
"beginning" do not actually make sense in timelessness; what nevertheless we are 
enquiring here is whether Origen holds a notion about an "eternity of world" even 
if this "world" is expressed in terms of God’s purpose to create it. For some 
scholars have alleged that even if  one concedes that the worlds did not actually 
exist, they attribute to Origen a view of God as beginninglessly having decided to 
create. This is what G. Florovski did {Aspects o f Church History, pp.45ff). What 
we assert here is that Origen does not hold such a notion.
492. frJohn, I. This "became" should be given particular attention; for it is the
same verb, in the same form, which Origen ecplicitly states that it denotes a 
previous nonexistence; s. supra.
493. frJohn, II. 494. frJohn, I.
495. Cf. J. Pepin, Theologie cosmique at theologie chretienne, Paris, 1964; 
pp.502-6; C. Tresmontant, La Me'taphgsique du christianisme at la  naissance de la 
philosophie chretienne, Paris, 1961; pp. 190-4; 319-26; 364; A.H. Armstromg, 
"Elements in the thought of Plotinus at variance with classical intellectual ism", 
Journal o f Hellenic Studies, (3, (1973), pp. 13-22.
496. Cf. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 2.1.1 ;2.30.9; 3.8.3. Christian writers later 
to Origen pointed out this distinction, too; Cf. Augustine De Civitate Dei, XI,24: 
Enarratio inPsalmum 134, sermo 10; Thomas Aquinas in Caelo I, lectio 29, n.12.
497. Timeau$ 29E-30A; 41B; s. Pepin, op. cit.
498. Enneads, VI.8.9(44-8); Vl.8.13; Vl.8.15( 1 -10); Vl.8.18(35-52);
Vi.8.21 (8-19).
499. Enneads, V. 1.6(25-7).
500. Enneads , 11.9.3(1-18); 11.9.8(21-7); III.2.2; 3.2.3(3-5); IV.8.602-13); 
V.1.6; v.1.7(37); V.3.16(1).
501. Later Platonists also attributed a notion of "will" to the Demiurge’s 
creative act. Cf. lamblichus de ilgst. 3,28: Proclus, in Platonis Timaeum 
Commentarii,{ed. E. Diehl, Leipsig, 1903-6); 1.362; 1.371,4.
502. commJohn, 19, XXII. 503. ib id
504. Enneads, 111.2.1-2; V.1.6.
505. Enneads, V.1.6; V.1.7 (2 and 37); V.4.1.
506. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that here Plotinus expresses his 
conception of the relation of the secondary reality, namely Intellect, to the One. It 
is to the One creating the Intellect that Plotinus denies the role of will 
[V. 1.6(25-7)]. He regards it as something like the light which surrounds the sun 
[V.1.6; V.1.7(2 and 37); V.4.1)]. Some would be tempted to assimilate this notion to 
the relation of the Father to the Son in Origen’s thought -in fact a vast number of 
scholars (some of them mentioned in this work) have done this. To prove how 
erroneous such a view is demands a treatise of its own. However we only note 
here that those who make these misleading assertions contradict themselves. For 
they also use the so-called Fragment 32, incorporated by P. Koetschau in his 
edition of Princ, where it is explicated that "the Son was born out o f the w ill of 
the Father". To what extent this passage (from Justinian’s libO r, Mansi IX.525)
expresses Origen's authentic views demands, as we said, a work of its own. We 
only make the juxtaposition in order to show that those who want to give credit to 
Justinian’s testimonies (and they are axactly those who attribute ’’Neoplatonism’’ to 
Origen) grossly contradict themselves. For it becomes clear that, even at this 
point, the very notion of the Father's w ill radically contrasts Origen’s thought (as 
presented by Justinian) from that of Plotinus’. Whereas Plotinus denies role of 
will to the One creatingthe Intellect, Origen is presented to affirm  a role to the 
will of the Father begetting the Son. At any rate, Plotinu’s affirmation of a 
necessity in the creation of lower levels of reality (namely the visible world) 
renders the contradistinction of the Neopl atonic conception of creation from that 
of Origen's even stronger.
507. R. Sorabji’s assertion that the basic idea of ’’conditionality” in the creation 
of the world is originated in Augustine is not correct. Cf. op. c it, p.241.
508. deOr, XXIII, 5.
509. commJohn, 19, VI; Cels, VII, 38. That before creation ’’essence’’ was 
’’uncreated" too is stated in commGen;3.
510. Cels, VI, 64.
511. frM att, 357. The opinion that "essence" was uncreated before creation is 
stated in commGen, 1 (commenting on Gen.1,12); ...xov Oeov, axEvvqiov eupovia 
xnv ouriav...
512. G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, p.53.
513. G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, p.310, n.12.
514 . Augustine, De Genesi ad litte r am, I; cited in G. Florovski, Creation ano 
Redemption, p.53.
515. frJohn, I. 516. ib id  517. ibid.
518. John, 1,4. frJohn, II. 519. frJohn, I.
520. This articulation, however, should be regarded in the context of Origen’s 
statements about the expressional difficulty to articulate truths which involve 
timelessness. Cf. commJohn, 2, XIX.
521. Fragment 5 Koetschau, in Princ, 1.2.10, and Fragment 10 Koetschau, in Princ, 
1.4.5.
522 . Those who attribute this view to Origen allege that he held a notion of some 
"spiritual world" before time; regardless of any other argument against such an 
allegation, the fact is that in Origen’s thought the categories of "spiritual" and 
"world" when used together do not make any sense; the only exception is Origen’s
term "intellectual world" (vontoc; ko&iioq) used in a certain context and explained 
there by Origen himself that this term means nothing but the son of God himself, 
the term "world" being here just a metaphor; s. Appendix A.
523. expProv, 9.
524. ib id ; s. also frJohn, I. A. Hamman is one more scholar who develops his 
assertions on Origen's conception of creation on the erroneous premise that Origen 
held a doctrine of "eternity of creation"; Cf. A Hamman, "L' Enseignement 
Patristique sur la Creation", Revue des Science Religieuse, 42 (1968), pp.101-4.
525. Heb.1,3. 526. Wis. 7,26. 527. Prov.8,25.
528. homJer, 9, 4. s. also commJohn, 1, XXIX. 529. Princ, 11.2.1. 
530. Princ, 1.2.2.
531. ibid.,. Here Origen alludes to the Stoic notion of KaiafinniiKijpavzacn'a; s. 
infra.
532. He refers to the Incarnation. 533. Phi 1.2,6.
534. Phil.2,7. frffa tt, 3.
535. Here is how R. Norris tries to "explain" what, "from the point of view of a 
Platonist" (namely Origen), he sees as a "contradiction", namely how is it possible 
that something is both incorporeal and generate. All he does is to regard that the 
term "beginning" has the meaning which Origen (explicitly and so many times) 
attributes to the relation between the Father and the Son. In order to stand by his 
false premise of the "doctrine of eternal creation" {op. c it, p. 154) which he 
attributes to Origen, Norris {op. c it, p.151) goes as far as to attribute to Origen 
also a notion which so strongly the Alexandrian theologian rejected. This is one 
more point where is becomes clear that one erroneous presuppositions leads to a 
series of others -and Norris' work is full of such (s. other notes about that work.
536. expProv,!.
537. C. Bigg takes for granted that Origen held a notion of eternity of the world 
( The Christian Platonists o f Alexandria, pp.240-2). His opinions about Origen's 
thought in that book are based upon this false premise. Therefore it could take a 
very extensive discussion to refute these opinions. We have already discussed how 
mistaken he was in rendering Origen's views of the "conceptions" of the Son {op. 
c it, p.210, n.1; s. supra, n.76). Bigg failed to grasp that whereas Wisdom and 
Logos were timelessly conceptions of the Son, the rest of them became, due to 
the very fact that the world was brought into being out of non-being. Whether this 
mistake was prior or posterior to his impression that Origen held a Platonic
doctrine of eternity of the world, does not matter. The fact is that H. Bigg 
compiled a work based on fundamental miscomprehensions of Origen's thought.
538. selPs, 2. 539. expProv, 1. 540. frJohn, I.
541. ib id  542. selPs, 32.
543. C. Bigg, op. c it, p.296.
544 . This was also held by eclectic Platonists such as Plutarch of Chaeronae; Cf. 
Philopoemen, 1,10.1: luKpaing Kai naaiuv xwpuuag iiig ufing ouaiag ide ibeag 
unoRappdvei ev toig vonpaai Kai xaig (paviaaiaig xou 8eou, xouieaii xou vou, 
utpEoiuioag.
545. Cf. De Opificio Mundi 3E f f j 5CJ 7B ffJ 29CJ Legum A?)egoriarum L ib ri, 
44A; De Migrations Abrahami, 404B (edit. Magney); also Cf. Plato , Timaeus 28A 
ff. cited in A.H. Chroust, "The meaning of time in the ancient world", p.61, n.370.
546. De Opificio Mundi, 2BJ ap. Chroust, too.
547. De Opificio Mundi, I.33-35.
548. De Aeterniatetae Mundi, 2.5; De Specia/ibus Legibus, 1.266.
549. Princ, 111.5.1.
550. The assertion of R. Sorabji that Origen holds that there is an "intelligible 
world" which is "without beginning" is wrong. That the term "intelligible world" 
makes no sense in Origen’s thought is discussed further in this chapter as well as 
Appendix A. Our discussion at this point shows also that the notion of creation 
"without beginning" is absolutely alien to Origen's thought. This pertains also to the 
providential creation. The "reasons" and Seupnpata which are the outcome of that 
creation had a beginning. This is what has eluded R. Sorabji and hence his mistaken
assertions that these creatures "have existed always" [Cf. op. cit., p.251, n.111.3.
551. selPs, 2.
552. expProv, 1. In this sense Origen here emphisizes that the term apxri 
(beginning) may also mean "the cause of coming into being (Apxil Kai ii uvog 
unap|£ug aitia).
553. commGen, 3.
554. In asserting that those two kinds of relation are virtually the same, R. 
Norris has made a serious mistake. Cf .op. cit., p.151.
555. E. de Faye has grounded his work De 1' influence du Gnosticisme sur Origene 
on two entirely mistaken assumptions. First, that Origen holds a notion of a 
"trasncendent world" of spirits. That this is an erroneous assumption is discussed
also in Appendix A. Secondly, that Origen holds a "doctrine of eternal creation", an 
assumption quite erroneous, too, as our discussion here shows. The claims of Faye 
in this work, where he asserts an influence of the Gnostics on Origen, grounding 
these assertions on false premises inevitably lead him to conclusions which 
seriously distort Origen's authentic views. Cf. E. de Faye, "De T influence du 
Gnosticisme chez Origene", Revue de V  Histoire des Religions, Paris, 87 (1923), 
pp.181-235.
556. commJohn, 2, XIV. 557. Cels, IV, 79.
558. selPs, 109. 559. Cels, IV, 79. 560. ib id
561. commEph, p.404,219-223; also, p. 407,34-35.
562. commJohn, 2, XIX. 563. expProv, 8.
564. R. Sorabji, op. cit, p. 196.
565. commJohn, 2, XIX.
566. R. Sorabji, op. cit., p.310.
567. A further discussion on this particular topic is beyond our scope. However, 
the passage from homJer quoted above is quite eloquent.
568. One can now see how wrong the assertion of R. Norris is, namely that one 
cannot think of God without thinking at the same time of the world. He asserts that 
"the doctrine of 'eternal creation* is, in Origen, a correlate of his understanding of 
the divine nature." {op. cit, p.154). These are the views of G. Florovski, too 
{Aspects of Church History, p.49) and of a vast number of scholars, some of which 
have already been mentioned.
569. R. Sorabji, op. cit., p.241.
570. R. Norris, op. cit., p.149ff.
571. loc. cit.J Thus the problem of Norris is that although he postulates Origen 
as a "Platonist", yet he finds in him fundamental views which are not consistent 
with Platonism. However he does not put his premise in question. Instead, he tries 
to provide an answer (pp.149-152) in which alleges that Origen is not really an
inconsistent Platonist. His allegation is that Origen did not hold that creation had a
beginning and came into being out of non-being. Of course he is wrong as his
premise of a world of "rational spirits" (p. 150) existing without any beginning
(p. 154) is wrong, too. For the notion of "beginning" is too strong throughout 
Origen’s works to be extinguished even through a miscomprehension. Certainly it is 
not a very apt comment to say that "Origen wants to have his cake and eat it", 
namely to assert that the "world of spirits" is without beginning and at the same
time to speak of "beginning". The simple answer here is that Origen does not hold 
any notion of any beginningless world whatsoever. Thus the comment of Norris 
applies rather to him himself. For he seeks on the one hand to maintain his 
assertion that Origen holds a "doctrine of eternal creation" (p.154) and on the 
other to sustain that this creation had a "beginning". Certainly it is not a 
"contradiction" of Origen's, but a profound miscomprehension of Norris.
572. The same happens with the conception of the relation between Knowledge and 
Virtue; s. chapter 4.
573. Cf. Princ, 1.2.2.
574. Princ 1.1.6; 1.2.10; 1.4.3-5. (This section is found in one MS only and has 
been obliterated from another, s. Koetschau’s ed., p.65, n. on 1.8); li.5.2-3.
575. Such an argument can be found in Aristotle {Physics, 8.1, 252a11-19; De 
Caelo, 1.12, 283a11) in opposing the view that there could have been rest for an 
infinite period and then motion. Augustine's answer to a similar question (namely 
"what did" God do before creation) was that "He was preparing hell for people who 
pry into mysteries" {Confessions, XI.12). His actual answer to both questions is 
that there was no time before the creation {Confessions, XI. 13; de Genesi contra 
Manichaeos, 1.2.3; De Civitate D ei, XI.5-6). But this was but a mere repetition of
an inspired view of Origen, already explicated in commJohn, 2 ,XIX, also in frJohn,
XIII, etc. -not to mention Princ, IV.4.1, a passage which acquires a totally 
different meaning regarded in the context of the fact that Origen did not hold any 
notion of beginingless of creation. In modern times this argument has been set 
forth by Leibniz in his famous exchange of five papers with Clarke; he developed 
his argument of "why not sooner?" in attacking the Newtonian opinion that time 
exists independently of change. However a further discussion on this point is 
beyond our scope. Cf. H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 
Manchester, 1956; pp.26-7; 37-8; 75-7.
576. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 2.28.3; Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos,
1.2.3.
577. Cels, I, 21.
578. The scriptural passages, which Origen appeals to, are Ps.101,28 and Mai.3,6. 
It is remarkable that he uses the two of them in both passages and quotes them in 
the same order. It is obvious that the first mainly suggests the notion of God 
Himself whereas the second alludes to the fact that any notion about Him does not 
imply any alteration to God Himself. In his translation of Cels, H. Chadwick has 
translated the passage of Malachi,3,6 as "I change not" ( op. c it, p.21). We
understand that this is the English rendering of the scriptural ouk naao'iupai, 
quoted by Origen. However, the verb is in the Present Perfect Tense and not in the 
Present Tense, so the passage means "I have not changed". For our topic it is 
significant to point out the difference, as the quotation is meant to suggest that 
eventhough God decided to create, there is no change or alteration that took place 
in God Himself. (Whether in the Hebrew text the verb is in Present Prefect Tense 
or in Present Tense, we do not know. What we know, however, is that in the Greek 
text the verb is in the form ouk qaaoiupai and this is what Origen quotes, too.).
579. Cels, VI, 62; our italics.
580. Cf. A.H. Chroust, “The meaning of time in the ancient world", The Ne\v 
Scholasticism, XXI (1947), p.21.
5B1. Timaeus, 30A.
582. Sophist 241 DJ 248 C.
583. TimaeuslV E ff.
584. Pr/nc, 111.5.3.
585. Cf. Chapter 3.
586. comm John, 10, XXXIX; s. also comm John, 10, XL I.
587. Cf. commJohn, 2, XIX.
588. Cels, VIII, 63.
589. Cels, VIII, 63. Kamflnnnk'ri paviama is a fundamental notion in Stoic 
epistemology: it means a perception of the mind which is regarded as true and no 
doubt can be entertained as to its truth. On the significance of it in Origen’s 
thought we discuss shortly below (note 596).
590. In Princ, although not by the Stoic name, Origen alludes to this intellectual 
capacity in speaking about the atemporal ontological relation of the Father to the 
Son stating this: "God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was 
born indeed from him and draws his being from him, but he is yet without any 
beginning, not only of that kind which can be distinguished by periods of time, but 
even of that kind which the mind alone is wont to contemplate in itself and to 
perceive, if  I may so say, with the bare intellect and reason. Wisdom, therefore, 
must be believed beyond the limits of any beginning that we can speak or
understand."; Princ, 1.2.2.
591. Cels, I, 42.
592 . Cf. Enneads, IV.4.1. On this point there is a particularly interesting article
by A.C. Lloyd: "Non-discursive thought -an enigma of Greek philosophy". Proceedings 
o f the Aristotelian Society, 70 (1969-70), pp.261-74.
593. Princ, IV.3.15. There can be no doubt that this passage expresses Origen's 
authentic views. For this affirmation is the same, not only in conceptual content 
but also almost in letter with the above mentioned similar statement in Cels, 1,
42: ...flEKieov ‘on tnv naaav laiopiav, Kav aflnSdg n, pouaeoSai KaiaaKeua^Eiv 
ug ^E^EvnpEvnv Kai KaxaannxiKiiv epnoinaai nepi auxng <pavxa<riav xuiv a$o6pa
eon xct^cnuidiuv Kai xuiv <ev> evtoig aSuvaxov. Similarly, in Pr/nc, 11.9.1, 
there is this expression: "Now ... let us ... contemplate the beginning of creation, so 
fa r as it  is possible fo r the mind to contemplate the beginning o f God's creative 
work.", (our italics.). In view of our discussion, there could be no doubt that this 
expression renders Origen's authentic views.
594. Cf. Enneads y 111.7.3.
595. This had already been stated by Plato, who concedes that any notion of 
"before" or "after" is possible only within time existent, s. Timaeus, 37 E f f j  Cf. 
Parmenides, 156 A ff.
596. One would say, however "But this is not plausible!". In saying this, he will 
have, quite unconsciously, already articulated the very definition of xazffSnnnxn 
pavzaaia according to Stoic thought. As a matter of fact, the Stoic conception is 
that "direct apprehension (KaxaflnnxiKii (pavxaaia) is different from what is 
plausible" (6ia<pEpEiv 6e xnv KaiaRnniiKnv (paviaoiav xou euRoxou) [SVF,
I,141,5-6 and, again, in 15-16]. What seems to be "plausible" is subject to 
dialectics and, after a certain argumentation, this "plausible" could be rebutted. On 
the contrary, KcciaRnniiKri (pavxaaia is not susceptible of rebuttal whatsoever, 
(xrjv |iev xap [sc. KaxaannxiKnv <pavxaaiav] a&iaqjeuaxov eivai, to &e eurloxov 
Kav daaug anofJaiveiv) [SVF, 1,141,6-7]. This means that "plausible" can be 
proven to be untrue, but what is apprehended through KaxaannxiKn (pavxaaia could 
never be proven to be untrue. [Cf. SVF, 11,29,39.]. This is why KaxaRnnxiKii 
(pavxaaia was regarded as "criterion of truth" (Kpixnpiov aflTtfEiag) [SVF,
II,22,28-30.]. For, by definiton, "KaxaRnnxiKn (pavxaaia is what arises from what 
really exists, namely from what is true and it would never arise from what does 
not exist." ((pavxaaia KaxaflnnxiKn eoxiv n and xou unapxovxog Kai Kax* auxo xo 
unapxov evanopepaxpevn Kai EvanEa$paxiape'vTi onoia ouk av xevoixo ano jin 
unapxovxog) [SVF,1.18,6-11J also in SVF, 11,24,12-14; 11,31,7; II,33,4]. So the 
truth apprehended through KaxaRnnxiKii (pavxaaia is beyond “ sensual perception" 
(kqi x^pig xng Kaxd Tag aiaSfjaEig evepxeiag) [SVF, 11,24,11] as well as beyond
what seems to be "plausible" (&ia<p£pei xou euRoxou) [SVF,1,141,5-6 and, again, in 
15-16]. With respect to the problem of time we give this example: The celebrated 
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion disputed the very possibility of a man to move at all. 
What is "plausible" and obvious was rebutted through dialectics and the discussion 
on such grounds goes on until our day (although it should not in the light of the 
development of Infinitesimal Calculus and the conception of relativity.).
The real meaning of KaxaRnntiKn (pavxaaia plays a crucial and decisive role in 
understanding Origen’s conception of the non-beginninglessness of the world. It is 
certainly not incidental that, whenever he treated this most delicate question, he 
expressed (or, rather, suggested ) his view by using the Stoic notion of 
KaxaflnnxiKii (pavxaaia. This fact must be given a serious attention and painstaking 
study in order to comprehend Origen's conception of creation and its relation to 
God. In his view, these questions cannot be taught through words but can only be 
apprehended through direct apprehension. For the theological notions (xujv 
8eoRoxoupevuiv evvoiuv) which are used, being a means expression, actually 
stand between human mind and God. (Cf. frJohn, XIII). It should be emphasized, 
however, that even "direct apprehension" is not regarded as an adequate 
intellectual function in order to comprehend these questions entirely. This 
comprehension is a hope (stemming from the promise of "seeing" God "face to 
face") pertaining to the eschatological reality and only to that reality, {ib id  ).
597. That God has everlasting duration rather than atemporality was held by 
Aristotle; Cf. Metaphysics, 12.7, 1072b13- 1073a 13. As regards Plato there is 
still controversy whether he regarded the Ideas as "everlasting" or "timeless"; for 
in his works the implications of duration and timelessness stand side by side and 
he offers no clear resolution; thus J. Whittaker in "The “eternity1 of the Platonic 
Forms" argues that Plato's notion of eternity is "everlasting duration". This is a 
view similar to F.M. Cornford's who interpreted eternity in Parmenides and Plato 
as "duration"; s. F.M. Comford, Plato's Cosmology, pp. 98; 102. On the other hand,
L. Taran regards Plato as the first atemporalist and so does M. Schofield; Cf. L. 
Taran, Parmenides, Princeton 1965, p.175; Malcolm Schofield, "Did Parmenides 
discover eternity?", Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 52 (1978), pp.243-66. 
Both the latter authors, unlike Plato, aver that in Parmenides eternity means 
"duration".
598 . Quite unconsciously, Justinian, in libOr, speaks of God's "will" (xu 
pouRnpaxi) to create. It is obvious, however, that he had not the slightest idea of 
the serious implications that the notions of God's w ill has in Origen's theology. 
(Cf. Mansi, IX. 489). The pertinent pasage was incorporated by Koetschau in his
edition of Princ\ as Fragment 24 (in Princ, 11.9.1). How absurd this act of
Koetsehau’s is is argued in chapter 2 §1, at the point where we discuss Origen’s
concepton about the relation of time to the notion of Infinite.
599. It is most regretable that the erroneous opinion, that Origen held a doctrine 
of eternal creation, has found a place in the excellent work Lehrbuch der
Geschichte der Philosophie written by W. Windelband with the collaboration of H. 
Heimsoeth. In vol. I, ch.2 (pp.245-303) this opinion has been taken for granted. In 
fact Origen is singled out as “the only one ... who abided by the basic 
characteristic of Greek science and taught that the cosmic process is eternal." 
(p.297). No one could blame Wilhelm Windelband for adopting this view. He is not 
an Origen-scholar but a leading figure of the Neokantian School of Heidelberg. In 
this work he acts as a historian of Philosophy and he adopts prevailing opinions 
about the persons involved in his exposition. The fact, however, that this opinion 
about Origen has found a place in a History of Philosophy written by a respectable 
philosopher, is quite indicative of how current this erroneous opinion is among 
scholars.
603. Princ, IV.4.1.; s. also comm John, 20, XVI11, and chapter 5.
604. commJohn, 20, XVIII. With his insistence on reading the philosophy of
Neoplatonism into the works of Origen, R. Norris states that "the Logos appears ... 
as the first step 'down' from the One in the stream of existence" and he is "the 
expression of eternal Mind" {op. oil., p.154). Origen never used these Plotinian 
categories. Beyond that, however, the assertion that the Logos is "existing down" in 
relation to God is just a miscomprehension by those who in all ways wish to 
attribute a Plotinian perception of the world to Origen. Our discussion in this 
section shows how wrong they are in regarding the Logos as being somewhere 
"lower" from God or "standing midway" (s. in fra ) between God and the world. The 
Logos is and always was with God in the divine timelessness.
605. We remind here that, in Origen’s thought, the term "invisible" implies
incorporeality and applies to the Trinity alone.
606. John, 1,26. commJohn, 6, XXX.
607. commJohn, 2, XV.
608. In Greek the word Logos means also "word" and "speech" and "instruction" 
and "preaching" and "teaching".
600. commJohn, 1, XIX. 601. frJohn, I. 602. ib id
609. John, 12,48.
611. commJohn, 1, XXXVIII.
610. commJohn, 2, XV.
612. Cels, V, 24.
613. H. Chadwick, Origen\ Centre Cel sum, p. 151.
614. op. c it, p. 151, n.4.
615. Cels, III, 34. 
617. fr lia tt, 3.
616. fr lia tt, 242. 
618. selPs, 109. s. also frJohn, CV.
619. commJohn, 2,1 V; our italics. Once more we draw the attention of the 
reader on the manner in which Origen develops his arguments, namely the 
scrupoulous linguistic analysis of scriptural passages. This analysis is based on a 
thorough knowledge of the temporal significance and implications of tenses of 
verbs. Origen was equally scrupulous himself in using verbs in the appropriate 
tenses, so that his statements express his conceptions in the most accurate and 
efficient manner. This is why we have regarded the painstaking study of his 
expressions as fruitful, in terms of indicating his authentic views.
620. excPs, 23; selPs, 23; frJohn, XLVI.
621. fr lia tt, 242 -quoting Matt.11,27.
622. Princ, IV.4.1.
623. commJohn, 20, XVIII. We agree with the interpretation of the English 
translator of the Princ, G.W. Butterworth who, in his introduction to the book, 
states that "rational beings ... are definitely outside the Godhead, as the Son and 
Spirit are definitely within.". Cf. FP, p. Iv. We give a more detailed account of 
this conception of Origen in chapter 5.
624. Princ, 11.9.2.' 625. Princ, IV.4.2.
626. fr lia tt, 3. 627. selPs, 32.
628. frJohn, XIII. 629. ib id
630. ibid. The assertion of J. Cheek that the state "before" the actual creation
was not a timeless one is wrong, s. J. Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption in the 
Theology o f Origen, Drew University, 1962, p.277. In his effort to identify Origen's 
conception of time to what 0. Cullmann has asserted as "biblical view of time", 
Cheek falls into the mistake to attribute to Origen the doctrine of eternal 
creation; (Cf. op. c it, p.534, n.15). On 0. Cullmann's views of time we discuss 
later in this work.
631. frJohn, XIII. 632. commJohn, 2, XIX.
633. commJohn, 2, XVIII. 634. commJohn, 19, XX.
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Notes to Chapter 2.
1. John Callahan, Four views o f time in Ancient Philosophy, Connecticut, 1968.
2. J.Rist, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge, 1969J p.273.
3. Cf. R. Sharpies (in collaboration with F.W. Zimmermann), "Alexander of 
Aphrodisias On Time", Phronesis, 1982.
4. fr fla tt, 487.
5. ibid. At this particular point, Origen uses the term "extension" not to denote a 
period of time, but a certain moment of it, namely the expected second advent of
Christ, according to Matt.25,31; it is also significant to note that, in this passage, 
he refers to events as occurring "in" time ( i d  e'v auiu).
6. commMatt, 15, 34.
7. commMatt, 15, 28.
8. Athenagoras, De Resurrections Mortuorum, M.6.1005. M. Spanneut regards it as 
an indication of Stoic influence; Cf. M. Spanneut, Le Sto'icisme des Peres de 1 
bglise, Paris, 1957; p.356; It is remarkable, however, that the author deems that 
the Stoic influence upon the early Christian writers does not go further than 
Clement of Alexandria.
Besides, Origen’s fundamental view on the essence of time is totally different 
from that of Philo's. For the latter clearly holds a Platonic conception of time and 
postulates that the divine life (aiuv) is "the archetype and model for time"; Quoa 
Deus fmmutabilis S it, 6.32.
9. Justinus Martyr, Philosophus, Confutatio quorundam Aristotelis dogmaticum. 
M.6.1525D ff. The points to which we refer are 1525D, 1528B-C, 1529A, 1532C, 
1533A etc.
10. deOr, XXVII, 13.
11. deOr, XXVII, 14. The same terminology, in the same context and in the same 
sense, as Origen's are echoed by John Chrysostom who speaks thus: nevie npEpag 
Eni ing otKiag kcctexeicci to npdpaiov (sc. before Passover) ... dieue SuEtai ... 
nevtE 5iaotfipaTa xpdvou SnRouiai tatg nevie xauiaig npE'paig ano A6rip pe'xpi 
auvtERdag; Inpascha 5.2; Cf. ibid. 5.1; M.59.735ff. Also: trig eniouong Tipepac -  
ouk oi6ag d  id Bidertnpa oipei; Homilia in Matt. 19.5. The same term Sidmnpc 
was also used by Fssaias Abbas in the expression avfjRuoEV ev pcttaidimi id 
Sitfaiqpa ifig npepag; Orationes, 10; M.40.1135B. Accordingly, Olympiodorus of 
Alexandria defines time thus: xpovog pdv ectii io  Sidainpa kcc9' o npaxiEiai u; 
Commentarii in Ecclesiastem, 3.1; M.93.508A.
oyu
12 . frM a tt 102 II.
13. selPs, 22.
14. Cels, IV/ 99. s. chapter 5.
15. The same preposition Sid a is used in the passage stated above, namely in the
expression Std xpovikljv Stacrznpdzujv as in deOr, XXVII/ 14. Gregory of Nyssa 
is one of the firs t in the long series (s. in fra ) of Christian writers who employed 
this terminology of Origen: Cf. n Ktioig ndocc xw xuiv gciujvujv Siaoxnpati 
napapEipEiiai. ContraEunomium J N.45.364D.
16. commMatt, 17, 24. 17. ib id
18. frM att, 221.
19. commJohn, 19, XX. 20. commJohn, 1/ XVI.
21. commJohn, 1, XVI; "the with-many-significations of the voice; id noRuanpov 
xdg (puvrig.
22. Prov.16/7. 23. I Cor. 15/25.
24. I Cor. 13/12. 25. I Cor.8/2.
26. Prov.16/7. 27. commJohn, 1/ XVI.
28. The meaning of "salvation" is discussed later in this work, notably in chapters 
4 and 5.
29. commJohn, 1, XVII.
3 0 . The term Stdtrzrjpa was widely used later, during the Arian controversy by 
both sides in the quarrel. Thus Alexander of Alexandria states that what was 
alleged by the Arians was that nponxeitai kci' auioug xrig id  oRa Bnpiouptfouang 
iou Qeou ao<p(ag ekeivo io Staompa ev u <patri jjlti x£XEvfia3ai iov uiov uno iou 
natpog; Epistula ad AJexandrum Constantinopolitanum, 6; M.18.557A. In the 
orthodox statements against the Arians, the term Stdaznpot is used so frequently, 
that it sometimes appears as almost a synonym to "time". Thus Athanasius states: 
io Rexdpevov ev iu  ... ipaRpui npog iov uiov 'fi (taaiReia aou naviwv tuv aiuvuv' 
ouk EnnpEnei uvri Kav io xuxov 6iccainpa 6iaRoxicraa9at ev ui pn umipxEV o 
Roxog. Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.12; M.26.37A.
Accordingly Basil of Caesarea states: oie ouk fiv, uig tpaiE (sc. Eunomians) i i  nv 
ekeivo io fiidoinpa; itva  auiu npocmxopiav EnivonoaiE; n pev x^P Koivri 
auvnSEia fi xpdvoig n aiwaiv anav 6idainpa unopdRREi. Adversus Eunomium, 2.13; 
M.29.596B. He also speaks about the Sabellians and Arians oi xpoviKotg Siaoinpaoi 
iou pev naipog iov uiov, iou 6e uiou io nvsupa id axiov 6iaipouai. Liber de
Spiritu sancto, 59; M.32.177B.
Quite expectedly, the term Sidainpa in this case is used by him who was most 
influenced by Origen’s thought, namely Gregory of Nyssa. We quote his statement, 
not only because the term Sidozgpa is remarkably frequently used, but also 
because here Gregory offers an account of his conception of time as an 
‘'extension":
0 npeapuiepav ifig xou uiou £ufig iqv iou naipog 6oxpaii£uv Staainpaii xivi iov 
povoxevq xou eni naviuv 8 eou naviug Su g it n j i ' io u io  5e n dnEipov ... n not 
nepaoi kcci anpdoig (pavepoig opi^dpevov. aRR' ansipov jiev emEiv ouk egcgei o ifig 
pEcdirycog Roxog n navieRug iriv iou naipog i e  Kai uiou evvoiav 6iaxpoc<pd 
Roxuj ... oukouv ... ouSepiav e£e i xwpav dnEipov e w o e iv  id Bidampa, aRRd 
nenepaapEvuj nvi Kaia naaav avaxKTiv iov povoxEvfi iou naipog Siaairiaouai ... o 
Roxog ouiog ouk e£ ai!6iou Eivai iov sni naviwv 8 eov ‘ aRR' and uvog upiopEVOU 
anpeiou ifiv apxdv EoxnKEvai KaiaaKEudaEi. o 8 e Rexw , io io u io v  e c u  ... io psia 
i i  x^vdpevov 6ia iou npdg eauiou Sidainpa opi^ Ei Kai iqv iou npounovooupevou 
unooiaaiv. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1; M.45.357D-360B.
31. commJohn, 6, LVII. For the translation of o6u as "methodically" s. L. and S., 
p.1199.
32. Cf. SVF, 11,39,31.
33. Cf. commEx. 34. commJohn, 32, III.
35. This point is discussed in chapter 5. 36. SVF,II,165,20-22.
37. Enneads, 111.7.8. We have in general followed the translation of 
A.H.Armstrong, but with some substantial changes: Thus, we translate "&idaiaoig" 
as "extension" and not as "distance" which does not mean Sidaiaoig . but 
anoaiaaig; also the expression oaov x«p means "for as long as"; Armsrtong's 
translation as "for the same space" would create confusion as he obviously means 
"space of time" just where Plotinus makes the crucial distinction between space 
and time. Also, the expression inv ing upepiag Siaaiaaiv does not mean "interval 
of rest" but "the dimension of rest" according to Plotinus' conception of time as a 
"dimension of life"; s. in fra .
38. Enneads. 111.7.10.
39. Cf. SVF 2.329-35 and 521. Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. 10.218; Cf. J.M.Rist, 
Stoic Philosophy, ch.9; Pasquale Pasquino "Le statut ontologique des incorporels", 
in Jaques Brunschvig (ed.), Las Stoiciens at leur logique, Paris, 1978.
40. Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, p.23.
41. SVF,II,166,4-10. e h  &e k q k e iv o  Rt w ie o v  and iuv npOEipnpEVUV on noRRou
8e i toioutov unovoTioEca io v  xpdvov o riRdiuv oiov 01 ano trig  I io a g  uneRapov fi 
xuiv ek xou nepmaiou noRRoi, 01 pev Kax* emvoiav qnRfjv auiov a u v ia ia v ie g  
apevnvov Kai exx to ia  xou jiii oviog’ ev xap fiv xuv nap' auxoig aaw p a iu v  o 
Xpovog, a Sri KaianEtppovniai nap’auioig ug aSpavn Kai ouk ovxa Kai e'v enivoiaig  
uipiaxapeva ijuRaig’ 01 6e' auppePnKog xng Kivnaewg Rexovieg.
42. V. Goldschmidt, op. c it, p.197.
43. J. Rist, op. cit., p.287.
44 . J.Rist, op. c it, p.283-8.
45. At this point, our analyses in the Introduction about the change of existential 
attitude during the period discussed, should be recalled.
46. I Cor.8,13.
47. expProv, 10. Aristotle had given a definition of mtfv which reads thus: "io 
xeRog io nepiexov iov xng ekccgiou £udg xpovov ... aiuv EKaaiou KEKRniai"; De 
Caelo 279a25. The comparison of the two definitions and uses of the term aitfv 
shows how admirably has Origen transformed the notion according to the conception 
of time which he himself established through the terminology introduced by him, as 
is discussed below.
48. selPs, 60.
49. In Greek the term for "noun" is "ousiastikon (ouaiaaiiKov)" which means a 
name for the "ousia" ("essence") of a thing; what Origen does here is not to use a 
noun ("ousiastikon"), that is he does not directly depict the "essence"("ousia") of 
time. Why he does so will be discussed later in this chapter.
50. Ps.2,7.
51. commJohn, 1, XXIX; Cf. the passage from homJer quoted in chapter 1,§4.
52. commMatt, 15,31.
53. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orationes, 38.8J N.36.320B. aiwv x«P ouie xpovog, ouie 
Xpovou ii  pepog ... aRR' onep npiv o xpovog ... xouio xoig a'i&ioig aiuv, io 
oupnapEKiEivopEvov xoig ouoiv.
54. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa lib ri quattuor, 2.1; M.94.861B. io iou 
aiuivog ovopa noRu&npov eon ... aiuv x&P Rexeicci ... n EKaaiou xuv av9puinuiv 
Im ' ... naRiv ... o x^wv eiwv xpovog' naRiv ... oRog o napuv p(og, Kai aiwv o 
pdRRuv, o pEia ifiv ava&iaaiv aiEREuiqiog ... naRiv ou xpovog, ouBe xpdvou u  
pdpog ... aRRa io oupnapEKiEivopEvov xoig ai'Sioig ... onsp x«P ioig uno xpdvov o 
Xpovog, xouio xoig a'iSioig eo iiv  aiuiv.
55. Origen is quite clear in defining qlljv as a "natural system" (ouoxqpa
tpuaiKov), namely a purely worldly reality, s. chapter 4.
56. commMatt, 12, 6. He refers to the "apperceptions" Oeupnpciicc) of wisdom.
57. John, 1,26. commJohn, 6, XXX.
58. We make the contrast between "time" and "space-time" only for the sake of 
the analysis; the separation is not an actual one, it cannot be an actual one, and 
the distinction between those two is but an intellectual abstraction.
59. Eph.2,2.
60. commEph, p. 403. 61. expProv, 10.
62. Eph. 1,7-8. 63. commEph\ 239,37-41.
64 . In this case ccpxn, alludes to the wisdom itself and, therefore, it has a
non-temporal meaning.
65. Here the term apxri has obviously a temporal significance, alluding to the 
begining of time.
66. s. supra.
67. This is denoted by the preposition nupd in the term nccp-ccKoflouSouv.
68. SVF,11,165,4-9. As we saw above, this is a point on which Plotinus criticizes 
the Stoics, namely because they do not define if this "parakolouthema" is "either 
later or contemporary or earlier" ( Enneads,; 111,7.10).
69. De Opiffcfo Mundi, 1,26-7: npeopuiepov 6* ano<patvEo8ai lofipav a<pifldoo<pov.
70. SVF,165,10-12.
71. There was only the verb napEKiEivu, Cf. L. and S. p.1334 and supp. 115.
72. 163 A.D. -flEpi XpEiag Moptwv: "oupnapEKiEivopEvov dflw m  prim ing
ptxxEug".
73. Meditations, 7,30: aupnapeKidveiv tfjv vdnoiv ioig asxopevoig.
74. Enneads, 111.7.13
75. Enneads, 111.7.11.
76. This actually was a problem for the Stoics, namely whether time should be 
considered as a body or not and, subsequently, whether it should be regarded as a 
"being" or not.
77. G. Florovski: Creation and Redemption, p.50.
78. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram , V. 5, PL. XXXVI, 325: "factae itaque
creaturae motibus coeperunt currere tempora; unde ante creaturum frustra tempora
requiruntur, quasi possint inveniri ante tempora tempora ... potius ergo tempora a 
creatura, quam creatura coepit a temporeJ utrumque autem ex Deo“ (Thus created 
beings begin to run <moving> into time; hence in would be in vain to search fo time 
before creation, as of it were possible to find time before time ... so it is more 
likely that time began from creation than creation from time; yet both <derive> 
from God).
Also in De Genesi contra Manichaeos, J.2. PL XXIV, 174,175; De Civitate Dei, XI, 6, 
PL xli, 321: "quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae 
aliquid aliqua motione mutaret ...?" (Who does not see that time would have never 
existed unless creation had come into existence, which by some movement could 
change something or other?) and in p.322: "procul dubio non est mundus factus in 
tempore, sed cum tempore" (There is no doubt that the world was not created in 
time, but along with time). Also in Confessiones, XI, 13, PL XXXII, 815-816 et 
passim. [Cf. P. Duhem, Le Systems du Monde, II, Paris, 1914, p.462ff.
79 . Cf. SitmiqpaiiKq n v i napaiaoEi aupnapEKiEtvEiai (sc. fi K iia if i ouaia); 
ContraEunomium, M.45.933A. Following Origen's articulation on the presence of the 
Logos in the world, he also states: tSiov ecfii xng SEoiqiog io  6ia naviuv nm v  
Kai xq (puaei xuv oviuv Kaia nav pepog aupnap£KiEiv£CF9ai; Oratio Catechetica, 
M.45.80D. Referring to the aeons as time he again sticks to Origen's own words, 
speaking of iqv  SiaaiqpaiiKfiv xuv aiuvuv napaiaaiv; Contra Eunomium, 12; 
M.45.1064A. Following Origen in the sense of "begining" (apxd) in Gen. 1.1, as 
referring to the providential creation he states that q x<*p 'apxiV naviog 
6iaaiqpaiiKou vofipaiog aRfloipiug exei; Apologia in hexaemeron, 8.; M.44.72A. 
Echoing Origen's view that God is the "cause" of creation in no sense of any 
temporal causality whatsoever, he speaks of God as a iu av  ... navxog 
SiaaiqpaiiKOU voqpaiog unspKEipEvqv; De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur, 
M.46.172C. Again he refers to the generation of the Son exactly as it was 
portrayed by Origen and uses his master's own terminology: pqSev Eivai ... o 
paxa£u xqg xou uiou npog xov naxepa auvatpEiag eupiOKexai, pq SiaaxqpaxiKov xi 
voqpa; Contra Eunomium, 4; M.45.661B.
80. Cf. onep qpiv o xpovog ... xouxo xoig ai&ioig, aiuiv, xo aupnapeKxeivopevov 
xoig ouaiv oiov xi xpovikov Kivqpa; Orationes, 38.8, M.36.320B.
81. Cf. xq eauxou ai!6idiqxi aupnapEKXEivopevqv exei iqv  naxpoxqxa; Adversus 
Eunomium,2A2'i M.29.593B; ibid, 2.13 (M.596B). Also, u&xe oRq axE&ov av8punou 
XEVEtx iqv  ek xou piaoug opxqv oupnapEKXEivai; Epistulae, 204.1; M.32.745A.
82. Cf. o 0Eog xou xpdvou ifig £ufig auxuv unEiEpsio* iva pfi etg xpdvov paKpov 
napapsvoviEg, aupnapEKieivuvxai xq KaxLa; Commentaries in isaiam, 26.16;
M.81.496ff. Here Theodoretus follows a meaning of oupnopEKieivopevov as in
Origen’s commEph. 1.8: aviUpiRonjioupEvov Ka'i oupnapEKiEivopEvov Kaia io 
SuvaiovJ (Fr. IV, p.239).
83. Cf. aupnapeKtdveiai avSpwnoig o piog ev eviauioig, ev pqaiv ... xouioig apa 
expfiv Kai qpag aupnapEKieiVEiv tag evapeioug epxaaiagJ De temperentie ei 
virtute centuriae ad Theodulum, 2.58J M.93.1529D ff.
84. The following passage is strikingly repeating Origen’s own words and was used 
by Athanasius in his attack against Arianism: Td ... Kiiopaia ... SiaaiqpaiiKqv 
apxnv iou Eivai e' x e i ... o 5 e' io u  0 eou Roxog ouk e'x u v  apxnv iou Eivai ... fiv aei; 
Orationes tres adversus Ananas, 2.57J M.26.268C. What Athanasius uses here is not 
only Origen's conception of the relation of the Father to the Son, but also Origen's 
terminology of temporal notions.
85. Cf. iq ... cmEipta oupnapEKiEivuv oou iou noSouviog iqv KivqaivJ Opuscule 
theologies et polemics, M.91.9A.
86. Cf. iq iou oupaiog qRiKia oupnapeKieiveiv id eauiouJ Scholia da 
incarnations; 13J M.75.1369ff.
87. Cf. iu  navii aiuvi oupnapEKiEivopevqv ... iqv npupiav; Homiliae in Genesim, 
27.1 OJ M.53.23ff.
88. Cf. id ... 3eia SeRqpaia ... iq Seia anEipia oupnocpeKieivdpevcc; Commentariiir 
Proverbia, 4,14J M.87.1256D.
89. Cf. aiuv ou xpovog ... aRRd io aupnapeKieivdpevov ioig ai&ioig, oidv n  
XPOVik o v  Kivqpia Kai 5iaaiqpaJ de fide orthodoxs lib ri guattuor. M.94..864. This is 
the same terminology used by Origen in commJohn, 1, XXIX.
90. SVF,II,165,20-22.
91. commJohn, 2, XIX. 92. commJohn, 2, I.
93. Princ,\ IV.4.2. 94. selPs, 54.
95. commJohn, 2, X. 96. ibid. 97. commJohn, 2, XIV.
98. selPs, 76. 99. commMatt, 15,31. 100. selPs, 60.
101. deOcYXVU, 16. Here the term attuv has a temporal meaning because it is
used in a context of mainly speaking of time; indeed, at that point of deOr, Origen
ponders upon the meaning of the term "today" as in the Lord's Prayer. Yet this 
temporal sense is not the only meaning of aiuvJ it has also a spatial meaning, 
which will be discussed in chapter 4.
102. commEph, p.403, 170- 184; s. also, 16,101, 5-8. It is important to note
that Origen uses the term "aeons (xoug aiuvag)" in the Plural whereas the 
predicate applied to that term is in the Singular, namely "creature (Kiiapa)J it is 
again obviously that the term "aeons" is used instead of "time" and this is why the 
predicate is in the Singular.
103. enarrJob, 32.
104. Meditations, VI,37; VII,U VIII,I; IX,35 and 37; X,27; XI,1; XII,26.
105. Meditations, 11,14; VII, 19; IX,28.
106. Meditations, V,13; VI,15; VII,25; IX,19; X,7.
107. Meditations, VII, 67, and cf. X,21.
108. Meditations, V,33; X,17 and 34; XII, 7 and 32.
109. commNatt, 17,33.
110. s. also Cels, V, 60; commJohn, 2, XXIV.
111. commJohn, 2, X. 112. selPs, 54.
113. commJohn, 1, XVII. 114. expProv, 16.
115. 0. Cullmann, Christ and Time, p.73.
116. The expression "contamination" appears as a favourite one to H. Puech. Cf. 
"Gnosis and Time", p.52. 0. Cullmann prefers to name Greek thought as "danger". Cf. 
chapter 4.
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120. Cels, VII, 46.
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133. Princ, IV.4.8.
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136. Princ, 111.1.23.; 111.6.6.
137. frM att, 22.
138. For the Stoic view of time as continuum, cf. SVF, 11,164,23-25.
139. SVF, 117,19J 166, 1 and 8. 140. SVF,11,117,18-23.
141. SVF,II,164,27. 142. SVF,II,164,26-30.
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144. SVF,II,165,37-43. 145. SVF,11,117,42-43.
146. J.Rist, op. c it p.280.
147. SVF,II,166,4-10.
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[SVF,117,18-233.
149. SVF,II,117,5-6.
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thought.
151. SVF,II,117,20-22. 152. SVF,11,117,40-43.
153. cels, VIII, 49. 154. expProv, 10.
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Paris, 1958J p.71.
162. Enneads, 111.7.10.
164. Enneads, 111.7.11.
166. Enneads, 111.7.13; also, 111.7.11.
168. These are not the only differences; Origen's conception of "aeon" is 
fundamentally a "natural" one (s. se/Ps, 5 and chapter 4), whereas, in Plotinus’ 
view, "aeon" is the timeless eternity. Shortly below we discuss on Plotinus’ views 
in as much as they are related to this section of our work.
169. Princ, IV.4.8. 170. Princ, IV.4.8.
171. Princ, IV.4.8.
172. What the nature and the actual contend of "end" is, will be discussed in 
chapter 5.
173. Cels, IV, 99.
174. Gregory of Nyssa faithfully follows Origen in the distinction between 
spatio-temporal reality as one "contained within dimensions" as opposed to the 
"dimensionless" divine reality (we discuss this topic later in this paragraph): xng 
awpaxiKhg Kai SiaaxnpaxiKhg (puaeug ... as opposed to ... h voepd ie Kai 
a&iaaxaxog tpuaigJ De anima et resurrectione, M.46.48B; similarly in De hominiz 
opificio, 23.3J M.44.212A. The reader should not Gregory’s use of the term voepo 
in its proper sense, as it is discussed in Appendix A.
This Gregory’s adherence to Origen’s terminology is particularly striking in Contra 
Eunomium'. auxn (sc. created being) SiaaxnpaxiKn napaxauEi aupnapEKxeivexai, 
Kai xpovu Kai xonu nEpiEipxopevn, emvn (sc. divinity) unepEKnmiEi naoav 
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nvog £ig xi in £un 6io6Euouaa; Contra Eunomium, 12; M.45.933B; ibid. 1064C.
175. homLuc, 1.
176. R. Sorabji, op. C7/V p.123. 177. ibid.
178. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1.359-64 (M.45.364); 1.370-1 
(M.45.368); 1.685-9 (M.45.461-4); 2.459 (M45.1064C-D) 8.5 (M.45.796A); 9.2 
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Gregory’s view, s. H. von Balthasar, Presence etpensee, Paris 1942, pp.1-10.
179. R. Sorabji also includes the definition of time by Basil of Caesarea among 
these "fuller" accounts. On this he obviously follows an erroneous view of J. 
Callahan, on which we discuss later in this paragraph.
180. We shall give one example of thorough ignorance of Origen's thought. In the
163. Enneads.. 111.7.11. 
165. Enneads, 111.7.11. 
167. Enneads, 111.7.11.
article "Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time", {Sturfia 
Patristics, 117 (1976), pp.199-222) B. Otis actually follows J. Callahan’s views 
of the conception of time in either Greory of Nyssa or Basil of Casarea, as 
discussed shortly below. It is strikingly obvious, however, that Otis has but a 
vague, distorted and, at any rate, indirect knowledge of Origen's thought. We shall 
not comment on the view that Origen’s thought was but a Christian version of 
Platonism; and views such as that Origen regards the Son as "creaturely" [p.332] 
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that the use of terms Sidairjpa and Sidaiamg used for time itself "first comes 
into the Christian vocabulary with Methodius’ critique of Origen" [p.336]. And he 
further notes: "The point of importance is that before the Cappadocians, Biriainpa 
is used in a negative sense (as in Methodius) ... It is not used as an essential and 
inalienable mark of all creatures. But it is clear that the importance of time is 
brought out by the abandonment of Origen’s eternal creation", [p.336, n.1] The 
reader can judge for himself how much the author of the article is ignorant 
Origen’s views. He certainly is unaware that Methodius in his "critique of Origen" 
was but using Origen’s own notions. Further, he does not know that what he calls 
"Cappadocian coneption of time" has two aspects: First, a mainly "objective" view 
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/ u z
work devoted to this topic.
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conviction about the finiteness of the world stems from his conception of prophecy 
and, in the final analysis, from his conception of time -as we discuss in chapter 3,
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/U-H
269. SVF, 11,165,39.
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276. We translate the term "aSpoug tf£vn9noo|i£vnv" as "taking place all at
once"J this expression in this meaning is also found in Aristotle, Physics186a 15.
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282. frM att, 487.
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284. Is.26,20. 285. homJer, 12, 10.
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287. commMatt, 15,31. 288. deOr, XXVII, 13.
290. SVF, 11,166,8-10; Cf. A.A. Long, "Language and thought in Stoicism" in his 
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292. op. c it, p.61.
293. Cf. J.M.E. McTaggart "The unreality of time", Mind, n.s. 17 (1908), 
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299. David Bohm, Wholeness and the implicate Order, London, 1980, pp.210-12.
300. A major difference on the question of time was that whereas Epicurus 
postulated time-atoms, the Stoics held time to be continuous and infinitely 
divisible; the convergence on ascribing to time a lower reality is due to different 
reasons as Epicurus regarded time as a mere attribute of an attribute, a mere 
appearence, a symptom accompanying things in motion; the Stoic views on the 
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301. Such was the view of Diodorous Cronus as presented by Sextus Empiricus; s. 
Adversus Mathematicos 10.85-90; 143; 347-9; also Phyrronia 2.245; 3.71. On 
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Neoplatonists Simplicius and Damascius -the head of the Neoplatonic school at 
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lamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragm entsLeiden, 
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S.Sambursky and S. Pines, The Concept o f Time in Late Neoplatonism , pp.94-99. 
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existing before all temporal things whereas it is only to the latter which is 
divisible into past, present and future. In short, lamblichus makes the distinction 
between a higher now and a lower now.
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show, nevertheless, is that the questions about time on which Origen did provide 
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321. Princ, 11.5.3.
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330. Here, especially in the expression "we think", we again find Origen's notion 
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Eusebius, "Theophan." 11,21 J Nemesius, "de Nat. Hom.38j Augustine, de Civ. Dei, 
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339. Cels, IV, 67-68.
340. Some later Stoics rejected this doctrine, notably Panaetius (Diog. Laert. 
VI 1,142J Cicero, de Nat Deor. 11,46; Diels, Dox. Gr. 469) and Boethus (Philo, de 
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of resurrection {Strom. V,9,4). Cited by H. Chadwick, op. cit, p.279, n.6.
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"The biblical view of the uniqueness of the course of the world, which is also a 
view of Persian religion, stands in antithesis to the pantheistic and astrological 
doctrine of recurrence with its confusion of God and the world, of eternity and 
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"eternal recurrence" [ ibid. ]; he just postulates this view without providing any 
reasoning for that. Our discussion in this work will show that this assumption of 
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334. FP, p.83, n.1 
336. Cels, V, 20.
342. FP, p.83, n.1.
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241. frM att, 553. 242. Pr1nc,\.2A.
243. commJohn, 10, XXXV.
244. selPs, 117. We shall give only an example so that the reader can judge
the magnitude of absurdities which have been alleged about Origen’s thought. M.
Werner regards the abandonment of Paul’s intepretation of the soteriological 
significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus as the "decisive moment in 
the process of de-eschatologizing" [ The Formation o f Christian Dogma, p.72ff]. 
His view is that within the development of the Catholic Church theology, the 
crisis reached its zenith in the persons of the Alexandrian Christians, Clement 
and Origen [op. c it, p.117]. and he goes on thus:
"In the Gnostic schools, in the gnosticising circles of the Church, and especially 
with the Alexandrian Christians, the principal break with the traditional doctrine 
of the soteriological significance of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus becomes 
clearly evident. For the inevitable reconstruction of doctrine by means of
Hellenistic religious philosophy so developed that in the new dogma the 
soteriological significance of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus, in any form, 
had no part to play.*', [op. c it, p.1193-
In view of our analyses in this paragraph we need not comment on such claims 
about Origen's thought. We assume, nevertheless, that the reader can only but 
deplore the carelessness with which certain scholars have attempted to write the 
history of development of Christian thought. This is one more point which showing 
the acute necessity of quoting and not just citing crucial passages of Origen, as 
discussed in the Introduction.
245. homLuc, 15. The same notion, namely that out of the passion and 
ressurection of Jesus an "emancipation" of souls has already taken place, is
expressed in selPs, 67: H kcu io  uipog xou oiaupou Re^ei, ev u avapdg Kai 
xoug ev aepi 6a[povag xa i xa nveupaxa irjg  novppiag a<p' tic £iXov uneprKpaviag 
K aiaandaag, id g  un' auxuv aixpaRuxiaSEioag ipuxag 6ia xuv novnpuv n p d p u v , 
kcci ano 8eou anoaxdaag, KaSdnep n v d  aixpaRuoiav ano xuv a6ou KEuSpuivuv 
avERKuoag nREuSEpuasv.
256. selPs, 76.
257. Cels, VI, 79. We endorse the criticism of H. Crouzel against R. Hanson's 
Allegory and Event, namely Hanson's failure to grasp the meaning of the 
incarnation and history in Origen. Cf. H. Crouzel, "Origene devant 1' Incarnation et 
devant V Histoire", Bulletin de Lliterature Eccle'siastique, 1960, pp.81-110.
258. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica, 32.
259. Namely the meaning of the term euccxxeRiov as "announcement of things 
gladdening him who hears them, once he has accepted that which is announced"; 
commJohn\ 1, V.
260. commJohn, 1, V; our italics.
261. Cels, II, 77. For he once (dnaO both rose again and convinced his 
disciples about his resurrection, and convinced them to such an extent that they 
show to all men by their sufferings that they are looking for eternal life and for
246. frM att, 57. 
248. frM a tt,! 1. 
250. homLuc, 15. 
252. homJer, 5, 5. 
254. Cels, III, 28.
247. commJohn, 10, XXXV. 
249. Heb.1,9. Cels, VI, 79.
251 . mm
253. Gal.5,17. 
255. frM att, 221.
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the resurrection which has been exemplified (uno6£6£ixp£vnv) before them in 
word and deed, and that they deride all the troubles of life."
262. commJohn, 10, XXXV. Why Origen calls this resurrection as "perfect" 
and what is it distinguished from, will be discussed in chapter 5.
263. commJohn, 1, VII. 264. selLev, (M.l2.397ff).
265. Cf. Cels, II, 77. 266. selLev.
267. commMatt, 15, 35. 268. commMatt, 12, 34.
269. selPs, 48.
270. Cels, II, 38; s. also Cels, IV, 38; VI, 20; commMatt, 17, 33.
271. commJohn, 10, XXV. 272. selJob, 35.
273. frM att, 135. 274. frM att, 152.
275. Luke, 16,25. excPs, 36.
276. selPs, 36. 277. selPs, 61.
278. selLev. 279. ih id
280. commJohn, 1, VII. 281. commJohn, 1, VIII.
282. ib id . 283. selEz, 17; s. also chapter 5.
284. Gen.6,13ff. commJohn, 20, IV.
285. Princ, 111.5.3. 286. Cels, V, 59.
287. Princ, 111.6.8. Here is one more proof for our remark in chapter 1, 
according to which the statements in Princ, III.5.2-4 are but interpolations of 
Rufinus. Whereas at that point is stated that the narration in Genesis does not 
indicate the very beginning of creation, but only the creation of the present 
world, in Princ, 111.6.8 it is asserted that this narration is "referring to the 
beginning of the entire creation". Thus there is a gross contradiction into the 
same work and, indeed, into the same Book (the Third) of this work. Origen was
not the kind of thinker to contradict himself -least of all so grossly and in the
same work. Rufinus made his Interpolations which have rendered a text in which 
certainly this discrepancy is not the only one.
288. commJohn, 13, XLVI; 13, XLVIII. 289. expProv, 19.
290. selEz, 6. 291. frM att, 5.
292. Cf. Heb.4,9. 293. Deut. 16,16.
294. deOr, XXVII, 16. 295. Gal.4,10.
296. Heb. 10,1. 297. Ex. 12: 2,3,6,15,18.
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298. Heb.10,1. 
300. James,2,23. 
302. Lev.16,29ff.
299. Hos.14,9. 
301. Deut. 16,9. 
303. Lev.23:24,27.
304. Cf.l Cor. 2,16.
305. Cf. Ex.21,2; Lev.25: 4-7, 10-17; Deut. 15: 1-3.
306. Cf. Lev.25:8 ff; 27:17 ff.
307. Rom.11,33. deOr, XXVll, 14. Without reflecting on Origen's conception 
of time at all, J. Daniel ou has considered this passage out of its context and 
alleged that "the totality of Time" in Origen is consisted of “the jubilee of 
aeonian years" and he thinks that in this, too, he has been "anticipated by the 
Gnostics."; Cf. Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture; tr. J.A.Baker, London, 
1973; p.496. We made a hint about this in chapter 2,§2. In view of our analyses 
here it is obvious that Daniel ou was entirely unaware of Origen’s conception of 
time. Anyway, Origens speaks allegorically of "week of aeons" and "month of
aeons" and "year of aeons" also in deOr, XXVII, 16 and in commMatt, 15,31.
308. commMatt, 15, 31. 309. ib id
310. Cels, V, 59. 311. selGen (M .l2 .92ff).
312. Cels, IV, 59. 313. Phnc, 11.3.6.
314. Cels, VI, 60 and 61. 315. homJer, 16,9.
316. Cels, IV, 31.
317. frM att, 383; a similar view is found in frM att, 4.
318. Cf. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, tr. J. Moreau from the 
German 2nd edition with revisions to 1960, pp. 125-6; Quite rightly Boman argues 
that "Cullmann is wrong if  he thinks that the difference between the biblical and 
Greek conceptions of time consists in the fact the biblical time is linear and the 
Greek cyclic ... our grammatical tense -or time- conception is always v/hat 
Cullmann designates by the misleading expression linear\ while objective, 
astronomical time is always cyclic."; (op. cit., p.162.).
319. Cf. J. Marsh, The Fulness of Time, London, 1952; pp.176ff.
320. 0. Cullmann, Christ and Time, p.67.
321. s. homJer, 9,1; selLev; commGen, 3; and passim
322. Cels, II, 16; IV, 19; commJohn\ 10, VI; Cf. also, Princ, I.Pref.4; 
"And this Jesus Christ was born and suffered in truth and not merely in
735
appeearance, and truly died our common death."; Cf. also Princ\ 11.6.3.
323. Cels, VI, 78 and 79.
324. homJer, 14,6.
325. Origen rejects what he calls "the mythology about aeons" (xriv nepi xwv 
aiuvwv puSonouav) ( commMatt, 17, 33) obviously alluding to the tales of the 
Gnostics and explicitly rebuking them in other cases; s. also, Cels, V, 61; 
commJohn, 2, XXIV.
326. 0. Cullmann, op. c it, p.68.
327. Cf. Gen.49,10.
328. Cf. Rom. 1,3. frJ o h n LVill -commenting on John,4,22, "for salvation is 
of the Jews".
329. E. de Faye, "De V Influence du Gnosticisme chez Origene", Revue de 1 
Histoire des Religions, H, (1957), p.222.
330. A. Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Vol.I (Tubigen, 5th ed., 1931), 
pp.250; 253, n.1; 266; 267; 269. F.C. Burkitt, Church and Gnosis (Cambridge, 
1932); H.H. Schaeder, "Bardesanes von Edessa", Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, 
LI (1932). As Harnack points out (Vol. I, p.250, n.1), the conception of Gnosticism 
as "the acute secularization, or Hellenization of Christianity" goes back to Franz 
Over beck, Studien zur Geschichte der alten Kirche (Chemnitz, 1875), p. 184. 
Cited in H.C. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", p.56, n.21.
331. Socrates, Historia Ecclesiastics, 1,22,8.
332. Jerome, EpAv, 12; cited in FP, p.309, n.7.
333. Cf. Gal.3,24.
334. Cf. Rev. 14,6; Heb. 9,15: 12,24: 8,13. Princ, 111.6.8.
335. Cf. Phil.2,7. 336. Cf. Matt. 16,27.
337. Cf. Rev. 14,6. 338. Cf. Heb. 10,1.
339. Lament. 4,20. 340. P rinc, IV.3.13.
341. commJohn, 1, XXXV. 342. Heb.2,9.
343. commJohn, 1, XXXV. 344. homLuc, 10.
345. Cf. Eph.4,9. 346. commJohn, 19, XX.
347. commJohn, 13, XXXVI —XXXV11; s. also frJohn, XC. This affirmation 
needs particular attention, because there are many misunderstandings surrounding
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Origen's thought on this point. He devotes a whole paragraph in commJohn in 
order to make clear that the Jesus' saying "To finish his work" [John, 4,34] does 
not imply that what was made by God in the beginning was "imperfect". For "it is 
absurd to say that the Father has been a creator of something imperfect, and the 
saviour has made perfect the imperfect, because it was made imperfect" 
[commJohn, 13,XKXVI-XXXVI 13. That saying of Jesus denotes a "deeper mystery" on 
which Origen makes a few suggestions further on. Thus, assertions that Origen 
held that the creatures created by God were "incomplete" are totally wrong. This 
mistake is usually combined with the erroneus presupposition that Origen held a 
"doctrine of eternal creation".
As an example we adduce here the following allegation of R. Norris: "To be a 
creature, then is to be 'originate', and in this sense generate. But this implies, as 
we have seen, something further about the character or nature of creatures. It 
suggests that they must be regarded as in themselves incomplete -eternally 
unfinished and eternally created." (op. c it., p.151). Such views are are but an 
utterly gross distortion of Origen’s real views. In fact they have nothing to do
with Origen's thought. In his obsession with attributing Neoplatonic views to
Origen, R. Norris is entirely unaware of the fact that he attributes to Origen 
exactly the opposite views of those that he really held. This serious mistake is 
directly related to Norris' assertion (s. chapter 1, §4) that the affirmation about 
creatures having a "beginning" implies that the relation of creatures to the Father 
is the same to the relation of the Logos to the Father (op. c it, p.151)J the only 
difference is that the Logos is perfect whereas the creatures are "eternally 
unfinished" as they are "eternally created" in like a manner that the Son is 
"eternally generated" by the Father. The distortion of Origen’s views is serious 
indeed.
348. commMatt, 17, 19. 349. commJohn, 1, VII.
350. commJohn, 1, VIII. 351. ibid.
352. commMatt, 16, 22. 353. commJohn, 6, IV.
354. Cels, III, 38; IV, 69; VI, 79.
355. commMatt, 16, 23. Thus "soul is by nature a holy place of God" because
"there is a holy remnant in our soul", s. also selPs, 45; commMatt, 16,23;
ft" 1-71 Jer, XXII; commJohn, 10, XXIV. What is characteristic here is that 
Origen again states his view that "salvation" out of the incarnation of Christ 
pertains not only to the "soul", but also to "more" (nReiovuv), alludings to the 
beings of the other ranks of life, and that the "service to God" takes place
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according to "heavenly and spiritual laws" alluding to the notion of "eternal 
gospel".
356. commMatt, 16, 23; 16, 24. 357. Cf. commJohn, 32, III.
358. Quoting I Tim. 2,8. Cels, VII, 44.
359. commMatt, 10, 2. 360. commMatt, 16, 20.
361. commMatt, 16, 21; s. also commJohn, 6, LIX.
362. commJohn, 6, LIX; s. also selPs, 23.
363. Cels, VII, 36; commJohn, 2, XVII.
364. frl-7 1 J e r, XXII.
365. Cf. Cels, IV, 21 and Cels, VI,71. 366. commJohn, 20, XII.
367. Fragment 30 KoetschauJ libOr, Mansi IX.532. In Princ, IV.3.13. A similar 
passage is found in Jerome, EpAv, 12.
368. See also Theophilus Alex. "Ep. synod 4 (Jerome, epAv, 92) and "Ep. pasch. 
1.10,11 (Jerome, epAv, 96)". Cited in FP, p.310, n.3.
369. Using the phraseology of Heb.6,4-6.
3 7 0 . Gal.2,19. The phrase "I will be crucified from above" (dvuSsv peRRw 
oiaupouoSai) is not a scriptural one. It is supposed to have been uttered by Jesus 
and is stated in a work entitled "Acts of Paul", as Origen himself explains at this 
point of commJohn. This is why Origen is not categorical on that this phrase has 
actually been said by Jesus. His diffidence on the point is obvious and this is why 
he speaks about those who "want to accept" that this "has been said by the 
saviour", (et xu 6e (piRov napa6e£aa8ai xo ev xcdg nauRou flpctleoiv 
avaxEXPappevov wc uno xou auxripoc eipnpEvov*). He does not take the view that 
this has actually been said by Jesus. The point which Origen wants to make, 
however, is exactly the opposite of that of which Justinian and Jerome accused 
him: Even if  this phrase has really been said by Jesus, this by no means puts the 
uniqueness of Incarnation in question. For the point which Origen makes perfectly 
clear is that in no case another "crucifixion" of Christ means another incarnation.
371. Gal.2,20. 372. Cf. Rom.6,4.
373. commJohn, 20, XII.
3 7 4 . Jerome, Apology, I.20J cited in FP, p.88, n.4.
375. homJer, 14,6. 376. homJer, 14, 7.
377. Col. 1,18.
378. Cels, VI, 79; s. also §2 in this chapter where we discuss how Origen
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understands the "mysteryx (commJohn, 10,XXXV) of passion and resurrection 
a fte r the resurection of Jesus until the final resurrection.
391. deOr, X, 2.
392. frM att, 484. Oi xctp xou auxripog Roxoi aei xa oikeicc evEpxhaouotv ug 
xeReioi kcci ouk £ni5£xo}i£voi peRxtoug X£V£G3ai napeRaovieg o eicriv. aRR’ ’o 
oupavog pev kcu t\ xn nansREuaoviai, oi 5e Roxoi ccuxou pevoucri’, Roxoi ovxeg 
xou 6i‘ ou xa navxcc exevexo .
393. expProv, 6.
394. Jerome, epAv, 12J cited in FP, p.309, n.7.
395. L. and S., p.21. 396. frM att, 38 I and 38 II.
397. s. selPs, 48: TsRog &e vodoeig xov peRRovxa aiuva, ooxig eoxi xeRog xou 
napovxog. (As end you should understand the future aeon which is the end of the 
present one.).
398. Dan. (Sus.), 42.
399. commMatt, 13, 1. In this passage one can see that, in Origen’s view, 
prophecy pertains chiefly to the eschatological perspectives of the world (see 
§2 in this chapter), namely to the final goal of free moral action as well as to 
the end of the world itself. If Origen held a just short-sighted conception of 
prophecy, then a notion of infinity of the world would not render prophecy 
impossible; but in that case prophecy would be just a prediction uttered at one 
time and realized at a future moment; such a prediction would make no difference 
from Greek oracles or other pagan predictions. Even those prophecies of Jewish 
prophets concerning their historical perspectives at a certain time, are not just 
predictions of historical events but they are understood as placed in the whole 
process of acting in dialectical relation to the will of God. As we discuss further 
in this paragraph, Origen strongly rejects those pagan oracles. What the passage 
above shows is that it is mainly on the ground of the eschatological direction o i 
the world in time that he draws a clear line between biblical prophecy and pagan 
oracles. Thus the notion of prophecy is understood as a decisive factor in the
379. Matt.27,17-18.
381. frJohn, XIX.
383. homJer, 14, 7-8.
385. Is.50,6.
387. Cf. II Cor. 12,9.
389. commJohn, 20, XXXVII.
384. homJer, 14, 17. 
386. homJer, 19, 13. 
388. I Cor. 1,24.
390. homJer, 15, 3.
380. Cels, Pref., II.
382. I Cor. 15,49.
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establishment of a philosophy of history pertaining to the perspectives of the 
entire world.
400. R. Sorabji, Time\ Creation and the Continuum, p.198; his italics. As regards 
our topic, R. Sorabji makes two fundamental mistakes throughout the 
above-mentioned work. First, he attributes views of Origen to Gregory of Nyssa, 
as appearing for the first time, and is unaware of the fact that Gregory just 
echoes the views of Origen. In one particular case he postulates such views of 
Gregory as an "answer" to Origen (op. c it, p. 151J his italics) Secondly, Sorabji 
is unaware of the fact that the fundamental conceptions of time and divine being 
(as well as the terminology used) in Philoponus, again, are but mere (yet not 
always perfect) repetitions of Origen's views. We discuss these assertions of 
Sorabji's in due course in this work.
401. commGen, 3. 402. Princ\ 111.5.1.
407. R. Hanson, Allegory and event, London, 1959; pp.364ff.
408. H. Koch, Pronoia undPaideusis, Leipsig, Berlin, 1932; pp.89ff.
409. J. Danielou, Origen; tr. W. Mitchell, London, 1955; p.312.
41 0 . H. de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit: L ‘ intelligence de V Ecriture d‘ apres 
Origins. Paris, 1950; p.70.
41 1 . M. Harl, Origene et la fonction revelatrice du Verbe IncarneJ Paris, 1958; 
p.353.
412. ^ //^ (in trod uctory  text, loc. c it.). Cf. §2 in this chapter.
413. commJohn, 1, VI; s. also Princ\ III.1.16.
4 1 4 . Cf. Exod.7,8. Cels, II, 50; our italics.
4 1 5 . Cels, II, 52; our italics.
416. s. also Cels, 111,25; IV,96. 417. Cels, VI, 10.
418. Cels, III, 3. 419. Cf.Wis. 7,27. Cels, IV, 3.
420. selDeut.
421. Princ, IV.2.7; xoug 6iaKovoug xfig tfRr)8dag, npotprixag k c u  anoaxoRoug.
422. Cels, VI, 45.
423. Cf. Joshua 13,22. 424. frJohn, LXXXV.
425. selNum, (commenting on Num.24,7).
40 3 . Cels, IV, 79. 
405. frM att, 21.
404. Cels, IV, 9. 
406. frM att, 57.
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426. commJohn, 1/VI; 16, 335,29ff.
427. commJohn, 1, VI; s. also homJer, 1,3.
428. Cels, VII, 4.
429. That is, Zeus: Homer, ll/as, 15,234-5. Cels, V II, 6.
430. This affirmation is quite frequently found in Origen's works. Cf. exhMar,
XXXII; Cels, IV, 29; V II, 4; Also, R.P. Lawson, OrigemThe Song o f Songs, 
Commentary and Homilies, p.35J etc. The scriptural authority, to which Origen 
appeals, is the passage in Psalms, 95,5.
431. Numb.23,23. 432. frl-7 /J e r, XLIX.
433. Cels, VII, 7. 434. homJer, 15, 1.
435. commJohn, 1, VI. 436. homJer, 1,3.
437. Jer. 18: 8,10. homJer, 18,5. 438. selEz, 2.
439. commGen, 3. 440. ibid.
441. f r  1-71 Jer, XLIX.
4 4 2  selDeut. our italics. EnaSfi o pev 8sog iriv 5uvapiv anEKaRuniEv' o Be 
npoipTTuie if i Eautou xflwaon ekexptiio  npog napaaiaaiv iwv BeBtiRujpevuv . 
Ktvnaig ouv Rexeicu  ri npotpniiKri (puvri, ota napiaiuaa id  uno 8 eou Eipnpeva. 
(commenting on Deut. 1,3).
443. Cf. Princ, 1.2.2. 4 4 4  Princ, IV.4.8.
445. Princ, 111.3.3. 446. commJohn, 10, XXXV.
447. Cels, V, 51. 448. Cels, II, 77.
449. Princ, 111.5.5. 450. commJohn, 20, XIII.
451. O.Cullmann, Christ and Time, p.55ff.
452. frLuc, 34.
453. Princ, 111.1.14. Aneipoi xap flpdv, wg av etnoi n g , at ipuxat, Kat aneipa 
id  io u iu v  ii8n, Kat nRstaxa oaa Kivdpaxa Kat at npoSEOEig Kat at EniPoRat Kat 
at oppat' uv Etg povog oiKovopog apiaxog, Kat xoug Kaipoug EmaiapEvog Kat xa 
appo^ovxa ponSfjpaia Kat xag axwxag Kat lag  oBoug, o i ij v  oRwv Seog Kat 
nairjp...
4 5 4 .  commMatt, 17, 9. Tou &£andtou 6e £a ii <povou> Kat irig 3£tag EniaxripTig 
auxou id EiBevai xov EKaaiou xuv avSpumuv Kaipov, noiE Kat noiE
noppu Eaitv o Kaipog xuiv Kapnuiv.
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455. Cels, III, 38.
456. Jerome, epAv, 9; cited in FP, p.240, n.3.
457. Jerome, epAv, 9J loc. c it, p.241, n.6.
458. Cf. Heb. 1,14. 459. commGen\ 3. 460. ib id
461. commJohn, 13, L. 462. commGen, 3.
463. commMatt, 17, 9. s. also, frJohn, LXI.
464. Cels, IV, 69. 465. commEx; our italics.
466. commJohn, 1, VII. At that point Origen refers to the incarnation of 
Christ, stating that this took place at that time and not before because he was 
waiting for the appropriate preparation to take place so that the people who 
would live thereafter could be able to apprehend that he was the Logos of God 
who was incarnated into history.
467. commJohn, 13, XLVIII. 468. ib id
469. Princ, III.1.14. 470. Cels, VI, 79.
471. homJer, 18, 5. 472. Cels, VI, 45.
473. Cels, II, 3. 474. deOr, II. 1.
475. homJer, 1, 3.
476. commMatt, 17, 6 -quoting Matt.21,33-43.
477. commJohn, 13, XLVI -quoting John 4,36.
478. Cf. John, 1,14. 479. homJer, 18, 5.
480. Cf. Cels, VI, 79. 481. commJohn, 1, VI.
482. commJohn, 13, XLVI -using the phraseology of I Peter, 1, 20.
483. Cels, VI, 46. 484. Cels, II, 10; also in Cels, I, 61.
485. Cels, V, 19. The term EKriotu should be rendered as "for every one" and 
not "for each man" as H. Chadwick translates (op. c it, p.278). Here again 
Chadwick renders the as if  Origen held the divine-creaturely relation in terms of 
God-man and not God-rational creatures; and this, against what is stated in the 
original text of Cels itself.
486. commJohn, 13, XXXII. 487. deOr, II, 1.
488. commJohn, 32, III. 489. Eccl.3,1.
490. Eecl.3,5. 491. Heb.6,1.
492. commMatt, 10,10.
4 9 3  As we argue in this paragraph, the notion of kairos refers not only to 
human beings but also to beings of ranks of life  either higher or lower than the 
human one. Angels, for instance, act in time and at the appropriate "kairoi" by 
"reading" the "book of God", that is the positions of the heavenly bodies, and 
perceiving when they should carry out a certain task vis-a-vis human beings.
494. Princ, IV.2.7. 495. enarrJob\ 27.
496. enarrJob\ 32. 497. Using a phraseology as in I Cor.4,1.
498. commJohn, 20, II.
499. commJohn, 1, VIII. In Greek, the term for "beautiful" is oreos (upaiog) 
and this term is directly derived from a notion of time. For oreos is what is "in
its ora (ujpctJ hour)" and, since it is in its ora; it is orimon (wpipovJ mature).
Departing from the observation of nature, namely fruits, in Greek the terms for 
"beautiful" (tfreos; upaiog ) and "mature" (tfrimosj upipog) come directly from 
the term "hour" (o ra J upa). What is "in its hour" is "mature" and therefore it is 
"beautiful". Thus it is very understandable that, in the above-mentioned 
expression, Origen, who had a very good command of the Greek language, directly 
relates the term "beautiful" to what is "done at the appropriate kairos".
500. commMatt, 16, 1. 501. ib id  502. Matt. 10,23.
503. Cels, I, 65. 504. Phil.3,8.
505. Cf. Heb. 10,1. Cels, 1,2. The same notion of "more opportune time" Origen
uses in commMatt, on the same subject as above, namely quoting Matt.16,20J S. 
commMatt, 12, 17.
506. Quoting Matt. 14,15. 507. commMatt, 11,1.
508. commMatt, 16,1. 509. deO r,\!\,A .
51 0 . selJud, -quoting Ps. 74,3. (M.12.949).
511. selPs, 1 -quoting Ps.1,3.
51 2 . Cant, 4; Cf. chapter 4. 5 1 3 . commMatt, 15, 34.
514. commMatt, 15,35. 515. ib id
516. commMatt, 15, 35. In this passage we can also find Origen’s conviction 
that faith and life  in church may produce an existential realization of future in 
the present. Thus he allegorically regards "day" as a man’s lifetime (commMatt 
15, 36); in that case "vineyard" is the "church of God" (commMatt 15, 37)J 
nevertheless it is the allegorical method itself which allows Origen at another 
point to regard "day" as the whole of time (commMatt, 15,31) and "vineyard" as
the kingdom of God, namely the actual eschatological reality, as the final goal 
and perspective of striving in time ( commMatt 15, 35).
517. deOr, XXVII, 16; s. also commMatt, 15,31.
518. deOr, XXVII, 16.
519. In Plato the word for "place" -xupot) actually means "space" ( horos 
-Xwpoc)J at any rate, the root of the Greek words for both "place" and "space" is 
the same.
520. commJohn, 13, XIII, using the language of Gal.4,4.
521. Cf. frJohn\ LXXX. 522. commJohn, 20 XIII.
523. Cullmann, op. c it, p.58.
524. J. Marsh, The Fulness o f Time, London, 1952J pp.175-6.
525. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", p.46.
526. Nevertheless i t  is another question whether or not, in such a case, one may 
speak of "cyclical time" in itse lf. For it  is one thing to speak of "cyclical" or 
"anacyclological" view of time; but to speak of "cyclical time" is quite another. 
W. Kneale has asserted that temporal order is not cyclical; Cf. "Time and Eternity
in Theology", Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society, LXI (1960-1), pp.91-2. 
A major d ifficu lty is to distinguish time from change. Pythagoreans held that it  
is possible to speak of "cyclic time" [Eudemus apud Simplicius, in Aristotelis 
Physicorum Commentaria, 732, 30 (DK58B34) quoted by G. Kirk and J. Ravin in 
The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), §272. It is due to this 
Pythagorean view that Origen rebukes them by name [s. ch.3,§1]. J. Lucas 
develops an arguments according to which there is no cyclic time: If  time really 
were cyclic, there would be no recurrence of events, he argues. For when events 
A?-cur, they actually re-peat themselves; his conclusion is that "cyclic time is 
static time, and static time is no time" [J. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, 
London, 1976, p.57-60]. s. further H. Reichenbach, Space and Time, New York, 
1957, ch.ll, §21, pp. 141-3; M. Cleugh, Time, London, 1937, p.225; G. Whitrow, Tht 
Natural Philosophy o f Time, Edinburgh, 1961, pp. 40-1 and 259-60. In a more 
Mathematical way the problem is treated by T. Chapman, Time: A Philosophical 
Analysis, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1982, pp.62-85. Similarly, A. Grunbaum, "The 
Status of Temporal Becoming", The Philosophy o f Time, ed. R. Gale, New York, 
1967, pp.322-353; by the same author, "The Nature of Time", in the Frontiers ot 
Science and Philosophy, ed. R. Colodny, London, 1964, pp.147-88; H. Mehlberg, 
"Philosophical Laws of Physical Time", The Monist, January 1969, vol.53, n.1, 
pp.340-84, p.363. We have already pointed out that the notion of "cyclical time"
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does not render anyone of the Greek conceptions of it. On this point v/e can 
endorse J. Lucas' arguments.
528. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", pp.52-3.
529. J. Daniel ou, Origins., (Paris, 1948), pp. 137-98 and Sacramentum fu tu ri 
Etudes sur les engines de la typologie bihligue, (Paris, 1950).
530. H. de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit: L ' intelligence de V Ecriture d ' apres 
Origene, (Paris, 1950), pp. 267-94.
531. in this sense, space is certainly continuous, as time is continuous in itse lf 
and, therefore, the whole of space-time is continuous, too.
Motes to  C h a p te r 4.
1. Princ A 1.3.6. 2. Princ, i 1.3.6.
4. excPs, 17. it is then obvious that the reference in the Princ about "seven 
heavens" has been largely modified ( i f  not entirely interpolated) by Rufinus.
12. Princ, i!.3.6.At this point, i t  is obvious that Rufinus has confused Origen's 
authentic conception of the v/orld in itse lf as well as its relation to the divine 
reality. Although the Greek passages demonstrate that Origen draws a clear and 
decisive line between the world and the transcendent God, at this point Rufinus 
presents Origen as rather uncertain about this radical hiatus between God and the 
world. This is a misleading rendering of Origen's thought, as there is abundance 
of passages in Greek where Origen explicitly enunciates his views on the subject. 
This particular point of the Princ may well be elucidated by Origen's views as 
stated in comm John (19, XX), where the radical transcendence of divine reality 
to the world is clearly enunciated.
13. s. Gen. 1,10; also On Psalms Homilias, 2,4.
14. Cited in FP, p.91, n.6, from On Psalm. Horn. M.4.
527. Cf. commJohn, 1,XXV; 1,XXVI; Cels, IV,30; IV,74; deOr, VI,1;
commMatt, 10,11; set Job, 35; Princ, 11.1.1.; II .9.3.; 111.1.1.
3. Cels, VI, 21; VI, 23.
5. commJohn, 1, XXXI.
7. Gen.28,12-13.
6. commJohn, 19, XXI
8. Cels, VI, 21.
10. Luke, 10,20. 11. Matt.5,4.
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15. Gen. 1,1.
16. Princ\ 111.6.8. Cf. Deut.4,38J Ps. 37.11 j Matt.5,4.: Heb. 4,9. This is one more 
poin in Princ shoving Rufinus' ignorance of Origen's eschatological views. Here 
he has confused the notion of eternal life  (as a kind of "end"J s. in fra ) with the 
conception of the absolute end (which v/ill be discussed in chapter 5). Hence this 
paragraph begins with reference to "the consummation of all things" (namely, the 
absolute end) and continues v/ith descriptions applying to eternal life  - which is a 
different conception, as we shall see shortly below. It is not surprising that 
many scholars assert that Origen’s eschatology is "notoriously" obscure (Cf. P. 
PI ass. loc. cit. ). Once the study of Origen's thought is confined into the 
contradictory text of the Latin rendering of Princ such a conclusion is 
inevitable. However, in this chapter, as well as in chapter 5, we shall show that 
Origen held crystal clear eschatological ideas.
17. Princ, 11.3.6. 18. ! I Cor.4,18; 5,1. 19. Ps. 8, 4.
20. Is.65,2. 21. Princ, 11.3.6. 22. Matt.5:5,3.
23. Ps.37,34. 24. Princ, 11.3.7.
25. Cf. Luke 17,21, s. frM att, 74. * 26. Princ, 11.3.7.
27. frMatt, 38 II; also frM att, 15.
28. frMatt, 15. 29. frM att, 74.
30. frM att, 75; s. also commMatt, 10,14; 12,14; homJer, 14,17; 
selPs, 9; deOr, XXV, 1-3.
31. selPs, 142. The notion of "contemplation" with respect to eternal life  is 
discussed in the §2 in this chapter.
32. s. Matt.3,2; 4,17. 33. s, Luke 6,20; John 3:3,5.
34. frJohn, XXXVI. 35. selDeut, (commenting on Deut. 8, 7).
36. ibid. 37. homJer, 14, 17.
38. Cf.ls.66, 52. commMatt, 17, 33.
39. commMatt, 17,33. 40. Cels, VII, 31.
41. Cf. homLuc, 15. u5e &o£a, ekei cmoKctRuijJig.
42. deOr, XXIII, 4. 43. Dial, (BGF, p.379).
44. Cels, VI, 69. This expression is reminiscent of Plato, Phaedrus 247C -and 
Origen is aware of that, as himeself points out in 10,74,13ft". Cf. also Republic 
582C, Aristotle Physics 209b20. The distinction of Origen's conception of eternal
l i fe  from  the Greek thought is discussed la te r in this chapter.
45. commJohn, 19, XX. 
47. Princ, 11.3.7.
45. commJohn, 19, XXII.
40. selPs, 14; our italics.
49. Phil.3,14. se/Ps, 23; our italics. 50. ibid.
51. Cf. Ps.26,13. frMatt, ^2. 52. Cels, VI, 44.
54. Cels, VI, 59.
55. Quoting Ps.26,5. 
57. selPs, 23.
59. Princ, 11.3.7.
60. CommJohn, 13, XLVI. x o u  a y E i p o y e v o u  6 e c u  eiq e v  ndviag t e R o q
ouvd^oviog.
61. commJohn, 13, XLV III.
62. Ps.48,10. We discuss the actual meaning of this "knowledge" later in this 
chapter.
63. selPs, 48.
64. selPs, 48; Here Origen im plicitly refers to the Aristotelian view and 
rejects it. s. also frM att, 383.
74. Cels, V, 24. H. Chadwick’s translation of "aiuviov" as "everlasting" (op. 
c it, p.282) is not correct. Here Origen alludes to the character of eternal life  as 
a different particular "space" of the world. In Cels, VII, 28, he uses the same 
word, namely Pioiriv as found in Homer (Odyssea, IV,563-5), in order to indicate 
the spatio-temporal character of this particular world.
75. Cels, VI, 59.
76. The translation of the term npook'mpog as "temporal" by H. Chadwick (op.
c it, p.332) is not correct; for npdoKmpog does not denote the category of just
"being in time" and thus being "temporal", but it  means "to last for a time" and
thus to be "temporary" and therefore "transient". This sense of nponkmpog has
65. Eccl.12,14. 
67. selPs, 4.
66. selPs, 139. 
68. selPs, 118.
69. frMatt, 583; commMatt, 1 4 ,5 . 70. commJohn, 13, XLIX.
71. s. commMatt, 12, 26; selPs, 41.
72. selPs, 23. 73. frM att, 233.
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remained unchanged throughout the centuries and it  is exactly in this sense that it  
is currently used in Modern Greek. Beyond that, H.G.Liddell and R. Scott in their 
Greek-EngJish Lexicon (p.1515) provide this correct translation of npdoKmpog 
and cite relevant passages from ancient writings in Greek. It is quite remarkable 
that, among those citations, the above stated passage of Paul's is adduced as an 
example where the term npdoKonpog means "lasting for a time" and thus 
"temporary".
77. II Cor.4: 17-18.
78. The translation of H. Chadwick here may lead to serious misunderstandings of 
Origen's thought with respect to questions directly related to our topic and 
already discussed in the previous chapters. Thus H. Chadwick uses the terms 
"sensible world" and "intelligible world", although Origen himself nowhere uses
the term "v/orld" whatsoever. This certainly is not incidental and we already have
discussed how cautious Origen is in using his language. What we have here is the 
distinction between the notions of "sensible", "not seen" and "invisible", as 
discussed in chapter 1. A painstakining reading of the passage shows the 
consistency of Origen in his view that what is "invisible" (that is, incorporeal) is 
"not seen" -but what is "not seen” is not necessarily "invisible". H. Chadwick's 
translation might well lead to the seriously misleading conclusion that Origen 
holds a notion of dualism between "sensible world" and "intelligible world". As 
we discussed in chapter 1, such a notion is absolutely alien to Origen’s thought.
79. Heb.4,14.
80. John, 14,3. 81. Cf. Plato, PPeedrus, 247B.
82. John,4,14. 83. John,7,38; Ps.148/4.
84. Plato, PhaedruSj 247C.
85. Rom. 1,20. Apart from our dissent from the translation of npdcKctipog and 
one or two other points, the translation of this passage is from H. Chadwick’s 
Origen, Cotnra Celsum. We regard the expression "invisible things" [of God] as 
inaccurate. In the Greek text of the Epistle of Paul there is no word for "things" 
whatsoever. There is only the term id  odpaza (the invisible) without any noun 
at all. We understand that modern tranlations have adopted the term "attributes" 
instead of "things". However, we regard this as unsatisfactory, too, particularly 
because it  could create misunderstandings with respect to Origen's conception of 
God Himself as well as His relation to creation. Hence at this point we just keep 
H. Chadwick's translation, although with reluctance and being conscious of the 
arguments that this rendering may raise -and indeed raises.
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86. I Cor. 8: 12,10. Cels, VI, 19-20.
87. Vis.9,15.
88. Cf. Ps. 18,8; Eph.1.18. exhMar, XLVI I. This statement should be considered 
within its context. Origen wrote the exhMar as a consolation and support of the 
morale for his friend Ambrose, at a time when the latter was persecuted and 
Imprisoned for his faith. In his tendency to console and boost his friend 
psychologically, Origen appears to devalue the body. However, as we discuss 
later, his view is not as simple as it  appears here. The body plays a crucial role 
(indeed as significant as that of the soul ) in the process towards the 
eschatological perspectives of human beings, s. infra.
89. s. also selPs, 8; selPs, 22; expPror 14.
90. selPs, 142.
91. commMatt, 12, 36-43.
92. Origen expounds this view in seJPs, 22.
93. frJohn, XIII; exhMar, XIII; deOr, I; XVI 1,1; On human corporeality, s. 
Cels, II,65; II,66; V I,17; V II,62; commMatt, 12,6.
94. D ial (BGF, p.379).
95. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, p.151.
96. This mistake again stems from the fact that Sorabji uses the Princ as his 
main source, not only there but throughout his book. Henceforth any 
miscomprehension of Origen’s thought is subsequent to this original mistake.
97. commJohn, 2, XVIII.
98. commJohn,!, XXVIII. 99. commJohn, 13, Ml.
100. R. Sorabji, op. c it, p. 150-1. 101. op. c it, p.15U his italics.
102. Cels, VII, 62. This affirmation of Origen should be understood in the 
context of his views of God Himself, as discussed in chapter 1J that is, when God 
"manifests" Himself he does not appear as he really is but he appears according 
to his oiKovojiict, so that he can be comprehended by creatures.
103. expProv, 24; ev &e iui peRriovii <aiuvi> n napd xou Kupiou Siavopri.
104. s. also commJohn, 13, XVIII; 19, XIV; enarrJob, 39.
105. I Cor. 13,12; s. commJohn\ 13, XVIII.
106. Cf.l Cor. 13,9.
107. It is quite remarkable that Origen does not say "in the aeon to come" but "in
the aeons to come", which means that "ascending" to eternal life  will occur in 
the indefinite future, as a result of free moral action of rational creatures.
108. I Cor. 13,10.
109. i John,3,2.
110. frJohn, X. Cf. our discussion in chapter 1, §1, that Origen holds a notion 
of God in Himself.
111. Cels, VI, 19.
112. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 247, 250.
113. For the Stoic conception of heroes, s. Cels, !li,37.
114. Cf. Aristotle, De Generations Animalium, 736b5f.
115. Cels, III, 80. 116. Cels, VII, 46.
117. Cf. Cels, IV,21; VI,7. 118. Exod.3,8.
119. Cels, VII, 28. 120. Cels, IV,30; IV,39; VI,3.
121. deOr, XIX, 1.
122. Here Origen appeals to Ps.148,4-5.
123. The view that Plato and the Greeks plagiarized the Hebrew prophets was a 
commonplace of Jewish apologetic, taken over by Christian writers. Cf. Justin, 
Apologias, I.59-60J M.6.328ff.
124. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 247C. Cels, VI, 19.
125. This is Origen’s conception of the individual resurrection. Cf. commMatt\
13 21; 17, 33; Cels, VI, 29; homLuc, 17; selPs, 65; etc. This is one more 
point which contrasts Origen from the Gnostics who did not expect anu particular 
or general resurrection; Cf. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", p.81.
126. Cels, III, 81.
127. Cels, V, 59. s. chapter 5, §4.
128. Dial, (BGF,16,373, 35ff.).
129. s. also Cels, III, 28; IV, 22.
130. commJohn, 19, XXII. 131. expProv, 1.
132. selPs, 20. 133. selPs, 118.
134. homLuc, 1. 135. Cels, V, 12.
136. Wi s., 1,4. Dels, V, 29.
137. expProv, 24. It is certainly not incidental that in this passage Origen
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repeats the words of the above-mentioned passage in the Wisdom of Solomon.
138. Cels, VII, 45.
139. selPs, 17.
140. selPs, 5. (commenting on Ps. 5, 13). TqivEtai 6 e  d xou O e o u  xvuiffic etc 
5Ruo, Eig npri£iv kcu 8ewpiav‘ kcu in q piev npd e^ujg onRov ing eu&OKiag eoii, 
xde 6 e  SEupiag o oiE^ccvog. Texdpniou 5e kcu d xd£ic* npo xdp xou oi£<pdvou xo 
onRov, eneiSd kcu npo ids Sewpiag d npa i^g.
141. homLuc\ 1. In view of this discussion, the assertion of R. Morris (op. 
cit., p. 133) that, according to Origen, soul "returns" to God through knowledge" is 
wrong. Origen held exactly the oppsite view. Knowledge is not a "means", as it 
was to Platonists, but a result of returning to God. Knowledge is not prior but 
posterior to "returning" to God. Furthermore, the actual content of this 
"knowledge" has nothing to do with the Platonic conception of it.
This misconception of Origen's thought constitutes one of the most serious 
distortions of his thought and is a view entrenched hitherto. In a recent hook, the 
entire exposition of Origen’s theology and exegesis is based on the erroneous 
premise that he held some idea of "divinization through knowledge". Cf. Karen Jo 
Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen's Exegesis, 
Berlin/ New York, 1986J p. 147.
142. Cf.l Cor. 1,27. Cels, VII, 44.
143. Cels, III, 39. 144. ib id . Cf.Cels, 1,62.
145. ib id . 146. commJohn, 1, VIII.
147. Z/T/tf/7/7, XXXIX; £ud Ss cuuvio£ eanv oux d Koivd due kcu sispoie £uoiq 
undpxei, ccRR’ d ek ide nioiEug kcu xde flomde ccpEide exxivoiievti.
148. This topic is of utmost importance, because it is a pivotal point which 
shov/s how Origen's mentality was not just different from but indeed was 
incompatible with Platonism. There is abundance of evidence about that throughout 
those v/orks of Origen preserved in Greek. This point, however, is one which 
needs to be studied ad hoc as it needs a quite extensive discussion.
149. Cels, 111, 28; frM att, 2 14; expProv, 10; and passim .
150. Quoting John,17,3. Cels, I I I, 36.
151. R. Norris, op. c it, p. 137.
152. Cels, IV, 19. This term of Origen’s is a scriptural one and he quite often
refers to John,15,14-15 and other similar passages in v/hich the closest relation 
to God is portrayed as "friendship".
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153. expProv, 10.
154. Yet not an absolute endJ s. chapter 5.
155. Res. (M. 11.96). Methodius attributes the term "edge of blessedness" 
(jiakapioinioQ ccKpoinia) to Origen, in a passage where it is only this term that 
authentically echoes Origen's real thought, as the rest of the allegations cited 
there are absolutely falsely attributed to him.
156. expProv, 28.
157. Cf. commJohn, 13, XL! 11-XLVI 11; homJer11,2.
158. homJer, 14, 17. It is remarkable that he speaks of this aeon applying
to this the term here and not the term now.
159. homJer, 14, 17. 160. As in John 18,36.
161. homJer, 14, 17. 162. comm John, 2, I.
163. selPs, 144; Cf. our discussion in chapter 2 about the finitude of time.
164. selPs, 144. In Greek the word anspa'viog ("aperantos") derives from "a-" 
(not) and "peras" (end)j thus "a-perantos" is what is without "peras", namely 
what is "endless". The word aneipop ("apeiros", infinite) comes from the same 
root,according to the same structure, and has more or less the same meaning.
165. Cf. also, commMatt, 11,4-7.
166. s. commMatt, 11, 4 -7  -explaining the deeper meaning of the same word 
as found in Matt. 14,22.
167. L. and S., p.41Q. 168. s. commMatt, 10, 12-13.
169. selPs, 145. 170. Cels, Ml, 34.
171. commMatt, 16, 5. 172. Princ, i 11.6.8.
173. selPs, 2. 174. Cf.John 17,3. l l i ,  37.
175. selPs, 36. 176. Ps.36,16.
177. selPs, 118. 178. selPs, 38.
179. selPs,16; selPs, 144. 180. selPs,5A: expProv, 19.
181. selPs, 142.
182. seIPs, 54; selPs, 138; expProv, 5; expProv, 6.
183. Cf. SVF, 11,47,30.
184. Indeed, in the structure of Greek words, the final syllable "-tuv" denotes a 
"greatness" of v/hat the root of the word indicates [M.X. OiKovopou: rpopparixr,
i/fg  Apxctiag EflftnviKijg (Grammar of the Ancient Greek Language), ed. University 
of Thessaloniki, 1974. p.237, 1385]. So if  in the root of the word "ai-a“ (earth) 
the final syllable "-uv" is added, then the word "ai-uv" is formed; according to 
this structure, aiuv means "great earth" or "great land". Taking into account that 
Origen uses the figure "arc of the heaven" (cnpiSa xou oupavou) [Ce/s, III, 80J 
Vil, 44] this conception of aeon is highly likely. The word nufl-uv (which in this 
context is synonym to aqug) comes from nufl-n in the same way that o:i-uv 
comes from ai-oc.
185. Varro, De Lingua Latina, VI, 11. (s. SVF, 11,47,28-30).
186. Cf. Homer, /lias, 14,453: end 6n xov fiinn yu){T\ xe kqi aiuv. Thus 
aiuv comes to mean "life"; Cf ./lias, 19,27: ek 6' aiuv ne^aiai.
187. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, 279a 11ff.
188. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 37d. Thus the turning-point in the original meaning of 
aiuv occurs at the time of classicism. It is not surprising then that, almost 
seven centuries later, Plotinus asserts cciuv to be derived from ad ov. Cf. 
Enneads, 111.7.4.(44); aiuv and xou ad oviog. it is obvious that Plotinus 
thinks that the term aiuv was formed only after ad and applies only to the 
higher timeless reality; he asserts that the real meaning of ccel is "truly" (being) 
{Enneads, III.7.6.). So he asserts that the term aiuv came into use only according 
to this lignguistic and philosophical process. It is obvious that he traces back the 
linguistic history of the term aiuv only until Plato. However the facts are quite 
different. For the writings of Homer show that the term aiuv is far more ancient 
than what Plotinus asserts here.
189. A. Ctiroust, "The meaning of time in the ancient world", The New 
Scholasticism; XXI (1947) J p.31, n.176.
190. Cf. Aristotl e, De Caelo, 279a11 ff.
191. Physics., 221b3-5.
192. In his Diciionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque (vol.1, p.42), P. 
Chantraine makes some speculations but he does not opt for any solution and 
leaves the question unanswered. At any rate, he does not connect aiuv  with aid 
(eath, land). In studying Origen's conception of the term aiuv  , we have taken 
into account the actual spatio-temporal meaning which is attributed to this term; 
also, having considered the most original meaning of the term a iu v , as found in 
Homer's / lias (14.453, 19.27), and a e i, as found in Homer's Odyssea (21.69, 
9.74 etc.), we assert that aiuv comes from the term aia  and we adduce this 
analysis as a contribution to the actual etymology of the term a iu v .
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193. As we shall discuss later, the perception of eternal life  in the v/ay 
described above, namely as a kind of "edge" is consistent with Origen's notion of 
"after" the eternal life, which is discussed in chapter 5.
194. This is clearly stated in exhMar, XLVI I. Origen here uses the term aflriKiu 
(endless) explicitly referring to the "contemplation" (3eo:v) of the "living Logos"
( E[lipU}{OV a 6 tfO V ).
195. frMatt, 3. 195. Quoting Gal. 1,4. homJer, 17, 3.
197. commJohn, 2, Xill.
198. Co/s, VI, 35. At that point again Origen takes the distances from the views 
of the GnosticsJ s. infra.
199. homJer, 14, 17.
200 . There is a point, however, where the term "infinite aeon" is used, in a
passage in Princ. Although reasonable doubt on whether they are actually Origen’s 
own words always exists, here there is no actual question which would arise. For 
at that point, the expression "infinite aeon" or "boundless aeon" is a figure used 
in comparing the "fifty years of a lifetime here" to the entirety of time. Out of 
this comparison "aeon" (which is used instead of the term "time") is stated as 
"infinite" ( Princ, Ii 1.1.13). Certainly the way in which the term "infinite” leaves 
no room for doubt that it is nothing more than a figure of speech (as, in the same 
way it is said of "infinte souls" {Princ, I!1.1.14) meaning just a great length of 
time or a vast multitude of creatures (besides, he uses the expression wg dv 
einoi ng, which effectively means "so to speak"). It should be noted, however, 
that in this text preserved in Phil, the term "infinite" is used too loosely and 
too lightly. This is in contrast to the rest of Origen's work preserved in Greek, 
where he constantly applies the term "infinite" to God only. In any case Origen's 
views that both time and creatures are finite are expounded throughout his works 
in Greek. The fact, however, that the term "infinite" (cmstpog) is used three
times [plus one time the term "boundless" (aneipog)] in just two short
consecutive paragraphs is quite strange. Certainly it is unlike Origen -in the light 
of the rest of his works in Greek. This fact arouses some questions as to how 
authentically the Cappadocians who compiled Phil have rendered Origen's own 
words.
As for the translation (the Latin version of this point is extant, too) there are 
fundamental mistakes. H. Crouzel and N. Simonetti translate dnaipov m uvs as "V 
eternite sans fin" {Origene: Traite des Principes, vol.Ill, p.77) which is totally 
wrong and misleading, as the very word "eternite" is never used by Origen and
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here the term "aeon" means just "time". The Latin translation of Rufinus at this 
point (he applies the term “aeon" to soul and states that as “aeternum"), 
compared to the preserved one in Greek, show that he has entirely distorted 
Origen's authentic views. Further, H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti again translate 
cmapavroY aiiih'a  as "V eternite sans fin" quite falsely {op. c it, 111,79- 80,515). 
The Latin text, in which Rufinus speaks of “ad perpetuum et aeternum tempus" is 
again totally misleading of Origen's authentic views.
201 . exhMar, XLV! I.
202 . frLuc, 58.
20 3 . Heinrich Lausberg: Handbuch der Liierarischen Rhetorik ; Max Hueber Verlag, 
Munchen, 1968. p.344, §685.
210 . On the meaning of hope in eternal life  we discuss in chapter 5.
211. selPs, 22.
212 . In view of that, it is quite absurd that P. Plass describes no less than five 
kinds of "eternity" asserting that this term appears in Origen with all these 
meanings, s. P. Plass, "The Concept of Eternity in Patristic Theology", Studh 
Theologies, 36 (1982); p.11-13.
21 3 . In view of this, R. Sorabji’s {Time, Creation and the Contunuum, p. 122] 
emphasis on the expression in the Princ that God is "not only above time but also 
above eternity" is pointless. For the expression is obviously an interpolation of 
Rufinus. Origen did not use the term "eternity" and it was through other 
expressions that he expressed his view of God as radically transcendent to the 
world.
214 . selPs, 147. A man who has made progress and experiences eternal life  
"within" himself, is called "the holy place of God", as we have seen in se/Pp 23.
215. deOr, XV, 3; commJohn, 6, XLII.
204 . selPs, 110.
20 5 . selPs, 117. 
20 8 . ibid
20 5 . Comm ! Cor, p.234. 
20 7 . selPs, 22. 
209 . ibid.
216 . Cels, VI, 25. 217. commJohn, 6, XLV.
218 . Cels, V I,23; V II,30; VIII 22; fr 1-71 Jer, XLVI 11; selPs, 124.
219. Cels, V II, 28; V II, 29.
220. Cels, V III, 75. 
222. Cant, 3.
22 1 . Cf. Gal.4,26. Cant, 3.
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223. Cant, 1; xrjv a^iepaoiov i ipuxriv ri EKKfinuiav n id n^ipoviKov xou 
Xpicriou.
224. f r  1-71 Jer, XLVI I i.
225. Cels, VI, 25; commJohn, 13, XIII.
226. Cf. Gal.4,26. SBlPs, 130.
227. It should be emphasized, however, that Origen does not accept the virtually 
Gnostic view of the church as an "emanation from a higher world" (Cf. Cels, VI, 
35). EKKfinoiH (Church) was the eighth member of the Valentinian Ogdoad: 
Irenaeus, Ac/versus Haereses, 1,1,1; i,2,2J 1,5,6; Tertullian, Ad versus
Valentinianos, 25.
228. selEz, 17. On the actual meaning of "knowledge" in Origen, s. supra.
229. Cels, VIII, 75. Cf. the expression for the original state before the fa ll as 
"our ancient fatherland" ( selPs; 117) and "mother" {selPs, 130).
230. SB IPs, 5. We translate the term Snrgopdg (differences) as "the 
differentia" in order to follow the strict meaning of the word; it  is here being 
used in the same sense that Aristotle uses it  in Metaphysics 1057b7 and in Topics 
139a29 used in the plural (as it  is used here) and meaning "the differentia of a 
species", namely the differences of species or kinds. This is exactly the sense in 
which Origen uses the term here.
231. Phil o, De Mutations Nominum, 267; Quod Dsus S it Im m utatilis, 32; Cf. Quis 
Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit, 165: xpovoc is the pioc of the Koopoc aiaSrudc, 
aiwv is the piog of God and the xoopog vonxdg. This is the same definition of 
aoJy given by Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus, as quoted in chapter 2. 
And yet it  was Origen who has been regarded as a "Platonist".
232. Philo, DeFuga, 57.
233. Philo, Legatio adGsium, 85.
234. Philo, De Fugs, 78.
235. C.H. Dodd, The interpretation o f the Fourth Gospel, Cambridge, 1955, p. 150.
236. C.H. Dodd, ibid.
237. expProv, 3. 238. ib id  239. selPs, 138.
240. expProv, 10. 241. selPs, 138.
242. Commentary on Romans, VI,5; Quoted in P. Toll inton, Selections from  the 
Commentaries and Homilies o f Origen, London, 1929; pp. 125-6.
243. Rufinus1 awkwardness is already apparent: He discusses "eternity" in spite
of the fact that Origen never uses this term, which is not really a scriptural one. 
244. John, 17,3. 245. John, 14,6. 246. I Thess. 4,17.
247. Cf. D ial (BGF,16,379,35).
248. Cf. selPs, 22.
249. R. Tollinton, op. c it, pp. 125-6. 250. op. c it, p.126, n.5.
251. so IPs, 48. This is a similar affirmation to that of Aristotle’s in De
Caelo, 279a11ff: to xdp xeflog id nepiexov idv ifig yufig £Ko:cfiou XP0V0V -  ca^ v
EKdOIOU KEKrlTliai.
252. commJohn, 20, XXXIX; Cels, VI, 70; commMatt, 11,17.
253. Cels, II, 77.
254. deOr, XXV, 2; Cels, III, 38; III, 64.
255. commJohn, 20, XXXIX. 256. selPs, 60.
257. C f. Ps.76,6. 258. selPs, 76.
259. Rom. 16,25; II Tim. 1,9; T it. 1,2.
260. H.Sasse, "Aiuv", p.209. 261. op. c it, p.198.
262. op. c it, p. 199. 263. selPs, 5.
264. What is significant in the passage above is that in one and single comment 
of three or four lines the term "aeon" is found in a purely natural sense, that is 
as pertaining to the world and yet it is a homonym. For in the first place it 
means the "world" as a spatio-temporal reality and then it is employed to denote 
the rank of life  of the supreme blessedness. And also, in the same passage, the 
term muviog is used in a metaphysical sense, as it is clearly applied to God 
Himself.
265. homLuc, 15.
266. commJohn, 13, XXXII; 32, III.
267. Cant, 4. A stark contrast between Origen’s thought and that of Plotinus
was pointed out by W.R. Inge. The following passage is quite indicative of the 
point which he makes: "Plotinus could not even console himself with the delusive 
hope of an approaching end of the world. The apocalyptic dream, which has been 
the strangest legacy of the later Judaism to Christianity, never consoled or 
troubled the mind of Pagan philosophers. They must have fe lt that tempers 
pessima sunt, but they could not say hora novissima. Deliverance, for them, was 
not hoped for in the future, but half-seen beyond the veil in the present. It was a 
different kind of W eltflucht from that of monastic Christianity; both alike rest
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on truth mixed with illusion, on faith and courage which are s till not faithful and
courageous enough. The Chrsitian doctrine of the Incarnation, which Augustine
sought for and could not find in the Platonists, puts the key-stone in the arch'.
( The Philosophy o f Plotinus, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1923, p.259.).
268. selEz, 13. ev in  peRrlouon niispa.
269. homJer, 18, 6. ; s. also Cels, VIM, 72.
270. frM a tt, 393 -quoting the similar passage from Mark 10,30.
271. Einar Moll and is quite right in arguing that Origen's thought does deal with
history: "Not only is salvation according to him based upon historical events, the 
incarnation, passion, death, and resurrection of Christ, but i t  is conceived of as 
the end of all history." (op. cit., p.157).
272. Cf. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", in Man and Time, Princeton, 1973J
pp.75-82.
273. A.H. Armstrong - R.A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, London, 
1960Jp.110.
274. H. Jonas, Gnosis und spatantiker Geista Gottingen, 1954J pp.211-13 ("Die 
Rolle der zeit bei Origenes").
275. A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. by Phillip S. Watson, Philadelphia, 1953J pp. 
375ff.
276. We endorse the assertions of that Origen's mysticism was rooted to the 
tradition of the church. As he argues, Origen's mysticism has a character which is 
dogmatic rather than speculative. Therefore it  is a mysticism of a Christian, not 
a Gnostic character. Cf. A. Lieske "Die Theologie der Logos-Mystik bei Origenes", 
Milnsterrische Bitrage zur Theologie, Munster i. W, 1938.
277. This is one more point on which E. de Faye has seriously distorted Origen’s
thought. He alleges that what Origen regards as "redemption" is but a "mystic
contemplation" the purpose of which is but "gnosis". Thus, he concludes, on this 
topic, too, “there is no difference at a ll" betv/een the aspirations of Origen's and 
those of Gnostics such as Basilides, Valentinus and Ptolemeus. In view of our 
discussion here (as well as that in chapter 5) the reader can judge for himself 
how grossly Faye has misconstrued Origen's thought and the extent to which he 
lacks a comprehension of Origen's authentic views. Cf. E. de Faye, "De V Influence 
du Gnosticisme chez Origene", Revue de 1’ Histoire des Religions, Paris, 87 
(1923)J pp.232ff.
278. Cf. Wis. 7,17-18. frLuc, 50. 279. Cf. Cels, IV, 60.
280 . frLuc, 50; s. also frMatt, 140. 281 . Princ, 111.3.2.
282. Princ, 111.3.2.
283. A. Harnack, History o f Dogma, vol. ii, pp.319ffJ 340-2. With respect to 
this, Harnack's conclusions are buttressed by his unqualified acceptance of 
Porhyry's judgement of Origen, whose culminating point reads thus: "His (sc. 
Origen's) outward life  was that of a Christian and opposed to the law, but in 
regard to his view of things and of the Diety, he thought like the Greeks, in as 
much as he introduced their ideas into the myths of other peoples" [op. cit, 
p.341]. The whole statement is preserved by Eusebius in Historic ecclesiastics, 
VI,19. There is a strong possibility that Porphyry has confused the Christian 
Origen with a pagan of the same name. S. further, Rene Cadiou, Origen: His L ife  in 
Alexandria, tr. J. Southwell, London, 1944J pp.186ffJ and H. Turner, The Patter/, 
o f Christian Truth, Appended Note F "The Philosophical Background of Origen", 
pp.464-70. At any rate, the above mentioned erroneous allegation of A. Harnack 
becomes more striking that he not only employs the statement of Porphyry but 
also stresses that this observation can be verified everywhere from Origen's 
works (op. c it, vol.ll, p.241).
284. Cf. E. de Faye "De 1' influence du Gnosticisme sur Qrigene", Revue de I 
Histoire des Religions, Paris, 87 (1923); pp.181-235J also E. de Faye, Origen anc 
his work, London, 1926; pp.121-141 and 146-165.
285. Hal Koch Pronoia und Paideusis, Leipsig, Berlin, 1932; pp. 14, 47 and 140; 
particularly, on redemption, eschatology and history, s. pp.33, 39 ff, S9ff and
158.
286. A.H.Armstrong-R.A.Markus, op. c it, pp.121-2.
287. op. c it, p. 129.
288. Cf. frM att, 212. 289. commJohn, 10, XIV.
290. Cf. commJohn, 2, XVII; Cels, IV, 10.
291. Cf. R. Hanson, Allegory and Event, London, 1959; pp.332-56 and 364ff.
292. op. c it, p.364ff.
293. Cf. M. Werner, The Formation o f Christian Dogma, Translated from the 
author's abridgement by S.G.F. Brandon. New York, 1957., pp.117, 293-4.
294. op. c it, p.297.
295. op. c it, p.294]
296. Cf. commGen,Z (commenting on Gen. l,1 6 ff).
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297. selPs, 144. 298 . selPs, 5.
2 99 . Pr/nCj 11.3.5. 30 0 . seJPs, 5.
301 . selEz, 16. The Greek text, nevertheless, as edited today, has the word 
"nofiflaxwe" (in many ways) instead of "ipioffug" which Origen cites here.
30 2 . H. Sasse does not distinguish any ambiguity in the biblical use of the term
auuv -apart from the current distinction of aiuv meaning either "time" or
"world". He points out that "in the Bible the same word cuwv is used to indicate 
two things which are really profoundly antithetical, namely the eternity of God 
and the duration of the world". His mistake is, however, that he failed to grasp 
the spatio-temporal meaning of the terms i^w and awviog when they refer to 
anything apart from God Himself. He thinks that cauv may mean "time" or
"world". He does not grasp any inherent connexion between these two notions. This
is why he doubts on whether "The full significance of 'eternity' ... can ever be 
answered with any certainty." (H. Sasse, op. ci'E  p.199).
30 3 . Cf. homJer, 14, 17. 30 4 . commTlati, 14, 5.
305 . comm John, 2, !. 30 6 . excPs, 36.
30 7 . As, for example in selEz, 16.
308 . As, for example, in ssIPs, 5.
309 . T. Bom an, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek; tr. by J. Moreau, London, 
1960J p. 139.
31 0 . E. von Dobschutz, "Zeit und Raum im Denken des Urchristentums", Journal or 
Biblical Literature, XLI (1922), pp.212-23.
311 . C. von Orelli, Die hehraischen Synonym a der Zeit und Ewigkeit genetisch unc 
sprachvergleichend dargestellt, Leipzig, 187U pp.9ff.
312 . J. Petersen, Israel: Its  L ife and Culture, tr. A. Moller, London, 1926-47, 2 
volsJ l-ll, pp.488ff.
313 . H. Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament; Oxford, 1946J 
pp. 106ff.
31 4 . J. Marsh, The Fullness o f Time, London, 1952, pp. 19-34.
315 . J. Muilenberg, "The Biblical View of Time", Harvard Theological Review, 
LIV (October 1961).
316 . Cullmann, op. c it, p.66.
31 7 . Boman, op. c itf p. 139.
31 8 . This v/as pointed out by E. von Orelli, op. c it, p.64J J. Marsh, op. ci'E
p.179J For a "Vocabulary of Time" in Hebraic thought, s. Wheeler'H. Robinson, 
Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford, 1946), pp. 1Z 0 -1J like so 
many others, the assertions of this author, too, are buttressed on the conclusions 
established by von Orelli.
319. E. von Dobschiitz, "Zeit und Raum im Denken des Urchistentums", Journal of 
Biblical Literature, XLI, 1922, 212-23.
32 0 . R. Markus accepts the fact that "eternity" is not a biblical conceptJ he adds 
though that this is a concept "which may help the Christian thinker in his attempt 
to understand the biblical datum'.' (op. c itf pp. 127ffJ his italics). We thoroughly 
disagree with any "helpfulness" in this notion -fa r  from it.
3 21 . H. Puech, op. c it, p.52.
3 22 . Puech, op. c itf p.47.
3 23 . Puech, op. c it, p.46.
3 2 4 . Origen, however, avoided awkward expressions such as "history ... governed 
by God". His conception of Providence stands side by side with the "principle of 
impartiality" of God with respect to the worldJ this is quite indicative of how 
cautious he was in articulating his view of the dialectical relation between God 
and creatures.
3 2 5 . H. Puech, op. c it , p.47. 32 6 . frM a tt, 57.
327 . H. Puech, op. c itr p.49ff. 32 8 . Princ, i 11.6.6.
335. Num.ll. in Homiliae in Numeros, 1.3, Origen interprets the position of the 
tribes at the four points of the compass as referring to the resurrection of the 
dead; Cf. ibid., ill,3 where it means the four ranks in heaven mentioned in 
Heb.12,18-23 (some reach Mount Sion, some the heavenly Jerusalem, some the 
multitude of angels, while the best reach the church of the first-born). What is 
important out of these figures is the notion of Origen that the outcome of 
Judgement is a world classified in ranks of life.
336. Cels, VI, 23. There is a crucial distinction which should be emphasized at 
this point. Here Origen refers to the soul which "enters into the contemplation of 
divine things" and not into the divine reality itself. This point will be discussed 
in chapter 5.
329. Princ, 111.6.9.
331. Cf.Matt.7,14
333. Ps.91,14. exhMar, XXX
330. commhatt, 10, 3.
332. Song o f Songs, 2 ,10 -11 .
334. Ezek.48,31 -35.
337. commNatt, 15, 18. 338. commMatt, 15, 17.
339. sc. Christ, who is "heavenly", as stated in I Cor. 15,48 quoted hereJ
commflatt, 15, 18. 
340. frJohn, XCV.
34 1 . D ia l ( BGF, 16,379,31 -3 2 )J s. also Cels, IV,3; V II I ,72; seiPst 4. 
expProv' 19. Princ, Mi.5.8.
342. Princ, i i i. 1.19. 343. exhNar, V.
344. Cf. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", in Man and Time, Princeton, 1973J p.55ff.
345. Cels, VII, 42. 346. Plato, State, 562C.
347. selPs, 23. The role of grace is pointed out at several points of Origen's 
vorksJ s. fr/iattj, 300: Ano3fiKTiv 8i  vopisov inv ’avu lEpouoaRnp' n^ouv idg 
aiuvioug povdg, ev ulq oi d^ioi lug aiiog anoiiSevccci etg 16 avaR6#ug eKaoxov 
KopiaaaSai iity napa 0eou SiSopEvnv auxoig xdpiv. (Commenting on Matt.,13,30).
346. comm John, 19, Vi.
349. Cf. John, 10,7,9.
350. comm John, 19, VI; s. also expProK 4.
351. comm John, 6 , XIX; On the exact meaning of this conception we give a
further account in in chapter 5.
352. Cf. John, 14,6. 353. Cf. John, 10,7.
354. comm John, 6 , XLIII. 355. commMati, 12, 26.
356. II Tim.2,21. Princ, I I I .1.23. Jerome renders this passage as follows: 
"And in another place: But according to us a vessel which has by reason of 
pre-existing merits been fashioned for honour may, if  it fails to do work worthy 
of its title, become in another age a vessel of dishonour.: and on the other hand a 
vessel which as a result of former sin has received a name of dishonour may, if  
in the present life  it has willed to receive correction, become in the new 
creation a vessel sanctified and useful to the Lord, prepared unto every good 
work." (epAy, 8)J cited in FPJ p.206.
357. Cf. I Peter.2,5. 350. Cf. Gal.4,4.
359. Here Origen alludes to the body v/hich v/ill have been tranformed into a 
spiritual one, according to Paul’s affirmation that the body is "sowed as flesh" 
and is "raised up as spiritual". This is a notion to v/hich he often refers 
throughout his works.
360. Cf. John,4,21; comm John, 13, XIII.
36 1 . se/Beut, (commenting on Deut.8,7.).
36 2 . deOr, XXVI I, 13. 363. selPs, 25.
364 . s. also fr1~71Jert XI. In this Fragment, the language describing eternal 
life  as an active state is remarkably expressive.
36 5 . The translation of omoSctvdv iov k o l v o y  3dvaiov as "dying in the ordinary 
way", by J.Oulton and H. Chadwick, (Alexandrian Christianity, London, 1956J 
p.421) is wrong. Y/hat Origen means by this expression is the kind of death and 
not the way in which one dies. The distinction which he here alludes to is the 
three kinds of death as he describes them in Dial.
370. Due to the similarity of the notion discussed as well as that of 
expressions, this passage corroborates the fidelity of that in Princ, namely at the 
point where the notion of "boundless aeon" is stated. This fidelity is not
unexpected as that passage is from the Phil. However, our1 reservations 
regarding the use of the term "infinite" in Phil remain.
371. deBr, XXIX, 14: pctKpoa'c xpovuv nspidSoiy; It is significant to remark 
that this expression is used by Origen to denote a period of time extended in many 
aeons. Thus, in commJohn, he says "ouk oi6a 5e, si paKpaiy xpovidv neptdSoiy 
avctKUKRoupEvaig id napanFlricria ndRiv Suvaiov ^EveaSai" ( commJohn, 10, XLil), 
alluding to the notion of recurrence of worlds.
372. deOr, XXIX, 14. In this passage, the expression zt\q ^eveljeujq
EntSupnucxviEQ (once willed to be born) denotes the assuming of human nature 
after a certain judgement. This is an expression used with an implication of 
"falling" in the human rank of life. Origen uses the same expression, in the same 
sense, in ( com m il a tt 15, 27) with respect to the notion of "falling" of "angels" 
and "ascending" of human beings to the heavens on the "day of judgement" ( ibid. ).
373. commJohn, 20, XXXIX. in the Greek text the expression translated here as
"never" is "in the aeon" ( e l q iov aiuva).
3 6 6 . Cf.Rev.6,9; exhtlar, XXXIX. 
3 6 8 . selPs, 2.
3 6 7 . selPs, 118.
37 4 . I Cor. 15,26.
37 6 . commJohn, 20, XXXIX. 
3 78 . Ps.21,16.
3 8 0 . Heb.4, 14.
3 8 2 . Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 247B.
3 81 . John, 14,3. 
3 83 . John,4,14.
3 79 . commJohn, 20, XXXIX.
3 75 . John, 11,25. 
37 7 . John,8,51.
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38 4 . John,7,38; Ps.148, 4.
38 5 . Cf. Plato, PhsedruSj 247CJ As usually in this work, Origen articulates his 
own views using Celsus' expressions, like this Platonic one.
38 6 . Rom. 1,20. 38 7 . I Cor. 8: 12,10; Cels, VI, 19-20.
38 8 . II Cor. 12, 2 -4 . 38 9 . Heb.4,14.
39 0 . exhriar, XIII. 3 9 1 . selPs, 29.
39 2 . Origine. Traite des Principes, vol.11,p. 76, n.52 ref. to vol. I,p. 164.
393 . commJohn. 1, XXVI. 394 . so IPs, 139.
39 5 . exhriar, XLV! I. 396 . frJohn. CV.
397 . commriatt. 12, 26. 39 8 . Cf. John 1,37-39.
39 9 . John 1,40. 400 . commr-latt. 10, 1.
40 1 . selPs, 22. 402 . I Tim.6,16.
403 . Numb. 14,28; Ez.34,8. 4 0 4  commJohn, 2, XVII.
405 . Cf. PS. 114,9. 40 6 . Cf. Ps. 142,2.
407 . commJohn, 2, XVII. In this passage, by the expression "the previous life" 
(ir|v npoin^ oupevTiv £ufjv) Origen alludes to the notion that angels have fallen 
and become men whereas men have ascended and become angels.
40 8 . II Tim.2,5.
40 9 . There is no expression such as "on earth" which H. Chadwick falsely adds 
{op. oft.,. p.361) in the text, thus changing the meaning of it; for Origen here 
studiously uses general terms, as he refers not only to the "earth" but to any 
"place" of the world. This is why Origen uses the expression nou rod navrdg
which means "in a paricular place of the whole world" and not "in a particular
part of the universe", as Chadv/ick translates it. The term "universe" does not 
render properly Origen's conception of the world, as discussed in chapter 1.
4 1 0 . Cels, VI, 44.
4 1 1 . Not the "man", as falsely H. Chadwick translates {op. oft.,. p.361)J for there 
is no word for "man" and Origen alludes to rational creatures in general.
41 2 . John 6,51; Co/s, VI, 44.
4 1 3 . Cels, V, 21. 41 4 . commriatt; 15, 10.
4 1 5 . commMatt, 15, 27. 41 6 . Jude, 6.
41 7 . commMatt, 15 ,27 . 41 8 . commriatt, 11, 17.
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4 1 9 . Phil.2,10. 42 0 . Princ, 1.4.2.
42 1 . Princ, 1.2.4. 422 . Princ, 1.2.10.
42 3 . Princ, 1.5.3.
424 . Cf. John 10,29. commJohn\ 19, IV. d  \ir\ eKnaoaiav an' auirig tauioug 
paKpuvovieg and nig x£lP0£ 8£gu, oux apnaxiicFoviai' ouSeig xdp apnd^ei and 
irig X£lpdQ iou 8eou.
42 5 . homJer, 18, 3. 426 . so IPs, 4.
4 2 7 . Rom.6,10. Dial (BGF,16,37S,33ff). 42 8 . Ez.18,4.
42 9 . Gen.5,5. 43 0 . Dial.• (BGF,16,379,35).
4 3 1 . It would be beyond our scope to elaborate, but just for reasons of 
historical completeness of the exposition we note this: Thomas Aquinas pointed 
out that the notion of "eternity" involves the discussion of the eternity not only 
of God but also of creatures J and not only of the creatures saved but also of
those damned. This, according to Aquinas, would be three different kinds of
eternity. [Cf. Summa Theologiae, 1a,q.10,a.3J ap. R. Sorabji, Time,, Creation ant 
the Continuum,, p.98]. Certainly the conception of these "eternities" is not the 
same with that of Origen's -Origen does not even use the very term "eternity" at 
all. However the idea that the notion of "eternal" is a homonym and there are 
three cases where the term eternal can be distinctly  applied, is a perception 
found in Origen's theology.
4 3 2 . Cels, VI, 25. 43 3 . Matt.5,22 etc.
434 . Joshua 18,16. 43 5 . Cels, VI, 25.
43 6 . commJohn, 13, XXXVII.
437 . commriatt, 17, 16. ...dg iov aaadipiov tpuiiog <naviog> KaiaSiKaaSrivcxi 
xonov, ev3a (JKdiog fiv id wg ev aKoieai pcc9uiepov kcu Kaaoupevov 'aKOiog
e£uiepov'. For the classifications of different spaces Cf. commJohn, 19, XXII.
438 . Cels, VI, 45. The expression iv‘ ouiwg ovopKxou ("so to call them") again 
implies that those particular spaces of the world, although radically separated 
from each other, are not perceived in terms of geometrical distance, but 
qualitative difference.
439 . Cels, VI, 45. 44 0 . selPs, 5.
44 1 . commhlatt, 11, 17. 4 42 . expProv,. 19.
443 . ib id  444 . expProv, 1.
445 . frM a tt 102 II. 446 . selEz, 7.
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4 4 7 . Cels, V III, 52. 4 48 . Cels, Hi, 78.
44 9 . Cels, IV, 10.
4 5 0 . Cels, IV, 72; Cf. homJep 20,3.
45 1 . Cels, VI, 26. The following fact is quite characteristic of how the 
eschatological ideas of Origen have eluded C. Bigg: On the one hand, he adduces 
this passage of Origen, but he seems confused and offers no explanation of it at 
all. On the other hand, he just adduces some references where Origen speaks of 
eternal punishment. These seem to him to be contradictory and regards them 3s 
"not sufficient to prove Origen’s point" and he concludes that Origen "endeavours 
to prove far too much". So, with respect to this point, too, Bigg seems to opt for 
the misleading (and contradicting this very point) suggestion that in Origen the 
term auJv has a Platonic sense, namely "endless, changeless duration“jp.277, n.1. 
That in Origen aiuv has a purely natural meaning has already been discussed in 
this chapter. Of this fact Bigg was entirely unaware.
45 2 . expProv, 19.
45 3 . expProv, 24.
45 4 . expProv, 10. o 8e aoepfig, anuBdcx aiwvia nepupepeiai ev iu  eniSupetv 
kccl npauav id pfi Qeu ipirla.
45 5 . H. Crouzel, "L‘ Hades et la Gehenne selon Origene", Gregorianurr, 
Commentarii de Re Theologies et Philosophies, 79 ( 1978), p.330-1.
456 . ibid
45 7 . selPs, 1. 45 8 . H. Crouzel, op. c it, p.330.
459 . commJohn, 10, XXX. 4 60 . Cf. selPs, 1.
461 . commhlatt, 10, 13; Cf. our discussion in chapter3,§1.
462 . Besides, H. Crouzel has stuck to the letter of the Princ and speaks of 
"three levels, heaven, earth and hades, v/hich make up the world" {loo. c it ). This 
is a fundamental mistake in which many of the misconstructions of Origen's 
thought in that work have originated. As we stressed in chapter 1, failure to 
apprehend Origen's perception of the world, and its movement in time, could be a 
source of many misapprehensions. Origen's world consists not of "three levels" 
but of a (non-defined) number of particular spaces. As Origen points out, it is 
beyond the capabilities of human nature to know exactly how many these spaces 
are and hoe are they exactly classified. The expression in Princ is but a succint 
rendering of a profound conception, it is due to this fundamental misapprehension 
that H. Crouzel takes Origen's thought as dealing only with a time extended just
between now and the end of this aeon, v/hich Crouzel names as "resurrection". Cf.
H. Crouzel, op. cit.J also "Mort et immortalite selon Origene", Bulletin de 
L literature Ecclesiastique, 79 (1978), pp. 19-38, 81-96, 181-196.
46 3 . homJer, 11 ,2 .
464 . Cf. Leontius Byzantinus, Be seetis, 10.6; ae^oucri (sc. oi Q p ix e v ic io u )  ... on 
io  xou a iu v o g  ovopa  eni w p iapevou  xpovou r la p p d v e ia t ,  kcu o ia v  s in n  n xPa(pri 
o n  a iu m a  e a x iv  n K o fla a ig , ou d  pn  eni u p ia p e vo u  xpovou. (M.86.1265D).
46 5 . An example of distorted version of "Origenistie" thought can be found in a 
work entitled "Homilies on Pascha" and their content is supposed to be "in the 
tradition of Origen", as the subtitle claims. However, anyone who has an 
elementary acquaintance with Origen's language and views, as found in the 
entirety of his works in Greek, could be in no doubt that this work has nothing to 
do with Origen and his authentic thought. Cf. P. Nautin, Homslies Pascales. 
Sources Chretiennes, n.36, Paris, 1953.
Motes to  Chapter 5.
I. Rom.7, 9-10. 2. Cels, i l l,  62; our italics.
3. selPs, 4. 4. expProv, 5.
5. expProK 5. 6. selPs, 118.
7. selPs, 36.
8. commJohn, 2, XIII; s. also selPs, 4; selPs, 111; selPs, 144;
At this point i t  is worth while citing an account of Origen's views by Augustine: 
"But there are other teachings of this Origen which the Catholic Church altogether 
rejects, and as regards which it  does not accuse him falsely and is not to be put 
o ff by those who defend him; in particular, his teachings regarding purging and 
deliverance, and the cyclical return of the rational creation after a long period 
of time to the same evils. For what Catholic Christian, learned or unlearned, is 
not utterly repelled by what he calls the purging of evils, namely, that even 
those who have ended this life  in crime and wickedness and sacrilege, and the 
greatest of impieties -yea, more, the devil himself and his angels- shall, though 
after a very long time, be purged and set free and restored to the kingdom and 
the light of God; and again that after a very long time all those v/ho have been 
set free shall once more fa ll and return to these evils; and that these alternate 
cycles of blessedness and misery for the rational creation always have been and 
alv/ays w ill be? Against the philosophers from whom Origen learned this impiety I 
have argued strenuously in my book 'The City of God' [De heeresihus; XLill
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(Migne, PL, XLii)].
The distortions of Origen’s views made by Augustine are apparent. Origen never
spoke of "cyclical return" nor did he postulate any "alternate cycles of
blessedness and misery for the rational creation". The future is simply unknown. 
Least of all did Origen say that "these alternate cycles .... always have been and 
alv/ays will be". Far for the contrary -as our discussion has so far shown and
will also show further in this chapter.
What is remarkable, nevertheless, is this: Augustine seems particularly warm in 
condemning what he falsely postulates as the "teachings of this Origen”. He said 
nothing, however, of the fact that what he presented as his own theory of Time is 
largely.(if not entirely) based upon the (authentic) "teachings of this Origen" -as 
was shown in chapter 2.
9. Fragment 21, Koetschau, from Justinian, 1/tiOr, Mansi 532J Jerome, in epAv, 6, 
quotes the same passage. Cf.fP, p. 122, n.5.
10. Cf. Matt.28,18.
11. Cf. Luke 10,22 and M att.28, 18.
12. Cf. Col. 1,20.
13. homLuc.. 36; our italics. The same notion, in similar articulation, is found 
in frt1 a tt% l\.
14. H.Chadvick has not translated this last phrase at all, namely the expression 
"ent ndoi" (on all) {op. c it, p.507).
15. Cels, V III, 72. kgu id xeriog xwv npa^paiwv avaipeSnvcd son xriv KaKiav’ 
The translation of isftog nJv npaxpdwv as "end of treatment" (H. Chadwick, op. 
c itj p.507) is not correct; for in this last phrase Origen articulates his 
conclusion about the "end of things" (an expression frequently used by him) and 
no longer uses the figure of speech in which he speaks of "treatment" etc. As we 
shall discuss later in this chapter, the expression "end of things" (ieRoq tuv 
npa^pcmuv) has a particular significance in Origen’s thought and especially in his 
conception of time.
16. Cels, V III, 72. Similar affirmations of Origen are found in expProv, 19 
and expProv. 24.
17. se/Pp 9. Again, this passage is one more point where Origen clearly 
indicates that the expression "in the aeon" does not mean "for ever", namely it 
does not denote any notion of everlasting duration. His comment on this passage 
of the Psalms clearly indicates that the expression "in the aeon" (dg  iov cauva) 
may well go side by side with a notion of "until", namely an end of duration.
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Again, the terms "aeon" and "aeons" have a spatio-temporal significance.
18. selPs, 40; our italics. This notion of necessity is also explicated in 
expProv, 19.
19. frJohn, CXL. 20. Cels, 11,77.
21. Cels, IV, 11. 22. John, 13,36.
23. commJohn, 32, IN. 24. Acts,3,21.
25. homJer, 14, IB. 26. comm join 10, XXXV.
27. R0V.21,11 and 3,12. CommJofn 10, XLII.
28. H. Crouzel, "L'Hades et la Gehenne selon Origene", Gregorianum, Commentarh 
de Re Theologies et Philosophies, Roma, 59 (1978)J p.331. The allegation that 
Origen appears to have "hesitations and alternating positions" is also applied in 
his notions of "eternal" and "aeon". How wrong this assertion of Crouzel is, is 
discussed in chapter 4,§4. Crouzel simply has not grasped that in Origen's thought 
these terms are homonyms.
29. commJohn, 10, XXXVI; also, in Cels Origen opines that "resurrection" is 
comprehended only be "wise men"J ( Cels, IV, 30.).
30. Cf. Ez.37,7. 31. Cf. Eph. 4,13.
32. Cf. I Cor. 12,12. 33. Cf. I Cor. 12, 2 3 - 24.
34. I cor. 12, 24 -25 . 35. CommJofltl 10, XXXVI.
36. s. also, commJohti 10, XXXV; Cels, VI, 79.
37. Cels, V III, 19.
38 .18 .54 ,11-14 . Cels, V III, 20.
39. Cels, VIII, 20. 40. Cf. Rev.21,11.
41. Cf. Rev.3,12; commJo/iii 10, XLII.
42. comm Join 10, XLII. 43. comm Join 10, XLII I.
44. Cels, 6, 48. 45. Col.1, 24.
46. Cels, VI, 48. 47. I Cor. 15,22.
48. I Cor. 15,23.
49. Cf. John 13,3. Using the scriptural term "orders", Origen here alludes to his 
conception of the world comprising various ranks of life.
50. Job, 15,25. 51. Col. 1,15.
52. comm Join  32, III. 53. commJoin 10, X.
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54. ibid 55. selPs, 9.
56. commJohn, 20, V II; our italics.
57. Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paidsusis, Leipsig, Berlin, 1932.: pp. 33, 89ff, 158.
58. commNatt, 10, 2. 59. Cf. Matt.5,16.
60. commNatt 10, 2. 61. ibid
62. Here Origen reiterates his conviction that time will continue after the end of 
the present aeon.
63. Eph.4,13. 64. commNatt, 10,3; our italics.
65. commNatt 10, 2. 66. frJohti CXL.
67. Cels, II, 77. 68. frJohn, XCL.
69. comm John 10, XXXV. 70. frNatflfi II.
71 . Here Origen alludes to an Orphic myth about Dionysus, son of Zeus and 
Persephone, sv'ho was resuscitated after he had been torn in pieces by the Titans. 
The myth was interpreted as rebirth. Cf. Proclus, in P/atoms Timaeurr, 
Comment ran i, 313C; Plotinus, Enneads, IV.3.12.
72. Matt. 15,24.
74. Cels, IV, 17.
76. commJohn, 6, XLII I.
78. Cels, VI, 44.
80. homJer, 11,5.
82. commJohn, 19, XX.
84. Cf. Eph.4,9.
86. commJohn, 19, XXII.
88 . I Cor. 15,22-24.
90. John,20, 18.
92. selPs, 22.
94. I John,3,2.
96. commJohn, 2, XVIII.
98. frJohn, XIII.
100. commJohn. 19. VI.
73. Matt. 18 ,12-13 ; Luke 1 5 ,4 ff.
75. commJohn, 19, VI.
77. commJohn, 1, IX.
79. frNatt, 78.
81. selPs, 56.
83. ibid
85. commJohn, 19, XX.
87. Cf. Rom.6,4ff.
89. Cf. Luke,23,43.
91. commJohn, 10, XXXVII.
93. commJohn, 6, XIX.
95. frJohn, XIII.
97. commJohn, 2, XXVIII.
99. Prov.8,22.
101. commJohn, 6, IV.
102. selGen, (commenting on Gen.17,5.). 103. commJohn, 10, XXXVI
104. The term anoxamoramg is used also by the Stoics. Yet there can be no 
sim ilarity between Origen and the Stoics at this point. In Stoic thought, 
anoKaidomoig is the restoration of the nature, in the sense of "recurrence" of 
a next identical world. This restoration is perceived as "self-made" (an’ au iric  
jiovng), it  is also called "resurrection" (a v d o ia o ig )  3nd is postulated as taking 
place infinitely in a beginninqless and endless series of worlds [SVf, ii,30-38J 
11,190,19-203. This "natural" conception of anoKaidoiccmc as contrasted to 
Origen's conception is obviousJ for when he speaks of "restoration of the whole" 
(irig  anoKaiCEtndsEug iou naviog) ( selPs, 16) there is nothing in common with 
the Stoics apart from the sound of the expression. On the actual meaning of 
Origen's conception of anGKaidoicm ic we discuss further in this chapter.
105. homJer, 14, 18.
106. selPs, 117.
107. Cf. H. Crouzel, Hades et la Gehenne selon Origene", Gregorfanum, 
Commsntsnf de Re Theologies e i Philosophies, Roma, 59 (1978): p.331.
110. se/Ez 17. How the notion of "prophecy" in Origen underlines his 
teleological conception of time is discussed in chapter 3.
129. Tim.2,8; At the time of Origen it  v/as a commonplace that prayer may be
offered anywhere and not only in temples. Cf. deOr} 31.4; Clement of 
Alexandria, Strom stefs, 7.43.1 J Alexander of Aphrodisias, deFa to, I.
130. H. Chadwick {op. e ft, p.432) regards this expression as allusion to Plato, 
Phsedrus, 247A-C. Origen was aware of this expression as a Platonic one and 
quotes it  in Cels; III, 79. His conception of it, however, is radically different of 
that of Plato's. In Origen this "arc" refers to the uppermost place of the entire
108. s. Cels, II, 77 and frJohn, CLX. 109. Ez. 17,23.
111. commNatt, 17, 19. 112. commJohn, 13, III.
114. Cf. John, 11,25.
116. commJohn, 13, III.
118. John, 14,3. Cels, VI, 20.
120. Cf. Eph.4,9.
122. commJohn, 19, XXII.
124. commJohn, 19, XXII.
126. selPs, 23.
128. Cels, V II, 44.
113. expProv, 22.
115. Cf. John, 14,28.
117. Using the language of Heb.4,14.
119. commJohn, 19, XX.
121. commJohn, 19, XX.
123. Eph.4,10.
125. frJohn, CXXXIX.
127. Cels, VI, 20.
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world, and not only to the visible firmament. The very notion of "arc" underlines 
the radical "chasm" between God and the world, be it  "seen" or "not seen".
131. Cels, VII, 44.
132. L. and S., p.424.
133. Cels, III, 56. What Origen really suggests has totally eluded H. 
Chadwick’s translation at this point.
134. expProv, 5. 135. L. and S., p. 1722.
136. Cels, 111, 80. 137. exhhar, 111; XI11.
138. selPs, 23.
139. or, "to be made into God"; SeonoiriSupievj deOr, XXVII, 13.
140. expProv, 2. Cf. our discussion in chapter 2, §1.
141. commJohn, 1, V111. 142. se/Ps, 21.
143. commJohn, 19, XXII. 144. se/Ps, 21.
145. Cels, VII, 38; Princ, IV.2.7. The fact that Origen quite often speaks of 
the "soul" of Jesus is indicative of his affirmation of the fu lly  real humanity 
assumed by the Logos. Hence E. de Faye's assertion [E. de Faye, "De V influence du 
Gnosticisme chez Origene", p.221, n.1] that this suggests that sometimes Origen 
regards "soul" as a synonym to voug is not correct. In fact Origen never uses 
the term voug in a Plotinian sense -least of all to indicate the divine reality in 
v/hich the "soul" of Jesus, like all souls, is originated. This is an extrapolation 
of Faye, quite usual among those scholars who read Origen's thought through the 
glasses of Neoplatonism. It is not only the divine reality, but even the creatures 
of higher ranks of life  where Origen regards that the term "soul" cannot be 
applied. (Cf. Cels, VI, 71; VII, 38; commJohn; 1, XXV.). Thus, speaking of these 
beings he uses terms such as "hypostasis'', quite explicitly contrasted to “soul" in 
the same expression, (Cels, VI,71) -but he does not use the term voug; the use 
of this term in such a context is attributed to Origen quite arbitrarily and 
v/ithout any grounding at all. The term voug can be found only in expressions such 
as "the voug of a scriptural passage" or similar ones, meaning just the "truth" or 
the “deeper meaning" of the scriptural passage. Indeed the passage homJer, 15,4 
to which Faye appeals here (quoting only the citation and not any text at a ll) 
proves exactly the opposite of what he alleges. We are not quite sure that he 
actually read that passage itself. For it  is there that Origen quite explicitly 
stresses that the term "soul" applies to Jesus not in as much as he is God and 
Wisdom, but only "in as much as he is a man". In the most extreme case, the term
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voug is used to indicate the "comprehensive ability" of rational creatures (as in 
frJohn, I). At that point, however, the use of the term voug is quite far away 
from that v/hich Neoplatonist attributed to it.
146. Ps. 109,1. commJohn, 32, Ml.
147. Rev.22,13.
148. commJohn, 1, XXXI. Origen here comments on the passage in Revelation 
22,13ff, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the f irs t and the
last.".
149. expProv, 1. in the passage of the Proverbs at hand it  is "wisdom" v/ho is 
regarded as the "means" for this perfection.
150. The very expression "to one end" is also found, with the same meaning, in 
commJohn, 13, XLV1.
151. PS. 109,1. 152. ! Cor. 15,25.
153. i Cor. 15,27-28.
154. Ps.62,1. Princ, 1.6.1. That "salvation" means to be found worthy of 
ascending to the eternal life  is also found in Origen's writings in Greek, as we 
have seen.
155. Princ, 11 i .5.7. 156. Princ, I i 1.5.6.
165. Princ, 1V.3.13.
166. Fragment 30, Koetschau, from Justinian, lihOr, Mansi IX.532, incorporated 
in Princ, 1V.3.13. We have discussed these allegations, as well as the similar 
ones of Jerome, in chapter 3.
157. Phi 1.2,8.
158. s. 1 Cor. 155,28; Col.1,17-19; Eph.1,22ff. Princ, lil.5 .6 .
159. Princ, 1.6.4. 
161. Cf. Gal. 4,2. 
163. Heb.10,1.
160. Princ. 111.6.8.
162. I Cor. 15,28. Princ, 111.6.9.
164. Lament.4,20.
167. a'eOr, XIII. 168. Quoting Rom.8,21.
169. Ps. 103,4.
170. Rom.8,21. deOr, XIII. 
172. Cels, V II, 42.
174. ib id 175. Ps.41,5. deOr, III.
173. frJohn, XIII.
171. deOr, Ml.
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176. A c ts ,5, 41. deOr, i l l .  177. se/Ps, 18.
178. se/Ps, 9.
179. Ce/s, IV, 57. It is here worth while comparing this passage to Origen’s 
definition that "Aeon is a natural system, comprising various bodies [and] 
containing logical differentia due to the knowledge of God" {se/Ps, 5)J this 
comparison makes it  again obvious that the term "aeon" indicates the 
spatio-temporal reality of the "world".
180. Ce/s, VI, 61. 181. Cels, iV, 9.
182. se/Ps, 71.
183. There is a phrase in Justinian’s libOr (Mansi, IX. 533) which was 
incorporated by Koetschau in Princ IV.3.1., as Fragment 29. it reads thus: "Now 
what man of intelligence w ill believe that the firs t and the second and the third 
day, and the evening and the morning existed without the sun and moon and 
stars?’’. This sentence actually expresses Origen’s view that the "days" in Genesis 
do not express time. Besides, it  echoes Origen’s view that the existence of time 
proper is related to the existence of space proper.
184. Cf. Gal.4,10. 185. Heb.10,1.
186. deOr, XXVII, 14. 187. frJohn, K ill.
188. Princ, 111.5.4. One might be tempted to assert that here Origen regards the 
heavenly bodies as having souls. We give an account of this question in Appendix
B.
189. se/Ps, 38 -quoting Ps.38.
190. commJohn, 1, XVII -quoting Rom.8,20.
191. s. commJohn, 1 ,XXV; 1,XXVI; Ce/s, IV ,74; IV,99; commNatt, 
10,11; se/Ps, 35; etc.
192. Rom.8,21. 193. Cf. John, 6,52.
194. Princ, 111.5.4. 195. Princ, 11.3.2.
196. Princ, 11.3.2. 197. Princ, 11.3.3.
198. Princ, 11.3.3. our italics.
199. Princ, 111.1.19; s. also exhNar, V. 2 0 0 . Princ, 11.3.3.
201 . Princ, 11.3.1. 202 . ib id
203 . Princ, 11.3.2-7. 204 . Princ, 11.3.6.
20 5 . Fragment 19, Koetschau, (From Justinian, ZihQr, Mansi IX, 529)
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incorporated in Princ, 11.3.3.
2 0 6 . mm
207 . Cf. Fragment 10, in Princ, L4.5J Fragment 40, in Princ, iV.4.8.
20 8 . epAv, 5; cited in FP, p.84, n.3.
20 9 . Cf. Rom.8,21 and I Cor. 15,28.
210. John, 17,21.
211. Jerome, epAv, 9a; cited in FP, p.246., n.4. A similar assertion is adduced by 
Justinian in libOr, Mansi IX. 529 and reads thus: Nov/ v/hen God is said to become 
'all in a ll' (! Cor. XV. 28), just as v/e cannot include evil, v/hen God becomes all 
in a ll, nor irrational animals, lest God should come to be in evil and in irrational 
animals; nor lifeless things, lest God, v/hen becomes a ll, should even come to be 
in them, so neither can we include bodies, which in their own nature are 
lifeless.". Koetschau has incorporated this passage, as Fragment 27, in Princ,
11.6.2. At the pertinent point of the Latin translation of Rufinus, the expression 
"so neither can v/e include bodies, which in their ov/n nature are lifeless" does 
not exist.
212. Princ, 11.3.1. 213. John, 17,24.
216. Princ, 111.6.9. It is not surpising then that scholars such as P. PI ass assert 
that "Origen’s eschatology is notoriously obscure" [op. c it, p.14]. Once he tried to 
study Origen’s thought using the Princ, as his only source, he could not reach any 
conclusion different from that ; besides this conclusion appears quite convenient 
and rather "safe", as this view has been taken by quite a number of other 
scholars, too.
21 9 . Cf. also the relevant allegations of Jerome, in epAv, 5,6, cited in FP, p.92, 
n.7.
220. Princ, 111.6.8.
221 . Princ, 11.2.1. In the light of our previous analyses, it  is obvious that the 
expression "after a space of time" is but a rough rendering of Rufinus; v/e again 
mention our remark about how carelessly Rufinus has treated temporal notions in 
his translation due to the very fact that he was not aware of Origen's conception 
of time.
214 . John, 17,21. 21 5 . 1 Cor. 15, 28. Princ, 11.3.5.
21 7 . Princ, 11.3.7. 2 18 . Princ, 11.3.7.
222 . Princ, 11.3.2. 22 3 . Princ, 11! .6.3.
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224. Princ, 111.6.3. 225 . 1 Cor.7,31.
226. Princ, 111.5.1; our italics.
227 . Matt. 14,35 and parallels. Princ, 111.5.1.
228 . Princ, l.Pref.7. Although the conception is Origen's, expressions such as
"this v/orld ... began to exist at a definite time" are too far from Origen’s highly
scrupulous use of language.
2 29 . Princ, 111.5.1. Here again the translation of Rufinus, namely the expression 
"a time after the last days” should be regarded in the context of our previous 
remarks, namely how carelessly he has treated temporal notions of Origen.
2 3 0 . P rinc,! 11.5.1.
231. Such an entirely erroneous view is also alleged by D. Balas. [Cf. D. Balas,
"The idea of participation in the structure of Origen’s thought. Christian
transposition of a theme of the Platonic tradition", Origeniana. Premier collogue 
international das etudes origeniennes. Bari, 1975; p.260]. A number of 
extrapolations are made out of the study of the Latin rendering of Princ and 
commJohri only -whereas the rest of Origen's work is neglected. All the author 
sees and claims to be Origen’s thought is Platonism and a Neoplatonic 
world-picture of a hierarchy from the lower to the highest degees of being [op. 
cit., p.2613. He quite falsely speaks of a "created intelligible world"; the 
materiality of the entire world has totally eluded him; the radical hiatus between 
God and the world has eluded him too. In short, he reads into Origen’s works not 
what Origen says but what he wants to read into those two works of Origen. Thus 
he stands in the long series of authors who have made assertions about Origen, 
not out of a genuine study of his v/orks but from a second-hand repetition of 
erroneous views established by earlier scholars.
23 2 . P. Plass is one more scholar among those who have adopted this wrong view 
[P. Plass, op. c it, p. 14]. In contrast to others, however, he has gone as fa r as to 
attribute the notion of a "sacred time" in a reality between divine timelessness 
and v/ordly time. We commented on that in chapter 2, §2. Consequent on his 
mistake he alleges that Origen’s eschatology suggests that "time (along with 
space and matter) is then transfigured into some sort of supratemporal mode of 
being"; he further alleges that this kind of reality is a "changeless duration". 
This is a totally erroneous assertion; it  is not accidental that Plass does not 
adduce any evidence, any passage of Origen's on which this would be grounded 
-fo r the simple reason that there is nothing into Origen’s work which even 
remotely would be taken to suggest views like these.
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233 . Dial; 01 Ro^oi fienioiepoi aiaiv... (BGF,16,372,24).
234 .  Dial;... k c u  TifiSopev zni flotfov p u c rc iK O V ...  (BGF, 16,373,29).
235 . Dial; BsopsSa aKpoaiuv taxvnv Siavoiav e x o v t u v .  (BGF, 16,372,24-25).
236 . Princ, 111.6.3.
237 . Princ, 1.6.2; 11.1.3.; IN.5.4.; 111.6.3.;
238 . Princ, iV.3.14.
240 . ibid.
242 . homJer, 18, 6.
2 4 4  homJer, 1, -9.
XXXVI.
2 4 6 . Cels, IV, 30.
248 . commJohn, 1, XVI.
25 0 . commNatt, 17, 19.
252 . Princ, 111.6.4.
25 4 . Princ, IV.3.14.
256 . commJohn, 32, XVIII.
258 . se/Ps, 61 -commenting on Ps.61,6.
259 . commJohn, 20, XIX. The notion of the incarnated Logos "coming out" of
God is expounded in commJohn, 20,XV111. Origen emphasizes, however, that, at 
the time of the incarnation, Christ was both "out" of God and "in" God. The
contradiction in the phrase is only apparent; s. commJohn, 20,XVIII.
260 . In view of this conception, the passage in Princ where the entire world is 
portryed as the "things ... which are external to the Trinity" {Princ, IV.4.1.) can 
be regarded as an expression of Origen himself.
2 61 . For the scriptural grounding of this figure Origen appeals to John,13,3.
262 . commJohn, 19, XX.
2 63 . The radical hiatus between God and the world is a fundamental notion of 
his theology. It is because R. Cadiou failed to grasp this point that he has made 
the erroneous allegation reading thus: "Origen's philosophical system is based upon 
a notion as old as Greek philosophy: the notion of participation." [R. Cadiou, 
Origen: His life  in Alexandria, St. Louis, 1944, p.329]. This is quite subsequent to 
the fact that Cadiou has seen in Origen's work nothing more than Platonism and
.6.8.
239 . homJer, 14, 18.
241 . Princ, 111.6.3.
243 . Cels, y I, 61.
2 4 5 . commJohn, 10,
2 47 . I Cor. 15,25.
249 . frJohn, XIII.
251 . John 17,21; 10,30. 
253 . Is .4 1,22-23.
255 . commJohn, 1, XVI. 
257 . commJohn, 13, XLVI.
Neoplatonism. One particular expression indicative of what he read into Origen's 
work. He speaks of philosophical system of Origen. But such a thing does not 
exist whatsoever. There is only the theology of Origen. It is a serious mistake to 
regard Origen as a philosopher -and he is regarded as such by those who have not 
understood his thought. For although Origen is of great interest to philosophers, 
he is above all a theologian. A philosopher who wishes to grasp Origen's thought 
should approach his work as a work of a theologian. Cadiou is not the only one 
who made this mistake. Following the above erreoneous allegation, D. Balas has 
v/ritten an article where a series of extrapolations are based upon the wrong 
presuppostion of "participation" and that Origen's world-picture is but a Platonic 
and Neoplatonic one, as we point out in note 231 (s. supra. ).
264 . G. Florovski, Aspects o f Church History, pp.69-70.: Certainly, he is not the 
only one; M. Wiles, does the same, too, following Florovski's assertions almost 
verbatim. Cf. M. Wiles, "Origen as a biblical scholar". The Cambridge History of 
the Bible, vol. 1 (1970), pp.454-88.
265 . Indeed Origen held a conception of God Himself far more radical than 
Florovski does. For whereas Florovski attributes to God the category of 
"essence", Origen conception of God's radical transcendence was so strong and 
profound that he affirmed many times that even "essence", whatever it may mean 
or pertain to, was "made" by God and God Himself is "beyond essence" and "does 
not participate to essence"; Cf. our discussion in chapter 1.
266 . It is due to this approach of Origen that a certain reconstruction of Celsus 
polemic treatise against Christians, entitled "True Discourse", has been possible.
267 . Cels, IV, 99.
268 . Aristotle points out that among all thinkers of the past Plato alone taught 
that time had a definite beginning; Cf. Physics, 251 b16ff. Even in that case, 
however, space proper is regarded as beginningless.
269. Origen is aware if  this view and states that in Cels, VI, 48. Cf. xo napd: 
nf)diuivi ev xaig eniaioflcu£ ReBe^pevov ... nept xou SiaKocprioavioQ xo6e xo nav.
270 . Cels, IV, 99.
271. See the term oiKOVopd in the passage above; Origen strongly believes in 
the divine dispensation (oiKovop(a) and criticizes those who do not believe in 
that. Thus he refers to those who "have been deceived and thinx that the things 
under the moon are not provided (anpovonia)" adding that "Aristotle is among
them" {se/Ps, 35); s. also Cels, I, 21.
272 . Cels, V II, 44. 273 . SVF, 11,167,8.
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274 . Cels, VI, 71. 275 . Cels, V, 7.
276 . This was a Stoic doctrine; Cf. SVF,l!,167,35r'f. Also in Sextus Empiricus, 
Ad versus Naihematicos, IX.338-49, 352; II. 264; Phymania, 111.98-101. Cf. 
Athanasius, Contra Gen tea, 28; M.25.4ff.
However, Origen's articulation that it is the "world" which is the "whole" is 
similar to Stoic one only in letter. His premises for holding this view are 
entirely different, namely it is the transcendence of God -a notion which has no 
room in Stoic thought, which regarded God as immanent in the world. Origen’s 
conception is completely different: If the "whole" was the reality of both God and 
world, then, he argues, God would be regarded as "part" of the "whole". But God 
is not "part" of the "whole". He is beyond the "whole". Besides the conception of 
the radical transcendence of God, this view of Origen's suggests a fundamental 
view of his which has been underestimated (and sometimes denied) by a vast 
number of scholars who overstressed and miscomprehended his allegorical 
exegesis: Origen here strongly affirms the fu ll re a lity  of the world.
If the world was a "lie" (as, for example, it was to the Gnostics) or it was 
"less" real, then it would be regarded as a "lie" which is included in the entire 
reality (including the divine one) as a lie, which, in the final analysis, does not 
affect the fundamental truth of the real existence of the "whole" which is 
"higher" than this world.
Origen’s statement at this point of Cels, exactly show that such a conception is 
entirely alien to his thought. The world is the "whole", it is fully real, whereas 
God is beyond the whole.
27 7 . Cels, I, 23.
27 8 . L. and S., p.2008, 4.eJ We have, however, translated it as "through time" 
because when Origen wants to express the notion of "after a time" he uses the
term xpovog (time) in the plural; Cf. commNatt, 13, 1; 5id noowv xpovwv;
also deOr, XXVII, 14; 6id x p o v i k w v  Siaainpdiuv. Yet the notion of "through" is
also indicated by the use of plural as well as in selPs, 9, where he states that 
the Lord "must reign throughout the aeons (Sid i u v  cuuvuv) 'until he puts all his 
enemies under his feet' (Ps.109,1). Thus, from a conceptual point of view, in 
Origen's view of time the preposition mainly means "through", which is the 
current meaning of the preposition.
27 9 . It would be a serious mistake to assert that the above mentioned expression 
of Origen simply denotes the purification of a world after a consummation and to 
take the term enioxpetpEiv as meaning "returning" only in the sense of "repenting".
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This, four tv/o main reasons: First, the discussion at this point is clearly about 
whether or not "God returns to Himself through time". Origen has explicated this 
in the begining of the paragraph. Celsus alleges that "God does not return to 
Himself through time". The above mentioned passage shows that Origen holds quite 
the opposite. Secondly, it could not be asserted that after a consummation it is 
the "whole" that returns to God. For what takes place is only a re-arrangement of 
rational creatures in the various ranks of life. So, those creatures who are 
transposed to lower ranks of life  not only do not "return" to God, but, on the 
contrary, they fall even farther from Him. At any rate, after a consummation it 
is not the "whole" that returns to God. This "return" of the "whole" to God 
constitutes the eschatological perspective and the final goal of striving in time.
2 80 . CommEph. p.242, 2; at another point of the same work he points that the 
preposition Sid indicates a notion of duration {op. c it, p. 143,14-15]J in Greek, 
the term for "duration" is "diarkeia" (BidpKEia) which is composed from the 
preposition "dia" (6id) and the verb "arko" (apKtu).
281. Cf John, 13,3.
282 .  commJohn\ 32, III; koc i i o u  Iif) pouRnSeviog nponxoujiEvwg e^easeiv and 
iou naipog, <iva> eRSn id e^eRSovia dg idg x^pag k c u  iri£ei iou inoou, 
k c u  oiKovopnSfi npog iov 8 e o v  und^Eiv aKoflouSouvia auiu, 5id id aKoRou'Setv 
auiu Eoopsva npog iov 8 e o v .
283. John 13,36.
284. comm John, 32, ill. 285. John,8,21.
286. Cf. Gal. 1,4. 287. Cf.Eph.2,7. commJohn, 19, XIV.
288. commJohn, 10, XXXIX. 289. commJohn, 10, XXXIX-XLIII.
290 . In this passage the term ouyyevng is related to the word Siauinuamc
which is in Genitive; the expression tru##*evng Siaoujpazog here means "related 
to the extension". Origen uses a similar expression a few lines before this point, 
as he speaks of tru^evsi'g epSopdSog which means "related to the number 
seven". The term gevitrSm is not explicitly stated but it is implied according to 
a common habit in Greek, namely to omit verbs which are very common and 
apparently meant. This happens in English, too. For we say; "once all perfected, 
creatures will be ’perfectly' resurrected", instead of "once they w ill have ah 
been perfected ...".
291. commJohn, 10, XXXIX. The allegory of going out of Egypt in order to 
reach the promised land is usual in Origen's thought and it refers to the 
eschatological perspectives of the world.
292. ib id .; ...ioie 5id iriv noRRriv eipnvTiv...
293. This is the mistake v/hich C. Blanc has made in translating this passage in 
French (s. Commentaire sur S. Jean, vol.!!, pp.548-9): "Cependant les travaux de 
la preparation des pierres, de leur extraction et de leur adaption a la 
construction, qui durent trois ans, me semblent representer toute la duree de T 
intervalle apparantee a la triade d3ns 1'eternite.". The translation of A. Menzies 
in Ante-Nicene Fathers, (add. vol.iX, New York, 1897), is far too bad to be 
worthy of comment; for he renders a text such as "this appears to me to point 
solely to the time of the eternal interval which is akin to the triad" (p.404). 
This is not even a paraphrase of the text, as the translator has not grasped the 
syntax of even secondary points of the text.
302. Cf.John, 1,29; commJohn, 6, LVN.
303. s. Comm, f  Cor; eicn nveg dv8punoi pfi napaSExopsvoi ‘id iou nveupecioc 
iou 8eou* ou 5td inv >|.ucriv ug oioviai oi siepo&oEoi, cxRRcc 5id id pd 
nap<E>OKEuaKEvai Ectuioug."; p.240.
304. Cant 6.
305. Cant, 1/2; 6.
306. Cant, 1. ev #dp iu la p ie iu  iou  vuptpiou "ndv ieg  ol Snoaupoi irig croslag
kcu ir ig  xvuaewg anoKputpOi" (quoting Col.2,3).
307. W. Herberg, "Eschatology", in The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970, vol.8, 
p.694-7.
308. The "naturalistic" view is characterise of what Herberg calls "primitive" 
religion where the basic reality is nature: "Nature is engrossed in cyclical
rhythms, and the pattern of eternal recurrence becomes the context of 
naturalistic eschatology". "Eternalistic" views are characteristic of "Greek and 
Oriental spirituality.". "In most cases eternalistic eschatologies find their
background in the conception of time as the endless cycle of eternal recurrence. 
It is from this ‘vain repetition’ that they seek to escape: the 'last thing' hoped for 
is the deliverance of the individual from the unreal realm of the empirical, 
temporal and historical to the timeless realm of spirit." [op. cit., our italics.]. 
Herberg's view is that that "historistic eschatologies" in the full sense of the
294. commJohn, 10, XXXVII; 10, XXXV. 295. commJohn, 32, III.
296. commJohn, 10, XXXVII.
298. Cf. II cor.5,19.
300. Cf. I Cor. 15,26.
297. Princ, III.5.8.
299. Cf. PS. 109,1; Heb.10,13.
301. I Cor. 15,28.
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term have appeared only in the sphere of Hebraic religion, by which he means 
both Judaism and (Primitive) Christianity, in this category, Herberg includes also 
Islam, and notes that Zoroastrianism (Parsiism) constitutes a perplexing problem 
because "its view of time and history is not one of eternal recurrence, but rather 
one of a linear movement toward a consummation." [ ibid. ].
309 . A. von Harnack, History o f Dogma, (7 vols.) vol. 11, tr. N. Buchanan from 
the 3rd edition. New York, 1958; p.319ff.
31 0 . A. von Harnack, Outlines o f the History o f Dogma, tr. E. Mitchell with an 
introduction by P. Rieff. Boston, 1957; p.60.
311. Cels, V III, 64. Cf. chapter 4.
3 18 . Cels, V III, 64. It is worth mentioning that Origen, who never uses 
unnecessary or superfluous words, here alludes to three different existential 
states of rational beings; "angels" are those beings of higher ranks of life; 
"souls" indicates the existential status of human beings after their human death 
until the end of the aeon (Cf. chapter 3); "spirits" alludes to the beings of the 
eternal life  (Cf. chapter4).
319 . deOr, X,2; XI, 1.
320 . homJer, 15, 3.
32 1 . selPs, 68; Auiog xotvuv o Oeog Ao^og auxriv avans'iinai iw flaipi, 
iSionoioupevog la  kcc3’ ov eirlntpE rivSpunov ntf3n. Cf. also deOr, X, 2 .
32 2 . selPs, 4. ...naviog a t^ou Siri iiiv axannv nctvia £fini[oviog. Here one can 
see the teleological character of Origen’s time, vividly expressed through the 
notion of "hope" (eRniCoviog) as well as his conviction that it is love which 
constitutes the main existential pre-requisite for the fu lfilm en t o f hope.
3 2 3 . John, 17,5.
3 2 4 . selPs, 4 -quoting Ps.4,9. 32 5 . Cels, II, 77.
3 2 6 . John 1,29. 3 2 7  commJohn, 1, XXXII.
328 . Princ, 11.1.2. 32 9 . Princ, 11.1.2.
330 . Princ, 11.3.4. 33 1 . Princ, 11.3.2.
314. f r l -  /  WLam, IV. 3 1 5 . f r  1-1 WLam, XXXIX.
317. selPs, 41; see al so selPs, 113.316. selPs, 37.
3 3 3 . Princ, 11.3.2. The language of Rufinus should not be pressed too far; for 
example, in the light of our discussion in chapter 2, the expression "infinite ... 
ages" is certainly not a phrase of Origen but a figure employed by Rufinus. 
Similarly the term "immortality" denotes the ascent to eternal life. In Princ,
11.3.3. Origen argues that at that state rational creatures possess bodies, although 
the translation of Rufinus has, to a certain extent, obscured the conception behind 
the text, as he has not apprehended that eternal life  as an “end" denotes a 
different status from that of the final end.
33 4 . Princ, 11.1.2. 33 5 . Cels, IV, 99.
33 6 . commNatt, 12, 34.
33 7 . Due to the totally erroneous premise that Origen is a "Platonist" and holds 
a "doctrine of eternal creation", R. Norris.was.unable to discern the dramatic 
character of time (and, thus, of history) in Origen's thought. It is then not 
surpising that he reaches the mistaken conclusion that in Origen's thought there is 
"little room" for a concern with the concrete course of history as the context of 
man’s encounter with God. ( op'. c it, p.156).
33 8 . Cf. 0. Cullmann's discussion of the tension between the "mid-point" and the 
end {op. c it, pp.146ff). The striking diference, however, is that to Cullmann it is 
only the "end" of this aeon but not the end of time. In contrast, to Origen this is 
the absolute end of time. Furthermore, whereas Cullmann wishes to postulate this 
"tension" only in terms of time, Origen had already an account of the dramatic 
dialectics in spatio-temporal terms; this means that the tension is not only 
between Present and Future, but it is the tension between Present and Here on the 
one hand, and Future and There, on the other.
3 3 9 . This is a conception of time which has no place in 0. Cullmann's conception 
of time.
3 4 0 . commJohn, 10, XXXV.
34 1 . In H. Puech's exposition of what is supposed to be the Christian view of 
time, there are affirmations such as "time ... progresses towards an end, a goal"; 
it "has a beginning and an absolute end"; "time has a full reality and a 
significance" and "it has not only a definite orientation but also an intrinsic 
meaning" [op. c it, p.46]. All these are nothing more than a repetition of a view of 
time established by Origen. But Puech's conception of time, as such , is indeed 
quite vague there. It is obvious that he is not familiar with the problematique of 
time in itse lf. Thus there are roughnesses such as "the world is wholly immersed
in time". In his speaking of time proper, there is nothing of Origen’s refined and 
sophisticated language. Puech actually ignores the relation of space to time and 
thus he speaks of the world as "immersed in time" whereas Origen spoke of 
oupnap£Kmvo|i£Vog. Further he repeats the arbitrary and ungrounded assertion 
that, "time runs ... in a straight line". But time in itself is a dimension v/hich does 
not "run" whatsoever. Puech here (quite unconsciously) uses Neoplatonic terms, 
since it v/as Plotinus v/ho said that time "runs" (oupnapaSeei), as we have seen. 
And certainly there is nothing v/hich would suggest that time has anything to do 
with a "straight line". Modern Physics has already proved that no notion of 
"rectilinear" can be attributed to time. The "geodetic lines" of the universe are 
"curves" and there is strong doubt on whether a "rectilinear line" in the universe 
can make any sense at all. At any rate Puech is quite unaware that if  there is 
something correct in his assertions, it is nothing more than a repetition of 
Origen’s thought, of which was quite unaware as himself states further in that 
work. Cf. H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", in Nan and Time, Princeton, 1973; p.49ff.
34 2 . It is quite striking how different are the views of what Christian scholars 
postulate as "the Christian view of time". H. Puech regards "Christian time" as 
"finite, limited at both extremities" [op. c it, p.46] whereas 0. Cullmann 
postulates "Cristian time" by the exactly opposite view. H. Puech affirms an "end" 
of time whereas this notion is the main target in Cullman's attack.
3 4 3 . Cullmann, op. c it, p.76.
3 4 4  op. c it, p.64 ff.
3 4 5 . We concentrate on the conception of time and we do not need to discuss the 
obvious theological and cosmological differences, which are not essentially 
related to the point v/e discuss here.
34 6 . Cullmann, op. c it, p.76.
3 4 7 . op. c it, p.63. - 3 4 8 . op. c it, p.76.
3 4 9 . op. c it, p.63. 3 5 0 . op. c it, p.73.
351 . op. c it, p.60. 35 2 . op. c it, p.64ff and p.73.
353 . This is not . the only point where Cullmann unconsciously contradicts 
himself. Indeed he employs Greek conceptions and Greek affirmations about time. 
As we have pointed out in chapter 1, this is due to the quite apparent fact that 
Cullmann lacks a knov/ledge of the problematique o f time in itse lf, whereas 
Origen was profoundly aware of it. We just give one more example of this. In
chapter 2, Cullmann postulates that in Greek thought "time moves is a cyclical
way" [op. c it, p.64-5] whereas in the New Testament "time ... is perceived as a
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rectilinear movement" [op. eft., p.65]. 0. Cullmann is quite unaware of the fact 
that here he employs the most extreme assertions of the pagan thought. For the 
very notion that " time moves" is exactly a conception of Plato's. On this point R. 
Markus describes the Platonic conception of time stating that to Plato time moves 
"as the first of the moving things" [A. Armstrong - R. Markus, Christian Faith anc 
Greek Philosophy, London, 1960, pp.119-20]. Besides, when Cullmann says (s. 
supra ) that ''tim e is  ... movement" all he does is to repeat the opinion of 
Eunomius, against whom Basil wrote his work Contra Funomium arguing how 
nonsense it is to say that time is movement. [s. chapter2, §1]. We already have 
discussed that Origen takes the anti-PI atonic view that time does not move 
whatsoever but it is an "extension", namely a dimension alongside which 
movement takes place. And, as we proved in chapter 2, Basil repeated Origen's 
conception of time in order to attack Eunomius’ views that time in itself is 
movement. The reader can see that what Cullmann actually does is to echo the 
views of Plato and of Eunomius, quite unconsciously postulating these views as 
the "Christian" view of time in its e lf. in fact, Cullmann is nearer to Plato than 
Aristotle v/as. For the latter clearly explicates that "time is not movement" 
[Physios , 221b10j 219a1 ffJ 218b22]. A similar view has been taken by J. 
Muilenhurg ["The Biblical view of time", p.238] who argues that "Biblical time is 
comprehended ... by its quality, by the nature of the content with which it is 
filled.". Thus he, too, regards time its e lf as defined by movement in it j in the 
final analysis, to speak of "quality of time" implies the premise that "time in 
itself" is "movement" -which is a pagan conception of time. Boman has taken a 
similar view {Cf. Boman, op. o it, p.131). In general, this is a view taken by a 
large number of scholars after E. von Orelli.
35 4 . The terms "preceding" and "following" are certainly used in a loose sense.
355 . commGeri, 3; deQr, VI ,5.
356 .  commGeti 3. Also in Cels, V!11,72. k c u  t o  i e B o c  t u v  npa^udxuv 
avaipe8riva{ eon iriv KaKiav’. This is one of the most clear statements of Origen 
that the expressions xeBog xuv npcctfinhuv denotes the eschatological reality.
35 7 . commMatt, 17, 19. Einar Molland makes the serious mistake of following 
H. Koch’s erroneous view that in Origen's thought there is no room for 
eschatologyJ Ch. E. Molland, The Conception o f the Gospel in the Alexandrian 
Theology\ Oslo, 1938J p. 157.
35 8 . fiomJer;. 11 ,5 .
359 . expProV; 1. 3 6 0 . selGeti (commenting on Gen. 17,5.).
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361. comm John, 2, XXIII. 362. exhMar^ LVI.
363. S. Cels, i ,2 2 -2 5 , and V,45. Regarding Aristotle, it is significant that, in 
Cels, Origen refers to him implicitly in speaking about "the Peripatetics". 
Generally, in Origen's works here are some notions which are of Aristotelian 
origin and sometimes the Stagirite is referred to by name. But, as G. Bardy points 
out, these are current ideas and commonplaces of his era rather than an outcome 
of a direct study of Aristotle by Origen -which is a moot question. Actually there 
can be no assertion of any "influence" of Aristotle upon Origen. As Bardy points 
out "Origene adopterait plutot, a l ’egard d’ Aristote, un attitude de defiance.; il n' 
est en tout cas pas familier avec sa pensee et jamais il ne le regarde comme son 
inspirateur." [G. Bardy, "Origene et VAristotelisme", Melanges Gustave Glotz, 
Paris, 1932, p.83]. We endorse this conclusion of G. Bardu.
J. Denis takes a similar view and asserts that it is possible that Origen might had 
never read Aristotle’s works themselves [Cf. J. Denis, De la philosophic d 
Origins; Paris, 1884, p. 16].
H. Crouzel, also, quite rightly asserted that there is no Aristotelian influence on 
Origen [Cf. H. Crouzel: Origene et la Philosophic, Paris, 1962.].
On the contrary, E. de Faye points out some philosophical points which are of 
Aristotelian origin, such as the notions of cmopicu, Bo&ikcu oumcei, noioimsc and 
unomyevov, free will and the reference to the "soul". [Cf. E. de Faye, Origene; 
vol. Ill, 1928, p.87, n.1j.
This is one more point on which Faye goes along with H. Koch who alleges that one 
might discern an indirect Aristotelian influence upon Origen’s thought [Hal Koch, 
Pronoia und Paideusis. Leipsig, Berlin, 1932J p.205L But these notions were 
widespread in the Hellenistic era and they do not prove any Aristotelian influence 
on Origen at all. At any rate, E. de Faye fails to see the most important point, 
namely Origen's adoption of the Aristotelian definions of izdog. For, as we said 
in chapter 3, these definitions particularly underline the teleologies1 character 
of time in Origen's thought.
364. deOr, XXIV, 2. 365. comm John, 1, IX.
366. comm John, 6, XL I.
367. comm John, 13, XXV. In doing so Origen uses the language of Eph.1,21.
368. This passage is from the Anathemas decreed by the Second Council of 
Constantinopole in 553. Similar is a text of Justinian’s in libOr (Mansi IX. 533, 
pp.396-397). Koetschau has incorporated this text into his edition of Princ. (in 
II.8.3). The translator G. Butterworth alleges that "though they cannot be taken as 
literal extracts from the 'De Principiis', they express the teaching of this work,
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doubtless for the most part in Origen's own words.". (FP, p. 125). in fact, 
however, this passage constitutes one of the worst and most malicious distortions 
of Origen's thought. It is buttressed on the false premise of an "eternal world of
spirits" and the subsequent allegations which Justinian made for aims of his own.
369 . Cf. D ia l (BGF,16,373,29).
3 7 0 . Cf. Cels, I, XXII. 37 1 . comm John, 1,IX; 6 ,XL I.
37 2 . In Greek it is a rule of etymology that the final syllables -ma, -m i and 
-os  signify the "result" of what the root (or, "theme") of the word indicates.
37 3 . expProv, 1.
37 4 . PrincJW&Z. 37 5 . ib id
3 7 6 . Js.41,22- 23.
37 7 . Prinp  I V.3.14. 37 8 . comm John, 2, XXX Ml.
3 7 9 . G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, p.50.
30 0 . COmmJohn; 1, XXIX. The passage o f Origen reads thus: "to  God there is 
not any evening and I think that there is  no morning e ither, but the tim e, so to 
say, which is  co-extended alongside w ith  his unbegotten and tim e less l i f e ,  th is  is 
the day named as today (ouk evi xdp ecmepa Ssou, e^u Se rixoupo:i, o n  ouSe 
npuicc, aaari o eupnapEKiEtvwv in  atfEVViiiu kq i at5(u auiou cuirj, (V  ou iug  
Emu, xpovog njiepa e o iiv  auxu oripEpov". For discussion on th is  passage, s. 
ch.2,§1, p.14.
John of Damascus uses all the notions which Origen first formulated in order to 
depict the Christian conception of time. Thus he speaks of the divine eternity 
stating that "it is not time, neither is it a part of time counted by the direction 
and course of the sun, namely what is consisted of days and nights, but is is what 
is co-extended alongside with that timeless, so to say, temporal movement and 
extension" (Aexetcxi ndfliv aiuv, ou xpovoc, ou5e xpovou n  p E p o g ,  Ttftfou <popd kcu
Spojitd pEipOUJiEVGV, TlXOUV 6l* Tlliepuv KCtl VUKTUV uUVl£Jld[IEVOV, da3d 10 
(JupinapEKiEivopiEvov xoig o:i&ioig, oiov n  xpovixov K ivnpa k c i &idoirip.a)J [de 
Fids orthodoxs lih r i quattuop 11,1.: f1.94.864],
38 1 . Did/, (BGF,16 ,373 ,29-35 ).
3 8 2 . commMatt, 15, 34. 38 3 . comm John, 2, XIX.
3 8 4 . se/Ps, 117. ...kcu xfiv apxouctv anEfldpopEV naipi&a...
3 8 5 . ib id  Kcd fi anapxd ir\q  (puaeug i f\q njiEiepag unepavw xwv oupavwv 
avnvnvExSn...
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386. 001111,14,3. 387. il Tim.2,12; our italics.
388. commMatt, 14, 17. it is obvious that the expression “upper Jerusalem" 
here alludes to the divine reality. The figure of "mother" is also used in 
16,138,3-5, also quoting Gal.4,26.
389. commMatt, 14, 16-17. 390. Matt. 19,5.
391. I Cor. 12,27. 392. commMatt, 14, 17.
393. John, 1,14. 394. commMatt, 14, 17.
395. Rom. 6, 5. 396. commJohn, 10, XXXVll.
397. commMatt, 17,34. 398. Heb.10,1.
399. commMatt, 17, 34. 400. selPs, 1.
401. expProv, 19. s. also expProv, 24. 402. Gal.6,14.
403. Gal.2,20. 404. !! Cor. 13,3.
405. Ps. 109,1; Heb.10,13.
406. commJohn, 10, X; s. also commMatt, 12, 34.
407. commJohn, 6, XXX. Origen is fully aware of the meaning of the term 
"until" (due) and he articulates his view of that as follows: "The term 'until’ is 
frequently found in the scripture denoting a continuous stretch of time, like in 
'until 1 put your enemies as a footstool under your feet' (Ps.109,1) and in 'until 
you grow old ! am' (ls.46,4) and in 'did not return' the dove to Noah 'until the 
waters were dried up' (Gen.8,7); these [expressions] have been made in order to 
denote a continuous stretch of time, it also may be so understood as it is found in 
the phrase 'he knew' her not’, which means that [Joseph] did not know how did 
’she’ [sc. Mary] conceive, ’until she brought forth' and he [sc. Joseph] saw the 
signs which occurred." (quoting Matt.1,25J frM att‘ 22.).
408. commJohn, 1, XVI.
409. frJohn, XIII. 410. commJohn, 2, XV ill.
411. commJohn, 1, XVI. 412. Rom. 11,36.
413. Gregory of Nyssa has followed Origen on this point, too; thus he suggests 
that the world is created from God. ( De hominis opificio  , 23-4; M.44.209C- 
213C). R. Sorabji regards this notion as a "striking innovation"; ( Time, Creation 
and the Continuum , p.294; also p.194). What scholars have not realized is that 
they cannot speak of "innovations" in Gregory of Nyssa unless they have 
previously studied the thought of Origen. For the latter has exerted a profound 
influence upon the latter. Least of all they can speak of "answer" of Gregory to
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Origen, as Sorabji emphatically did [op. eft., p.151]. Hence, again, all Gregory 
saus is not a “striking innovation" but is an echo of Origen's views. On the other 
hand, H.A. Wolf son has regarded this view of Gregory as a kind of Neopl atonic 
notion of "emanation"; Cf. H.A. Wolf son, "The identification of ex n ih il o with 
emanation in Gregory of Nyssa", Harvard Theological Review63 (1970); p.53-60. 
However; as regards Origen (who is the source of the notion), this is not case at 
all, as we have seen.
414 . Cols, VI, 65. By a conflation of i Cor. 8,6 and Rom. 11,36, the same notion 
is stated in the Prologue of the Commentary on the Song of Songs: "...the word 
'God' is used primarily 'of whom are all things, and by whom are all things, and 
in whom are all things'; ". s. R.P. Lawson, Origen: The Song o f Songs, Commentary 
and Homilies, p.34.
415. An account of this alleged distinction has been given by J. Rist, "Basil's 
'Neoplatonism': its background and nature" in Paul Fedwick (ed.), Basil of 
Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, Toronto 1981, p. 167; H.A. Wolf son, "The 
meaning of ex n ih ilo \ n the Church Fathers, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophy and St 
Thomas", in Medieval Studies in Honor o f Jeremiah D. Ford , Cambridge Mass. 
1948, pp.355-70; H.A. Wolf son, "The indentification of ex nihilo  with emanation in 
Gregory of Nyssa", Harvard Theological Review, 63 (1970), pp.53-60.
41 6 . Porphyry, for example, portrays creation not in terms of "out of nothing", 
but he avers that God generates things "from himself" (cup eauiou) [Porph. ap. 
Procl. in Tim. (Diehl) 1.300,2]. Plotinus, too, speaks of creation as coming from, 
the One [Enneads, V.8.12.].
417. J.P.Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
trans. Hazel Barnes. New York, 1956, p. 104.
418. K. Jaspers expresses this notion clearly, namely that Casein or existence 
is "the unreflecting experience of our life  in the world"; (Cf. Karl Jaspers, 
Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans. E.B. Ashton. New York, 1967; pp.63-6). 
A similar analysis can be found in other writings of his, too. However, this 
Casein should not be confused with Jaspers' notion of Existenz which 1. Is not a 
kind of being, but of a potential being. 2.Existenz is freedom found as the gift of 
Transcendence. 3. Existenz is the "ever-individual self, irreplaceable and never 
interchangeable". This is the context in which K. Jaspers asserts that "there is no 
Existenz apart from Transcendence". A comparison of this notion to Origen's 
conception of individual being would be of great interest. In that context one 
should consider Heidegger’s view that the essence of man lies in existence and 
(as it seems from the later developments of his philosophy) existence comes to
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maturity as it responds to the call of being. Particularly intersting v/ould be to 
study Heidegger’s assertions that Dasein's essence ( iVasan) is constituted not of 
properties but of possible ways of being, with respect to Origen's views; (Cf. 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. J. Maequarrie 3nd E.S. Robinson. New 
York and London, 1962. p.67j our italics). However a further discussion of this 
point is out of our scope.
419. In fact to say that a man exists "ecstatically" is but a tautology; for 
ecstasis is nothing but the Greek cognate of "existence".
420. D?3l (BGF,16,374,21): Auo ouv Kot9' e k c c o io v  npuv e ic r iv  dvSpunoi. V/e 
note that Origen's affirmations as expounded in this (relatively recently
discovered) work have not been studied in the depth which they deserve and in 
connexion with the rest of his works. Dial was published in 1949 according to 
the papyri of Toura, of 6th or 7th century A.D. in the works on Origen, which 
appeared since that, however, the allegations of Platonism in Origen have been 
left virtually unchallenged, in spite of the light which this work of Origen 
throws upon his thought as a whole.
4-21. Taking the Latin meaning of the words, ex means "out from” whereas sistc 
means "to cause to stand". Thus ex- sis to (which later became exists) indicates 
the notion of "coming into existence" in the sense "to arise" or "to appear". (Cf.
C.T. Lewis - C. Short, A Latin Dictionary, Oxford, 1962, p.702). Certainly in no 
case will a student of Origen's thought find these terms in his works, for the 
simple reason that Origen wrote in Greek. But when one wants to compare Origen's 
view of the world, as being outside of God, with the meaning of "existence" in 
modern existentialism, this account of the etymology of the word "existence" is 
quite useful.
422. commJohn, 6 , XIX.
423. SO IPS, 16. 424. SO IPs, 21.
425. Cels, IV, 99. 426. s. Appendix A.
427. commJohn, 1, XXV. 428. Cels, VI, 48.
429. commJohn, 1, XXV. The allegory of the church as the bride of Christ is 
current nowadays and it has its origin in the scripture. Israel is the fiancee of 
Yahwe [Os.2,18, ls.62,4-6; etc.] the church is the bride of Christ [Eph.1,22-23; 
Rev.21,9-10]. Later Hippolytus interpreted the Song of Solomon as an allegory of 
the love of Christ to the church. As he there le ft no source of the tradition 
traced, 1t is Origen who first iniciated the idea and anticipated all the later 
commentaries. Cf. 0. Rousseau: introduction aux Homelies sur le Cantique, Paris,
1954J pp. 13-16J Also, s. C. Blanc, Comm, sur s. Jean, I, p. 140, n.2].
43 0 . Cant, 6; i f i g  e i i e  EKKRnaiag e i i e  vupt^nc ™  Roxou yjuxnc-EKnEaouaa
iou nccpa&e'ujou npog xflv eniyovSov lauinv CufiY... In the next chapter, namely 
Cant, 7, one can find Origen’s fundamental conviction about the decisive 
eschatological significance of the incarnation and resurrection of Christ as well 
as that the "bride" is now "in betrothal" and lives "in hope of the resurrection": 
. . . v u v  pev ug e v  anapxn Rappdvouaa trig uioSaatag t o v  appaj3uvG, kgi iriv trig 
avacjidocuc ErlniSa... in the light of our previous discussions on Origen’s 
conception of the meaning of incarnation, there cannot be the slightest doubt 
about the authenticity of these texts from Procopius Gazaeus’ work, in fact, it is 
due to our analyses that the text of Cant can be regarded as highly trustworthy 
and deemed as quite authentically expressing Origen’s real v i e w s ,  in fact, the 
phraseology and the style of this text is absolutely Origen's one and so are all 
the conceptions expressed in it.
4 3 1 . Cels, Vi, 79. 43 2 . Cant, 1 -commenting on Song, 1,8.
43 5 . Cant, 6; Rojkov £woy fi vu|i<pn. Here is enunciated that the teaching of 
the Logos and the destiny of the world is for all rational creatures and not only 
for human beings; aRR’ end eotiy o Roxoq ouiog, ou piri ijjuxri k o iv w y l jv ,  aRRd 
nRsiooi k g i Sio:<p6poig... The structure of Origen’s world, consisted of different 
ranks of life  and all of them related to the Logos in different degrees, is again
vividly expressed. Cf. Cant, n ...xnv a^tipaoxov qjuxfiv Re^a f\ EKKRnaiav n to
nxepovLKov iou Xpiaxou; Cant, 2: a up a xdp h vuptpn E k k R tig ig  Xpiuxou; Cant,
6: ... KCtt KaxanRriKxtKfiv xrjv xe xe R e iu p e v tiv  $ritftv EKKRnotav... eugpaivopevog 
5e eni in Suvdpsi i u v  o^SaRpuv trig e iie  E k k R tk jig q  e i ie  vup<piiE iou Roxou
ipuxrie'. Cant, 7: eon 5e fi vuiKpn iou Roxou ipuxfL n iou Xpisiou EKKRriaia, &ia 
io v  noiifoavia io ev , kcxi io  peooioixov iou $pa#pou R uogvxg .
43 6 . Cant, 3; Gnoppmoxepuv e9eRwv k o iv u v e iv ,  k g i iiig xeReioiepag 
[iEIGGXElV avanauGEUfc.
43 9 . Here Origen deliberately uses the term Ro^oi in its twofold sense, namely 
as "words" of Jesus and "reasons"; this is why he speaks of "reasons for 
everything" through one and the same expression. The deeper meaning lies in the 
conception of the incarnation of Christ. His "words", during his corporeal 
presence in the world, "began" the new creation and his work was another form
43 3 . C a n t,l, 43 4 . Cant, 3.
43 7 . Cels, VI, 49. 4 3 8 . Cf. Matt.24,35.
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of the "creation" he made "in the beginning". These "words" are as creative as the 
“reasons" (=words) uttered in the beginning. The homonymity of the term ndgot 
allows Origen to articulate two facets of his thought at the same time by using 
the term in its twofold sense. The matter, however, is quite more profound in 
Origen’s mind and it could take an extensive analysis in order to discuss how he 
comprehends the realtion between "words" and "reasons". There is something more 
than a homonymity. A fiogog is held to be both a "word" and a "reason". In his 
view, it is the fldjfog that "has all the power". The Rd^og of a passage in the 
scripture (namely the truth behind it) is what has the force. Yet this Rd^og is 
also regarded powerful as an "utterance". So, if  it is uttered, it is like a 
powerful "medicine" which can "clean" evil and act against daemons by virtue of 
the fact that it was "uttered" ( homJer, 2,2). Thus the power of a Rd^og lies both 
in the fact that it is a "reason" as well as in the fact that it is "uttered". 
Therefore, ftoxoc is regarded at the same time as having the sense of both 
"reason" and "utterance". Indeed, this Rd^og is in itself a powerful creature . 
(Cf. frf/a tt, 484). This topic, however, is a particular facet of Origen's theology 
which requires a separate discussion.
440. John, 1,1. Cels, V, 22. 44 1 . commJohn, 1, XiX.
442 . commJohn, 1, XXXIV. 4 4 3 . comm John 1, XIX; 1, XXXIV.
4 4 4  Riato, State, 546Aj 529ff. 445 . COmmJo/lh 13, XXXVII.
446 . commJohn, 13, XXXVII. Here Origen uses the expression of Jud.6.
44 7 . John,4,34. 448 . commJohn, 13, XXXVII.
449 . commMatt, 17, 33. 45 0 . expProv, 6.
451 . so IPs, 21; our ita lic s . 45 2 . commJohn, 10, X.
453 . commJohn, 1, IV. 45 4 . H alt. 16,25.
455 . commMatt, 12, 27.
456 . The expression "after the resurrection" (paid xnv avdoiaciv) is also used 
in commMatt, 17,34.
457 . Gen.2,2-3. 4 5 8  Cf. Plato, Politicus, 272E.
459 . Heb.5,11. cels, V, 59.
46 0 . At other points Origen also alludes to this eschatological reality again 
using the term "sabbatism", expaining that it means the reality after the abolition 
of evil. Cf. excPs, 77: ...dg iov av Xpioiw vooupavov cc^pcmcpdv, louiaonv ale 
aptficcv kcu KaiaRn£Lv ifiv ef apapiiag...
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46 1 . commMatt\ 12, 36. This notion is a very crucial one not only in 
general, but also with respect to Origen’s conception of time and history. Thus, 
one would pose the following question: Since God knows everything and evil will 
be finally definitely abolished, then why does Origen speak of the "suffering" of 
Christ and his "re-crucifiction", after the historical crucifixion of Jesus? V/hy is 
Christ regarded as "suffering" since he knows that evil will finally be abolished? 
The answer to this question can be given only through the notion of "body" of 
Christ. When Origen describes the "suffering", he refers to the historical now 
where the event which constitute Christ’s "passion" occur. Although evil will 
finally be abolished, Christ suffers now for what happens now, exactly because 
the relevant historical events take place in his "body”. This significance which is 
attributed to the dicisiveness and dramatic character of the historical now 
demonstrate Origen’s affirmation of the full reality of history and the pertinency 
of occurrences in it, in the strongest terms possible. In fact, this conception of 
"passion" of the "body" of Christ constitute Origen's answer to those who 
misconstrued the character of his allegorical exegesis and alleged that Origen 
does not consider the role of history in his theology. [Such are the views of R. 
Hanson (Cf. eh.3 and n.407, ch.4 and n.291), M. Werner (Cf. ch.4 and n.292), H. 
Koch (Cf. ch.3 and n.408) and others.
46 2 . The case of C. Bigg is a very typical example of how easilyy scholars 
attributed Platonism to Origen. In his work The Christian PJatonists o f Alexandria 
(Oxford, 1913) this assumption was taken for granted -the title of the work 
says all. The reader, however, should note that, on pp. 273-80, Bigg does not 
actually provide any treatment of Origen’s eschatology. He is satisfied that 
Origen's sources are to be found in Plato. Henceforth, however, all he does is to 
raise questions, which he cannot answer. Instead of an exposition of what Origen 
held on the subject, this section of the book is full of questions v/hich Bigg 
raises and leaves unanswered. This is not unexpected; for his fundamental 
assumption of "Platonism" in Origen was wrong. Bigg postulated a certain point of 
view from which Origen’s thought should be approached. He does not deviate from 
that point of view. It is not surpising that he appreciates nothing from there and 
has so many unanswered questions. Origen certainly did treat all the questions 
concerning the eschatological perspectives of the world, as our discussion in this 
work shov/s. Thus, to postulate Origen as a "Platonist” is not just a 
miscomprehension. It is a point of view which hinders from seeing crucial facets 
of his thought. In view of this major misunderstanding it would be rather 
superfluous to comment on false assertions that Origen held that there are “three 
heavens" {op. c it, p.273, n.i).
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46 3 . A similar phenomenon happens with the translation of the Princ by Rufinus: 
Too many scholars point out that Rufinus has edited and emended the original text 
and they express it in a way as though it were a great discovery; the vast 
majority of them fails to remind the reader that it is Rufinus himself who, in his 
Prologue, affirms the fact that he has interfered with the original text.
464 . Tob it, 12,7. 46 5 . Mat't.7,6. 46 6 . Wis. 1,4.
46 7 . Cels, V, 29. 4 6 8 . Eph.5, 31 -32 . 4 6 9 . Gal.2,20.
47 0 . He appeals to John 2,21 in commJohn, 10, XXX!X.
47 1 . Appealing to Eph.5,30 in frJohn\ XCL.
47 2 . commJohn, 10, XLH.
4 7 3 . commJohn, 10, XXXIX; s. a lso  commJohn, 10, XL I.
4 7 4  By contrast, 0. Cullmann holds that it "surrendering" of the "kingdom" from 
the son to the father will happen at "some moment" of the aeon to come; op. e ft, 
p.76.
47 5 . Cf. so IPs, 9. 4 7 6 . commJohn, 10, X.
4 77 . This is a view of J. Cheek, Eschatologg and Redemption in the Theology of 
Origen; Drew University, 1962; p.273. Generally, in that work, the author has 
committed himself to a constant effort to play down (indeed to deny) anu spatial 
notion in Origen's conception of the course of the world. He has gone along with 
the view that what is "spatial" is "Greek" and therefore "contaminating" -to use a 
favorite term of H.Puech. So the author's effort is to prove that Origen's thought 
deals only with terms of time and not of space. In his effort to argue against 
those who regard Origen as a Platonist, he thinks that the best way to achieve his 
aim is to deny any spatial notion in Origen’s thought. In spite of his good will, 
he inevitably reaches the diametrically opposite point of those who regard Origen 
as a Platonist. The spatio-temporal character of Origen's thought has eluded him 
no less that it has eluded the vast number of scholars who, quite superfluously, 
regard Origen a just a Platonist and Neoplatonist.
4 7 8 . There are striking contradictions in 0. Cullmann's thought on this point. He 
affirms that the "end" may either mean the end of the "present aeon" [op. eft, 
p.76,§2] and of the creation [op. off., p.77] or "the end of the biblical apocalyptic 
course, which is the subject of the New Testament" [op. cit., p.76]. He also 
affirms that the second "end" (namely, when God will become "all in all") "falls 
into the aeon to come" [ibid]. Thus he asserts that the "subjection" of the Son to 
the Father will occur at some moment in the aeon to come. He asserts that the
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kingdom of Christ has a "temporally limited character" [op. eft.., p.151] and "like 
the church, the kingdom of Christ has, therefore, a beginning and an end" [ih id ]. 
According to his view that temporal categories express always duration and never 
moments of time, he holds that there w ill be an actual temporal period between 
these two "ends". What he does not say is how this second "end" is determined 
into the "new creation". How long is the interval between these tv/o "ends"? what 
( i f  anything) happens in the meantime? what is going ( i f  anything) to change into 
the "new creation" once the kingdom of Christ reaches its "end"? He does not deal 
with such questions, which should be in the core of the subject of that book. This 
is understandable. For, on the one hand, he has to employ a real temporal period 
betv/een the two "ends" and on the other the "new creation" in bound to be 
immutable, according to a purely Platonic perception. Again, the very existence of 
time in such a reality, as well as the discussion about the duration of the interim 
between the two "ends", can hardly be grounded on the scripture.
479. Wis. 7,17-21. R.P. Lawson, Origen, The Song o f Songs, Commentary eno 
Homilies, London, 1957J p.221; At that point the whole passage is quoted. This 
expression is quite often used by Origen in his works in Greek, especially when he 
wants to allude to the knowledge of Physics. Time is regarded as a natural 
element of the world and this is why Origen did not devote any analysis to i t  pet 
se. However, as our discussion has shown, he not only had a profound knowledge 
of the problem, but he also made outstanding contribution toward the formation of 
a Christian viev/ of time.
480. Here the simultaneity of the beginning of time and space is affirmed again.
481. Cf. Matt. 24 ,35 ; Mark, 13,31.
482. R.P. Lawson, Origen, The Song o f Songs, Commentary and Homilies, London,
1957J p.221; our italics. H. Puech portrays as a Greek conception of time the 
"eternal revolving in a circle" where there is no "beginning", "middle", or "end" in 
an absolute sense; "any idea of the creation and consummation of the universe is 
inconceivable" he adds. [H. Puech, "Gnosis and Time", pp.39-46]. In the same work, 
however, he regards Origen as virtually adopting a "Greek" conception of time. 
Our discussion here shows how wrong he is in taking that view.
483. Einar Molland, The Conception o f the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology, 
Oslo, 1938; pp. 162-164. It is indicative of how the notions of "end" have been 
confused in the Latin version of Princ that E. Molland is confused himself and he 
can produce no .answer to his question; thus he states: "But w ill there ever come 
an end of all time? That is the terrible problem to his thought. In the De 
Principiis he follows his tv/o lines of thought to their utmost consequences, one
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leading to the idea o f an absolute end, the other denying the poss ib ility  o f an 
absolute end" [ ibid., p.162]. E. Molland is  obviously unaware of how care lessly 
Rufinus has treated Origen’s conception o f tim e as well as that the term  "end" is  
a homonym alluding to d iffe re n t re a litie s . Thus what is  the " te r r ib le  problem" is  
only the Latin version o f Origen’s work.
4 8 4  Cf. Gen. 2,17. Princ. 111.6.3. 
485. in  Rom. V. 1U
486. E. Molland, op. c it, p. 162.
487. Regarding these a ffirm a tio n s  in in Rom.} Molland wonders; is  i t  "Origen or 
is  i t  Rufinus?" who says that. The answer is  that i t  is  Origen h im se lf who says 
that.
488. Cf. 1 Cor. 6,17 and John 17,21.
489. R.P .Lawson, Origen: The Song o f Songs. Commentary and Homilies, London, 
1957; p.77.
491. E. Molland, op. c it, p. 162.
492. commJohn, 10, XLII.
493. commMatt, 12, 34: xov Kaiandxovia nepi iou SnRoupevou xpovov; ih id , 
in fra: io Kccisnd^ov.
494. Cant, 2; awpa #ap h vupipn EKKRnaia Xpiaiou...
4 9 5 .  Song of Songs, 2 ,1 6 -1 7 . Cant, 2: io  xap ev3eov auiou koRRoc 
9eacapevn, em au inp iov  adiKeio tpiRipov, pe8o ava ieS doa  ekeivou iuj kceRRs i, 
Re^ ei "kccxuj a u iu ’" e iia  in v  ia £ iv  avisRaps np'iv pev eRSeiv id  ie Reiov, 
Rdtfouaa, "e^u iw  a5eR(pi6uJ pou’" o ia v  Se leR eiug anoKaRu(p3ft, pn5ev KaiaR inn 
KEKpuppEvov, aiaSavopevn io u io  Re^ e i' "kcu a5eRcpi5dc pou spot’" d p m a i 5s nou 
ia ig  npofpnm aig, auidg Kupiog noipavei npag e'iq  iouq a iw vag, aRR’ oux Og vuv 
ev Kpivoig npdg noipavei lo ig  ev peau aKavSwv. The la s t phrase exactly  
suggests that the re a lity  "a fte r  the resurrection" is  a d iffe re n t ex is ten tia l state 
in which evil has been altogether abolished.
496. Cant, 2.
49 7 . Cf. Is.40,8 and 11. Cant, 2. Origen re ca lls  the figu re  o f "shepherd" 
because i t  appears in the passage at hand, namely Song o f Songs, 2 ,1 6 -1 7  and 
re la tes  i t  to the notion o f "endless" appearing in Is. 40,8. It is  obvious tha t, at 
any ra te , the sc rip tu ra l passages and figures  are in terpre ted  in a way b e fitt in g  
his conviction that there w il l be no other fa l l ,  it  is  the authority o f prophecy, 
nevertheless, where Origen seeks to ground th is conviction.
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498 . A.H. Chroust, therefore, is quite wrong is alleging that Origen holds a 
notion of "pendular time ... in terms of alternating approachment to and alienation 
from God. This scholar is one more among those who think that Origens thought is 
but a Platonic one; thus Chroust makes the mistake of linking what he takes as a 
suggestion in Plato to “pendular time" (Cf. Politicos , 270D) with Origen's view 
of time. s. A.H. Chroust "The meaning of Time in the Ancient World", The New 
Scholasticism,. XXI (1947) J p.27, n. 150.
49 9 . Cf. tTMati, 21.
500. R. Sorabji {op. c it, p. 187 and n.54) is not right to claim that, in this work, 
E. Molland says that Origen did not accept an end to the series of worlds until his 
later writings. For this is not what Molland says here. On the contrary H. 
Chadwick correctly states Mol land's views, namely that Origen accepted an end of 
history in his writings preserved in Latin. Cf. H. Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and 
the Stoa", Journal o f Theological Studies, 1947, p.41, n.3.
501. H. Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Stoa", Journal o f Theological Studies, 
1947, p.44.
502. Cels, V i, 20.
503. The v/hole v/ork of H. Chadwick's cited above is based on this fundamental 
miscomprehension. Hence we shall not comment on that further. We only note that 
the references made by the same author in Contra Cel sum, p.5Q8, n.1, as 
pertaining to the "eschatology" of Origen, actually pertain to the “end" as "eternal 
life " and not to Origen's conception of the absolute end.
504. Cf. chapter 2J Time as an "extension".
505. Cf. chapter 2J Time as a "dimension of life".
506. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek; tr. J. Moreau from the
German 2nd edition with revisions to 1960. London, 1960J p.154.
507. op c it, p.135J In elaborating this feature of Hebraic thought, Boman states 
that the rhythmic character of Hebraic thought is capable of being illustrated in 
several ways: "An isolated unit of time, therefore, has a rhythm which for the 
sake of comparison with rhythmic speech can be given the form: unaccented - 
accented - unaccented, or to compare it  with the pulse-beat: weak - strong - 
weak. Thus in Hebrew the period of day and night is a rhythm of dull - bright -
dull; evening - morning - evening ... Accordingly, the rhythm of the month is: new
moon - fu ll moon (or moon phases) - new moon. A year is: beginning - the months 
-return to the beginningJ ... A human life  is origin from the earth - l i fe  -return to 
the earth..." [ ibid. ].
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508. Nathan Glatzer, Uniersuchungen zur Geschichtslehre o’er Tannaiten; Berlin, 
1933J p.35.
509. N. Glatzer, op cit., p.36. With respect to the Old Testament, W. Herberg 
also explains that "...there is a unity, and this unity consists in the conviction 
that the present (historical) period of "wrongness" is a fa llin g  away from the 
original (protological) "rightness" (the rightness of God's creation), and it  is 
destined for a return to the final (eschatological) "rightness" in which God's 
purpose w ill at last be fu lfilled ." (W. Herberg, "Eschatology", Encyclopedia 
Eritannioa, 1970, vol.8. pp.694-7).
510. Cf. Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth o f the Eternal Return, tr. 
W. Trask, New York, 1959.
511. SVF, 1,3219-23.
512. On this point M. Eliade remarks that although there is a structural 
sim ilarity between the "eternal return" motif and Hebraic conceptions, there is a 
radically different valuation of the process in as much as the process, in Hebraic
thought, occurs only once and is irreversible. So the notion of "rhythm", which 
implies "repetition", as set forth by Boman, has facets which are subject to 
discussion. For he suggests that in the Hebraic pattern the rhythmic alternations 
proceed ad infinitum. [T. Boman, op. c itf p.134]. However such a discussion is out 
of our scope. [Cf. Mircea Eliade, op.cit. ].
513. H. Chadwick's asserts; "when we are dealing with Justinian as an authority 
for the actual doctrine of Origen himself, difficulties immediately arise. I 
venture to think that the only question is how far he can safely be distrusted." 
[C.7, p.102]. We endorse this affirmation and think that our discussion in this 
work shows that the extent to which Justinian should be distrusted clearer than
H. Chadwick implies, in fact we do not think that Justinian should be regarded as 
a source for Origen's thought at all.
514. commJohn, XXV!. indeed this is a facet of Origen's thought which has 
been widely misunderstood due to his method to regard history as containig 
"figures" of wisdom. It has not been grasped that this mainly pertains to the 
relation of past-future. Certainly the relation between up-down is not neglected; 
according to this view though it  is the wisdom of God which is manifested through 
historical events. In such a view the fu ll reality of historical events is 
reinforced rather than negated. Origen's prime concern is to be found in the 
affirmation "Those form er bear in themselves an image of those la tte r"  (Tuv 
yap SsuiEpuv EiKova (pepei id  npuia) { fr /ia ti, 57.]. What, in the final analysis,
this means is that Origen is preoccupied with the coordination of events in the 
historical plane and he does not seek to establish a relation between the 
historical and the non-historical. We agree with H. de Lubac’s insistence that 
Origen’s exegetical methods were influenced by those of the biblical writers [H. 
de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit' L ‘Intelligence de 1'Ecriture d'apres Origene. Paris, 
1950; pp.69-773 and that his "spiritual" conception of scripture is not a 
"de-historization" of the biblical narratives [ ibid., pp.246ff], A discussion of this 
question, however, is out of our scope. We only note that such a conception is 
actually originated in the conception of history as a procees towards salvation 
-a notion which stems from his te l eel epical view of time.
51 5 . Glatzer ( lea c it) suggests that in the Tennanitic conception the period of 
election precedes the inauguration of history proper, the election is co-incidental 
with the creation. On the other hand, Philo postulates an "intelligible world"; 
although at a point he speaks as i f  i t  was created firs t {de Opificio iiune) 
4.15-5.20), he insists {de Opificio Mundi 7.26-8- sim ilarly de Provident id  1,7) 
that this intelligible world was created simultaneously with the material world.
516. Boman, op. cit, p. 142.
5 1 7 . We wish to endorse the assertions of Walter Eichrodt who doubts that there 
is a peculiar sense of time, such as maintained by T. Boman {op. c it  ), J. Marsh 
{op. c it.)  and C.H. Ratschow (Carl H. Ratschow, "Anmerkungen zur theologischen 
Auffassung des Zeitprohlems", Zeitschrift fu r Theelogie und Kirche, LI (1954), 
pp.36-07) in part. Whether it  is due to the assertion that the ancient Israelites 
were a primitive people and were therefore unable to construct verb-forms as in 
Greek (as asserted by Ernst von Dobschtitz in "Zeit und Raum im Denken des 
Urchristentums", Journal o f B iblical Literature, XII (1922), 212 ff)  or to any 
other reason, i t  is a question which we leave open. Boman is wrong is alleging 
that this assertion of von Dobschutz "is no anwer to the question" (op. c it, 
p. 143). We do not see why a "theory of time" should by all means be attributed to 
a people who did not even have a word for the term "time" [Boman, ibid] and did 
not make the slightest hint about the problematique in time, but just lived in time 
cherishing a hope for the future -a hope stemming from their religious 
convictions.. To take the scriptural passages where this "hope" is expressed, and 
try to produce a "theory of time" out of it, to us seems as rather an 
extrapolation.
518. Boman, op. cit, p. 163.
5 1 9 . A.H. Chroust, "The Metaphysics of Time and History in Early Christian 
Thought", The New Scholasticism, XIX (1945), p.339. In support of his view the
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author cites John, 1,15J Col. 5,1 J Phil. 3,30.
520. In fact, one might ask Leibniz or Boman this question: in the Hebraic 
world-picture, is not the reality Goa-world an "order of co-existence"?
Notes to the Conclusion.
1. V is. 7 ,17-18 . frP /a tt 140; f r iia tt,  505; frLuc, 50.
2. expProv, 22. 3. ibid. 4. ib id.
5. As H. Jonas suggests that it  did to the Gnostics. Cf. Hans Jonas, Gnosis unc 
spatantiker Geist, 1: Die mythologische Gnosis j Gottingen, 1934; p. 100. Cf. also,
H.C. Puech, Gnosis and Time", in Man and Time, Princeton, 1973, pp.67ff.
6. Cf. J.E.Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption in the Theology o f Origen, Drew 
University, 1962; pp.315ff. The tendency of the author is to play down any 
spatial reference of Origen’s -and this, when himself, too, has used Princ, as his 
main source. His assertions is a kind of reaction to those who "accused" Oriqen 
for being preoccupied with “space" and thus "Hellenizing" Christianity. What the 
author has in common with those who he is supposed to oppose, however, is that 
he grounds his assertions on the same criteria of what is “Greek" or what is 
“Hebrew" and "Biblical". He thought that, in order to prove that Origen was not a 
"Greek", it  was enough to assert that Origen does not deal with space but only 
everlasting time, in doing so, he employs the allegations 0. Cullmann about what 
is the "biblical view of time". The author fa ith fu lly follows Culimann’s criteria 
and all he does is to try to assert that Origen comforms with them. Quite 
expectedly he has made a lot of extrapolations, which are also due to the very 
limited number of works of Origen which he studied.
7. Cf. D.F. Lawden, An Introduction io  Tensor Calculus, R elativity and Cosmology, 
3rd edition, New York, 1986.
8. M. Capec, The Concepts o f Space and Time, pp.xxxv and Ivi.
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Notes to Appendix A.
1. Our italics; As v/e discussed in chapter 1, the Plural {heavens) alludes to the 
multitude of ranks of life .
2. Cf. i! Cor. 4,18. 3. Cf. r la tt.5 ,8 .
4 . commJohn, 19, XXII. 5 . Col.1,15.
6. Cf. Eph.3,10. 7. PS. 103,24.
8. It is very signiicant that-Origen puts this term into quotation marks.
9. This suggests "the whole world", because the entire world is "material"; Cf. 
comm John, 19, XX!!.
10. John,8,23.
i  1. commJohn, 19, XX!i; our italics. Here Origen alludes to the analyses made in
the two previous sections of that work, namely that even the supreme ranks of
life  of the world are regarded as down In respect of the divine being which is up 
. [/hid. }. This is one more figure through which he depicts his fundemantsl notion 
of a radical hiatus between the world and the divine being.
\2. comm Join \ 9 , m\ .
13. Cf. xouc nooipavuSFvlac Rqxquq; commJohn, 1, XIX.
14. commJohn, 1, XiX. 15. Cf. frJohn, YAW.
16. expProv, 7. 17. Col .1.15.
18. Eph.3,10. 19. Ps. 103,24.
20. comm John, 20, XV! i i;  s. chapter 5 21. commMatt, 14, 17.
22. seJPs, 130 -also quoting Gal.4,26. 23. Cf. Prov.8,22.
24. comm John, 19, VI.
25. comm John, 20, XVII. s. also comm John, 19, XXII.
In PP. the translator G. Butterworth cites the following passage of Jerome: "In the 
same book he (i.e. Origen) says: Grant that God is invisible. If then he is invisible
by nature, he w ill not be visible even to the Saviour." {op. cit, p.99, n.i). The very
fact that Buterworth pays attention to this nonsense (and, what is worse, that he 
gives it  room in the translation of Princ) is quite indicative of a fact which v/e
have mentioned in this work; that is, the fact that Origen’s work has suffered
distortions without having been studied. Origen quite clearly treats the meaning of 
"seeing" the Father throughout his works, yet it  is beyond our scope to elaborate on 
this here. However, for a reply to this allegation, we quote a passage, deliberately
chosen from a work written exactly at the same period when Princ was written: it 
is from the Second Book of comm John, in paragrah I!, he strongly affirms the 
doctrine that the Son has a hypostasis of his own and adds that the Son, has 
always been "with God" in a "perpetual view of the paternal depth" (in  aSiafleiniu
Secc iou naipiKou pdSoug). comm John, 2, Si.
26. comm John, 19, XXII.
27. H. Crouzel, Origene et la connaissance mystique, Paris, 1956J pp.41-3J also, 
"Origene et la connaissance mystique". Stadia Patristica, V, TU 00 (1962), 
pp.270-6.
28. Origene, Traite des Principes, vol. IV, p.34, n.70. 29. ibid.
30. P. Chantraine: Diciiennaire Etymelogique de la Langue Grecque, Paris, 1968; 
vol.3, p.756.
31. Cf. Heracletus, 12; Zeno (SVF, i, p.32); Plato, Alcihiades I; Aristotle, de 
PartihusAnimalium 648a3; Placita Philosophorum (Ed. H. Diels, Doxographi Graeei 
Berlin, 1879, p.273); etc.
32. Cf.Aristotle, EihicaNieomachea J\ 174b34; Philodemus, de Piafate,81; etc.
33. D ia l (BGF, vol.16, p.374). 34. OXhUapiLVil.
35. CeiS,V 1,8. 35. Princ, iii.1.13.
37. Cels, V, 12 (id  von,id ... 'Kanpocia'); comm John, 1,9 (und vor.iuv
oeSaRuuv); commJohn, 1,XXV (iou voniou xdopou eon <pwg); commJohn, 20 ,X
(vorsiai noRtaO; frhlatt, 212 (vomwc 5s ‘ninisi sni xnc* oipouSiov -commenting
on Matt.10,29); sol Pout, (ihv vomiiv navonPLuv); sol Hum (vanca v 01110:1); This 
point is particularly eloquent, since the very expression in Numbers (namely,
Num.24,6), on which Origen comments, is a simile, s. also, SXuProv, 7 (tfuvia
voniwg eotiy 6 uKaSapioc noxiopdq); expProv, 23 (lau ia 5s napanSepevd aoi
und iou novnpou, vomug voei, kcu enipaRe irjv Sidvnoidv sou, d ecmv n x^P-)-:
BXpProv, 24 (ev pev iw vuv aiwvi ... d vomn nig ooeiac Sewpia').
38. commJohn; i, 9; Cols, VII, 46. It is particularly interesting that Origen 
asserts that the "invisible things" (Rom. 1,20) of God can be named so just because 
they are vorjid, namely because it is in their nature to be perceived through mind.
(s. Cels, Vi i,46).
39. commJohn, 19,V (n vomn sniSnpicO; The same notion is expounded in 
homJer, 9,1; Cf. commJohn, 13,XXIV (icfg vomoig kccl snoupavicic);
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commJohn, 2 0 ,IV (oux. eni oumaia ... aRR' sru uva vcrjid).
4 0 . Cf. commJohn, i3 ,X X !i;  5 ixwc xdp io  '©tug' ovo iidce ia t, aumauKov is  kcu 
nvEupaiiKov, dnsp e<j u  vo rjiov  kgl tug psv oci Rexqiev ggpgtgv, Oc 5' dv 
ERRnvsc ovopaaaiEV goluugtov.
The notion of nveupaiiKog is also re la ted to "im m a te ria l" in so IPs, 25; 
(nvEuiictiiKai 5e ekji, kgi ou npotiKaipoi 5td t o  riuRov kgi aKnpaioy.).
Also, " 'nvEupa1 o Ssog, ou g l ju g  auiov Rs^opsv e lv g l.  npog xdp G viib iauioR fjV
ituv a ia 9 n iu v  sSoc in  xpc!?n id  vo n id  ovopdCeiv nvEupaia xcd nvEupauxd; Cels,
VI, 70.
4 1 . commJohn, 13 ,  XXXH i.
4 2 .  Cf. comm Join 20, IV; Cels, I I I ,  42.
4 3 . exhMar, XLVil; selDeut, (Eon Ss k g i  n aoipia nveupa vospov, dx icv , 
u o v o x e v e q , noRuuepsg, Remov k g i  id  e£nc -commenting on Deut.8,3).
4 4 . Cf. expProv, 3 ; oupavov anepxd^eia i, K.aSapuiaiov k i ig l io : ,  axxeRwv te k g i 
xuv v o e p O v  ouoiwv oiKFiifjpLov. The context at that point is  a discussion about t h e  
w orld  comprising various spaces; th is expression alludes to eternal l i f e  as a 
perspective o f a human being who acts according to the word o f God. Here there is 
no danger o f misunderstanding, because Origen speaks of "place" (o iK H inp iov) o f 
higher beings. And in h is-thought, "place" is  always re la ted to co rporea lity , as we 
have seen.
s. also, se1Deut;t Ro^oc, ou oup8oRov nv id  pa woe ekeivo, Reutov e o ti if*  auiou 
(pduEi, kg l SinKOV 5td n d v iu v  nvcupd iuv vospuv, kgSgduv, R E n io id iuv . Here 
Origen suggests his notion o f the presence o f the Logos in a ll ranks o f l i fe .
4 5 .  selEz, 16; Koouog e o iiv  6 e'k x p u o l o u  k g l  ap#upou, 6 e'k vo nu a iu v  S e iw v k g l  
RdtfhJV LEpUV (JUVKJldfLEVOC IW TIXEPOVIKW.
4 5 . Enneeds, v.5. 4 7 . commJohn, 1, XXV. 4 8 . ibid. 4 9 . ib id
5 0 . commJohn, 1, XXVII. 5 1 . Eph.3,10.
5 2 . Trsite des Principes, vol. !V, p.34, n.70.
5 3 . op. c it , vol. il, p.58, n.58.
5 4 . op. c it , vol. II, p. 155, n.42.
N otes  to  A p p e n d ix  B.
1. Alexandrian Christianity\, (On Prayer, Exhortation to Martyrdom, Dialogue with 
Heraclides}, tr. by H.Chsdwick and d.Oul ton, London, 1956J p.33.
2. op. cit., p.336.
3 . Princ, H I.1.2. 4 . C f.commJohn, 1, XV1L 5. Princ, i l l .  1.2.
5. Princ, III. 1.2. 7. PrincJW M . 8. L. and S., p.498,2.
9. Princ, I! 1.1.2.
10. For a dating of Origen’s works, s. M. Harl, Origene et la fonction revelatrice 
du Faroe income, Paris, 1958; pp.70-1.
11. loc. cit.
12. dcOr, VM; our italics. 13. ibid. 14. homJen. 10,6.
15. Cels, V, 10-11. 16. homJer, 10,6. 17. ibid.
18. ibid. 19. Princ, HI.5.4.; our italics.
20. As C. Bigg notes, this notion is found in Philo and neither Jerome nor 
Augustine venture to deny that the stars may have souls; even Aquinas regards the 
question as open. Cf. The Christian PIatonists o f Alexandria, Oxford, 1913; p.242, 
n.1. What has eluded Bigg, however, is there is an evolution of Origen’s thought, as 
exposed in this Appendix. Once more, Origen had gone far too far -and yet this fact 
(like so many others concerninq his authentic views) has not been recognised.
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